1.  Introduction

2.  Interpretation of Article VIII, paragraph 1, of the Convention

3.  JARPA II in light of Article VIII of the Convention

(1)  Fin and humpback whales

(2)  Antarctic minke whales

182.  The Court turns next to the design of the sample size for Antarctic minke whales in JARPA II. The JARPA II Research Plan indicates that the overall sample size for minke whales was chosen following Japan’s calculation of the minimum sample size for a number of different research items, including age at sexual maturity, apparent pregnancy rate, blubber thickness, contaminant levels, mixing patterns between different stocks, and population trends. The plan further states that for most parameters “the sample sizes calculated were in a range of 800–1,000 animals with more than 800 being desirable”. Japan describes the process that it followed to determine the overall sample size for minke whales with reference to the following illustration that appears as Figure 5-4 in its Counter-Memorial:

• View full-sized figure

— Figure 5-4:  “Necessary annual sample sizes for respective research items under JARPA II, which was calculated by the established statistical procedures (source: Institute of Cetacean Research).”

(Source: Counter-Memorial of Japan, Vol. I, p. 261.)

183.  As depicted in this illustration, the overall sample size falls within a range that corresponds to what the JARPA II Research Plan sets forth as the minimum requirements for most of the research that JARPA II is designed to undertake. Japan asserts that for this reason, the overall annual lethal sample size was set at 850 (plus or minus 10 per cent, which allows for a maximum of 935 minke whales per year). As noted above (see paragraphs 159 and 169 ), Japan considered this number of whales to be sufficient for purposes of research, taking into account the need to avoid causing harm to the stocks.

184.  In contrast, in Australia’s view, Japan started with the goal of establishing a sample size of approximately 850 minke whales per year and then “retro-fitted” the programme’s design by selecting values designed to generate sample sizes for particular research items that corresponded to Japan’s desired overall sample size. Australia emphasizes that the JARPA II Research Plan is not clear in stating the reasons for the selection of the particular sample size appertaining to each research item. Australia also notes that different choices as to values for certain variables would have led to dramatically smaller sample sizes, but that, in general, the JARPA II Research Plan provides no explanation for the underlying decisions to use values that generate larger sample sizes. These shortcomings, in Australia’s view, support its conclusion that the minke whale sample size was set not for purposes of scientific research, but instead to meet Japan’s funding requirements and commercial objectives.

185.  In light of these divergent views, the Court will consider the evidence regarding Japan’s selection of the various minimum sample sizes that it chose for different individual research items, which form the basis for the overall sample size for minke whales. As noted above (see paragraph 172 ), the purpose of such an inquiry is not to second-guess the scientific judgments made by individual scientists or by Japan, but rather to examine whether Japan, in light of JARPA II’s stated research objectives, has demonstrated a reasonable basis for annual sample sizes pertaining to particular research items, leading to the overall sample size of 850 (plus or minus 10 per cent) for minke whales.

186.  In the JARPA II Research Plan, individual sample size calculations are presented with respect to each of the items referred to in the above illustration: age at sexual maturity, apparent pregnancy rate, blubber thickness, pathological monitoring (i.e., monitoring of contaminant levels), mixing patterns between different stocks, and “DNA mark-recapture”, which Japan describes as a method for researching population trends.

187.  The Court notes at the outset that the JARPA II Research Plan states that for all parameters, “a sample size needed to detect changes in a six-year period — has been adopted as the pertinent criterion”. The JARPA II Research Plan does not explain the reason for this threshold decision, but Japan offered some explanations during these proceedings, which are discussed below (see paragraph 192 ).

188.  The evidence shows that the JARPA II Research Plan lacks transparency in the reasons for selecting particular sample sizes for individual research items. This is a matter on which the experts called by the two Parties agreed, as described above (see paragraphs 158–159 ). With the exception of one variable (discussed in the next paragraph ), the JARPA II Research Plan provides very limited information regarding the selection of a particular value for a given variable. For example, in the Court’s view, there is no consistent effort to explain why, for the various research items relating to the monitoring of biological parameters, JARPA II is designed to detect one particular rate or degree of change over another that would result in a lower sample size. These shortcomings of the JARPA II Research Plan have particular prominence in light of the fact that the particular choices of rate and degree of change consistently lead to a sample size of approximately 850 minke whales per year.

189.  An exception to this pattern is arguably the discussion of the sample size applicable to the study of the age at sexual maturity of minke whales, as to which the JARPA II Research Plan furnishes some details about the factors that Japan considered in selecting the particular rate of change to detect. For this research item, the Research Plan also offers an indication of the relationship between the data sought and the first two JARPA II research objectives. The Court finds no comparable reasoning given as to the five other research items that were expressly used to set the overall sample size of 850 whales (i.e., those research items set forth in Figure 5-4 from Japan’s Counter-Memorial above). This highlights the absence of evidence, at least in the JARPA II Research Plan, that could support a finding that the sample size for the lethal take of minke whales, a key component of the design of JARPA II, is reasonable in relation to achieving the programme’s objectives.

190.  The Court also recalls that one of the experts called by Australia, Mr. Mangel, asserted that nearly the same level of accuracy that JARPA II seeks could be obtained with a smaller lethal take of minke whales and further posited that a smaller take and higher margin of error might be acceptable, depending on the hypothesis under study. Japan did not refute this expert opinion.

191.  The Court turns next to the evidence regarding Japan’s decision to use a six-year period to calculate the sample sizes for research items corresponding to minke whales, rather than a 12-year period as was used for fin and humpback whales. That decision has a considerable effect on sample size because the shorter time-period generally requires a higher figure, as the JARPA II Research Plan demonstrates (see paragraph 165 above).

192.  Japan, in discussing one research item (age at sexual maturity) in the Counter-Memorial, attributes the use of a six-year period to the need to obtain at least three data points from each JARPA II research area (since whales are taken from each area in alternating seasons), because it would be “highly uncertain” to detect a trend on the basis of only two data points. Japan also refers to the desirability of detecting change “as promptly as possible”. In the oral proceedings, Japan offered two different rationales for the six-year period. After initially suggesting that the six-year period was intended to coincide with JARPA II’s six-year review by the Scientific Committee, Japan withdrew that explanation and asserted that the six-year period for minke whales was chosen because it “coincides with the review period for the RMP”. This corresponds to the explanation given by the expert called by Japan, Mr. Walløe, in his oral testimony, although Mr. Walløe also described the use of a six-year period to calculate sample sizes as “arbitrary”.

193.  In light of the evidence, the Court has no basis to conclude that a six-year research period for minke whales is not reasonable in relation to achieving the programme’s objectives. However, the Court finds it problematic that, first, the JARPA II Research Plan does not explain the reason for choosing a six-year period for one of the whale species (minke whales) and, secondly, Japan did not offer a consistent explanation during these proceedings for the decision to use that research period to calculate the minke whale sample size.

194.  Moreover, Japan does not address how disparate research time frames for the three whale species are compatible with JARPA II’s research objectives relating to ecosystem modelling and multi-species competition. JARPA II is apparently designed so that statistically useful information regarding fin and humpback whales will only be available after 12 years of research (and the evidence indicates that, even after 12 years, sample sizes would be insufficient to be statistically reliable based on the minimum requirements set forth in the JARPA II Research Plan). As noted above (see paragraph 181 ), this casts doubt on whether it will be meaningful to review the programme in respect of its two primary objectives after six years of operation, which, in turn, casts doubt on whether the minke whale target sample size is reasonable in relation to achieving the programme’s objectives.

195.  The Court thus identifies two overarching concerns with regard to the minke whale sample size. First, Figure 5-4 shows that the final sample size of 850 minke whales (plus or minus 10 per cent) falls within a range derived from the individual sample sizes for various research items, but there is a lack of transparency regarding the decisions made in selecting those individual sample sizes. The Court notes that a lack of transparency in the JARPA II Research Plan and in Japan’s subsequent efforts to defend the JARPA II sample size do not necessarily demonstrate that the decisions made with regard to particular research items lack scientific justification. In the context of Article VIII, however, the evidence regarding the selection of a minimum sample size should allow one to understand why that sample size is reasonable in relation to achieving the programme’s objectives, when compared with other possible sample sizes that would require killing far fewer whales. The absence of such evidence in connection with most of the sample size calculations described in the JARPA II Research Plan lends support to Australia’s contention that a predetermined overall sample size has dictated the choice of the research period and the rate of change to be detected, rather than the other way around.

196.  Secondly, as noted above (see paragraph 149 ), Japan justifies the increase in the minke whale sample size in JARPA II (as compared to the JARPA sample size) by reference to the research objectives relating to ecosystem research and multi-species competition. However, the evidence suggests that the programme’s capacity to achieve these objectives has been compromised because of shortcomings in the programme’s design with respect to fin and humpback whales. As such, it is difficult to see how these objectives can provide a reasonable basis for the target sample size for minke whales in JARPA II.

197.  In addition, the Court recalls that Japan describes a number of characteristics that, in its view, distinguish commercial whaling from research whaling. Japan notes, in particular, that high-value species are taken in commercial whaling, whereas species of both high value and of less or no commercial value (such as sperm whales) may be taken in research whaling (see paragraph 89 above). The use of lethal methods in JARPA II focuses almost exclusively on minke whales. As to the value of that species, the Court takes note of an October 2012 statement by the Director-General of Japan’s Fisheries Agency. Addressing the Subcommittee of the House of Representatives Committee on Audit and Oversight of Administration, he stated that minke whale meat is “prized because it is said to have a very good flavour and aroma when eaten as sashimi and the like”. Referring to JARPA II, he further stated that “the scientific whaling program in the Southern Ocean was necessary to achieve a stable supply of minke whale meat”. In light of these statements, the fact that nearly all lethal sampling under JARPA II concerns minke whales means that the distinction between high-value and low-value species, advanced by Japan as a basis for differentiating commercial whaling and whaling for purposes of scientific research, provides no support for the contention that JARPA II falls into the latter category.

198.  Taken together, the evidence relating to the minke whale sample size, like the evidence for the fin and humpback whale sample sizes, provides scant analysis and justification for the underlying decisions that generate the overall sample size. For the Court, this raises further concerns about whether the design of JARPA II is reasonable in relation to achieving its stated objectives. These concerns must also be considered in light of the implementation of JARPA II, which the Court turns to in the next section.

(iii)  Comparison of sample size to actual take

199.  There is a significant gap between the JARPA II target sample sizes and the actual number of whales that have been killed in the implementation of the programme. The Parties disagree as to the reasons for this gap and the conclusions that the Court should draw from it.

200.  The Court recalls that, for both fin whales and humpback whales, the target sample size is 50 whales, following a two-year feasibility study during which the target for humpback whales was zero and the target for fin whales was ten.

201.  As to actual take, the evidence before the Court indicates that a total of 18 fin whales have been killed over the first seven seasons of JARPA II, including ten fin whales during the programme’s first year when the feasibility of taking larger whales was under study. In subsequent years, zero to three fin whales have been taken annually. No humpback whales have been killed under JARPA II. Japan recounts that after deciding initially not to sample humpback whales during the first two years of JARPA II, it “suspended” the sampling of humpback whales as of 2007. The Court observes, however, that the permits issued for JARPA II since 2007 continue to authorize the take of humpback whales.

202.  Notwithstanding the target sample size for minke whales of 850 (plus or minus 10 per cent), the actual take of minke whales under JARPA II has fluctuated from year to year. During the 2005–2006 season, Japan caught 853 minke whales, a number within the targeted range. Actual take has fallen short of the JARPA II sample size target in all subsequent years. On average, approximately 450 minke whales have been killed in each year. The evidence before the Court indicates that 170 minke whales were killed in the 2010–2011 season and that 103 minke whales were killed in the 2012–2013 season.

203.  As to the reasons for the gap between target sample sizes and actual take, Japan states that it decided not to take any humpback whales in response to a request by the then-Chair of the IWC. With respect to fin whales, Japan points to sabotage activities by anti-whaling non-governmental organizations, noting in particular the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society, and to the inability of the main JARPA II research vessel, the Nisshin Maru, to pull on board larger whales. As to minke whales, Japan offers two reasons that actual sample sizes have been smaller than targets: a fire on board the Nisshin Maru in the 2006–2007 season and the aforementioned sabotage activities.

204.  Japan refers in particular to incidents of sabotage during the 2008–2009 season (the ramming of vessels in February 2009 and the throwing of bottles of acid at Japanese vessels), the unauthorized boarding of the vessel Shonan-Maru in February 2010, which resulted in the withdrawal of that vessel from the fleet for the remainder of the 2009–2010 season for crime scene investigation, and additional harassment during the 2012–2013 season. Japan notes that the IWC has condemned such violent sabotage activities in a series of resolutions adopted by consensus.

205.  Australia takes issue with Japan’s account of the reasons for the gap between target sample sizes and actual take. Australia does not dispute that the decision to take no humpback whales was made in response to a request from the Chair of the IWC, but points out that this was a political decision, not a decision taken for scientific reasons. With respect to fin whales, Australia emphasizes the undisputed fact that Japan’s vessels are not equipped to catch larger whales. As to minke whales, Australia points to evidence that, in its view, demonstrates that actual take is a function of the commercial market for whale meat in Japan, not the factors identified by Japan. According to Australia, Japan has adjusted the operations of JARPA II in response to lower demand for whale meat, resulting in shorter seasons and fewer whales being taken. Australia also invokes press reports of statements by Japanese officials indicating that JARPA II’s research objectives do not actually require the amount of lethal sampling described in the Research Plan and can be accomplished with a smaller actual take.

206.  Taking into account all the evidence, the Court considers that no single reason can explain the gap between the target sample sizes and the actual take. As to humpback whales, the gap results from Japan’s decision to accede to a request from the Chair of the IWC but without making any consequential changes to the objectives or sample sizes of JARPA II. The shortfall in fin whales can be attributed, at least in part, to Japan’s selection of vessels, an aspect of the design of JARPA II criticized by the expert called by Japan (see paragraph 180 above). As to the fire on board a ship in one season, Japan did not provide information regarding the extent of the damage or the amount of time during which the vessel was compromised. The Court considers it plausible that sabotage activities could have contributed to the lower catches of minke whales in certain seasons, but it is difficult to assess the extent of such a contribution. In this regard, the Court notes that the actual take of minke whales in the 2006–2007 and 2007–2008 seasons was 505 and 551, respectively, prior to the regrettable sabotage activities that Japan has brought to the Court’s attention. In this context, the Court recalls IWC Resolution 2011-2, which was adopted by consensus. That resolution notes reports of the dangerous actions by the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society and condemns “any actions that are a risk to human life and property in relation to the activities of vessels at sea”.

207.  The Court turns next to Australia’s contention that the gap between the target sample sizes and the actual take undermines Japan’s position that JARPA II is a programme for purposes of scientific research. Australia states that it welcomes the fact that the actual take under JARPA II has been smaller than the programme’s target sample sizes. Australia asserts, however, that Japan has made no effort to explain how this discrepancy affects the JARPA II research objectives and has not adapted the programme to account for the smaller actual sample size. Japan also has not explained how the political decision not to take humpback whales, as well as the small number of fin whales that have been killed, can be reconciled with the emphasis of the JARPA II Research Plan on the need for the lethal sampling of those two species. Australia asks how a multi-species competition model can be constructed on the basis of data only from minke whales, if, as stated in the JARPA II Research Plan, information based on lethal sampling is required from all three species to construct such a model or to explore the “krill surplus hypothesis”. Australia emphasizes that Japan has asserted that the information it needs can be obtained only by lethal take but that the actual take has been entirely different from the sample sizes on which JARPA II was premised. Citing these factors, Australia describes JARPA II’s multi-species competition model goal as “illusory”.

208.  Japan asserts that the discrepancy between sample size and actual take, at least with regard to minke whales, likely means that “it will take several additional years of research to achieve the required sample sizes before the research objectives can be met”. Along these lines, Japan states that “if we conduct the research over a longer time or are willing to accept a lower degree of accuracy then a smaller sample size will also give viable results, but it might delay the ability to detect potentially important changes in a stock’s dynamics”. Japan also takes the position that the under-take to date of fin and humpback whales “does not preclude existing ecosystem models … from being improved by use of data that JARPA II has collected in respect of these species by non-lethal means”.

209.  The Court observes that, despite the number of years in which the implementation of JARPA II has differed significantly from the design of the programme, Japan has not made any changes to the JARPA II objectives and target sample sizes, which are reproduced in the special permits granted annually. In the Court’s view, two conclusions can be drawn from the evidence regarding the gap between the target sample sizes and actual take. First, Japan suggests that the actual take of minke whales does not compromise the programme, because smaller numbers of minke whales can nonetheless generate useful information, either because the time frame of the research can be extended or because less accurate results could be accepted. The Court recalls, however, that the minke whale sample sizes for particular research items were based on a six-year research period and on levels of accuracy that were not explained in the JARPA II Research Plan or in these proceedings. Japan’s statement that the programme can achieve scientifically useful results with a longer research period or a lower level of accuracy thus raises further doubts about whether the target sample size of 850 whales is reasonable in relation to achieving the stated objectives of JARPA II. This adds force to Australia’s contention that the target sample size for minke whales was set for non-scientific reasons.

210.  Secondly, despite the fact that no humpback whales and few fin whales have been caught during JARPA II, Japan’s emphasis on multi-species competition and ecosystem research as the bases for the JARPA II sample sizes for all three species is unwavering. In the view of the Court, the gap between the target sample sizes for fin and humpback whales in the JARPA II Research Plan and the actual take of these two species undermines Japan’s argument that the objectives relating to ecosystem research and multi-species competition justify the larger target sample size for minke whales, as compared to that in JARPA.

211.  The Court also notes Japan’s contention that it can rely on non-lethal methods to study humpback and fin whales to construct an ecosystem model. If this JARPA II research objective can be achieved through non-lethal methods, it suggests that there is no strict scientific necessity to use lethal methods in respect of this objective.

212.  Japan’s continued reliance on the first two JARPA II objectives to justify the target sample sizes, despite the discrepancy between the actual take and those targets, coupled with its statement that JARPA II can obtain meaningful scientific results based on the far more limited actual take, cast further doubt on the characterization of JARPA II as a programme for purposes of scientific research. This evidence suggests that the target sample sizes are larger than are reasonable in relation to achieving JARPA II’s stated objectives. The fact that the actual take of fin and humpback whales is largely, if not entirely, a function of political and logistical considerations, further weakens the purported relationship between JARPA II’s research objectives and the specific sample size targets for each species — in particular, the decision to engage in the lethal sampling of minke whales on a relatively large scale.

(c)  Additional aspects of the design and implementation of JARPA II

213.  The Court now turns to several additional aspects of JARPA II to which the Parties called attention.

(i)  Open-ended time frame

214.  Japan asserts that “JARPA II is a long-term research programme and has no specified termination date because its primary objective (i.e., monitoring the Antarctic ecosystem) requires a continuing programme of research”. The programme is organized into six-year “research phases” and “a review will be held and revisions made to the programme if required” after each such period. The first review by the Scientific Committee is scheduled to take place in 2014 (see paragraph 119 above). According to Japan, Article VIII, paragraph 4, of the Convention contemplates such open-ended research when it states that “continuous collection and analysis of biological data … are indispensable to sound and constructive management of the whale fisheries”.

215.  Australia draws two conclusions from the absence of any specified termination date in JARPA II. First, Australia contends that this demonstrates that the design of JARPA II is geared towards the perpetuation of whaling by any means until the commercial whaling moratorium is lifted. Secondly, Australia maintains that the open-ended nature of JARPA II precludes a meaningful assessment of whether it has achieved its research objectives, distorts the process of sample size selection, and therefore renders the design of JARPA II unscientific.

216.  The Court notes the open-ended time frame of JARPA II and observes that with regard to a programme for purposes of scientific research, as Annex P indicates, a “time frame with intermediary targets” would have been more appropriate.

(ii)  Scientific output of JARPA II to date

217.  Japan maintains that, prior to the periodic review of JARPA II, no meaningful evaluation of JARPA II’s scientific output can be made. Japan does assert, however, that the Scientific Committee has recognized the value of data derived from JARPA II, including genetic data and age data derived from lethal whaling. In addition, the expert called by Japan, Mr. Walløe, testified that in his view JARPA II has already provided valuable information relating to the RMP and the Antarctic ecosystem.

218.  Australia acknowledges that JARPA II has produced some results in the form of data that has been considered by the Scientific Committee. The Parties disagree about this output, however, in the sense that Australia argues that the data obtained from lethal sampling and provided to the Scientific Committee has not proven useful or contributed “significant knowledge” relating to the conservation and management of whales.

219.  The Court notes that the Research Plan uses a six-year period to obtain statistically useful information for minke whales and a 12-year period for the other two species, and that it can be expected that the main scientific output of JARPA II would follow these periods. It nevertheless observes that the first research phase of JARPA II (2005–2006 to 2010–2011) has already been completed (see paragraph 119 above), but that Japan points to only two peer-reviewed papers that have resulted from JARPA II to date. These papers do not relate to the JARPA II objectives and rely on data collected from respectively seven and two minke whales caught during the JARPA II feasibility study. While Japan also refers to three presentations made at scientific symposia and to eight papers it has submitted to the Scientific Committee, six of the latter are JARPA II cruise reports, one of the two remaining papers is an evaluation of the JARPA II feasibility study and the other relates to the programme’s non-lethal photo identification of blue whales. In light of the fact that JARPA II has been going on since 2005 and has involved the killing of about 3,600 minke whales, the scientific output to date appears limited.

(iii)  Co-operation with other research institutions

220.  Australia points to limited co-operation between JARPA II researchers and other scientists as evidence for its contention that JARPA II is not a programme for purposes of scientific research. One of the experts called by Australia, Mr. Gales, stated that JARPA II “operates in complete isolation” from other Japanese and international research projects concerning the Antarctic ecosystem.

221.  In response to a question put by a Member of the Court, Japan cited co-operation with other Japanese research institutions. The expert called by Japan, Mr. Walløe, suggested that co-operation with international research programmes “would be difficult for personal and political reasons”, given that the use of lethal methods is contentious among scientists. He acknowledged that co-operation with other Japanese research institutions, such as the National Institute for Polar Research, could be improved.

222.  The Court notes that the evidence invoked by Japan to demonstrate co-operation with Japanese research institutions relates to JARPA, not JARPA II. It observes that some further evidence of co-operation between JARPA II and other domestic and international research institutions could have been expected in light of the programme’s focus on the Antarctic ecosystem and environmental changes in the region.

(d)  Conclusion regarding the application of Article VIII, paragraph 1, to JARPA II

223.  In light of the standard of review set forth above (see paragraph 67 ), and having considered the evidence with regard to the design and implementation of JARPA II and the arguments of the Parties, it is now for the Court to conclude whether the killing, taking and treating of whales under the special permits granted in connection with JARPA II is “for purposes of scientific research” under Article VIII of the Convention.

224.  The Court finds that the use of lethal sampling per se is not unreasonable in relation to the research objectives of JARPA II. However, as compared to JARPA, the scale of lethal sampling in JARPA II is far more extensive with regard to Antarctic minke whales, and the programme includes the lethal sampling of two additional whale species. Japan states that this expansion is required by the new research objectives of JARPA II, in particular, the objectives relating to ecosystem research and the construction of a model of multi-species competition. In the view of the Court, however, the target sample sizes in JARPA II are not reasonable in relation to achieving the programme’s objectives.

225.  First, the broad objectives of JARPA and JARPA II overlap considerably. To the extent that the objectives are different, the evidence does not reveal how those differences lead to the considerable increase in the scale of lethal sampling in the JARPA II Research Plan. Secondly, the sample sizes for fin and humpback whales are too small to provide the information that is necessary to pursue the JARPA II research objectives based on Japan’s own calculations, and the programme’s design appears to prevent random sampling of fin whales. Thirdly, the process used to determine the sample size for minke whales lacks transparency, as the experts called by each of the Parties agreed. In particular, the Court notes the absence of complete explanations in the JARPA II Research Plan for the underlying decisions that led to setting the sample size at 850 minke whales (plus or minus 10 per cent) each year. Fourthly, some evidence suggests that the programme could have been adjusted to achieve a far smaller sample size, and Japan does not explain why this was not done. The evidence before the Court further suggests that little attention was given to the possibility of using non-lethal research methods more extensively to achieve the JARPA II objectives and that funding considerations, rather than strictly scientific criteria, played a role in the programme’s design.

226.  These problems with the design of JARPA II must also be considered in light of its implementation. First, no humpback whales have been taken, and Japan cites non-scientific reasons for this. Secondly, the take of fin whales is only a small fraction of the number that the JARPA II Research Plan prescribes. Thirdly, the actual take of minke whales has also been far lower than the annual target sample size in all but one season. Despite these gaps between the Research Plan and the programme’s implementation, Japan has maintained its reliance on the JARPA II research objectives — most notably, ecosystem research and the goal of constructing a model of multi-species competition — to justify both the use and extent of lethal sampling prescribed by the JARPA II Research Plan for all three species. Neither JARPA II’s objectives nor its methods have been revised or adapted to take account of the actual number of whales taken. Nor has Japan explained how those research objectives remain viable given the decision to use six-year and 12-year research periods for different species, coupled with the apparent decision to abandon the lethal sampling of humpback whales entirely and to take very few fin whales. Other aspects of JARPA II also cast doubt on its characterization as a programme for purposes of scientific research, such as its open-ended time frame, its limited scientific output to date, and the absence of significant co-operation between JARPA II and other related research projects.

227.  Taken as a whole, the Court considers that JARPA II involves activities that can broadly be characterized as scientific research (see paragraph 127 above), but that the evidence does not establish that the programme’s design and implementation are reasonable in relation to achieving its stated objectives. The Court concludes that the special permits granted by Japan for the killing, taking and treating of whales in connection with JARPA II are not “for purposes of scientific research” pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 1, of the Convention.

4.  Conclusions regarding alleged violations of the Schedule

5.  Alleged non-compliance by Japan with its obligations under paragraph 30 of the Schedule

1.  To my greatest regret, I cannot associate myself with the present Judgment in terms of the conclusions stated in paragraphs 2, 3, 5 and 7 of its operative part, as well as the reasoning stated in the reasoning part. My disagreement lies with the understanding of the Judgment on the basic character of the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (hereinafter “the Convention”), with the methodology the Judgment employs for interpreting and applying the provisions of the Convention, and thus with a number of conclusions that it reaches.

2.  In this opinion, I shall try to deal with some of the salient aspects of these points of disagreement. In view of the fundamental disagreement on some basic points, I shall be setting out my understanding on these points to clarify the differences that I have with the Judgment, rather than focusing on each and every concrete point on which I disagree.

3.  With regard to jurisdiction, while I maintain certain reservations on some aspects of the reasoning of the Judgment, I am not going to discuss this issue in this opinion, inasmuch as I have concurred with the conclusion of the Judgment that the Court has jurisdiction in this case. I wish, however, to place on record my reservation that under the somewhat unfortunate procedural circumstances, the Parties were not provided in the proceedings with ample opportunities to develop their respective arguments on the issue of jurisdiction, with the result that I could not but come to the conclusion that the Respondent has not succeeded in establishing that the Court lacks the jurisdiction to hear the present case under the Optional Clause declarations of the two Parties.

4.  It is my view that this case has come to present controversies on which the opinions of Judges have come to be divided, mainly due to the difference between the Parties on the perceived evolution in the situation surrounding whales and whaling that has come to emerge during the period between the time when the Convention was concluded and the present. A discrepancy in perception has come to develop between two opposing views. It is argued on the one hand that there has been an evolution in the economic-social vista of the world surrounding whales and whaling over the years since 1946, and that this is to be reflected in the interpretation and the application of the Convention. It is argued, on the other hand, that the juridico-institutional basis of the Convention has not changed since it was drafted, based as it was on the well-established principles of international law relating to the conservation and management of fishing resources, including whales, and that this basic character of the Convention should essentially be maintained. This to my mind is the fundamental divide that separates the legal positions of the Applicant, Australia, and New Zealand as an intervener under Article 63 of the Statute, and that of the Respondent, Japan.

5.  In order to have a proper understanding of the dispute, therefore, one has to look to the essential characteristics of the legal régime created under the Convention, in light of its object and purpose.

6.  The history of modern whaling dates back to the nineteenth century, when many nations of the world, including in particular the United States and Great Britain, were actively participating in catching and killing whales in the oceans, primarily for their oil which was indispensable in those days for civilized urban people who depended upon oil extracted from whales for their lighting. In the days when natural resources of the sea, especially fishing resources, were thought to be inexhaustible, rampant taking and slaughtering of whales went unchecked all over the world, motivated primarily by the desire for economic gains. Concern about overfishing led whaling nations of the world to conclude the International Agreement for the Regulation of Whaling of 1937, in order to regulate whaling and avoid the depletion of whale stocks. This agreement, however, turned out to be less than effective, lacking a strong regulatory régime on whaling, except for a system basically of monitoring whale catches. It was against such a state of affairs that the Convention of 1946 came to be concluded in order to improve this devastating situation which came to threaten the sustainability of whale stocks and thus the viability of the whaling industry. The basic objective to be attained in concluding this Convention was “to develop a sound conservation program which [will] maintain an adequate and healthy breeding stock” ( Chairman Mr. Kellogg, International Whaling Conference, Minutes of the Second Session, 1946, p. 13, para. 137), by calling for a halt to further overfishing of certain whale stocks that were being depleted.

8.  In explaining the purpose and objectives of the Convention, the Chairman of the Conference, Mr. Kellogg, stated as follows:

“The Preamble, as is customary, explains the purpose and the objectives of the Convention … The Preamble also points out specifically and primarily that the purpose of this Convention is to develop a sound conservation program which will maintain an adequate and healthy breeding stock. By restoring depleted stocks, as, for instance, the blue whale and the humpbacked whale, and by wise management of the existing stocks a maximum sustained yield of this natural resource can be assured. That, in a few words, is the general intent of the Preamble.” (Minutes of the Second Session, IWC, 1946, p. 13, para. 137.)

9.  It is clear from this that the object and purpose of the Convention is to pursue the goal of achieving the twin purposes of the sustainability of the maximum sustainable yield (“MSY”) of the stocks in question and the viability of the whaling industry. Nowhere in this Convention is to be found the idea of a total permanent ban on the catch of whales. That this was not the intention of the 1982 proposal for a moratorium can be confirmed by the Verbatim Record of the International Whaling Commission which voted for the Moratorium (IWC 34th Annual Meeting, 19–24 July 1982, pp. 72–86). In introducing this proposal, the Chairman of the Technical Committee stated:

“[The sponsor of the proposal] regards the whales as a trust for the future and has looked for rational management, but this has been difficult to attain. There is scientific uncertainty and lack of data, some of which are not fully available. Recognising the disruption to the whaling industry and the communities involved it proposed a phasing out over a fixed period of time during which there would be a diminution of whaling and catches based on scientific advice. This took the form of a new clause to paragraph 10 of the Schedule which has the effect of introducing a three-year period for the industry to accommodate, noting that block quotas will end in 1985.” (IWC 34th Annual Meeting, Verbatim Record, 19–24 July 1982, p. 72.)

10.  The concept of “conservation of fisheries resources” contains the element of “maximum/optimum sustainable yield” as its integral part as employed in the Convention. This is in line with the accepted approach to high-sea fisheries in general, which is well-established in the contemporary international law on fisheries. For example, the 1958 Geneva Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas defines the term “conservation of the living resources of the high seas” as “the aggregate of the measures rendering possible the optimum sustainable yield from those resources so as to secure a maximum supply of food and other marine products” (Art. 2; emphasis added).

11.  It is therefore of cardinal importance that the Court understands this object and purpose of the Convention in its proper perspective, which defines the essential characteristics of the régime established under the Convention. In this sense, the proper grasp of the essential characteristics of the régime created by the Convention should be the starting-point that constitutes the key to the proper understanding of the precise nature and structure of the regulatory régime contained in the concrete provisions of the Convention, and the legal scope of the rights and obligations prescribed for a contracting State engaging in scientific activities under Article VIII as its central element.

12.  In other words, the present Judgment has failed in my view to engage in analysing the essential characteristics of the régime of the Convention. The Judgment in its subsection on “General Overview of the Convention” ( paragraphs 42–50 ), does no more than reproduce what is contained in the provisions of the Convention, without trying to analyse the raison d’être of the Convention as reflected in its Preamble, except for the laconic statement that “[t]he functions conferred on the Commission have made the Convention an evolving instrument” (Judgment, paragraph 45 ; emphasis added). It does not specify what this implies. Any international agreement can be evolving inasmuch as it is susceptible to modification by the agreement of the parties. The fact that the Commission is given the power to adopt amendments to the Schedule as an integral part of the Convention, which can become binding upon those States parties which do not raise an objection, and that the Commission has amended the Schedule many times in this sense would not support the thesis that the Convention is an “evolving instrument” as such. The Convention is not malleable as such in the legal sense, according to the changes in the surrounding socio-economic environments.

13.  For the purpose of understanding the essential characteristics of the régime established under the Convention, the structure of the Convention has to be analysed in somewhat greater detail. It can be summarized roughly as follows:

1. (1)  the Contracting Governments have created an International Whaling Commission (hereinafter “IWC”) as its executive organ (Art. III). The IWC can take a decision by a three-fourths majority, if action is required in pursuance of Article V;

2. (2)  under Article V, the IWC may amend the provisions of the Schedule, which forms an integral part of the Convention (Art. I), by adopting regulations with respect to the conservation and utilization of whale resources (Art. V, para. 1), with the conditions that these amendments of the Schedule, inter alia, (a) shall be such as are necessary to carry out the objectives and purposes of the Convention and to provide for the conservation, development, and optimum utilization of the whale resources; (b) shall be based on scientific findings; and (c) shall take into consideration the interests of the consumers of whale products and the whaling industry (Art. V, para. 2). Each of such amendments shall become effective with respect to those Contracting Governments which have not presented objection, but shall not be effective with respect to a Government which has so objected until such date as the objection is withdrawn (Art. V, para. 3);

3. (3)  the IWC may also make recommendations to any or all Contracting Governments on any matters which relate to whales or whaling and to the objectives and purposes of the Convention (Art. VI);

4. (4)  notwithstanding anything contained in the Convention, a Contracting Government may grant to any of its nationals a special permit authorizing that national to kill, take and treat whales for purposes of scientific research, subject to such restrictions as to number, and subject to such other conditions as the Contracting Government thinks fit, and the killing, taking and treating of whales in accordance with the provisions of Article VIII shall be exempt from the operation of the Convention (Art. VIII, para. 1).

14.  It seems fair to conclude from what has been summarized above that the Convention has created a kind of self-contained regulatory régime on whales and whaling — somewhat comparable to the self-contained system of an intergovernmental international organization with its own administrative autonomy — equipped with its regulatory régime for matters within the purview of its jurisdiction. It goes without saying that such a system providing for the autonomy of the Parties, while created inter se, is not free from the process of judicial review by the Court in accordance with the power given to it for interpreting and applying its constitutional document, namely, the Convention.

15.  Within this self-contained regulatory régime, no power of decision-making by a majority is given to the IWC automatically to bind the Contracting Parties, except through a mechanism of consent to be given by each of the Parties as specified in Article V, paragraph 3. In this regulatory régime created by the Parties, no amendments to the Schedule will become effective in relation to the Contracting Party who objects to the amendments in question. Nor can any recommendation adopted by the IWC acquire a binding character in relation to a Contracting Party.

16.  Following the 1982 meeting of the IWC, when an amendment proposed by the Seychelles and supported by Australia and several other Member States was adopted, amending paragraph 10 of the Schedule to ban commercial whaling of all species beginning in the 1985–1986 season, Japan did eventually exercise this right to raise objection under Article V, which it later withdrew under pressure from the United States. The argument advanced with regard to this situation by the Applicant, and developed further by the Intervener, that the Convention has gone through an evolution during these 60 years in accordance with the change in the environment surrounding whales and whaling, and especially in the growth in the community interest of the world that whales be preserved as precious animals, would seem to be an argument that would be tantamount to an attempt to change the rules of the game as provided for in the Convention and accepted by the Contracting Parties in 1946. (The argument could be qualitatively different, if it were advanced on the ground, based on scientific evidence, that whales were being overfished to severe depletion or even extinction and that therefore precautionary measures would have to be taken to prevent this happening — an argument which would legitimately fall within the ambit of the Convention. It is my understanding, however, that such an argument has not been seriously advanced by the Applicant with supporting credible scientific evidence in the present case.)

17.  The Respondent claims that, faced with this new situation of the adoption of a moratorium on whaling for commercial purposes, it became necessary for the Respondent to advance a programme of activities for purposes of scientific research so that scientific evidence could be collected for the consideration of the IWC (or its Scientific Committee), with a view to enabling the IWC to lift or review the moratorium, which professedly was a measure adopted to be of not unlimited duration and subject to future review. The moratorium explicitly provided that the provision setting catch limits at zero “will be kept under review, based upon the best scientific advice, and by 1990 at the latest the Commission will undertake a comprehensive assessment of the effects of this decision on whale stocks and consider modification of this provision and the establishment of other catch limits” (Schedule, para. 10 (e)). It would seem difficult to see anything wrong in the Respondent’s course of action.

18.  Setting aside passing judgment on this argument of the Respondent, it is to be noted that the Convention prescribes that

1. (1)  “[the] amendments of the Schedule … shall be such as are necessary to carry out the objectives and purposes of [the] Convention and to provide for the conservation, development, and optimum utilization of the whale resources; [and] shall be based on scientific findings” (Art. V, para. 2), and

2. (2)  “any Contracting Government may grant to any of its nationals a special permit authorizing that national to kill, take and treat whales for purposes of scientific research” (Art. VIII, para. 1).

In this sense what the Respondent embarked upon under JARPA and JARPA II is prima facie to be regarded as being in conformity with the Convention and the revised Schedule, including its subparagraph 10 (e).

Thus the whole question of the legality of the whaling activities of Japan under JARPA, and JARPA II as its continuation, has come to hinge upon the question of whether these activities of the Respondent could fall under the activities “for purposes of scientific research” within the meaning of Article VIII of the Convention.

19.  The essential character of the Convention as examined above lies in the fact that the Contracting Parties have created a self-contained regulatory régime for the regulation of whales and whaling. The prescription contained in Article VIII of the Convention in my view is one important component of this regulatory régime. It would be wrong in this sense to characterize the power recognized to a Contracting Party to grant to its nationals special permits “to kill, take and treat whales for purposes of scientific research” (Convention, Art. VIII, para. 1) as nothing else than an exception to the regulatory régime established by the Convention — namely as an exception recognized in deference to the traditional notion of sovereign right to engage in hunting whales under the freedom of high-sea fisheries. The Contracting Party which is granted this prerogative under Article VIII is in effect carrying out an important function within this regulatory régime by collecting scientific materials and data required for the promotion of the objectives and purposes of the Convention, such as the New Management Procedure (“NMP”) or the Revised Management Procedure (“RMP”) discussed in the IWC for the proper management of the whaling stocks. It is for this reason that the Contracting Party in question, endowed under the Convention with the discretion to determine what types of scientific research it intends to conduct and how the research should be implemented, will be subjected to the subsequent process of review and critical comment by its executive organ, the IWC, and more specifically, its scientific subdivision, the Scientific Committee. These are the organs entrusted in this regulatory régime with the task of conducting the process of review and critical comment on these activities, from the viewpoint of achieving the object and purpose of the Convention on the basis of scientific assessment. It is to be noted that there is no provision, either in this Article or in any other part of the Convention, that empowers the IWC or the Scientific Committee legally to restrict the exercise of this prerogative of a Contracting Party to grant special permits in any specific way, except that the granting of special permits has to be “for purposes of scientific research subject to such restrictions as to number and subject to such other conditions as the Contracting Government thinks fit” (Convention, Art. VIII, para. 1). In other words, under this regulatory régime of the Convention the power to determine such questions as what should be the components of the scientific research, or how the scientific research should be designed and implemented in a given situation, is primarily left to the discretionary decision of the granting Government. The Contracting Government is obligated to exercise this discretionary power only for purposes of scientific research in good faith and to be eventually accountable for its activities of scientific research before the executive organs of the Convention, the IWC and the Scientific Committee. These organs have the responsibility to ensure that this will be the case by reviewing and raising critical comments from a scientific point of view.

20.  As I stated earlier, this does not mean that the Court, as the judicial institution entrusted with the task of interpreting and applying the provisions of the Convention, has no role to play in this whole process, while paying full respect to the internal autonomy of the Convention. The function of the Court as a court of law gives it the power to interpret and apply the provisions of the Convention from a legal point of view. Given the nature and the specific characteristics of the regulatory framework created by the Convention, however, this power of the Court has to be exercised with a certain degree of restraint, to the extent that what is involved is (a) related to the application of the regulatory framework of the Convention, and (b) concerned with the techno-scientific task of assessing the merits of scientific research assigned by the Convention to the Scientific Committee.

21.  On the first aspect of the problem relating to the application of the regulatory framework of the Convention ((a) above, para. 20 of this opinion), good faith on the part of the Contracting State, acting as an agent within the framework of this regulatory régime, has necessarily to be presumed. The function of the Court in this respect is to see to it that the State in question is pursuing its activities in good faith and in accordance with the requirements of the regulatory régime for the purposes of scientific research that is conducive to scientific outcomes which would help promote the object and purpose of the Convention. The concrete modalities of the activities for scientific research to be conducted by the State, including the programme’s design and implementation, however, should by its nature not be the proper subject of review by the Court. Article VIII expressly grants to the Contracting Government the primary power to decide on this, by providing that “[n]otwithstanding anything contained in this Convention any Contracting Government may grant … a special permit … subject to such restrictions as to number and subject to such other conditions as the Contracting Government thinks fit” (Convention, Art. VIII, para. 1). It clearly grants the State in question the power prima facie to determine concrete modalities of research activities to be undertaken under Article VIII, although under this regulatory régime, these modalities, to be determined by the State in question, would be subjected to assessment by the IWC and the Scientific Committee through the review process.

22.  Allegations made by the Applicant that the activities were designed and implemented for purposes other than scientific research under the cover of scientific research thus cannot be presumed, and will have to be established by hard conclusive evidence that could point to the existence of bad faith attributable to the State in question. Such serious charges of bad faith, either explicit or implicit, against a sovereign State can never be presumed and should not be accepted by this Court unless the Applicant can establish them by conclusive and indisputable evidence. This is an established principle of international law (see, e.g., Lac Lanoux Arbitration (France v. Spain), RIAA, Vol. 12, p. 281). Ulterior motives harboured by some individuals involved in the action, whatever their position may be, if any, should not be treated as relevant in principle, unless it is established by convincing evidence that such motives played the decisive role in formulating and embarking on the programme, constituting the real legal source (fons et origo) of the activities undertaken.

23.  On the second aspect of the problem relating to the determination of what constitutes activities “for purposes of scientific research” ((b) above, para. 20 of this opinion), I do not agree with the approach pursued by the Judgment to distinguish between “scientific research” as such and “[activities] for purposes of scientific research” (Judgment, paragraphs 70–71 ). It is true that the Judgment, after spending so many paragraphs ( paragraphs 73–86 ) attempting to define what constitutes “scientific research”, seems to have abandoned this effort in the end, rejecting the criteria advanced by the Applicant on the basis of its expert’s testimony. The Judgment nevertheless seems to dwell upon this distinction between “scientific research” and activities “for purposes of scientific research” with a view to establishing that an activity that may contain elements of “scientific research” cannot always be accepted as an activity “for purposes of scientific research”. To me such a distinction is so artificial that it loses any sense of reality when applied to a concrete situation. The Court should focus purely and simply on the issue of the scope of what constitutes activities “for purposes of scientific research” according to the plain and ordinary meaning of the phrase.

24.  On the question of what constitutes activities “for purposes of scientific research”, it must first of all be said in all frankness that this Court, as a court of law, is not professionally qualified to give a scientifically meaningful answer, and should not try to pretend that it can, even though there may be certain elements in the concept that the Court may legitimately and usefully offer as salient from the viewpoint of legal analysis.

25.  What is “scientific research” is a question on which qualified scientists often have a divergence of opinion and are not able to come to a consensus view. The four criteria advanced by one of the experts who testified before the Court and relied upon by the Applicant have not been accepted by the present Judgment as a useful framework to determine whether the activities of the Respondent in JARPA/JARPA II are for purposes of scientific research. Nonetheless the Judgment, in applying the test of objective reasonableness as its standard of review, does get into the “scientific assessment” of the Court itself on various substantive aspects of JARPA/JARPA II activities, in order to come to its final conclusion that these activities under the programme of JARPA II, especially focusing on the issue of the lethal taking of whales, cannot qualify as activities conducted “for purposes of scientific research”, because they cannot be regarded as objectively reasonable according to the scientific assessment of the Court on its own. As the Judgment itself makes clear, the Judgment engages in a substantive assessment of its own on these activities in the name of objectively examining their “reasonableness”. The question which immediately arises, however, is “in what context is this reasonableness to be judged?” Is it the legal context or is it the scientific context that the Court claims to be engaged in? If we are speaking of the legal context, the answer is clear. We have the answer in the Convention itself. The Convention leaves this point, at any rate at the level of the law, primarily to the good faith appreciation of the party which undertakes the research in question. If we are speaking of the scientific context, it would be impossible for the Court to establish that certain activities are objectively reasonable or not, from a scientific point of view, without getting into a techno-scientific examination and assessment of the design and implementation of JARPA/JARPA II, a task which this Court could not and should not attempt to do. This is the second reason why the Court should not engage in this exercise. I shall elaborate this point in the following section in connection with the issue of the scope and the standard of review.

26.  According to the structure of the Convention as interpreted in light of its object and purpose, the Contracting Parties expressly recognize the need and the importance of scientific research for the purpose of supporting the “system of international regulation for the whale fisheries to ensure proper and effective conservation and development of whale stocks” (Preamble, para. 7) as established by the Convention, which “provide[s] for the proper conservation of whale stocks and thus make[s] possible the orderly development of the whaling industry” (Preamble, para. 8). It is for this reason that the Conference which was convened for the conclusion of the Convention in 1946 stressed the critical importance of scientific research by scientific organizations engaged in research on whales. In this regard, the statement of its Chairman, which makes the following points, is highly relevant:

“it is not our [i.e., the Contracting Parties’] intention or our belief that this commission [IWC] would usurp any of the previous prerogatives … of these various scientific organizations that have been engaged in research on whales … [W]e are in the main dependent on the factual information and on the work of their staff … [T]he Conference should bear in mind the great debt we owe to these research organizations …” (Minutes of the Third Session, IWC/20, p. 11, para. 117.)

While Article VIII, paragraph 1, was taken from the language of Article X of the International Agreement for the Regulation of Whaling of 1937, the Chairman pointed out that “the two sentences reading, ‘each contracting Government shall report to the Commission all such authorizations which it has been (sic) granted’ are new” and that “[t]he remainder of Article VIII stresses the importance of scientific research and encourages dissemination of the resultant information” (Minutes of Seventh Session, IWC/32 p. 23, paras. 322–323).

27.  It becomes evident from what is quoted above that the intention of the Contracting Parties, in agreeing on the language of Article VIII of the Convention, was to provide for the right of a Contracting Government to grant to its nationals special permits to take whales for purposes of scientific research. This is a prerogative given to the Contracting Government by Article VIII of the Convention, and the Contracting Government may take this action without prior consultations with, or approval of, the IWC or its Scientific Committee. This is amply illustrated by the comments of one of the delegates during the drafting process, who suggested a contrary proposal “to require a contracting government to [issue permits for scientific research] after consultation with the commission, and not independently of it” (Minutes of Third Session, IWC/20, p. 11, para. 115; emphasis added). This proposal was not adopted.

28.  This of course is not to say that a Contracting Government has unlimited discretion in granting a special permit as an exercise of its sovereign freedom of action. The prerogative recognized under Article VIII is prescribed as part of the Convention, and more specifically as part of the regulatory régime established by the Convention. While in my view the assessment of scientific merits of research activities such as the JARPA/JARPA II programme, including the scientific assessment of their design and implementation, for achieving the purposes of the Convention is a matter assigned specifically to the organs of the Convention, especially the IWC and its Scientific Committee, there are certain aspects of this process of assessment which are to be subjected to the legal scrutiny of the Court in its exercise of its power of review for the interpretation and application of the Convention.

Within this delimited context, it is the role of the Court to examine from a legal point of view whether the procedures expressly prescribed by the regulatory régime of the Convention (i.e., the procedural requirements for the Contracting Party under Article VIII) are scrupulously observed. Without getting into the task of techno-scientific analysis of what should constitute in substance scientific research and without making the concrete assessment of each aspect of the activities involved — a task assigned to the Scientific Committee — the Court can also review whether the activities in question can be regarded as meeting the generally accepted notion of “scientific research” (the substantive requirement for the Contracting Party under Article VIII). This process involves the determination of the standard of review to be applied by the Court.

29.  In determining the standard of review, the Judgment sums up the positions of the Parties in the following manner.

First, for the position of the Applicant, the Court states the following:

“According to Australia, the Court’s power of review should not be limited to scrutiny for good faith, with a strong presumption in favour of the authorizing State, as this would render the multilateral régime for the collective management of a common resource established by the ICRW ineffective. Australia urges the Court to have regard to objective elements in evaluating whether a special permit has been granted for purposes of scientific research, referring in particular to the ‘design and implementation of the whaling programme, as well as any results obtained’.” (Judgment, paragraph 63 .)

30.  Second, the Judgment juxtaposes this position of the Applicant with the following quotation from the statement of the Respondent in the oral proceedings as representing the position of the Respondent:

“Japan agrees with Australia and New Zealand in regarding the test as being whether a State’s decision is objectively reasonable, or ‘supported by coherent reasoning and respectable scientific evidence and …, in this sense, objectively justifiable’” (Judgment, paragraph 66 ).

31.  Based on these two statements of the Parties, the Judgment concludes as its own position on the issue of the standard of review, as follows:

“When reviewing the grant of a special permit authorizing the killing, taking and treating of whales, the Court will assess, first, whether the programme under which these activities occur involves scientific research. Secondly, the Court will consider if the killing, taking and treating of whales is ‘for purposes of’ scientific research by examining whether, in the use of lethal methods, the programme’s design and implementation are reasonable in relation to achieving its stated objectives. This standard of review is an objective one.” (Judgment, paragraph 67 .)

32.  With regard to this conclusion of the Judgment on the question of the standard of review, it has to be pointed out that there is a jump in logic in the reasoning between what is summarized as the respective positions of the Parties in paragraphs 63 and 66 , and what is stated in this last quoted paragraph 67 as the conclusion of the Court which the Judgment claims to have been drawn from the respective positions of the Parties. In other words, the Judgment, ignoring the differences between the Parties on the question of the scope and the standard of review and without further explanation, would seem to endorse the position of one of the Parties, namely that of the Applicant. In paragraph 67 it declares, almost abruptly and extra cathedra, as it were, that the Court will assess “whether, in the use of lethal methods, the programme’s design and implementation are reasonable”, thus employing the formula advanced by the Applicant on the scope of the review and linking it with the standard of review seemingly conceded by the Respondent, as if to suggest that the application of this standard of objective reasonableness had been accepted as the common ground among the Parties in relation to the overall scope of the review, whereas, in reality, there was a wide difference of position between the Parties, especially in relation to the scope of the review. It has to be said that this conclusion as formulated by the Judgment is clearly a gross misrepresentation of what each of the Parties was prepared to accept as a common ground for the scope and the standard of review to be applied in the present context.

In the course of deciding that the Judgment, for whatever reason that has not been explained, is going to apply the yardstick that the programme must be objectively reasonable as the standard of review, the Judgment brings in to this process an entirely new element of “design and implementation” of the whaling programme (Judgment, paragraph 67 ), which relates to the scope of the review. This is an element which the Applicant has been insisting on introducing in support of its contention. The Judgment provides no explanation as to why it is legitimate or appropriate for the Court to expand the scope of the review by engaging in the examination of these substantive aspects of the JARPA II programme.

33.  A careful examination of the arguments of the Parties as developed through the written and oral proceedings in the present case reveals that the genesis of this standard of review would appear to derive its origin from the jurisprudence of the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization (WTO), which has had to face a number of cases which involve the issue of judicial review of sovereign decisions of Member States over scientifically controversial issues, as one of the Parties noted in its pleadings.

34.  When one examines more closely the quoted jurisprudence of the WTO Appellate Body in its context, it becomes clear that this general proposition in favour of the test of objective reasonableness, has its basis in the Appellate Body’s carefully reasoned argument for the demarcation line to be drawn between science and law in the context of the judicial review of a situation where there is no clear-cut consensual or even majority view of scientists on which jurists can rely. The rationale of the decision in question, which came before the WTO Appellate Body at the final phase of the United States — Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC-Hormones Dispute case (hereinafter “EC-Hormones”), illustrates this point. It is my view that the present Judgment takes this magic formula of objective reasonableness out of the context in which this standard was employed and applies it somewhat mechanically for our purposes, without giving proper consideration to the context in which this standard of review was applied.

35.  The Respondent tried to clarify its position on the issue of the standard of review by explaining how this standard of objective reasonableness could be relevant to the present case, in the following words:

“Yes: the Court can ask, could a reasonable State regard this as a properly-framed scientific inquiry. But it can no more impose a line separating science from non-science than it could decide what is and what is not ‘Art’. In Japan’s view, the correct question is, could a State reasonably regard this as scientific research?

That is why Japan agrees with Australia and New Zealand in regarding the test as being whether a State’s decision is objectively reasonable, or ‘supported by coherent reasoning and respectable scientific evidence and …, in this sense, objectively justifiable’.” (CR 2013/22, p. 60, paras. 20–21 (Lowe); emphasis added.)

What this part of the argument of the Respondent is relying on is the quotation, word-for-word, from the decision of the WTO Appellate Body in the final phase of the EC-Hormones case. It is for this reason important to examine the precise context in which this quoted passage appears.

36.  The decision of the WTO Appellate Body contained in its final report of 16 October 2008, reviewing and setting aside the earlier decision of its Dispute Settlement Panel, states as follows:

“[S]o far as fact-finding by [the WTO] panels is concerned, the applicable standard is ‘neither de novo review as such, nor “total deference”, but rather the “objective assessment of facts”’ …

It is the WTO Member’s task to perform the risk assessment. The panel’s task is to review that risk assessment. Where a panel goes beyond this limited mandate and acts as a risk assessor, it would be substituting its own scientific judgment for that of the risk assessor and making a de novo review and, consequently, would exceed its functions under Article 11 of the [Dispute Settlement Understanding of the WTO]. Therefore, the review power of a panel is not to determine whether the risk assessment undertaken by a WTO Member is correct, but rather to determine whether that risk assessment is supported by coherent reasoning and respectable scientific evidence and is, in this sense, objectively justifiable.” (WT/DS320/AB/R, p. 246, paras. 589–590; emphasis added.)

Here we find a well-defined exposé of the essential rationale for the standard of review developed in the jurisprudence that the Respondent quotes in agreeing to the test of objective reasonableness. The Appellate Body decision is very specific in clarifying that “a panel may not rely on the experts to go beyond its limited mandate of review” and that “[t]he panel may seek the experts’ assistance in order to identify the scientific basis of the … measure [taken] and to verify that this scientific basis comes from a qualified and respected source, irrespective of whether it represents minority or majority scientific views” (WT/DS320/AB/R, p. 247, para. 592).

37.  Despite the difference that these two cases — one being before the Appellate Body of the WTO, the other being before the ICJ — represent in terms of the law applicable, in the nature of the issue involved and in the context in which the dispute arose, as well as the obvious fact that the WTO decision cannot in any sense constitute a precedent for our purposes, there is nevertheless one common element to which this Court could pay regard. It is the point that when a court of law or a judicial body is engaged in the legal assessment of a scientific matter where scientists hold divergent views, the judicial institution is under an intrinsic limitation on its power and must not exceed its competence as the administrator of the law, by straying into an area which lies beyond its delimited function. Thus under the system in which the judicial body’s task is to review the risk assessment conducted by a member State endowed with that power and, to use the expression employed in the WTO jurisprudence, “[w]here [that body] goes beyond this limited mandate and acts as a risk assessor, it would be substituting its own scientific judgement for that of the risk assessor and making a de novo review and, consequently, would exceed its functions” (WT/DS320/AB/R, p. 246, para. 590). It is my view that it was in this sense and in this context that the jurisprudence of the WTO decision can be a useful point of reference for this Court in the present case, where the function of the Court “is not to determine whether the … assessment undertaken by a WTO Member is correct, but rather to determine whether that … assessment is supported by coherent reasoning and respectable scientific evidence and is, in this sense, objectively justifiable” (WT/DS320/AB/R, p. 246, para. 590).

38.  In my view, the Judgment has erred in its approach by taking this standard of objective reasonableness out of its context, and by mechanically applying it for the opposite purpose, that is, for the purpose of engaging the Court in making a de novo assessment of the activities of the Respondent, when that State is given the primary power under the Convention to determine what should be the modalities of activities for pursuing scientific research and to grant special permits for purposes of scientific research. This discretion given to the State issuing the permit is subject to the process of review and critical comment by the Scientific Committee and by the IWC in accordance with the regulatory framework of the Convention.

39.  The concept of “reasonableness” appears from time to time in the jurisprudence of this Court in some of its past decisions. In my view, however, it is not possible nor useful to try to apply this concept of “reasonableness” in a general way as the standard of substantive assessment. No one would dispute the validity of this concept as such, which like the concept of “fairness”, is one of the basic principles of international law, or for that matter of law in general, but its concrete interpretation and application as a standard of review will depend entirely upon the context in which the term is to be applied. It is not a standard for substantive assessment, but a yardstick for ascertaining whether a decision or an action is or is not “arbitrary” or patently “out of bounds”.

In the case concerning Dispute regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), the Court referred to the contention of the Applicant (Costa Rica) which argued that the way the Respondent (Nicaragua) restricted Costa Rica’s navigational rights on the San Juan River was “not reasonable”. The Court clarified the character of this concept in the following way:

“The Court notes that Costa Rica, in support of its claim of unlawful action, advances points of fact about unreasonableness by referring to the allegedly disproportionate impact of the regulations. The Court recalls that in terms of well established general principle it is for Costa Rica to establish those points (cf. Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2009, p. 86, para. 68, and cases cited there). Further, a court examining the reasonableness of a regulation must recognize that the regulator, in this case the State with sovereignty over the river, has the primary responsibility for assessing the need for regulation and for choosing, on the basis of its knowledge of the situation, the measure that it deems most appropriate to meet that need. It will not be enough in a challenge to a regulation simply to assert in a general way that it is unreasonable. Concrete and specific facts will be required to persuade a court to come to that conclusion.” (I.C.J. Reports 2009, p. 253, para. 101; emphasis added.)

40.  The position of the Respondent in the present case is analogous in law to that of the respondent under the 1858 Treaty of Limits in the case concerning Dispute regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua). The dictum of this Court in the latter case should be applicable to the situation in the present case.

41.  Having thus clarified the scope and the standard of review to be applied by the Court in reviewing the JARPA II activities under Article VIII, I shall refrain from engaging myself in the exercise of refuting the conclusions of the Judgment resulting from its substantive assessment of each of the concrete aspects of the design and implementation of the JARPA II programme, in order to ascertain whether they can be regarded as objectively reasonable, as the Judgment has tried to do in Section II, subsection 3.B (Judgment, paragraphs 127–227). I do so refrain, because in my view to engage oneself in this exercise would be doing precisely what the Court should not have done under the Convention in light of the essential character of the Convention so clearly manifested in its object and purpose, and in particular in light of the legal structure of the regulatory régime created under the Convention, as well as, most importantly, in view of the intrinsic limitation inherent in the power of the Court as a legal institution empowered with review in the present context.

42.  Nevertheless, I wish to draw the attention of the Court to one point of law which relates to a question of principle involved throughout the substantive assessment of the programme of JARPA II by the Judgment in its subsection 3.B. My critical comments relate to the methodology that the Judgment employs in applying the standard of objective reasonableness in assessing the concrete activities of JARPA II conducted under Article VIII of the Convention. In my view, the ordinary and plain meaning of Article VIII makes it clear that the Contracting Government has the primary power to grant special permits authorizing to kill, take and treat whales for purposes of scientific research. There is a presumption — a strong, though rebuttable, presumption — that the granting Government, in granting the permits, has made this determination not only in good faith, but also in light of a careful consideration that the activities are carried out for purposes of scientific research. As I have repeatedly emphasized, the function of the Court, engaged in the judicial review of the exercise of power by the Contracting Government, is to assess whether this determination of the Contracting Government in question is objectively reasonable, in the sense that the programme of research is based upon a coherent reasoning and supported by respectable opinions within the scientific community of specialists on whales, even if the programme of research may not necessarily command the support of a majority view within the scientific community involved.

43.  In particular, with regard to the issue of lethal taking of whales, which forms the central theme in the assessment in the Judgment of whether the programme in its design and implementation can be regarded as objectively reasonable, the Judgment appears to be applying the standard of objective reasonableness in such a way that it is the granting Party that bears the burden of establishing that the scale and the size of the lethal take envisaged under the programme is reasonable in order for the programme to be qualified as a genuine programme “for purposes of scientific research”.

44.  To place the onus of meeting such a stringent requirement upon the Party granting the special permits in accordance with the provisions of the Convention cannot be in consonance with the plain and ordinary meaning of Article VIII, which provides for an unqualified right of the Contracting Party to “grant … special permit[s] authorizing … to kill, take and treat whales for purposes of scientific research” as part of the regulatory régime created under the Convention.

45.  In the context of the present dispute, and applying the standard of objective reasonableness used by the Judgment as the yardstick for determining whether the activities were “for purposes of scientific research”, it should be the Applicant, rather than the Respondent, who has to establish by credible evidence that the activities of the Respondent under JARPA II cannot be regarded as “reasonable” scientific research activities for the purposes of Article VIII of the Convention. Under the Convention, the Respondent is given the presumptive power to grant permits for activities for purposes of scientific research. In my view, the Applicant has failed to establish that the activities carried out pursuant to JARPA II are not “reasonable” scientific activities.

46.  It is my belief that, in fact, the activities carried out pursuant to JARPA II can be characterized as “reasonable” activities for purposes of scientific research. It may well be that JARPA II is far from a perfect programme, but the evidence presented to the Court has clearly shown that it provides some useful scientific information with respect to minke whales that has been of substantial value to the Scientific Committee. By way of demonstrating the scientific value of JARPA/JARPA II activities, the Chair of the Scientific Committee stated in 2007 that “[t]he Japanese input into cetacean research in Antarctica is significant, and I would say crucial for the Scientific Committee” (Counter-Memorial of Japan, Ann. 207, Vol. IV, p. 387). It should be pointed out that a major review of JARPA II by the IWC is expected to take place this year (2014) and therefore a fully-fledged evaluation of the programme is premature (which is another reason for the Court not to pass hasty judgment). Although a specific assessment on the contribution of the scientific research conducted by the programme is not yet available for JARPA II itself, the report of the IWC Intersessional Workshop to Review Data and Results from JARPA, which is in many respects substantively similar to JARPA II, expressed the positive appreciation of the JARPA programme in the following words:

“The results from the JARPA programme, while not required for management under the RMP, have the potential to improve management of minke whales in the Southern Hemisphere in [two] ways … The results of analyses of JARPA data could be used … perhaps to increase the allowed catch of minke whales in the Southern Hemisphere, without increasing depletion risk above the level indicated by the existing Implementation Simulation Trials of the RMP for these minke whales.” (Report of the Intersessional Workshop to Review Data and Results from Special Permit Research on Minke Whales in the Antarctic, Tokyo, 4–8 December 2006; Counter-Memorial of Japan, Ann. 113, Vol. III, p. 201; emphasis in the original.)

In other words, this IWC Intersessional Workshop Report expressed the view that the JARPA programme can provide valuable statistical data which could result in a reconsideration of the allowed catch of minke whales under the RMP.

47.  What is referred to in this report is precisely the type of data that was envisioned as useful by the Convention. Article VIII of the Convention “[r]ecogniz[es] that continuous collection and analysis of biological data in connection with the operations of factory ships and land stations are indispensable to sound and constructive management of the whale fisheries” and states that “the Contracting Governments will take all practicable measures to obtain such data” (Art. VIII, para. 4). Article V of the Convention further states that amendments to the Schedule “shall be based on scientific findings” (Art. V, para. 2), and the text of the moratorium itself notes, as stated earlier, that it “will be kept under review, based upon the best scientific advice” (Schedule, para. 10 (e)).

48.  In light of this evidence given with the authority of the findings of the Scientific Committee that the JARPA activities provided some of the very data that the drafters of the Convention found to be “indispensable to sound and constructive management of the whale fisheries” (Art. VIII, para. 4), it is difficult to see how the activities of JARPA and its successor, JARPA II, could be considered “unreasonable.”

49.  By way of conclusion, it should be emphasized that the sole and crucial issue at the centre of the present dispute is whether the activities under the programme of JARPA II are “for purposes of scientific research”. The issue is not whether the programme of JARPA II has attained a level of excellence as a project for scientific research for achieving the object and purpose of the Convention, which is a matter to be considered and examined by the Scientific Committee. It may also be true that the JARPA II programme is far from being perfect for attaining such objective and may need improvements to achieve that purpose. Such criticism of JARPA II could appropriately be valuable in the review process, with a view to remodelling or redesigning these activities in accordance with what the regulatory framework of the Convention prescribes, but this cannot be the ground for the Court to declare that the activities of the programme are unreasonable for purposes of scientific research. Even if JARPA II contained some defects as a programme for purposes of scientific research, that fact in itself would not turn these activities into activities for commercial whaling. It certainly could not be the reason for this Court to rule that “Japan shall revoke any extant authorization, permit or licence granted in relation to JARPA II” (Judgment, operative part 7, paragraph 247 ).

(Signed) Hisashi Owada.

Accord avec le dispositif de l’arrêt en ce qu’il rejette l’exception d’incompétence soulevée par le Japon — Désaccord avec le raisonnement suivi par la Cour pour conclure au rejet de l’application de la seconde branche de la réserve australienne — Accord avec l’affirmation selon laquelle l’article VIII de la convention ne doit donner lieu ni à interprétation restrictive ni à interprétation extensive — Rejet à bon droit de la définition de «recherches scientifiques» donnée par l’expert appelé par l’Australie — Désaccord avec le critère d’examen objectif retenu par la Cour, la notion «en vue de» renvoyant nécessairement à l’examen des fins recherchées — Application erronée d’une présomption défavorable sous-jacente à l’encontre du Japon — En l’espèce, absence de disproportion manifeste entre les objectifs annoncés dans le cadre de JARPA II et les moyens mis en œuvre — Absence également d’excès manifeste dans la fixation de la taille des échantillons — Désaccord avec le point 2 du dispositif en ce qu’il conclut que les permis spéciaux délivrés par le Japon dans le cadre de JARPA II n’entrent pas dans les prévisions du paragraphe 1 de l’article VIII de la convention — Désaccord en conséquence avec les points 3, 4, 5 et 7 du dispositif.

1.  J’ai voté en faveur du point 1 du dispositif, par lequel la Cour décide qu’elle a compétence pour connaître de la requête présentée par l’Australie contre le Japon. Mais j’ai voté contre les points 2 à 5, par lesquels la Cour déclare que le Japon a méconnu plusieurs obligations substantielles découlant de la convention pour la réglementation de la chasse à la baleine de 1946 (ci-après la «convention»), en conséquence du fait que, selon l’arrêt, le programme de chasse dit «JARPA II», mis en œuvre par le Japon dans l’Antarctique à partir de 2005, n’était pas réellement, malgré les affirmations du défendeur, conduit «en vue de recherches scientifiques» au sens de l’article VIII de la convention. En conséquence, je n’ai pas pu approuver non plus les mesures que le point 7 du dispositif ordonne au Japon d’adopter pour remédier aux violations constatées.

2.  Bien que je partage la conclusion de l’arrêt en ce qui concerne la question de compétence, je ne suis pas convaincu par le raisonnement suivi pour y parvenir. Sur ce point, je pourrais certainement qualifier ma divergence de mineure. J’en expliquerai cependant les raisons ci-après (I). Sur le fond, en revanche, je suis au regret de constater que je suis profondément en désaccord avec la démarche générale adoptée par la Cour, et les articulations essentielles de son raisonnement : je crois qu’elle a fait fausse route. Je dirai pourquoi (II).

3.  L’Australie a saisi la Cour sur la base des déclarations d’acceptation de la juridiction obligatoire de celle-ci faites par l’Australie et le Japon, respectivement le 22 mars 2002 et le 9 juillet 2007. Le Japon a contesté la compétence de la Cour en invoquant l’une des réserves que l’Australie a formulées dans la déclaration d’acceptation, celle figurant au b) de ladite déclaration.

4.  Il n’y a eu aucune discussion entre les Parties — et il n’aurait pu sérieusement y en avoir — quant à la règle bien établie selon laquelle le défendeur à l’instance peut invoquer une réserve faite par le demandeur dans l’instrument par lequel celui-ci a accepté la compétence de la Cour, en opposant cette réserve à son auteur lui-même en vue d’obtenir de la Cour qu’elle décline sa compétence.

5.  C’est sur la portée, donc sur l’interprétation, de la réserve australienne, que le débat a eu lieu. La Cour a estimé que cette réserve n’était pas applicable en l’espèce. Je suis de cet avis. Mais elle l’a fait sur la base d’une interprétation de ladite réserve que j’estime très discutable.

6.  A vrai dire, la réserve en question n’est pas un modèle de clarté. Elle comprend deux branches, reliées entre elles par la conjonction «ou» («or»). La première est relativement claire, elle vise à exclure de la compétence de la Cour «any dispute concerning or relating to the delimitation of maritime zones, including the territorial sea, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf» — ce que je traduirais en français (seul le texte anglais est authentique) par : «tout différend concernant, ou se rapportant à, la délimitation de zones maritimes, y compris la mer territoriale, la zone économique exclusive et le plateau continental». Les Parties en sont convenues : le différend soumis à la Cour ne concernait pas, et ne se rapportait pas non plus à, la délimitation de zones maritimes — ce qui signifie que l’objet même du différend n’était pas constitué par une telle délimitation, à laquelle il n’était pas demandé à la Cour de procéder. Cela est évident.

7.  La seconde branche de la réserve est beaucoup moins claire, et c’est elle que le Japon invoquait.

Elle exclut de la compétence de la Cour tout différend maritime «arising out of, concerning, or relating to the exploitation of any disputed area of or adjacent to any such maritime zone pending its delimitation», ce qui pourrait donner en français : «[différend] découlant de, concernant, ou se rapportant à l’exploitation de tout espace disputé relevant d’une telle zone maritime ou adjacente à une telle zone dans l’attente de la délimitation de celle-ci».

8.  Le Japon a cherché à convaincre la Cour de faire une application strictement littérale de cette seconde branche de la réserve.

Le différend qui oppose les Parties, a-t-il soutenu, découle de la mise en œuvre d’un programme de chasse à la baleine, donc de l’«exploitation» d’un espace maritime donné — celui où se déroulent les activités autorisées par JARPA II. Le mot «exploitation» serait d’ailleurs encore plus approprié, a fait remarquer le défendeur, dans l’optique qui est celle de l’Australie — puisque selon la demanderesse il s’agit d’activités poursuivant des fins commerciales — que dans celle du Japon — pour lequel il s’agit bien d’un programme de recherche scientifique.

Par ailleurs, une partie au moins des espaces maritimes dans lesquels se déroule le programme JARPA II est revendiquée par l’Australie au titre de sa zone économique exclusive générée par la portion du territoire antarctique qu’elle revendique également. Cette revendication est toujours pendante, et aucune délimitation n’a été opérée — ni ne peut l’être, en raison du traité sur l’Antarctique de 1959 qui gèle pendant une durée indéterminée toutes les revendications territoriales sur l’Antarctique. La teneur exacte des revendications maritimes de l’Australie n’a pas été établie par les débats, mais l’Australie n’a aucunement contesté l’existence de ces revendications, ni le fait qu’elles englobaient des espaces maritimes coïncidant, au moins partiellement, avec les zones où se déploient les activités de chasse dans le cadre de JARPA II.

En somme, le Japon a soutenu que le différend soumis à la Cour découlait de l’exploitation d’espaces maritimes faisant l’objet d’une contestation quant à leur appartenance à la zone économique exclusive de l’Australie, laquelle n’est pas encore délimitée à cet endroit, et que par conséquent la réserve australienne, prise à la lettre, était applicable.

9.  Pour écarter cette application littérale, ce en quoi à mon avis elle a eu raison, la Cour a retenu deux motifs, l’un présenté comme essentiel, l’autre apparaissant comme surabondant.

A titre principal, l’arrêt relève qu’il n’existe pas de revendications concurrentes de l’Australie et du Japon sur les espaces maritimes concernés par le programme JARPA II. Or, selon la Cour, «[l’]existence d’un différend relatif à la délimitation maritime entre les Etats en cause [les Parties à l’affaire] est requise aux termes de la première comme de la seconde partie de la réserve» ( paragraphe 37 de l’arrêt). En d’autres termes, une condition nécessaire de l’application de la seconde branche de la réserve, invoquée par le Japon, est que les Parties à l’instance revendiquent concurremment les espaces maritimes dans lesquels a lieu l’«exploitation» qui est à l’origine du différend — et cette condition fait défaut en l’espèce.

A titre surabondant, l’arrêt relève aussi que «[l]a nature et l’étendue des zones maritimes [en cause] ne sont … pas pertinentes aux fins du présent différend» ( paragraphe 40 ), ce qui signifie que la Cour n’aura nullement besoin, pour trancher l’affaire, de se prononcer sur le point de savoir quel Etat — si tant est qu’il y en ait un — détient des droits souverains sur les zones maritimes en question.

10.  Je pense que la Cour aurait été mieux avisée de retenir seulement le second de ces motifs, nécessaire et suffisant en l’espèce pour justifier sa compétence.

11.  Le premier motif retenu, et qui se présente clairement comme le principal, repose à mon avis sur une interprétation très discutable, et inutilement restrictive, de la réserve australienne.

Celle-ci, comme on l’a vu, comporte deux branches distinctes quoique liées entre elles dans une certaine mesure.

12.  La première, celle qui vise les différends relatifs à la délimitation de zones maritimes, suppose certainement, pour être applicable, l’existence de revendications concurrentes entre les parties en cause sur les mêmes espaces ; il s’agit de dénier à la Cour la compétence pour connaître d’un différend de délimitation maritime opposant l’Australie à un autre Etat.

13.  En revanche, rien dans la formulation de la seconde branche, ni dans la logique qui lui est sous-jacente, ne conduit à la conclusion qu’elle ne peut trouver à s’appliquer que s’il existe des revendications concurrentes sur les mêmes espaces maritimes de la part des deux Etats Parties à l’instance.

On peut raisonnablement comprendre cette seconde branche comme ayant pour objet d’exclure de la compétence de la Cour (aussi) les différends qui, sans être directement relatifs à la délimitation maritime, appelleraient de la part de la Cour une prise de position — de manière incidente — sur la consistance et l’étendue des zones maritimes relevant de l’Australie, parce qu’ils auraient pour objet l’exploitation d’un espace maritime dont l’appartenance à une telle zone donnerait lieu à une contestation toujours pendante. En somme, l’Australie ne souhaite pas que la Cour se prononce, ni directement (première branche de la réserve) ni indirectement (seconde branche), sur les limites de ses zones maritimes.

Mais à la différence de la première branche, il n’y a aucune raison — ni textuelle ni logique — pour que la seconde branche de la réserve ne puisse s’appliquer que si les deux parties à l’affaire revendiquent concurremment les espaces maritimes concernés. En effet, on peut tout à fait concevoir une situation dans laquelle le règlement d’un différend opposant l’Australie à un autre Etat, relatif à l’exploitation d’une zone maritime revendiquée par l’Australie, conduirait la Cour à se prononcer incidemment sur le bien-fondé des revendications maritimes australiennes alors même que l’autre partie ne revendiquerait pas les espaces maritimes en cause. En pareil cas, la seconde branche de la réserve serait à mon avis applicable.

14.  Je suis donc d’avis que s’il est vrai que les deux branches de la réserve, laquelle constitue un tout, doivent se comprendre en lien l’une avec l’autre — raison pour laquelle la Cour a écarté à juste titre l’interprétation strictement littérale proposée par le Japon —, l’arrêt pousse trop loin cette unité en estimant que la seconde ne trouve à s’appliquer, tout comme la première, qu’en cas de revendications maritimes concurrentes.

Il s’agit là d’une interprétation restrictive d’autant plus regrettable que la Cour aurait pu l’éviter en se fondant seulement sur le second motif qu’elle mentionne, qui est indiscutable et suffisant en l’espèce, et en laissant ouverte toute autre question — si tant est qu’elle ait voulu demeurer prudente.

15.  Sur le fond, mon désaccord avec l’arrêt est beaucoup plus fondamental.

16.  L’affaire se présentait à la Cour dans des termes relativement simples.

La Cour avait à répondre à une question principale, qui commandait presque entièrement la solution de l’affaire : les permis spéciaux de chasse à la baleine délivrés par le Japon à partir de 2005 dans le cadre du programme JARPA II l’ont-ils été «en vue de recherches scientifiques» au sens de l’article VIII de la convention de 1946 ?

Une réponse affirmative, celle qu’à mon avis la Cour aurait dû donner, eût entraîné nécessairement le rejet de la quasi-totalité des prétentions de l’Australie.

La réponse négative que la Cour a cru pouvoir retenir ne pouvait au contraire que la conduire à faire droit à l’essentiel des demandes australiennes.

17.  C’est donc l’application en l’espèce des mots «en vue de recherches scientifiques» qui se trouvait au cœur de la présente affaire, et c’est sur ce point que je me sépare principalement de la majorité de mes collègues.

18.  Pourtant, ce n’est pas l’article VIII de la convention qui énonce les règles que le Japon était accusé par l’Australie d’avoir enfreintes. En lui-même, l’article VIII ne crée aucune obligation à la charge des Etats parties (sauf les obligations procédurales d’informer la commission et l’organisme désigné par elle des permis délivrés et des résultats des recherches scientifiques conduites en vertu de ces permis). L’article VIII a pour objet non d’imposer des obligations supplémentaires aux Etats mais de les exempter, pour les activités de chasse qu’ils autorisent et qui relèvent de ses prévisions, des obligations découlant des autres dispositions de la convention (y compris son règlement annexé). Les obligations substantielles dont l’Australie alléguait la violation par le Japon se trouvent au paragraphe 10 e) du règlement annexé à la convention (qui établit un moratoire sur la chasse «à des fins commerciales»), au paragraphe 10 d) du même règlement (qui établit un moratoire sur l’utilisation des usines flottantes), et au paragraphe 7 b) (qui interdit la chasse commerciale dans le sanctuaire de l’océan Austral).

19.  La raison pour laquelle le paragraphe 1 de l’article VIII joue un rôle si déterminant en l’espèce est que si les permis de chasse délivrés par le Japon dans le cadre de JARPA II ne poursuivent pas des fins de recherche scientifique, à l’encontre de ce que le Japon n’a cessé d’affirmer, alors il est inéluctable d’en déduire que les activités autorisées violent les trois dispositions (prohibitives) susmentionnées. En effet, d’une part, il est constant que la chasse autorisée dans le cadre de JARPA II se fait, entre autres, au moyen d’une usine flottante, de telle sorte qu’elle viole — si elle n’est pas couverte par l’exemption générale de l’article VIII — la prohibition résultant du paragraphe 10 d) du règlement pour une espèce particulière de baleines capturées par les chasseurs japonais. Et d’autre part, ni l’Australie ni le Japon n’ont prétendu que les activités de chasse autorisées dans le cadre de JARPA II pourraient poursuivre une finalité qui ne soit ni de nature scientifique ni de nature commerciale, de telle sorte que si ces activités ne sont pas conduites réellement «en vue de recherches scientifiques» — ce qui était la thèse de l’Australie —, elles constituent une violation tant du paragraphe 10 e) que du paragraphe 7 b).

20.  La Cour accepte ce postulat — que le Japon lui-même n’a pas contesté — au paragraphe 229 , et elle affirme, aux paragraphes 231, 232 et 233 de l’arrêt, que «toutes les activités de chasse à la baleine qui n’entrent pas dans les prévisions de l’article VIII de la convention (hormis la chasse aborigène de subsistance) tombent sous le coup» des paragraphes 10 e), 10 d) et 7 b) du règlement annexé. Je suis d’accord avec une telle affirmation, sinon sous la forme générale que lui donne l’arrêt sur la base d’une interprétation quelque peu hasardeuse de la convention, du moins dans les circonstances de la présente espèce et donc, certainement, pour les besoins de la résolution du différend soumis à la Cour.

21.  Mon opinion est que l’Australie n’a pas démontré que le Japon ne poursuit pas réellement, avec le programme JARPA II, les fins scientifiques qu’il prétend poursuivre (dans l’optique de l’Australie, on pourrait même dire : «qu’il fait semblant de poursuivre»).

22.  Je préciserai d’abord les points sur lesquels je ne suis pas en désaccord avec la démarche adoptée par l’arrêt, avant d’en venir à l’exposé de ma divergence essentielle.

23.  En premier lieu, ma position n’est pas fondée sur l’existence d’un prétendu «pouvoir discrétionnaire» que posséderait l’Etat qui délivre des permis spéciaux pour apprécier si les activités autorisées sont bien «en vue de recherches scientifiques». Bien sûr, le texte même du paragraphe 1 de l’article VIII fait apparaître des éléments de discrétion au bénéfice de l’Etat en cause : il n’est jamais tenu de délivrer un permis, et peut librement rejeter (en tout cas du point de vue du droit international) toute demande présentée par une personne ou un organisme, quel que soit l’intérêt des recherches envisagées ; s’il délivre un permis, il peut l’assortir de conditions restrictives qu’il détermine lui-même librement ; il peut annuler «à tout moment» un permis accordé et jouit à cet égard d’un pouvoir discrétionnaire — toujours du point de vue du droit international, car le droit interne peut le contraindre dans une certaine mesure.

En revanche, quand il s’agit de caractériser un programme de chasse comme étant «en vue de recherches scientifiques» au sens de l’article VIII, condition essentielle à laquelle cette disposition subordonne la délivrance des permis spéciaux, on ne saurait parler d’un pouvoir discrétionnaire de l’Etat. Certes, au moment où il statue sur une demande de délivrance d’un permis spécial, l’Etat doit nécessairement porter une appréciation sur l’intérêt scientifique du projet pour la mise en œuvre duquel le permis est demandé. Mais cette appréciation n’est pas souveraine : elle se fait sous le contrôle non seulement des organes institués par la convention, mais aussi, si un différend sur ce point est porté devant un organe judiciaire ayant compétence pour en connaître, sous le contrôle du juge.

A cet égard, je n’ai rien à objecter à ce qu’écrit la Cour aux paragraphes 59 à 61 du présent arrêt.

24.  Mon désaccord ne porte pas non plus sur la manière, prudente, dont la Cour a abordé la notion de «recherches scientifiques» au sens de l’article VIII.

Elle a eu raison, selon moi, d’éviter de donner une définition générale et abstraite de cette notion. Plus particulièrement, c’est à juste titre qu’elle a refusé de retenir les quatre critères proposés par l’Australie sur la base du rapport d’un des experts que la demanderesse a sollicités, le professeur Mangel : pour être scientifique, une recherche devrait se fixer des objectifs précis reposant notamment sur la base d’hypothèses vérifiables ; elle ne devrait, dans le contexte de la convention, recourir à des méthodes létales que si les objectifs ne peuvent pas être atteints par d’autres moyens ; sa conduite devrait être soumise à un examen périodique par les pairs, et au besoin elle devrait être ajustée en conséquence de cet examen ; elle devrait s’efforcer d’éviter toute répercussion négative sur les populations étudiées.

Comme le dit très justement le paragraphe 86 de l’arrêt, «ces critères semblent, pour l’essentiel, refléter ce [qu’un expert] a indiqué attendre d’un programme de recherche scientifique bien conçu, plutôt que constituer un moyen d’interpréter la notion de «recherches scientifiques» telle qu’utilisée dans la convention».

25.  En outre, j’approuve pour l’essentiel la manière dont la Cour a analysé l’objet et le but de la convention, à la lumière desquels l’article VIII doit être interprété, et la conclusion qu’elle en a tirée, à savoir qu’«il n’est justifié d’interpréter l’article VIII ni dans un sens restrictif, ni dans un sens extensif», puisque la convention vise à la fois à assurer la conservation des stocks de baleines et à permettre le développement durable de l’industrie baleinière ( paragraphes 56 à 58 ).

26.  Enfin, j’approuve l’arrêt lorsqu’il rappelle qu’«un Etat poursuit souvent plusieurs buts lorsqu’il met en œuvre une politique particulière» et que «par conséquent, … le fait qu’il puisse exister chez tel ou tel [représentant du gouvernement concerné] des motivations autres que la recherche scientifique n’interdit pas de conclure à la finalité scientifique d’un programme au sens de l’article VIII» ( paragraphe 97 ). En d’autres termes, il est possible que le Japon, en élaborant le programme JARPA II, ait été aussi sensible aux retombées favorables que la mise en œuvre de ce programme pouvait comporter du point de vue de l’activité industrielle et commerciale : cela ne suffit pas à le disqualifier au regard de l’article VIII en tant que programme de recherche scientifique. En revanche, si l’ampleur du programme était manifestement exagérée, cela tendrait à démontrer que — pour partie au moins — il ne poursuit pas des objectifs exclusivement scientifiques et — dans cette mesure en tout cas — n’est pas couvert par l’article VIII (je reviendrai plus loin sur ce dernier point).

27.  J’en viens maintenant à l’exposé des raisons pour lesquelles je ne peux pas adhérer à des éléments essentiels du raisonnement suivi par la Cour, et, en conséquence, à sa conclusion finale.

28.  Tout d’abord, je suis d’avis que, dans une affaire comme celle-ci, le défendeur devrait bénéficier d’une assez forte présomption en sa faveur.

Je ne suis pas, en règle générale, partisan de règles trop rigides en matière de charge de la preuve, et je n’ai jamais considéré que le demandeur devait, par principe, supporter exclusivement le fardeau de la preuve. Mais dans certaines affaires, la Cour est fondée à se montrer particulièrement exigeante à l’égard de la partie qui avance certaines allégations. Tel est le cas, notamment, lorsque l’une des parties allègue que l’autre agit de mauvaise foi, puisqu’il est communément admis que la bonne foi est présumée. Or, dans la présente affaire, il est clair que le procès fait par l’Australie au Japon repose fondamentalement sur l’idée qu’en élaborant et en mettant en œuvre le programme JARPA II, le Japon a agi de mauvaise foi, puisqu’il a dissimulé la poursuite d’intérêts commerciaux derrière les apparences d’un programme de recherches scientifiques.

Certes, l’arrêt s’abstient de se prononcer sur la question de la bonne foi, et même il affirme ne pas avoir à l’examiner, comme tous «les autres arguments invoqués par l’Australie» à titre subsidiaire ( paragraphe 243 ).

Mais si la notion de mauvaise foi est expressément présente dans les arguments présentés par l’Australie à titre subsidiaire, elle est aussi présente, implicitement mais nécessairement, dans l’argumentation qu’elle a développée à titre principal.

Je ne vois pas comment l’on peut conclure qu’un programme de chasse à la baleine qui se présente comme de nature scientifique, se propose des objectifs et met en œuvre des méthodes scientifiques, a été dûment communiqué comme tel au comité scientifique institué par la commission baleinière internationale, et dont les résultats ont donné lieu à certaines publications, n’est pas mis en œuvre «en vue de recherches scientifiques», ce qui est la thèse de l’Australie avalisée par la Cour, sans mettre au moins en doute — fût-ce implicitement — la bonne foi du défendeur. Lorsque la Cour prétend qu’elle n’a pas à se prononcer sur l’allégation de mauvaise foi avancée par l’Australie contre le Japon, et qu’en effet elle s’abstient de le faire explicitement, il me semble donc que cela relève davantage de la présentation formelle que de la réalité.

29.  La présomption de bonne foi n’étant pas irréfragable, l’observation qui précède ne suffit certes pas à démontrer que la conclusion de la Cour, à savoir que les permis spéciaux délivrés par le Japon dans le cadre de JARPA II ne l’ont pas été «en vue de recherches scientifiques», est erronée.

Mais pour fonder sérieusement une telle conclusion, il aurait fallu, selon moi, disposer d’éléments particulièrement solides, que les débats n’ont pas fait apparaître, et c’est au contraire sur la base de faibles arguments, et parfois de simples doutes, suppositions ou approximations, que la Cour a cru pouvoir accueillir les prétentions de l’Australie.

30.  Il est vrai que la conclusion finale de la Cour a été favorisée par deux aspects de sa démarche qui me semblent très critiquables.

31.  En premier lieu, loin de faire peser la charge de la preuve sur l’Australie, la Cour se montre en permanence particulièrement exigeante à l’égard du Japon, comme si c’était le défendeur qui devait prouver son bon droit. De bout en bout, la lecture de l’arrêt donne le sentiment que c’est du Japon qu’on attend explications, démonstrations, justifications.

C’est ainsi, par exemple, que sur la question essentielle de la taille des échantillons l’arrêt indique que la tâche de la Cour est

«de rechercher si le Japon a su démontrer, au regard des objectifs annoncés de JARPA II, l’existence d’éléments pouvant raisonnablement expliquer les tailles d’échantillon annuelles pour chacun des paramètres étudiés et ayant conduit à fixer à 850 spécimens (plus ou moins 10 %) la taille globale de l’échantillon de petits rorquals» ( paragraphe 185 ; les italiques sont de moi),

avant de conclure plus loin ( paragraphe 198 ) que les éléments de preuve — il s’agit bien entendu de ceux avancés par le Japon — «n’offrent guère d’explications ni de justifications quant aux décisions ayant présidé au choix de l’objectif de capture global», ce qui constitue «une raison supplémentaire de douter que la conception de JARPA II soit raisonnable au regard de ses objectifs annoncés». En d’autres termes, c’est du Japon qu’on attend la démonstration que la taille des échantillons (le nombre de baleines dont la capture est autorisée) est proportionnée à la poursuite des objectifs annoncés et le doute à cet égard est retenu contre lui.

32.  En second lieu, et plus fondamentalement encore, la Cour a adopté une méthodologie dont je dirais, pour le moins, qu’elle n’est pas convaincante.

Lorsqu’elle expose la méthode qu’elle entend suivre afin de qualifier un programme comme étant — ou non — «en vue de recherches scientifiques» au sens du paragraphe 1 de l’article VIII, la Cour indique que la question principale en l’espèce se rapporte à la locution «en vue de». Il ne suffit pas qu’un programme comporte des éléments de recherche scientifique ; il faut encore qu’il soit conçu et mis en œuvre «en vue d’» une telle recherche. Jusque-là, je parviens à suivre et je n’ai rien à objecter. Mais ensuite, l’arrêt donne à cette locution («en vue de») un sens et une portée qui me paraissent s’éloigner du sens ordinaire des termes.

«En vue de», selon moi, renvoie à l’intention, aux fins recherchées, aux buts réellement poursuivis (qui peuvent être différents de ceux qui ont été proclamés). Pas selon l’arrêt. La Cour insiste au contraire sur le fait que son critère est «objectif» ( paragraphe 67 ), autrement dit qu’il ne s’agit pas pour elle de déceler les intentions réelles du Japon, de chercher la réalité des fins poursuivies derrière les apparences. Et elle précise — au paragraphe 88 , qui est un chaînon essentiel du raisonnement — qu’un programme ne peut être regardé comme mené «en vue de» recherches scientifiques que «si les éléments de sa conception et de sa mise en œuvre sont raisonnables au regard des objectifs scientifiques annoncés» ; elle ajoute que pour apprécier cette adéquation il faut tenir compte de plusieurs éléments parmi lesquels l’ampleur du recours à des méthodes létales, les méthodes appliquées pour déterminer la taille des échantillons, la comparaison entre les tailles d’échantillon à prélever et les prises effectives, le calendrier et les résultats scientifiques obtenus, ainsi que le degré de coordination avec des projets de recherches connexes.

33.  A ce stade, j’ai vraiment du mal à suivre.

La plus ou moins grande adéquation des moyens mis en œuvre aux fins poursuivies permet certainement d’évaluer la qualité d’un programme de recherches scientifiques. A cet égard, tous les éléments mentionnés au paragraphe 88 sont sans nul doute pertinents. Mais je ne vois pas comment l’on pourrait conclure, de ce qu’un programme serait critiquable en ce qui concerne l’adéquation des moyens qu’il prévoit au regard des objectifs qu’il annonce, que ce programme ne serait pas conduit «en vue de» recherches scientifiques — surtout si l’on prend soin de préciser qu’on ne recherche pas les intentions subjectives de l’Etat en cause et qu’on s’en tient à une approche strictement «objective». Même si la Cour affirme limiter son examen à ce qui est «raisonnable», elle s’engage, à ce stade de son raisonnement, dans une direction qui la conduit à s’éloigner de son rôle et à évaluer la valeur scientifique de JARPA II plutôt que de chercher à en déterminer la nature — la suite de l’arrêt le confirme amplement.

34.  A mon avis, la Cour aurait dû procéder tout autrement.

Le programme JARPA II se présente comme un programme de recherche scientifique approuvé par le Japon. Il comporte des objectifs, que l’arrêt présente aux paragraphes 109 et suivants et dont la Cour ne remet nullement en cause l’intérêt ; il implique la mise en œuvre de moyens qui sont de nature scientifique, comme l’arrêt l’admet en indiquant que «les activités de JARPA II impliquant le recours au prélèvement létal de baleines peuvent être globalement qualifiées de «recherches scientifiques»» ( paragraphe 127 ) ; il a été dûment communiqué pour examen au comité scientifique avant la délivrance du premier permis à ce titre, comme la Cour le reconnaît dans la partie de l’arrêt dans laquelle elle rejette la demande de l’Australie tendant à faire juger que le Japon n’a pas respecté ses obligations au titre du paragraphe 30 du règlement ( paragraphe 238 ).

En conséquence, je suis d’avis que les permis délivrés au titre de JARPA II auraient dû être présumés l’avoir été «en vue de recherches scientifiques» — car on ne saurait mettre en cause la parole d’un Etat à la légère et sa bonne foi doit être présumée jusqu’à preuve du contraire — et que seuls des éléments très solides auraient pu justifier une conclusion défavorable au défendeur.

35.  J’estime que l’arrêt ne démontre pas l’existence de tels éléments.

Selon moi, deux cas seulement peuvent justifier qu’un programme officiellement présenté comme de «recherche scientifique» et qui en a au moins toutes les apparences soit considéré comme n’entrant pas dans les prévisions de l’article VIII : le premier cas est celui où il apparaît qu’il n’existe manifestement aucune relation raisonnable entre les objectifs annoncés et les moyens mis en œuvre, de telle sorte que ces moyens sont manifestement inaptes à atteindre les objectifs, ce dont on peut déduire que ceux-ci ne sont pas réellement recherchés ; le second est celui dans lequel la taille des échantillons fixée par le programme est manifestement excessive au regard des nécessités de la recherche compte tenu des objectifs annoncés, ce dont on peut déduire que pour partie au moins le nombre de baleines dont la capture est autorisée a été fixé sur la base de motifs, ou pour la poursuite d’objectifs, non scientifiques (donc vraisemblablement commerciaux).

36.  Il n’a pas été démontré selon moi qu’on se trouve ici dans un ou l’autre de ces cas.

La Cour — qui, il est vrai, a adopté une démarche particulièrement exigeante à l’égard du défendeur, puisqu’elle paraît avoir fait peser sur lui une présomption défavorable découlant de ce qu’on pourrait appeler une suspicion — a retenu des motifs à mes yeux trop faibles, et s’est exprimée par moments davantage comme le ferait un comité scientifique que comme aurait dû le faire un organe judiciaire.

37.  Entre les paragraphes 128 et 222 , la Cour énonce plusieurs motifs qui la conduisent à conclure, au paragraphe 227, que «les permis spéciaux au titre desquels le Japon autorise la mise à mort, la capture et le traitement de baleines dans le cadre de JARPA II ne sont pas délivrés «en vue de recherches scientifiques» au sens du paragraphe 1 de l’article VIII de la convention».

Aucun de ces motifs n’est bien convaincant en lui-même et leur addition, si elle finit par donner une impression de masse, ne saurait davantage emporter la conviction.

38.  Il est reproché au Japon ( paragraphes 141 et 144 ) de ne pas avoir réalisé des études concernant la possibilité de recourir à des méthodes non létales au lieu et place — dans une certaine mesure — des méthodes létales dans le cadre de JARPA II, ou plutôt de ne pas avoir prouvé devant la Cour qu’il avait réalisé de telles études. C’est possible, mais, d’une part, la Cour a écarté, au paragraphe 83 , la thèse de l’Australie selon laquelle dans le cadre d’un programme de recherche scientifique il y aurait une obligation pour l’Etat de donner systématiquement la préférence aux méthodes non létales et de ne recourir aux méthodes létales qu’en l’absence de toute autre possibilité. D’autre part, on ne voit pas en quoi le fait que l’Etat ait omis, au moment de l’élaboration d’un programme de recherche scientifique, de procéder à une étude sur un point particulier — fût-il pertinent — ôterait à ce programme son caractère scientifique. Tout au plus une telle lacune justifierait-elle une observation du comité scientifique. Mais ce n’est pas le rôle de la Cour de dire si JARPA II a été conçu de la meilleure manière (c’est le rôle du comité scientifique de procéder à une évaluation sur cette question), mais seulement de décider s’il s’agit bien d’un programme poursuivant des fins scientifiques. Quant à l’obligation pour les Etats parties de «tenir dûment compte des recommandations» de la commission baleinière internationale, laquelle a invité les Etats à «s’interroger sur la possibilité … d’atteindre les objectifs de recherche par des méthodes non létales» ( paragraphe 83 ), elle ne saurait avoir pour effet, sauf à obscurcir les catégories juridiques, de transformer lesdites recommandations en décisions obligatoires.

39.  L’arrêt retient aussi, à la charge du Japon, que la taille des échantillons a été fixée à un niveau supérieur à ce qui était nécessaire pour les besoins de la recherche scientifique, afin de procurer des ressources financières supplémentaires destinées à financer ladite recherche, alors que, selon la Cour, cette manière de procéder n’entre pas dans les prévisions de l’article VIII. L’argument est faible. D’une part, il repose sur une interprétation restrictive très discutable de la convention ; d’autre part, et en tout état de cause, il n’est pas démontré que le Japon ait procédé ainsi. L’arrêt ne s’appuie en réalité que sur un document produit par le Japon dont la formulation est ambiguë, mais dans lequel en tout cas on ne trouve pas la claire reconnaissance que la taille des échantillons aurait été augmentée pour des raisons financières ( paragraphe 143 ). S’il s’agit de reprocher au Japon d’avoir préféré, dans une certaine mesure, le recours aux méthodes létales en raison de leur moindre coût — notamment parce qu’elles permettent de commercialiser une partie du produit de la chasse — un tel reproche est probablement fondé en fait, mais certainement pas en droit : aucune règle — et l’arrêt lui-même n’en identifie aucune — n’empêche un Etat de tenir compte d’une considération de ce genre dans la conception d’un programme de recherche.

40.  L’arrêt examine ensuite la question générale de la détermination de la taille des échantillons dans le programme JARPA II.

Mais la Cour n’a pas été en mesure de parvenir à la conclusion que cette taille a été fixée de manière manifestement exagérée au regard des besoins de la recherche, une telle conclusion n’étant nullement étayée par les pièces du dossier. C’est plutôt à une mise en doute du bien-fondé des choix opérés par le Japon et des méthodes retenues par lui que se livre l’arrêt. Mais même si le doute est permis, cela ne saurait suffire à démontrer l’absence de caractère scientifique des fins poursuivies par le programme JARPA II, ni dans sa totalité ni même en partie.

41.  L’arrêt s’interroge, à cet égard, sur la différence importante entre les objectifs de capture retenus dans le programme JARPA, qui a précédé celui qui est en cause en l’espèce, et les tailles d’échantillon retenues dans JARPA II. Pour l’espèce des petits rorquals tout spécialement, la différence est importante : on est passé de 400 à 850 prises annuelles. La Cour exprime son scepticisme sur les explications avancées par le Japon. Celui-ci a fait valoir que JARPA II avait des objectifs plus ambitieux que son prédécesseur ; mais selon la Cour, il y a «davantage de ressemblances que de différences» entre les deux programmes ( paragraphe 151 ). Par ailleurs, une autre raison de «douter que l’augmentation de la taille de l’échantillon de petits rorquals … soit due à des différences entre les deux programmes» est que le Japon a lancé JARPA II sans attendre les résultats de l’évaluation finale de JARPA réalisée par le comité scientifique ( paragraphe 154 ). On est encore ici au niveau des interrogations, des doutes, des suppositions. Rien de bien solide.

42.  La Cour se penche ensuite longuement sur les méthodes permettant de déterminer la taille des échantillons nécessaire à la réalisation des objectifs de recherche. Elle se livre à des calculs d’une particulière complexité, et les présente notamment sous la forme d’un tableau et d’un diagramme (aux paragraphes 165 et 182 ).

Mais aussi sophistiqués soient-il, ces calculs ne permettent pas à la Cour de parvenir clairement à la conclusion que la taille des échantillons a été fixée à un niveau manifestement excessif. Ils ne font que nourrir des doutes, des incertitudes et des soupçons. Il est vrai que les explications fournies par le Japon manquent de clarté et de transparence, et qu’il subsiste un certain flou sur la manière dont il a procédé pour fixer la taille des échantillons. L’expert cité par le Japon, le professeur norvégien Walløe, a lui-même admis devant la Cour que «les scientifiques japonais n’[avaient] pas toujours fourni d’explications complètement claires et transparentes sur la manière dont la taille des échantillons [avait] été calculée ou déterminée». Mais le même expert a déclaré que, selon ses propres calculs, l’ordre de grandeur de la taille d’échantillon retenue pour les petits rorquals (ceux dont le nombre de captures autorisées est de loin le plus important) était «correct».

Quant à la Cour, la seule conclusion qu’elle soit à même de formuler au terme de longs développements (au paragraphe 198 ) est que «les éléments de preuve relatifs à la taille [des échantillons] n’offrent guère d’explications ni de justifications quant aux décisions ayant présidé au choix de l’objectif de capture global», et que c’est une «raison supplémentaire de douter que la conception de JARPA II soit raisonnable au regard de ses objectifs annoncés». Encore des doutes, provenant du constat de certaines lacunes ou faiblesses, mais rien qui vienne étayer solidement la conclusion que JARPA II ne poursuit pas réellement les fins scientifiques qui lui sont assignées.

43.  Ensuite, l’arrêt fait grand cas de la discordance entre les objectifs fixés dans le programme JARPA II quant au nombre de captures et les prises effectives. Ces dernières sont très inférieures aux objectifs. La Cour y trouve curieusement une raison supplémentaire de dénier à JARPA II le caractère d’un programme conduit «en vue de recherches scientifiques».

Les raisons de cette différence sont connues, et l’arrêt les mentionne ( paragraphe 206 ). Le Japon a renoncé à la capture des baleines à bosse à la suite d’une demande du président de la commission baleinière internationale, comme gage de bonne volonté. Quant aux deux autres espèces, la différence entre les objectifs et les prises effectives s’explique en très grande partie par le type de navires choisi, impropre à la capture des rorquals communs, et par divers actes de sabotage organisés par certains groupes hostiles à la chasse à la baleine qui ont empêché que les objectifs de capture des petits rorquals soient atteints.

44.  On voit mal, cependant, en quoi le fait que le Japon n’ait pas réalisé, au cours de ces dernières années, les objectifs de capture qu’il avait assignés au programme JARPA II, permet de conclure que ce programme a perdu son caractère scientifique, et encore moins d’estimer qu’il n’a jamais eu un tel caractère.

Le raisonnement de la Cour est, en substance, le suivant ( paragraphes 209 à 211 ). D’une part, puisque le programme JARPA II a continué malgré un nombre de prises effectives très inférieures aux objectifs initiaux, cela tend à démontrer que ces objectifs avaient été fixés à un niveau excessif et non pas selon les exigences de nécessité et de proportionnalité, et cela «accrédite encore la thèse de l’Australie selon laquelle la détermination des tailles d’échantillon de petits rorquals obéissait à des considérations qui n’étaient pas scientifiques». D’autre part, l’absence ou la rareté des prises pour deux des trois espèces concernées affaiblit l’argument du Japon selon lequel l’augmentation importante des objectifs de capture des baleines appartenant à la troisième espèce (les petits rorquals) dans le programme JARPA II, s’explique par l’introduction dans ce programme d’un objectif scientifique de recherche sur la concurrence entre les espèces, qui n’existait pas dans le programme précédent.

La Cour résume sa pensée dans la formule suivante :

«[l]e fait que le Japon continue, en dépit des différences entre les tailles d’échantillon prévues et les prises effectives, de s’appuyer sur les deux premiers objectifs de JARPA II pour justifier les tailles d’échantillon … et qu’il déclare en outre que ces volumes de capture très réduits peuvent néanmoins générer des résultats significatifs sur le plan scientifique, jette un doute supplémentaire sur le fait que JARPA II soit un programme en vue de recherches scientifiques» ( paragraphe 212 ).

Encore le doute. Mais un doute, et même une accumulation de doutes, suffisent-ils pour faire une preuve ? Selon moi, et au cas d’espèce en tout cas, on en est très loin. Au surplus, l’affirmation selon laquelle la réalisation partielle d’un programme de recherche ne prive pas celui-ci de la capacité de produire des résultats scientifiquement significatifs ne me paraît guère contestable, et je n’y vois rien qui soit de nature à alimenter d’aussi graves soupçons.

45.  Il est vrai que la Cour parachève sa démonstration par trois arguments ultimes, sous le titre «autres aspects», mais dont je suis obligé de dire qu’ils ne sont guère plus solides que les précédents : le programme JARPA II ne comporte pas de limite dans le temps — mais je ne vois pas bien d’où vient l’idée qu’un programme de recherche ne peut revêtir un caractère scientifique que s’il est limité dans le temps ; les résultats obtenus dans le cadre de JARPA II n’ont fait l’objet jusqu’à présent que d’un petit nombre de publications dans les revues scientifiques — mais cela ne suffit pas à fonder le constat que le programme n’est pas conduit en vue de recherches scientifiques, tout au plus ce pourrait être l’indice qu’il y a eu des faiblesses ou des défauts dans sa conception ; le Japon n’a pas donné beaucoup d’exemples de coopération entre l’institut chargé du programme JARPA II et d’autres organismes de recherche, ce qu’il aurait été, selon la Cour, «permis d’escompter» — mais on est encore ici dans une critique de la manière de conduire la recherche plutôt que dans une contestation convaincante de son caractère scientifique.

46.  Même ajoutés les uns aux autres, les griefs que la Cour adresse au Japon sont très loin de permettre de conclure, selon moi, que le programme JARPA II n’a pas été conçu et mis en œuvre «en vue de recherches scientifiques» au sens du paragraphe 1 de l’article VIII de la convention, ce qui est la conclusion que tire la Cour au paragraphe 227 .

Et ce, pour deux raisons essentielles : les doutes ne sont pas des preuves ; les défauts méthodologiques dans la conception d’un programme scientifique ne lui retirent pas son caractère scientifique, et ne lui impriment pas une finalité commerciale.

47.  Je regrette d’autant plus le parti que la Cour a choisi de prendre que, ce faisant, elle a négligé l’apport aux débats, selon moi remarquable, de l’expert cité par le Japon, le professeur norvégien de renommée internationale Lars Walløe. Ce dernier a démontré son indépendance d’esprit en critiquant, devant la Cour, certains des aspects, cependant mineurs, du programme JARPA II — l’arrêt d’ailleurs en tire argument contre le défendeur à plusieurs reprises. Cela ne rend que plus crédible, à mon avis, l’ensemble de sa déposition. Or, le professeur Walløe a affirmé que «les deux programmes JARPA et JARPA II ont fourni des informations précieuses aux fins de la mise en œuvre de la RMP (la procédure de gestion révisée, outil de gestion des stocks de baleines utilisé par la commission baleinière internationale) dans sa version actuelle ou d’éventuelles améliorations de cette procédure» et que «ces programmes apportent des informations capitales sur les évolutions qui s’opèrent actuellement dans l’écosystème de l’Antarctique».

En ce qui concerne la taille des échantillons, le professeur Walløe a indiqué, lors des audiences, qu’il ignorait comment les scientifiques japonais avaient procédé exactement, mais qu’ayant fait ses propres calculs pour déterminer, entre autres, la taille des échantillons nécessaire pour observer des changements relatifs à l’âge et la maturité sexuelle — paramètres particulièrement intéressants — sur une période de six ans, il a constaté «que le nombre de baleines nécessaires pour pouvoir observer un changement était de l’ordre de 900».

48.  Je n’ignore pas que le professeur Walløe étant un expert cité par l’une des Parties, la Cour ne pouvait pas tenir pour vraies, sans autre examen, toutes ses déclarations, alors même que d’autres experts, cités par la Partie adverse, exprimaient des avis différents.

Mais je pense que le fait qu’un homme de science de cette réputation exprime sans ambages son appréciation positive quant à l’intérêt scientifique des recherches conduites dans le cadre de JARPA II et quant au caractère raisonnable des tailles d’échantillons fixées (sauf, a-t-il dit, pour l’espèce des rorquals communs dont le nombre de captures prévues était trop faible pour donner des résultats significatifs) aurait dû peser grandement dans le jugement porté par la Cour sur la nature même de JARPA II.

Tel aurait été certainement le cas si la Cour, au lieu d’essayer de tenir le rôle d’une sorte de comité scientifique recherchant dans le détail ce qui, dans le programme JARPA II, pourrait être considéré comme un défaut ou une lacune dans sa conception ou sa mise en œuvre, s’était bornée à répondre à la seule question de savoir si les activités en cause étaient menées en vue de recherches scientifiques — que celles-ci soient excellemment ou imparfaitement conçues — et si elle n’avait pas appliqué au défendeur, de manière sous-jacente, un préjugé défavorable.

(Signé) Ronny Abraham.

1.  As my votes indicate, I agree with the conclusions the Court has reached. I also agree generally with the reasons it has given in reaching those conclusions. My purpose in this declaration is to address three matters in support of those reasons:

1. (a)   the broader context in which the case is to be seen;

2. (b)   the extent of the power of a Contracting Government to grant a special permit under Article VIII of the Convention and the related issue of the standard of review to be applied by the Court in the event of a dispute about the grant of particular permits;

3. (c)   the application of that standard of review to the facts of the present case.

2.  In the 65 years the Convention has been in force there have been massive changes both in the operation of the whaling industry and in attitudes and policies towards whaling. Under the Schedule, as in effect at the outset, the total allowable annual catch in the waters south of 40 degrees south latitude was 16,000 blue whales, or 32,000 fin whales or 40,000 humpback whales. (No provision was originally made in respect of minke whales.) By 1965 the taking of blue whales had been prohibited, and by 1972 the limit for Antarctic minke whales had been set at 5,000. These limits are two of the many manifestations of the exercise by the International Whaling Commission of its powers of regulation. Such binding action could be taken, if the necessary majority was available, subject to the power of a Contracting Government to object, with the consequence that it would not be bound by the new regulation.

3.  In 1972, the year the 5,000 limit on the take of minke whales was introduced, the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, held in Stockholm, recommended a ten-year moratorium on commercial whaling. As some of the nine original members of the Commission, which were all whaling nations at the outset, abandoned whaling and new members, with extensive NGO support, joined the Commission, the votes favouring a moratorium grew. As the Judgment recounts, the moratorium was adopted in 1982. Many factors, commercial, scientific, technological, environmental, political and others, no doubt lay behind that decision. Those factors are also manifested in the very many zero catch limits now to be found in the tables in the Schedule. Today’s Schedule is in very sharp contrast to that which operated 65 years ago. It is hard to imagine that those who in 1946 proposed and adopted the new “effective administrative machinery” anticipated it being used in such dramatic ways. They might think it passing strange that a power established to regulate an ongoing industry had been used virtually to prohibit it; compare, e.g., Dispute regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua) (Judgment, I.C.J Reports 2009, p. 249, para. 87 (1)).

4.  Those Contracting Governments which engaged in whaling and took that view had a number of options open to them. They could withdraw from the Convention by giving notice under its terms, as some did. They could exercise their right to object to the measures, as, again, a number of States, including Japan, did. They could seek to amend the Convention, but that possibility has not been pursued. Or they could challenge the lawfulness of a particular measure, again a course not taken.

5.  Over the last 30 years, the membership of the Commission has again changed, with an increase of those Contracting Governments which support whaling, as well as of those which are opposed. It has been possible for those on each side of the argument about whaling to complain that the Commission has become overpoliticized. One consequence has been that the Commission has become deadlocked and has recently decided to meet only every second year.

6.  I conclude this introductory passage by putting the current dispute, brought before the Court for decision in accordance with international law, in the broader context of methods of peaceful settlement of international disputes. From 2007 until 2010 there were extensive attempts through The Future of the IWC Process to resolve through negotiations a range of matters, including the dispute which is now before the Court. That process however failed. It ended just days after Australia filed its Application in this case. The Chair of the Support Group, when reviewing the process, particularly paid tribute to the United States of America for its energy and leadership during the negotiating process, and to Japan for its huge commitment and its willingness for compromise. Japan referred to this assessment several times during the written and oral pleadings. Australia said nothing at all about it.

7.  I see the extent of the power of the Contracting Government to grant a special permit and the extent of the power of the Court to review the grant as being essentially interrelated. The wider the power of the Contracting Government the more limited the power of the Court to review. For me, three features of the power conferred on Contracting Governments by Article VIII (I) of the Convention are significant. The first is that the wording of the provision at its core is not subjective. It does not say that a Contracting Government may grant a special permit for “what it considers to be” scientific research. The non-appearance of those words is emphasized by the subjective wording appearing at the end of that sentence — “as the Contracting Government thinks fit”. Such wording was, for instance, in issue in the Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters case, where the Court nevertheless considered that it had some power of review ((Djibouti v. France), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2008, p. 229, para. 145). That case is helpful in a second and more important way since the assessment there by the relevant State authority was based on that State’s own assessment of prejudice to its “essential interests”. The assessment here, by contrast, relates to a much more concrete matter — a programme for the purposes of scientific research relating to whales and associated matters. A third feature is the common interest of all the Contracting Governments in the operation of the Convention with the related roles of the IWC and its Scientific Committee. Those features all indicate for me real limits on the power of the Contracting Government to grant a special permit. A fourth significant matter bearing directly on the Court’s exercise of its power of review in this case is the extensive body of information in the record before it about the process which led to the range of decisions to establish the JARPA II programme and about its implementation.

8.  As the Judgment indicates, the positions of the Parties and the Intervener on the standard of review have evolved over the course of the proceedings ( paragraphs 62–69 ). While in general I agree with the test stated by the Court, I formulate it in this way: is the Contracting Government’s decision to award a special permit objectively justifiable in the sense that the decision is supported by coherent scientific reasoning? The test does not require that the programme be “justified”, rather, that on the record it is justifiable. Nor is it for the Court to decide on the scientific merit of the programme’s objectives nor whether its design and implementation are the best possible means of achieving those objectives. But it does have the role of assessing, in the light of the features of the power mentioned in the previous paragraph , the evidence to see whether it demonstrates coherent scientific reasoning supporting central features of the programme. Such tests, like that stated by the Court, become clearer as they are applied to the facts in issue.

9.  Subject to one matter of emphasis, I have nothing to add to the reasons given in support of the conclusions reached by the Court relating to the decisions taken by the Japanese authorities regarding the use of lethal methods as opposed to non-lethal ones ( paragraphs 128–144 ) and the determination of the sample sizes ( paragraphs 147–198 ); and relating to the comparison of the sample size to the actual take ( paragraphs 199–212 ). The matter of emphasis is that for me the evidence demonstrates a failure by the Japanese authorities even to address central matters involved in the initial design and ongoing implementation of the programme.

10.  In respect of the decisions regarding the use of lethal methods and non-lethal ones, I see as critical the failure of Japan to provide any evidence of any studies which it undertook of the use of non-lethal methods through the long period running from the planning of the programme to the present day (see in particular paragraphs 136–141 ). The Court did, by contrast, receive evidence from the two experts called by Australia about the enhancement and wider use over that time of non-lethal methods which were capable of being used for at least some of the objectives of the programme.

11.  So far as the determination of the sample sizes is concerned, the lack of any clear explanation in the record for the choices of a 12-year research period for two of the species and of six years for the other means, as I see the matter, that those aspects of the decision which are critical for the sizes of the samples of the different species are not supported by coherent scientific reasoning. Among the objectives of the programme are inter-species competition and ecosystem research ( paragraphs 176–178 ). A similar lack of explanation appears in respect of the choice of annual sample sizes of 50 for each of the humpback and fin species when the research plan for the programme called for a take of at least 131 of each species for the purpose of one of the objectives ( paragraph 179 ).

12.  I next see as significant the essential failure of Japan to explain in a persuasive manner the big increase in the target for minke whales from JARPA to JARPA II. On the one hand, it said that the new objectives were a major reason, when they do not appear to be clearly distinct from the objectives of JARPA as they existed in the last part of that programme; but, on the other, it emphasized the need for continuity in moving from the first to the second programme ( paragraphs 147–156 ). It does not appear to me to be scientifically credible to maintain both of those arguments at one and the same time.

13.  Finally, I consider the difference between the sample size and the actual take. I see it as significant that, while Japan has continued to issue special permits for the taking of the same numbers of the three species throughout the programme, except for 2005 and 2006 in respect of fin and humpback whales, it has never reported to the IWC and in particular to the Scientific Committee on the consequences of the much reduced takes of minke whales and fin whales and the nil take of humpback whales for the design and implementation of the programme ( paragraphs 209–212 ). The Annexes to Japan’s Counter-Memorial in the part concerned with documents which it issued (Anns. 133–159) include only three possibly relevant documents submitted to the IWC or its Scientific Committee (Anns. 152, 153 and 156) and none on its face addresses those changes and the possible consequences for the research. Only one of them dates from the time of the full-scale operation of JARPA II and does no more than list publications arising from JARPA II as well as from JARPA. That failure is to be seen in the context of the requirements of paragraph 30 of the Schedule and the duty of co-operation with the IWC and its Scientific Committee which, as the Court notes, both Parties and the intervening State recognize ( paragraphs 83 and 240 ).

14.  To summarize, the evidence before the Court, as I read it, does not show that the Japanese authorities in planning and implementing the programme have given any real consideration or indeed any consideration at all to the central elements of the programme discussed above. Accordingly, and for the reasons also given by the Court, I conclude that the programme does not fall within the scope of Article VIII (1) and that, as a consequence, the actions of Japan, taken in terms of the programme, for the killing, taking and treating of whales under it, breach paragraph 10 (e), paragraph 10 (d) and paragraph 7 (b) of the Schedule.

(Signed) Kenneth Keith.

1.  The Teleological Approach

2.  Response of New Zealand to Questions from the Bench

1.  Collective Decision-Making under the ICRW Convention

2.  Review of Proposed Special Permits under the Schedule

1.  The Tension between Conservation and Exploitation: Arguments of the Parties

2.  Whale Stocks — Conservation and Development: Responses of the Parties and the Intervenor to Questions from the Bench

3.  General Assessment

A.  The dispute between the Parties

B.  The standard of review applied by the Court

C.  The applicable law

D.  The assessment of the legality of the special permits for JARPA II

Issue before the Court confined to whether JARPA II compatible with the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling — Interpretation of the Convention — Object and purpose of the Convention — Resolutions of the International Whaling Commission — Relevance for interpretation of the Convention — Subsequent practice of the parties to the Convention — Withdrawal of Japan’s objection to the commercial moratorium — Obligations under Article VIII of the Convention — Relationship between Article VIII of the Convention and paragraphs 7 (b), 10 (d) and 10 (e) of the Schedule — Relationship between JARPA and JARPA — JARPA II not within the exception in Article VIII, paragraph 1, of the Convention — Japan therefore in breach of its obligations under paragraphs 7 (b), 10 (d) and 10 (e) of the Schedule — Whether Japan has acted in bad faith — Whether Japan has breached paragraph 30 of the Schedule — The Court’s decision not to order a second round of written argument.

1.  JARPA II, like Japan’s other whaling programmes, has long been the subject of controversy. To many of its critics, whaling is intrinsically wrong and incompatible with contemporary ethical and environmental principles. For such critics, the adoption of the moratorium on commercial whaling by the International Whaling Commission (“the Commission”) in 1986 was a vindication of those principles. Seen in that light, it is to be regarded less as a moratorium, in the true sense of the word, than as a comprehensive and indefinite ban on all forms of whaling. Defenders of Japan’s whaling programmes, by contrast, point to the long-standing cultural traditions of whaling in Japan and the economic dependence of certain Japanese communities upon the continuation of whaling. These are large and important questions which arouse strong emotions but they are not the questions the Court is called upon to decide (see paragraph 69 of the Judgment). The issue before the Court is a narrower one, namely whether or not JARPA II is compatible with Japan’s international legal obligations under the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (“ICRW”) and it is that issue alone which the Court has determined in the present Judgment.

2.  The broader debate to which I have alluded is, however, reflected in a marked difference between the Parties regarding the approach which should be taken to the interpretation of the Convention. For Australia, the Convention is — or, at least, has become — an agreement about the conservation of whales. Australia relies upon the references to conservation in the Preamble of the Convention and the approach taken in a series of resolutions adopted by the Commission which, Australia considers, show that “the legal regime for the regulation of whaling has evolved from a system primarily designed to manage the exploitation of a natural resource to an increasingly conservation-oriented regime” (Memorial of Australia, para. 2.125). On that basis, Australia argues that the ban on whaling introduced when the moratorium was adopted in 1986 is to be regarded as the general rule to which Article VIII of the Convention provides a very limited exception justifying whaling for purposes of scientific research, an exception which must be restrictively construed.

3.  By contrast, Japan focuses on the final paragraph of the Preamble, which records the decision “to conclude a convention to provide for the proper conservation of whale stocks and thus make possible the orderly development of the whaling industry”, from which Japan deduces that conservation was not intended to be an end in itself but only a means for securing the orderly development of the whaling industry. Japan emphatically rejects Australia’s evolutionary argument, maintaining that the resolutions of the Commission on which Australia relies were frequently adopted by very narrow majorities and against the opposition of Japan. In that context, Japan suggests that the Commission has, in effect, been hijacked by those who are fundamentally opposed to all whaling. For Japan the adoption of the moratorium in 1986 was the product of that fundamentalism, rather than scientific assessment. When the Commission amended the Schedule to the Convention to incorporate the moratorium, Japan exercised its right under Article V, paragraph 3, of the Convention to object to that amendment, thus rendering it inapplicable to Japan, and withdrew its objection only because of pressure from the United States. Against that background, Japan argues for a broader interpretation of Article VIII of the Convention.

4.  I do not find either of these approaches wholly persuasive. Australia’s approach is difficult to reconcile with the language of the Preamble and, in particular, the passage quoted in the preceding paragraph . The language of the Convention and its travaux préparatoires make clear that an important objective of the Convention was to ensure a future for the whaling industry by making sustainable whaling possible. On the other hand, Japan’s argument that the Convention treats conservation as wholly subordinate to the development of whaling is also untenable. The Preamble shows that both conservation and ensuring a future for sustainable whaling were considered to be purposes of the Convention.

5.  That balance between the two goals is not, in my opinion, altered by the resolutions of the Commission, at least not in the way, or to the extent, suggested by Australia. In this context, it is important to recall that the Convention makes provision for two very different types of resolution. Article V, paragraph 1, provides that the Commission may adopt regulations which amend the Schedule. Since the Schedule is an integral part of the Convention (in accordance with Article I, paragraph 1, of the Convention), such regulations are, in effect, amendments to the Convention itself, although the Commission does not have the power to remove Article VIII or to negate the effects of that provision. Regulations require a three-fourths majority (Article III, paragraph 2) and are binding on every State party to the Convention, unless that State raises and maintains an objection in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article V, paragraph 3. It has been the use made by the Commission of this power to adopt regulations that has been the main force in making the Convention “an evolving instrument” (Judgment, paragraph 45 ). The second type of resolution is one adopted under Article VI, by which the Commission may “make recommendations to any or all Contracting Governments on any matters which relate to whales or whaling and to the objectives and purposes of this Convention”. The adoption of a recommendation requires only a simple majority. There is no dispute about the legal effect of regulations. The question is whether recommendations from the Commission assist in the interpretation of the Convention.

6.  Where a treaty creates a body such as the International Whaling Commission in which all the member States are represented, resolutions adopted by that body form part of the subsequent practice of the parties to the treaty. As such, they are capable of constituting an aid to the interpretation of the treaty, in accordance with the principle set out in Article 31 (3) (b) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. However, subsequent practice is valuable as an aid to the interpretation of a treaty only to the extent that it establishes the agreement of the parties. Australia referred to 40 resolutions of the Commission. Of those, ten were adopted by consensus (the last one in 1994) and should therefore be considered as establishing the agreement of the parties to the Convention. Of the remaining 30 resolutions cited by Australia, all were adopted by majority vote. In many cases, the vote was very close. For example, Resolution 2003-3, on southern hemisphere minke whales and special permit whaling, was adopted by 24 votes to 20 with 1 abstention. Resolution 2005-1 criticizing JARPA II was adopted by 30 votes to 27 with one abstention. Even where the majorities were larger, the record frequently shows substantial dissent. For example, the resolution by which the Commission endorsed the Berlin Initiative of 2003 (Resolution 2003-1), a resolution emphasized by counsel for Australia (see, e.g., CR 2013/8, p. 21, para. 27), was adopted by only 25 votes to 20. In almost every one of these cases Japan was one of the dissenters. Far from establishing the agreement of the parties to the Convention, these resolutions demonstrate the absence of any agreement and cannot, therefore, be relied on to sustain an interpretation of the Convention which can bind Japan.

7.  Moreover, any assessment of the potential relevance of recommendations as an aid to the interpretation of the Convention must take into account the relationship between recommendations, which (as their name suggests) are not mandatory, and regulations, which are legally binding. As explained in paragraph 5 , above, the exercise of that power is subject to important safeguards in that it requires a three-fourths majority of those States voting and is subject to the objection procedure, which enables a State to opt out in whole or in part from the application of the new provision. It would be entirely at odds with that carefully constructed power to treat recommendations, adopted by simple majority and without any procedure for objection, as capable of producing effects similar to those of regulations. Since the power to amend the Schedule gives the Commission scope for adapting the Convention to changing circumstances, the need to interpret and apply the treaty as a “living instrument” has already been accommodated. There is thus less of a case for treating recommendations as having significant effects on the basis of an evolutionary interpretation of the provisions of the Convention. Moreover, it is evident that the Commission has frequently been divided over major issues and that changes which some member States would like to bring about have not commanded the degree of support necessary for the adoption of an amendment to the Schedule. To permit such changes to be introduced through the back door by means of recommendations would destroy the balance of the Convention.

8.  Finally, whatever criticisms Japan may have of the commercial moratorium, the fact remains that it withdrew its objection to that moratorium and has been legally bound by it for more than 25 years. It is not now open to Japan to come to the Court and seek to defend a broad interpretation of the principal exception to that moratorium by casting doubt upon the manner in which the moratorium was adopted. Whether there was a sound scientific basis for the adoption of the moratorium in 1986 and whether Japan was pressured into withdrawing its objection to the moratorium cannot influence the decision of the Court on whether the killing of whales as part of JARPA II is, or is not, “for purposes of scientific research” within Article VIII of the Convention. In my opinion, the Court was quite right to hold that this question has to be answered by examination of the terms of Article VIII without any predisposition towards a restrictive or an expansive interpretation of that provision (Judgment, paragraph 55 ).

10.  That provision imposes a number of obligations. Some are purely ancillary in character, in that they come into existence only as a consequence of a State’s decision to issue a special permit. Thus, the penultimate sentence of Article VIII, paragraph 1, requires that any State issuing a special permit must report that fact to the Commission. Article VIII, paragraph 2, lays down an important obligation to ensure that, so far as practicable, whales taken under special permit shall be processed (presumably so that their meat is not wasted). On the other hand, Article VIII , paragraph 3, imposes an obligation upon all Contracting Governments to communicate to a body designated by the Commission (which has designated the Scientific Committee for these purposes) scientific information regarding whales and whaling available to that Government irrespective of whether that information has been obtained pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 1. Similarly, Article VIII, paragraph 4, imposes a general obligation to take practicable measures to collect data.

11.  Important as these obligations are, none is in issue in the present case. Australia has not suggested that Japan has failed to comply with any of the obligations described in the preceding paragraph . These proceedings are about the provision in the first sentence of Article VIII, paragraph 1. That provision does not expressly impose an obligation; rather, it grants to a Contracting Government a power to authorize the killing, taking and treating of whales for the purposes of scientific research and provides that if any whale is killed, taken or treated in accordance with that provision, that action will “be exempt from the operation of this Convention”. In other words, the first sentence of Article VIII, paragraph 1, is a shield, not a sword. So long as any killing, taking or treatment of whales is in accordance with the requirements of Article VIII, there will be no breach of any other provision of the Convention (including any provision of the Schedule). On the other hand, if a Contracting Government purports to exercise the power granted by Article VIII, paragraph 1, but in fact exceeds the scope of that power, then that exemption will not apply and the lawfulness of any killing, taking or treating of whales will have to be measured against the other provisions of the Convention. Of course, there is an implicit obligation upon a State which exercises the power to grant special permits to act in good faith but for the reasons given below (see paragraph 29 ), I do not accept that Japan has violated that obligation.

12.  Australia’s principal case is rather that, because JARPA II does not meet the requirements of Article VIII, paragraph 1, the killing, taking and treating of whales under JARPA II contravenes other provisions of the Convention, specifically paragraphs 7 (b), 10 (d) and 10 (e) of the Schedule. Those paragraphs were added to the Schedule over the years by the International Whaling Commission in the exercise of its powers under Article V of the Convention. It is those three paragraphs (together with paragraph 30, the claim in respect of which has a somewhat different character) which constitute Australia’s cause of action in the present proceedings. It is, therefore, necessary to examine each of those paragraphs in turn.

13.  Paragraph 7 (b) of the Schedule prohibits commercial whaling in the area designated as “the Southern Ocean sanctuary” (see Judgment, paragraph 233 ). The prohibition applies to all species of whale but Japan is not bound by it with regard to minke whales, since Japan exercised its right to lodge an objection to this amendment of the Schedule in so far as it applied to minke whales. That objection has not been withdrawn. Since Japan has not, in fact, taken any humpback whales during JARPA II, the only question which arises under paragraph 7 (b) is whether the killing, taking and treating of fin whales under JARPA II is contrary to Japan’s obligations under this paragraph.

14.  Paragraph 10 (d) of the Schedule prohibits “the taking, killing or treating of whales, except minke whales, by factory ships or whale catchers attached to factory ships” (see Judgment, paragraph 232 ). Since minke whales are expressly excluded from the application of this provision and it applies only to actual taking, killing or treating, the only question is whether the taking, killing or treating of fin whales under JARPA II is contrary to Japan’s obligations under paragraph 10 (d).

15.  Paragraph 10 (e) of the Schedule is more far-reaching. This provision creates what is known as “the moratorium on commercial whaling” (see Judgment, paragraph 231 ). The relevant part of the paragraph provides that “catch limits … for commercial purposes of whales from all stocks for the 1986 coastal and the 1985/86 pelagic seasons and thereafter shall be zero”. The obligation which this provision imposes applies to all three species of whales that are the subject of JARPA II. It is thus the only provision of the Schedule which is applicable to the killing of minke whales, the species which constitutes the overwhelming majority of whales killed in the course of JARPA II. In addition, it is not confined to the actual killing, taking and treating of whales but applies to the setting of a catch limit above zero. It is therefore capable of applying to Japan’s act of setting a catch limit of 50 for humpback whales under the permits granted in each year of JARPA II, notwithstanding that no humpback whales have in fact been taken.

16.  All three of these paragraphs impose obligations upon Japan. If JARPA II complies with the requirements of Article VIII, paragraph 1, then the killing, taking and treating of whales (and, by implication, the setting of a catch limit above zero) under JARPA II is exempt from the provisions of these three paragraphs and Japan cannot be in breach of the obligations which they impose. On the other hand, if JARPA II does not meet those requirements, then Article VIII, paragraph 1, provides Japan with no exemption and it becomes necessary to consider whether Japan has violated its obligations under any or all of the three paragraphs.

17.  There is no room for doubt regarding paragraph 10 (d). That prohibits any taking, killing or treating of fin whales by factory ships or vessels attached to factory ships. The principal vessel employed in JARPA II, the Nisshin Maru, is plainly a factory ship. Accordingly, the taking of fin whales by the Nisshin Maru, or the vessels attached to her, will entail a violation of Japan’s obligations under this paragraph unless Japan is exempted from that obligation by the operation of Article VIII, paragraph 1.

18.  The position as regards paragraphs 7 (b) and 10 (e) requires closer examination. Japan’s obligation under paragraph 7 (b) is to refrain from “commercial whaling” of fin whales in the Southern Ocean sanctuary. The obligation under paragraph 10 (e) is to refrain from setting catch limits above zero for the killing “for commercial purposes” of any of the three species of whale. Australia contends that the Convention recognizes only three types of whaling: subsistence whaling (under paragraph 13 of the Schedule), whaling for scientific purposes (under Article VIII of the Convention) and commercial whaling. Since Japan has never suggested that whaling carried out under JARPA II is subsistence whaling, Australia maintains that if JARPA II whaling does not fall within the provisions of Article VIII, then it must be classified as commercial whaling. Japan did not disagree with this analysis during the proceedings. Indeed, counsel for Japan commented that “[t]he [Commission] recognizes three categories of whaling: commercial, aboriginal subsistence, and special permit whaling” (CR 2013/12, p. 44, para. 14). Japan has not attempted to suggest that even if its whaling under JARPA II fell outside the exemption granted by Article VIII, paragraph 1, it might nevertheless avoid violating the prohibitions in paragraphs 7 (b) and 10 (e) on the basis that it was not to be regarded as commercial whaling.

19.  The position taken by the Parties in the present proceedings is in accordance with what appears to be the understanding of other States parties to the Convention and of the Commission itself. Thus, when the adoption of the commercial moratorium was under consideration in the Commission in the mid-1980s, it seems to have been accepted by all concerned that if the moratorium was adopted, the effect would be to ban all whaling for States bound by the moratorium with the exception only of subsistence whaling and scientific whaling which complied with Article VIII. The intention behind paragraph 10 (e) was a comprehensive ban on whaling, subject only to the two exceptions just mentioned. Moreover, since the adoption of the moratorium, there appears to have been no suggestion by any State that the scope of paragraph 10 (e) was more limited.

20.  An examination of what actually takes place in the course of JARPA II also supports the conclusion that, if whaling under JARPA II does not fall within the provisions of Article VIII and thus benefit from the exemption granted by paragraph 1 of that Article, then it must be regarded as whaling for commercial purposes and, therefore, thus as contrary to paragraph 10 (e). The meat from whales taken under JARPA II is sold, so far as practicable and so far as there is a market for it, to customers in Japan. The sale of whale meat is a commercial activity and if whales are taken with a view to their meat being sold, then one of the purposes of that whaling is a commercial purpose. So long as JARPA II whaling is in conformity with the provisions of Article VIII, paragraph 1, the existence of that commercial purpose raises no legal issue. On the contrary, paragraph 2 of Article VIII expressly permits (and indeed requires) that whales taken under special permits should be processed and the proceeds dealt with in accordance with the directions of the appropriate government. However, paragraph 2 is relevant only if whaling under JARPA II is in conformity with Article VIII, paragraph 1. If that is not the case, then that whaling falls to be assessed by reference to the provisions of paragraph 10 (e) (and, to the more limited extent that it is relevant, paragraph 7 (b)). At that point, the fact that meat from whales taken is intended for sale is sufficient to make the whaling activity one conducted for commercial purposes and thus a breach of the moratorium.

21.  Demand for whale meat in Japan has been falling in recent years and significant quantities of whale meat acquired as a result of JARPA II whaling remain unsold. Yet that fact does not mean that the sale of whale meat ceases to be a commercial activity, or that the taking of whales whose meat is to be sold is not commercial whaling. An activity does not lose its commercial character simply because the commerce is unprofitable any more than, in the field of sovereign immunity, an activity has to be characterized as sovereign rather than commercial because the State engaging in it is making a loss.

22.  That the supply of whale meat from JARPA II for Japanese consumers remains an important part of Japan’s thinking regarding JARPA II is demonstrated by a statement made by the Director of the Japan Fisheries Agency, Mr Kazuyoshi Honkawa, in the Japanese Diet in October 2012. That statement was made after the written pleadings in the present proceedings had closed, so it must be assumed that all concerned would have been aware of the significance of what he was saying. The statement is sufficiently important that it deserves to be quoted at some length.

“Before the earthquake, Japan’s scientific whaling programme supplied approximately 3,700 or 3,800 tonnes of whale meat. 2,000 tonnes of that was from the Southern Ocean. Most of that was minke whale. Minke whale meat is prized because it is said to have a very good flavour and aroma when eaten as sashimi and the like.

Another 1,700 tonnes came from the North West Pacific Ocean in 2010, 120 tonnes of which was from coastal scientific whaling. So, just over 1,500 tonnes was from whales taken by the ICR [the Institute for Cetacean Research]. Most of this was from sei whales and Bryde’s whales.

In addition, 470 tonnes was from whales caught by small-type coastal whalers in 2010. These were Baird’s beaked whales, which are whales that are very similar to dolphins. Meat from Baird’s beaked whales is processed into a dried meat something like jerky. When you went to Ayukawa recently, the whalers from Ayukawa were engaged in taking Baird’s beaked whales, and I believe it would be most unlikely that they would be handling minke whales from the Southern Ocean.

Consequently, we have said that the scientific whaling programme in the Southern Ocean was necessary to achieve a stable supply of minke whale meat.” (Minutes of the Meeting of the Sub-committee of the House of Representatives Committee on Audit and Oversight of Administration, 23 October 2012; translation provided by Australia.)

This statement and, in particular, the final paragraph, clearly shows that the supply of whale meat from JARPA II to Japanese consumers has not ceased. So long as JARPA II whaling falls within the exemption granted by Article VIII, paragraph 1, of the Convention, this commercial aspect of JARPA II is perfectly lawful. If, however, JARPA II is not in conformity with Article VIII, paragraph 1, then this commercial aspect shows that Japan is in breach of its obligations under paragraphs 7 (b) and 10 (e) of the Schedule.

23.  The critical question before the Court is, therefore, whether JARPA II whaling is in conformity with Article VIII, paragraph 1. If the conclusion is that it is not in conformity with Article VIII, paragraph 1, however, the result is not that Japan has violated its obligations under Article VIII. The question is critical because the answer will determine whether or not Japan has violated its obligations under paragraphs 7 (b), 10 (d) and 10 (e) of the Schedule.

24.  I agree with the reasoning in the Judgment that JARPA II whaling does not meet the requirements of Article VIII, paragraph 1, of the Convention. The principal reason why Japan is unable to rely upon the exemption conferred by Article VIII, paragraph 1, is that the numbers of whales authorized to be killed under JARPA II are not objectively reasonable in the light of the objectives of JARPA II. As explained above, the effect of Article VIII, paragraph 1, is to exempt the killing, taking and treating of whales from the other provisions of the Convention. Accordingly, it cannot be sufficient to establish that a research project like JARPA II has scientific objectives. To take advantage of the exemption contained in Article VIII, paragraph 1, it is necessary that the numbers of whales to be killed are sufficiently related to the achievement of those objectives. That is where, in my opinion, Japan’s case breaks down.

25.  To see why, it is important to consider the relationship between JARPA II and the earlier JARPA programme. JARPA II shares certain objectives with JARPA and Japan has insisted upon the need for continuity between the two programmes. Thus, Japan has sought to explain its decision to embark upon the feasibility study for JARPA II before it received the results of the Scientific Committee’s review of JARPA by maintaining that the need for continuity in the provision of data justified such a step. In addition, in designing JARPA II, Japan relied heavily upon work done in the course of JARPA. An important example is that, when it was asked by a Member of the Court what assessment it had made of the potential for using non-lethal methods in JARPA II, Japan referred only to a study carried out some years earlier in the course of JARPA; there was no suggestion that a fresh assessment had been carried out in respect of JARPA II. Yet JARPA II involved a dramatic increase in the number of whales to be killed. Under JARPA only minke whales were to be killed and the sample size for that species was initially set at 300, with numbers rising to 400 in the latter years of the programme. By contrast, the sample size for minke whales under JARPA II was set at more than double that for JARPA (850 whales with the possibility of going to a maximum of 935 a year). JARPA II also envisaged an annual take of 50 fin whales and 50 humpback whales. While Japan acceded to a request from the then Chair of the Commission not to kill any humpback whales and has not taken any during the lifetime of JARPA II, the permits issued each year under JARPA II continue to provide for the taking of up to 50 humpback whales. Japan maintains that this substantial increase in killing is justified by the more extensive research goals of JARPA II.

26.  The objectives of JARPA II are set out at paragraphs 113–118 of the Judgment. A key difference from JARPA lies in the second objective, which is described as “modelling competition among whale species and future management objectives” (see Judgment, paragraph 115 ). That clearly requires research into more than one species of whale and was the principal reason for adding a sample size for fin whales and humpback whales. Yet, from the outset Japan has taken no humpback whales and the number of fin whales taken has been very small, falling far short of the sample size provided in JARPA II. It is noticeable that the independent expert called by Japan, Professor Walløe, stated, in answer to a question from a Member of the Court, that the fin whale sample size was unjustifiable and would not have yielded any useful data. Japan did not attempt to refute his answer. Japan is certainly not to be criticized for not having killed more fin whales and it deserves more credit than it has perhaps received for its decision to accede to the request from the Chair of the Commission not to go ahead with its plan to take humpback whales. Nevertheless, there is no sign that Japan has made any adaptation to JARPA II as a result of these changed circumstances. It still maintains the sample size of 850 minke whales a year (though it has actually taken significantly fewer). Yet that figure was initially justified on the basis that it was necessary for modelling competition. It is not possible to model competition by the study of only one species. Japan maintains that it is obtaining data in respect of other species by the use of non-lethal methods but that merely begs the question why, if such methods supply the relevant information in respect of fin and humpback whales, can such methods not be employed more extensively in respect of minke whales.

27.  If one sets aside the objective of modelling competition between whale species, the dramatic increase in the number of minke whales to be taken under JARPA II from those taken under JARPA becomes extremely difficult to justify. The other research objectives of JARPA II are sufficiently close to those of JARPA that it is difficult to see how they could justify more than doubling the sample size of minke whales. Moreover, there is no evidence that Japan has engaged in any serious attempt to assess what sample size is required in light of the changed circumstances resulting from the actual implementation of JARPA II.

28.  That is just one aspect of the weakness of Japan’s case but it is one which I found particularly significant. For that and for the other reasons given in the Judgment, I consider that JARPA II whaling cannot be brought within the provisions of Article VIII, paragraph 1. Consequently, in my view, that whaling entails a breach by Japan of its obligations under paragraphs 7 (b) and 10 (d), in respect of fin whales, and paragraph 10 (e) in respect of all three species.

29.  I do not consider, however, that Japan has been shown to have acted in bad faith. In advancing its case for a finding of bad faith, Australia quoted a number of statements by serving or retired Japanese officials which, it maintained, demonstrated that Japan’s true purpose in launching its programmes of scientific whaling in the Antarctic (JARPA and then JARPA II) was a desire to keep its whaling industry alive. Australia particularly highlighted three such statements (CR 2013/7, pp. 27–28). The first was a statement to the Diet by the then Director-General of the Japan Fisheries Agency in 1984 (20 years before the start of JARPA II and at a time when Japan still maintained an objection to the commercial moratorium) that

“after the moratorium commences, the path to ensure the continuation of whaling would be, for Southern Ocean whaling, to position it as a research whaling activity which has a scientific nature … the continuation of whaling ought to be planned for …”.

The second was an extract from a memoir by a retired Director-General about how “scientific whaling was viewed as the only method available to carry on with the traditions of whaling”, a statement which is even less persuasive as evidence of bad faith if, as Australia now accepts, the correct translation should have been “pass on the traditions of whaling”. The third was a 2013 statement by a minister that “I don’t think there will be any kind of an end for whaling by Japan”. These statements, like the others cited in the Memorial (and the statement quoted at paragraph 22 , above) suggest that science was not the only consideration for Japan, but that is not enough in itself to take JARPA II outside the scope of Article VIII, paragraph 1. It certainly does not suffice to make out a case of bad faith.

30.  I have voted in favour of the finding, in operative paragraph 6 of the Judgment, that Japan has not breached its obligations under paragraph 30 of the Schedule, because I consider that Australia has not made out its case that Japan failed to give the Scientific Committee the information regarding JARPA II permits required by that paragraph. Paragraph 30 requires the submission of certain information regarding proposed special permits to the Scientific Committee in sufficient time for the Committee to consider those permits and report to the Commission. Paragraph 30 gives the Committee a power of review, it does not confer upon it a power of approval (a point made clear by the late Sir Derek Bowett in his advice to the Commission regarding the proposal to insert what became paragraph 30 in the Schedule). While the JARPA II permits themselves are uninformative, the information required was nonetheless contained in the JARPA II research plan, which was shown to the Committee in good time.

31.  Nevertheless, I must express my disquiet about one aspect of Japan’s behaviour in this respect. Paragraph 30 of the Schedule has to be understood in the context of the broader duty of co-operation to which all Contracting Governments are subject. Japan did not contest the existence of that obligation. In my opinion, that duty means that a State is not free to adopt a formalistic approach to paragraph 30. On the contrary, the information which it gives must be such as to enable a meaningful review and the State must take account of the outcome of that review, even though it is not obliged to implement any recommendations that the Committee might make or to agree with the Committee’s assessment of the proposed permits. The Judgment demonstrates that — for whatever reason — Japan has not been able to implement the JARPA II research plan; it has abandoned the attempt to take humpback whales and its actual take of fin and minke whales has fallen far short of the sample sizes identified in the plan. Yet, the record shows that Japan has continued to submit special permits in identical terms throughout the years of JARPA II. It has not provided any information regarding whether, or how, the plan has been adapted to take account of the changed circumstances. It must, therefore, be open to question whether there has been a full compliance with the duty of co-operation.

32.  Paragraph 6 of the Judgment records the fact that Japan requested, but Australia opposed, a second round of written argument in this case. The Court did not order a second round but decided instead to proceed straight to the oral phase. Since Japan made clear its disappointment with this decision and since the Judgment says almost nothing about it, I want briefly to explain why I consider the Court’s decision to be justified.

33.  The Rules of Court make clear that a second round of written pleadings is by no means automatic. Article 45, paragraph 2, provides that the Court may authorize a second round if the parties are so agreed or if the Court decides, proprio motu, or at the request of one of the parties, that a second round is necessary. In other words, unless the parties are agreed, the Court has a discretion to decide whether or not to order a second round if it considers that further pleadings are necessary.

34.  Three considerations seem to me to be important in this regard. First, it must always be open to the Court to order a second round of written pleadings if the Court decides that this is necessary, for example because the Court considers it does not have sufficient information on a particular matter.

35.  Secondly, the number of cases now being brought before the Court means that the Court has an obligation to ensure that proceedings do not become unnecessarily protracted. The Rules of Court make clear that the Applicant should set out the entirety of its case in the Memorial and the Respondent in the Counter-Memorial (Article 49, paragraphs 1 and 2). A State should never hold part of its case — whether argument or evidence — in reserve for a second round.

36.  Lastly, there is, in my view, a distinction between the Applicant and the Respondent when the Court comes to consider whether to accede to a request for a second round made by one party but opposed by the other. The first round of written pleadings closes with the Counter-Memorial. That document will usually be the first indication which the Applicant receives of the Respondent’s case. It may raise matters which the Applicant has not considered, or evidence which the Applicant needs the opportunity to refute. There is, therefore, a strong case for ordering a second round of written pleadings when the Applicant so requests; not to do so may occasion serious injustice if the Applicant is denied the opportunity to respond to evidence or argument raised by the Respondent in the Counter-Memorial. By contrast, when the Respondent prepares its Counter-Memorial, it has the benefit of having seen both the Application and the Memorial. It has a duty to set out its case in response in full in the Counter-Memorial. If, having seen the Counter-Memorial, the Applicant considers that it does not need a second round of written pleading, it is difficult to see on what grounds the Respondent can claim to need such a second round. It has already had the last word and no injustice is done by denying it the opportunity to rehearse or add to its case.

37.  The one consideration in favour of ordering such a second round in the present case was that Japan had raised an objection to jurisdiction (though not as a preliminary objection) and wished to have an idea of the response it could expect from Australia. I accept that in some cases the nature of the jurisdictional objection might be such that a second round of written argument became necessary but I do not think that such was the case here. Japan’s objection was based upon the interpretation of Australia’s declaration under Article 36 (2) of the Statute. Consideration of that objection required no documents or other evidence beyond what had been submitted by Japan and what was already freely and publicly available and Japan, represented by very experienced counsel, can have been in little doubt what form Australia’s response would take.

38.  Accordingly, I think the Court was right to refuse the request for a second round of written argument.

(Signed) Christopher Greenwood.

1.  Although I concur with the Court’s conclusion that special permits granted by Japan under JARPA II do not fall within the meaning of Article VIII, paragraph 1, of the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, much to my regret, I do not agree with all of the reasonings upon which the Judgment is based. My votes on paragraphs (3), (4) and (5) of the operative part are not based on the same legal considerations as those stated by the Court. As required by my judicial duty, I append this separate opinion to the Judgment with the explanation of my position.

2.  The dispute between the Parties in the present case with regard to the issue whether or not Japan’s granting of special permits to the JARPA II programme is in compliance with the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (“the Convention”) essentially concerns the meaning of Article VIII, paragraph 1, of the Convention and its relationship with the rest of the treaty provisions. To adjudicate the dispute, the Court may arguably need to examine the scientific aspects of the case, but the legal aspects, in my opinion, should take the centre-stage of judicial review. In its reasoning, although the Court deals with each of the issues relating to treaty interpretation, these crucial issues do not receive sufficient consideration in relation to the legality of the JARPA II programme. Consequently its reasoning for the conclusions regarding alleged violations of the Schedule lacks some coherence.

In the pleadings, Japan insists on its right to grant special permits for JARPA II by adopting a strictly textual interpretation of this Article. Australia, on the other hand, challenges the legality of JARPA II’s use of lethal sampling on the basis of the object and purpose of the Convention. Each Party underscores one side of the Convention.

4.  Article VIII sets up a special category of whaling under the Convention, pursuant to which, a contracting party may issue special permits to its nationals to kill, take, and treat whales for purposes of scientific research (scientific whaling). In issuing such special permits, a contracting party may specify the number of killing and other conditions as it “thinks fit”. Moreover, killing, taking and treating under special permits are exempt from the restrictions imposed on commercial whaling under the Convention, including the Schedule, which forms an integral part of the Convention.

5.  It is clear that by these terms the Convention confers a discretionary power on the contracting parties with regard to scientific whaling. What is not clear from these terms, however, is to what extent a contracting party may exercise such discretion in granting special permits for scientific whaling. This is the very question that divides the Parties.

6.  By its plain meaning, Article VIII, paragraph 1, of the Convention apparently leaves the matter of granting special permits in the hands of each contracting party. The term “thinks fit” implies a certain degree of appreciation by the authorizing State, given the fact that scientific programmes are designed and implemented at national level. In addition to the exemption from the operation of the Convention, procedural requirements under the Convention for reporting of such authorizations to the International Whaling Commission (the Commission) and transmitting data and information to the designated organ of the Convention (Art. VIII, paras. 1 and 3) do not substantively affect or restrain this discretional power. Furthermore, review process in the Scientific Committee does not contain, apart from procedural formalities, any mandatory obligations on the authorizing State with respect to the granting of special permits; resolutions relating to scientific whaling are generally of a recommendatory nature. From that viewpoint, Japan’s claim that the contracting parties enjoy an expansive right in issuing special permits, cannot be said to be untenable.

7.  The weakness of Japan’s interpretation of Article VIII, however, lies in the fact that the discretional power of the contracting parties is derived from the regulating régime of the Convention, therefore it cannot be deemed unlimited. The reason for this is threefold. First, in granting special permits for killing, taking and treating whales for scientific purposes, the contracting party must avoid any adverse effect on the stocks with a view to maintaining sustainable utilization and conservation of the resources, otherwise the very object and purpose of the Convention would be undermined, a point on which the Parties hold no different views.

8.  Secondly, in assessing the state of the stocks for the consideration of scientific whaling, the contracting party inevitably has to pay attention to the situation of commercial whaling. Restrictions imposed thereof indicate the manageable level of the stocks. In other words, there is an intrinsic link between commercial whaling and scientific whaling, particularly when scientific whaling is purportedly to be carried out on a large scale and on a continuous basis. This aspect is borne out by the fact that prior to the moratorium on commercial whaling, such dispute as the current one with the JARPA II programme would not arise; lethal sampling did not pose an issue.

9.  Thirdly, as it is true with every right, discretion under Article VIII, paragraph 1, as a corollary, also means a duty on every authorizing party to exercise the power properly and reasonably by virtue of the principle of good faith under the law of treaties. For these reasons, it cannot be said that Article VIII has bestowed a self-defined right on the contracting parties.

10.  On the issuance of special permits, the Court states that notwithstanding the discretion enjoyed by a contracting party, “whether the killing, taking and treating of whales pursuant to a requested special permit is for purposes of scientific research cannot depend simply on that State’s perception” ( paragraph 61 of the Judgment). This statement, however, is left unexplained. The Court’s view may be taken as self-evident; such determination has to be based on objective scientific assessment, checked against by external review. However, Japan’s claim that according to the rules of treaty interpretation the meaning of Article VIII must be given first and foremost by its express terms, and so long as the relevant treaty provision on the issuance of special permits is not revised to that effect, it is up to each authorizing party to determine the granting of special permits, is a relevant issue. Technically speaking, the granting of special permits and review of proposed programmes are two subject-matters under the Convention. In my view, the Court should, first of all, address the issue whether the authorizing party can or cannot, as asserted by Japan, freely determine, as it “thinks fit”, the number of killing, taking and treating of whales for purposes of scientific research, an issue that bears on the relationship between Article VIII and the other provisions of the Convention.

12.  In the course of its 68 years’ operation since 1946, the Convention, as an evolving instrument, has undergone considerable change by way of its Schedule amendments. Although terms on scientific whaling under Article VIII remain intact, various restrictions on commercial whaling for purposes of conservation have indeed exerted a creeping effect on the way in which scientific research may be conducted, particularly with respect to methodology and scale of sample size. Notwithstanding policy differences between the anti-whaling group and the whaling parties, the parties have generally recognized the importance of conservation for the protection of whale resources. Moreover, revision of guidelines and reviews of special permits by the Scientific Committee also move in the direction of conservation. With these developments, it is hard to claim that scientific whaling is totally detached, free-standing, from the operation of the Convention and that the “margin of appreciation”, if any, for the contracting parties in granting special permits stays the same as before.

13.  That said, as the decision to grant special permits solely rests within the discretion of the authorizing party, there is no point in considering whether such a decision is subjectively taken or not; the authorizing party is obliged to use its best knowledge to determine, as it perceives proper, whether or not to grant special permits for proposed scientific research programmes. Once adopted, that decision nevertheless is subject to review, scientific or judicial. The assessment of the decision of course cannot simply rely on the perception of the authorizing party, but must be conducted on an objective basis. The authorizing party should justify its decision with scientific evidence and sound reasoning.

14.  In light of the foregoing, it is apparent that the standard of review by the Court should focus on legal issues. In the Judgment the Court states that

“[w]hen reviewing the grant of a special permit authorizing killing, taking and treating of whales, the Court will assess, first, whether the programme under which these activities occur involves scientific research. Secondly, the Court will consider if the killing, taking and treating of whales is ‘for purposes of’ scientific research by examining whether, in the use of lethal methods, the programme’s design and implementation are reasonable in relation to achieving its stated objectives.” (Judgment, paragraph 67 .)

This approach poses a number of questions, as revealed in the subsequent reasoning.

15.  First, in assessing Japan’s exercise of its right under Article VIII, paragraph 1, in granting special permits, judicial review of the Court should link with treaty interpretation. The question whether activities under JARPA II involve scientific research is a matter of fact rather than a matter of law, therefore it should be subject to scientific review. I take the view that it is not for the Court to determine what elements a scientific research should or should not contain, nor is it for the Court to adjudicate what kind of activities involve scientific research. As special permits are granted by the authorizing party pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 1, of the Convention to programmes for purposes of scientific research, it should be presumed that activities under such programmes involve scientific research. It is up to Australia to prove with convincing evidence to the Court that such is not the case with JARPA II, with Japan having the right to rebuttal. As the Court stated in the Pulp Mills case that in accordance with the well-established principle onus probandi incumbit actori, it is the duty of the party which asserts certain facts to establish the existence of such facts. This principle has been consistently upheld by the Court (see case concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2010 (I), p. 71, para. 162; Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2009, p. 86, para. 68; Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge (Malaysia/Singapore), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2008, p. 31, para. 45; Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (I), p. 128, para. 204; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 437, para. 101). It is not necessary for the Court itself to go over the key elements of JARPA II as part of its judicial review and ascertain that JARPA II activities “can broadly be characterized as ‘scientific research’” (Judgment, paragraph 127 ); its finding, on the basis of the evidence presented to the Court, that Australia has failed to prove that JARPA II activities, in order to be qualified as scientific research, must satisfy the four criteria as identified by Australia, could sufficiently lead to the conclusion that Australia’s claim against JARPA II activities as not involving scientific research is unfounded.

16.  In its reasoning, the Court draws the distinction between the term “scientific research” and the phrase “for purposes of” in Article VIII, paragraph 1, of the Convention, which to a certain extent, dictates the standard of review as articulated by the Court. Accepting Australia’s interpretation that these two terms are cumulative, the Court actually sets up two conditions for review: the programme activities must first be characterized as scientific research and additionally, they must serve purposes of scientific research. As is stated above, determination of scientific research is primarily a matter of fact subject to scientific scrutiny. The phrase “for purposes of” cannot stand on its own without the modifier “scientific research”. When the Court is tasked to determine whether, in the use of lethal sampling, the elements of JARPA II’s design and implementation are reasonable in relation to its stated scientific objectives, it is actually set to assess the scientific merit of the programme. In that case the term “for purposes of” would mean to evaluate the design and implementation of JARPA II so as to see whether they are justifiable for achieving the objectives of the research programme. This interpretation, in my opinion, unduly complicates the meaning of the phrase “for purposes of scientific research” in Article VIII, paragraph 1, rendering the Court’s role beyond its judicial purview.

17.  Notwithstanding the above, I agree with the majority that in order to ascertain whether special permits for JARPA II genuinely serve purposes of scientific research, the Court may have to examine some relevant aspects of the design and implementation of JARPA II in the light of its stated objectives. As the case hinges on the legality of Japan’s determination to grant special permits to JARPA II, the Court, in my view, should focus its review on the question whether Japan’s issuance of special permits to JARPA II satisfies the requirement under Article VIII, paragraph 1, namely, for purposes of scientific research. The standard of review as agreed by the Parties that tests whether a State’s decision to grant special permits is objectively reasonable, supported by coherent reasoning and respectable scientific evidence, should therefore primarily relate to special permits rather than the programme in general.

18.  In the Court’s review, a few of its findings pertaining to Japan’s determination to grant special permits to the JARPA II programme are important.

19.  First, the Court finds that Japan does not prove that it has duly conducted feasibility studies on the use of non-lethal methods with an effort to reduce lethal sampling, thus failing its obligation to give due regard to the resolutions and Guidelines adopted by the Commission. It concludes that,

“the papers to which Japan directed [the Court] reveal little analysis of the feasibility of using non-lethal methods to achieve the JARPA II research objectives. Nor do they point to consideration of the possibility of making more extensive use of non-lethal methods in order to reduce or eliminate the need for lethal sampling, either when JARPA II was proposed or in subsequent years. Given the expanded use of lethal methods in JARPA II, as compared to JARPA, this is difficult to reconcile with Japan’s obligation to give due regard to IWC resolutions and Guidelines and its statement that JARPA II uses lethal methods only to the extent necessary to meet its scientific objectives.” (Judgment, paragraph 144 .)

20.  Secondly, two pieces of probative evidence support the Court’s finding that Japan’s determination of sample sizes is influenced by its funding consideration. One is the 2007 document referred to by Japan to prove that it has given necessary consideration to the use of non-lethal methods in JARPA II. The document explains why certain biological parameters require lethal sampling, but it also suggests that lethal sampling be preferred because it provides a source of funding to offset the cost of the research. Secondly, Dr. Walløe, the expert called by Japan, also testifies in the oral proceedings before the Court that “Japanese scientists have not always given completely transparent and clear explanations of how sample sizes were calculated or determined”. He admits that he is under the impression that JARPA II sample sizes had been “influenced by funding consideration”, although he does not find that objectionable.

21.  Thirdly, the Court finds that the JARPA II Research Plan lacks transparency in the reasons for selecting particular sample sizes for individual research items, a point agreed by the experts called by both Parties. The shortcomings in the design of the Research Plan are not explained by Japan with supporting evidence, which casts doubt on the reasonableness of the sample sizes in relation to achieving its objectives.

22.  Lastly, in view of the evidence regarding the gap between the target sample sizes and the actual take in the implementation of the programme, the Court draws the conclusion that the target sample sizes are larger than reasonable for achieving JARPA II’s objectives. The Court notes that the sample sizes for fin and humpback whales and review periods chosen cast doubt on the centrality of the objectives that Japan highlights as the rationale for the annual number of minke whale samples that it sets up.

23.  These findings, among others, are decisive for the Court’s ruling on Japan’s decision to issue special permits for JARPA II. Important as they are, in relation to the purposes of JARPA II, I think the Court should have given further consideration to the question of funding, as it bears directly on the pivotal issue of the case — the size of lethal sampling.

24.  In its pleadings, Japan does not deny that funding consideration is involved in the determination of granting special permits, but asserts that such practice is normal in fishery research. Dr. Walløe does not deem it questionable either. Besides, Japan’s explanation that for certain scientific research and data collection, non-lethal methods are “impractical, cost-ineffective and prohibitively expensive” does not appear a mere excuse for its lethal sampling, as this kind of situation often exists elsewhere in scientific research.

25.  It is apparent that the use of lethal sampling in JARPA II per se does not pose an issue under the Convention; Article VIII clearly confers that discretion on the contracting parties. The Court agrees that under Article VIII, paragraph 2, the fact that a programme involves the sale of meat and the use of proceeds to fund research is not sufficient, taken alone, to cause a special permit to fall outside Article VIII. What remains at issue is whether the scale of lethal sampling for JARPA II is reasonable.

26.  In my view, Japan fails to explain to the satisfaction of the Court how the sample sizes are calculated and determined with the aim of achieving the objectives of the programme. Technical complexity of the matter does not release it of the burden of proof, as the issue lies at the core of the dispute. Moreover, Japan does not succeed in refuting with solid evidence Australia’s allegation that the funding consideration actually dictates its sample sizes and in proving that fund-raising is just incidental and derivative from the research activities. It could have explained how JARPA II activities are funded and whether there are other financial sources that support the programme.

27.  Furthermore, in response to Australia’s claim that Japan’s real intention in conducting JARPA II is to maintain its whaling operation and that the programme is commercial whaling in disguise, Japan’s rebuttal is weak and unpersuasive. Even if fund-raising through commercial means may not necessarily render the programme as commercial whaling, or commercial whaling in disguise, given the scale of lethal sampling and the unlimited duration of JARPA II, the cumulative effect of its lethal take on the conservation of whale resources is not insignificant and negligible, which gives all the more reason for requiring Japan to justify its decision on special permits.

28.  Prior to the moratorium on commercial whaling, use of proceeds from the sale of whale meat to fund scientific research might be an acceptable practice among the contracting parties, insomuch as the stocks were not affected. Such “margin of appreciation” enjoyed by the parties, if any, however, becomes questionable when the moratorium on commercial whaling is imposed, because excessive scientific whaling would unavoidably undermine the collective effort of the contracting parties in the conservation measures. The term “for purposes of scientific research” under Article VIII, paragraph 1, should thus be strictly interpreted; sample sizes that are dictated by fund-raising consideration, therefore, cannot be considered as “objectively reasonable”, or “for purposes of scientific research”.

29.  It is based on these considerations that I agree with the Court’s conclusion that JARPA II does not fall with the meaning of Article VIII, paragraph 1, of the Convention.

30.  Having reached the above conclusion, the Court turns to examine Australia’s contention that Japan has breached three provisions of the Schedule by conducting JARPA II. The three provisions of the Schedule include: the obligation to respect zero catch limits for the killing, for commercial purposes, of whales from all stocks (paragraph 10 (e) of the Schedule); the factory ship moratorium (paragraph 10 (d)); and the prohibition on commercial whaling in the Southern Ocean Sanctuary (paragraph 7 (b)).

31.  Under the Convention, there are basically three types of whaling involved: commercial whaling, scientific whaling and aboriginal subsistence whaling. Pursuant to Article 1, paragraph 1, of the Convention, the Schedule constitutes an integral part thereof. “All references to ‘Convention’ shall be understood as including the said Schedule either in its present terms or as amended in accordance with the provision of Article V.” At the same time, Article VIII, paragraph 1, also provides that scientific whaling shall be exempt from the operation of this Convention, which means that restrictions and conditions relating to the granting of special permits for purposes of scientific research are not subject to the Schedule. Therefore, before addressing Australia’s contention, the Court has to first determine the applicability of these three paragraphs to JARPA II.

32.  The Court takes the view that all killing, taking and treating of whales that fall within neither scientific whaling under Article VIII, nor aboriginal subsistence whaling under paragraph 13 of the Schedule, will be considered subject to the same restrictions as laid down in the three paragraphs. That is to say, since the Court reaches the conclusion that JARPA II does not fall within the meaning of Article VIII, paragraph 1, of the Convention, it would be regarded as commercial whaling. This is because, the Court says,

“[t]he reference to ‘commercial’ whaling in paragraphs 7 (b) and 10 (e) of the Schedule can be explained by the fact that in nearly all cases this would be the most appropriate characterization of the whaling activity concerned. The language of the two provisions cannot be taken as implying that there exist categories of whaling which do not come within the provisions of either Article VIII, paragraph 1, of the Convention or paragraph 13 of the Schedule but which nevertheless fall outside the scope of the prohibitions in paragraphs 7 (b) and 10 (e) of the Schedule. Any such interpretation would leave certain undefined categories of whaling activity beyond the scope of the Convention and thus would undermine its object and purpose.” (Judgment, paragraph 229 .)

Paragraph 10 (d), although without an explicit reference to commercial whaling in its terms, should equally apply to all the cases with regard to the prohibition of the use of factory ships except in scientific and aboriginal subsistence whaling.

33.  Based upon the above reasoning, the Court finds that since the special permits under JARPA II do not fall within the meaning of Article VIII, paragraph 1, of the Convention, Japan thereby has not acted in conformity with its obligations under paragraphs 10 (e), (d) and 7 (b) of the Schedule. With due respect, I find this line of reasoning quite confusing.

34.  In the first place, the premise for the application of paragraphs 10 (e), (d), and paragraph 7 (b) to JARPA II is that the Court has determined that JARPA II is in fact a commercial whaling operation rather than a programme for purposes of scientific research. There is no evidence identified by the Court that supports this conclusion. On the contrary, in the Judgment, the Court ascertains that the programme has scientific objectives and its use of lethal methods per se is not objectionable. Moreover, it concludes that Japan has complied with its obligations under paragraph 30 of the Schedule in submitting in time proposed special permits to the Scientific Committee for review and comments.

35.  Moreover, most of the shortcomings in JARPA II as analysed by the Court are, by and large, technical flaws associated with the design and implementation of the programme, which do not by themselves transform JARPA II into a commercial whaling operation. Fund-raising, albeit by market sale of whale meat, does not necessarily alter the scientific nature of the programme, unless the Court finds bad faith on the part of Japan. The conclusion of the Court that JARPA II activities do not fall within the meaning of Article VIII, paragraph 1, cannot be understood to mean that JARPA II activities thereby do not involve scientific research. That is to say, scientific whaling, even if with flaws, remains scientific in nature. It does not fall outside that category.

36.  Furthermore, from a legal point of view, consequences of breach of Article VIII and that of the Schedule paragraphs can be different. In the former case, the conditions and the number of special permits may be revised or revoked upon the review and comments by the Scientific Committee. To put it in another way, as a technical matter, when the granting of special permits by Japan for JARPA II is found not within the meaning of Article VIII, paragraph 1, Japan is not prohibited to issue special permits for the programme, provided such issuance is brought in line with the requirement of Article VIII, paragraph 1. In this regard, JARPA II continues to fall within the purview of the Scientific Committee for periodical reviews. In the latter situation, however, as Japan is deemed breaching its international obligation under the Schedule of the Convention by violating the moratorium on commercial whaling, its international responsibility shall be invoked. Consequently, under the rules of State responsibility, Japan shall be obliged to revoke all the extant special permits and refrain from granting further for JARPA II, which would apparently forestall the Scientific Committee’s review.

37.  I vote with the majority on paragraphs (3), (4) and (5) of the operative clause because I am of the view that Japan’s granting of special permits for JARPA II has been unduly excessive in relation to achieving its stated objectives, which may arguably have adverse impact on the effectiveness of the moratorium on commercial whaling. Nevertheless, JARPA II remains a programme for scientific research, in my opinion. Japan should be given the opportunity to address the shortcomings in the design and implementation of the programme in the Scientific Committee during the upcoming periodical review.

(Signed) Xue Hanqin.

The Court should have clarified more precisely the limits of discretion of a Contracting Government under Article VIII as well as the scope of the Court’s power to review the exercise of that discretion — In particular, the Court should have specified the criteria which have guided and informed its determination of whether the special permits issued under JARPA II were “for purposes of scientific research” — Japan has not fully complied with the procedural obligations under paragraph 30 of the Schedule to the ICRW.

1.  I concur, in principle, with the Court’s findings in points 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 7 of the operative part of the Judgment and I agree, in general, with the reasoning upon which those findings are predicated. Nonetheless, I believe that there are certain key aspects of this dispute in respect of which the Court has missed an opportunity to elaborate its views and articulate the reasoning underpinning its findings. These include the extent of a Contracting Government’s discretion under Article VIII of the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW) as well as the scope of the Court’s power to review such discretion. In my view, these aspects merit further elaboration than that accorded to them in the Judgment. Furthermore, I have voted against the finding of the Court, in point 6 of the operative paragraph, that “Japan has complied with its obligations under paragraph 30 of the Schedule to the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling with regard to JARPA II”, because in my opinion, the facts before the Court do not bear out this conclusion. It is precisely these points in respect of which this opinion is offered.

2.  The Judgment deals briefly with the question of the discretion of a State party issuing special permits under Article VIII of the ICRW, without elaborating on the nature or extent of that discretion (Judgment, paragraph 61 ). Yet, as the Court points out at a later stage, it is precisely the exercise of this discretion that the Court is called upon to review (Judgment, paragraph 67 ).

3.  The ICRW is a historical attempt by the States parties (consisting of both whaling and non-whaling nations) to regulate whaling, in recognition of their common interest in “ensuring the conservation of all species of whales while allowing for their sustainable exploitation” (Judgment, paragraph 56 ). To this end, the ICRW was intended to replace unregulated unilateral whaling by individual States with a system of collective regulation whereby States parties to the ICRW chose to work collectively and to abide by the obligations they assumed thereunder, in order to protect their common interests and achieve their common goals. It is against this historical background that the discretion referred to in Article VIII of the ICRW must be understood and appreciated.

4.  Article VIII sets up a mechanism whereby a State party may issue special permits to conduct whaling strictly “for purposes of scientific research”. In the light of the object and purpose of the ICRW, the scientific research to be conducted under such permits is intended for the benefit of not only the State issuing the permits but also the International Whaling Commission (IWC) and the international whaling community as a whole. Any whaling conducted outside the special permits is subject to the restrictions set out in the ICRW. The discretion afforded by Article VIII is thus an integral part of the collective regulatory mechanism and is necessarily limited in scope and character.

5.  First, the discretion to issue special permits must be exercised judiciously or “reasonably” and in accordance with the object and purpose of the ICRW. Second, the special permits must be strictly “for purposes of scientific research”. Third, the issuing State must ensure that it sets a catch limit in the permits, and lastly, the issuing State must ensure that the procedural requirements set out in paragraph 30 of the Schedule to the ICRW are complied with. In short, these are the yardsticks that the Court ought to examine in reviewing Japan’s exercise of discretion in issuing special permits under Article VIII of the ICRW.

6.  Similarly, I also consider that in stating its standard of review (see Judgment paragraph 67 ), the Court should have elaborated upon the criteria that guided its determination of whether or not JARPA II fits within the scope of Article VIII. In my view, the criteria logically flow from the yardsticks outlined above. Furthermore, the Court should have regard to the parameters that the States parties to the ICRW consider relevant in this regard. These parameters are reflected in paragraph 30 to the Schedule, which sets out the elements that must be specified in any proposed special permit submitted for review to the Scientific Committee. They are elaborated further in the binding resolutions and guidelines of the IWC. Among the latter, the Annex P guidelines may be given a particular weight, since they are the most recent set of guidelines adopted by consensus and on the basis of which JARPA II will be assessed by the Scientific Committee in 2014. These criteria are set out in greater detail below.

7.  In determining whether a special permit is issued “for purposes of scientific research”, it is perhaps only logical that one should start by defining the term “scientific research” as used in Article VIII and elsewhere in the ICRW, since the Convention itself does not define the term. Without this first step, it is difficult to envisage how one can meaningfully determine whether a special permit is issued “for purposes of scientific research”.

8.  In the Judgment, the Court rightly discards the criteria proposed by Australia as to what amounts to “scientific research”, noting that those criteria “appear largely to reflect what one of the experts that [Australia] called regards as well-conceived scientific research, rather than serving as an interpretation of the term as used in the Convention” (Judgment, paragraph 86 ). However, the Court then declines to give its own interpretation of the phrase, simply stating that it does not “consider it necessary to devise alternative criteria or to offer a general definition of ‘scientific research’” (ibid.).

9.  Whilst I accept that the Court should not attempt a forensic definition of what is or is not “scientific research” (a task more suited to scientists rather than lawyers), in my view, the Court should at least have considered the ordinary grammatical (dictionary) meaning of the phrase, as a basis for the reasoning and analysis that follows in the Judgment. Although the concept of “science” is inherently vague, “scientific research” must, in its most basic sense, involve “a systematic pursuit of knowledge concerning the structure and behaviour of the physical and natural world through observation and experiment” (Oxford Dictionary). In my view, this is a workable definition that could have been adopted as a basis for the Court’s reasoning and analysis.

10.  Regarding the parameters or criteria that should be taken into account in reviewing a State party’s exercise of its discretion to issue special permits under Article VIII, I consider that the Court should take into account the following factors gleaned from the provisions of the ICRW, its Schedule and the binding resolutions of the IWC.

11.  First, the whaling programme for which the special permit is sought must include defined research objectives as required by paragraph 30 of the Schedule. While the Schedule is silent on how precise and elaborate the stated objectives should be, some guidance can be found in this regard in Annex P, which states that research objectives should “be quantified to the extent possible”. In terms of substance, the guidelines in Annex P affirm that these objectives do not have to relate exclusively to the conservation and management of whales, but may also be directed at “improv[ing] the conservation and management of other living marine resources or the ecosystem of which the whale stocks are an integral part and/or, … test[ing] hypotheses not directly related to the management of living marine resources”. In addition, any scientific research programme must be based on appropriate scientific methodology.

12.  Secondly, Article VIII explicitly requires that the Contracting Government issuing a special permit for scientific research whaling must set limits on the number of whales to be killed, in addition to any other conditions it sees fit. Paragraph 30 of the Schedule requires that the permits specify the “number, sex, size and stock of the animals to be taken”. While a Contracting Government enjoys considerable discretion in determining the catch limits, it must exercise that discretion consistent with the object and purpose of the ICRW, in that whales may be killed only to the extent necessary for achieving the stated goals of the scientific research programme. In this regard, Annex P, which provides some guidance on how the Scientific Committee assesses the appropriate balance between lethal and non-lethal methods, requires that the special permit proposal must provide “an assessment of why non-lethal methods … have been considered to be insufficient” (emphasis added). Thus, the use of lethal methods where non-lethal alternatives are a viable option may serve to indicate that a particular whaling programme is not genuinely designed and/or implemented “for purposes of scientific research”.

13.  Thirdly, the issuing State must ensure that the proposed scientific research programme is designed and implemented so as not to endanger the target whale stocks. In this regard paragraph 30 of the Schedule requires the proposed permit to specify the “possible effect [of the research programme] on conservation of [whale] stock[s]”.

14.  Lastly, paragraph 30 of the Schedule requires a State party to submit the proposed special permits to the Scientific Committee for prior review and comments. This procedural requirement enables the IWC and its Scientific Committee to play a monitoring role in respect of special permit whaling, while obligating the issuing State to co-operate with the IWC, a duty I elaborate upon in the paragraphs below. As stated before, it is my considered opinion that the foregoing criteria or parameters should have served to guide and inform the Court in its task stated in paragraph 67 of the Judgment, and should have been set out in the Judgment.

15.  I have voted against point 6 of the operative part of the Judgment because I disagree with the reasoning and findings of the Court regarding Japan’s compliance with its obligations under paragraph 30 of the Schedule to the ICRW. In my view, that paragraph imposes more than a formal or procedural obligation to notify the Scientific Committee of certain information. The obligation entails a substantive duty of meaningful co-operation with the IWC and its subordinate organs such as the Scientific Committee. Thus in determining whether or not Japan is in breach of its obligations under paragraph 30 of the Schedule, the real issue to be addressed is not whether Japan complied with the required procedures in relation to JARPA II but rather, whether Japan fulfilled its obligation of meaningful co-operation with the IWC in relation to that programme. I examine this issue in greater detail below.

16.  It will be recalled that under the ICRW system of collective regulation, the IWC (and its subsidiary bodies such as the Scientific Committee) play a crucial role in regulating whaling. The IWC does so through amendments to the Schedule to the ICRW, for example, by designating protected species and ocean sanctuaries, and setting annual catch limits. The IWC is also entrusted with monitoring scientific research whaling. It is this role of the IWC, when viewed in the overall context of the object and purpose of the ICRW, that forms the basis of the duty of co-operation by the States parties. As part of this duty of co-operation, a Contracting Government is required under Article VIII of the ICRW to “report at once” to the IWC all authorizations that it has granted for special permit whaling, and secondly, to transmit to the Scientific Committee, “in so far as practicable and at intervals of not more than one year”, scientific information available to that Government resulting from the scientific research conducted pursuant to those permits. (See Art. VIII, paras. 1 and 3.)

17.  Furthermore, paragraph 30 of the Schedule, which forms an integral part of the ICRW, was introduced as a procedural guarantee to ensure that States parties do not circumvent the duty of co-operation envisaged under Article VIII. Paragraph 30 thus obliges a Contracting Government, before it issues the special permits, to submit them to the IWC “in sufficient time to allow the Scientific Committee to review and comment on them”. In turn, the Scientific Committee is mandated to review and comment upon the proposed special permits and to submit its report and recommendations thereon to the IWC. The IWC may, in turn, make recommendations to the Contracting Government in relation to the proposed permit. (See paragraph 30 of the Schedule and Rule M (4 (a)) of the IWC’s Rules of Procedure.) There is therefore a link between the Article VIII obligations of notification, reporting and dissemination of scientific information on the one hand, and the obligations of prior review in paragraph 30 of the Schedule, on the other. Thus, while the gathering and dissemination of scientific information is central to the functioning of the IWC and forms part of the system of collective regulation under the ICRW, the review procedures under paragraph 30 serve as the mechanism through which special permit whaling may be monitored and the collective interests of the States parties protected.

18.  The review procedure under paragraph 30 is designed to ensure that Article VIII is applied as the parties to the ICRW intended it to. Accordingly, all aspects of a proposed special permit are subject to prior review by the Scientific Committee, including the objectives of the research programme, the number, sex, size and stock of the animals to be taken, opportunities for participation in the research by scientists of other nations, and possible effect on conservation of whale stocks. The duty of co-operation by States parties must be viewed and appreciated in light of the above provisions, and in the context of the overall objectives of the ICRW. In this context, meaningful co-operation requires a State party to do the following:

1. (a)   to submit to the IWC the proposed special permits before they are issued and in sufficient time to allow the Scientific Committee to review and comment on them;

2. (b)   to provide to the IWC, in relation to the proposed permits, the information specified in paragraph 30 (a) to (d) of the Schedule;

3. (c)   to give due consideration, in good faith, to the views and recommendations of the IWC, with a readiness to modify the terms of the special permits or the decision to issue them, taking into account such recommendations;

4. (d)   on an annual basis, to keep the Scientific Committee informed of the progress and results of scientific research conducted under the special permits, including by providing accurate information regarding any modifications in the implementation of the research programme; and

5. (e)   to offer opportunities for collaboration to other researchers within the international scientific community.

19.  Assessed against these benchmarks, the evidence in the present case clearly shows the following shortcomings in relation to JARPA II. First, against the recommendation of the IWC that no additional Japanese special permit programmes be conducted in the Antarctic until the Scientific Committee had completed an in-depth review of the results of JARPA, Japan launched JARPA II before the Scientific Committee had completed a review of JARPA (see, for example, IWC Resolutions 2003-3 and 2005-1). Secondly, there is no indication that Japan has duly considered the IWC comments and recommendations in respect of certain controversial aspects of JARPA II such as its resort to lethal methods (see, for example, IWC Resolutions 2005-1 and 2007-1). Thirdly, although the JARPA II Plan provided the essential information required under paragraph 30 of the Schedule, much of the information is not detailed enough to be considered compliant with the relevant IWC guidelines, a shortcoming likely to hamper the Scientific Committee’s upcoming review of JARPA II. Fourthly, Japan has failed to submit the specific special permits issued in respect of JARPA II to the Scientific Committee for prior review, as required by paragraph 30. Given that these permits are virtual replicas of the permits issued under JARPA and that JARPA II differs in implementation at least, from its predecessor, it is imperative that the Scientific Committee ought to have had prior opportunity to review and comment on them. Fifthly, as noted in the Judgment (paragraph 222), apart from reference to collaboration with Japanese research institutes in relation to JARPA I, there is no evidence of co-operation between JARPA II and other domestic and international research institutions other than an undertaking, in the JARPA II Plan, that “[p]articipation of foreign scientists will be welcomed, so long as they meet the qualifications established by the Government of Japan”.

20.  In view of the above shortcomings and having regard to the duty incumbent upon States parties to meaningfully co-operate with the IWC, I am unable to join the majority in finding that “Japan has complied with its obligations under paragraph 30 of the Schedule to the [ICRW] with regard to JARPA II”.

(Signed) Julia Sebutinde.

1.  Paragraph 30 of the Schedule to the ICRW

2.  JARPA II as a commercial whaling programme

Special permit whaling under Article VIII of the ICRW — The use of lethal methods “for purposes of scientific research” under the ICRW must be indispensable to the research — The precautionary approach is relevant to the interpretation of the ICRW — States parties to the ICRW have a duty to co-operate with the IWC and its committees — Japan has breached paragraph 30 of the Schedule to the ICRW.

1.  As my vote indicates, I largely agree with the conclusions the Court has reached and its reasoning. There are, however, two areas in which my views differ from those of the majority.

2.  My first point of difference from the majority turns on the nature of the restrictions on lethal methods in scientific research on whales in Article VIII of the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling 1946 (ICRW): can lethal methods be used when a State party considers it necessary or only when no other methods for the relevant scientific research are available? Both Parties to this dispute accept that lethal methods may be essential for research on some scientific questions about whales.

3.  At the time the ICRW was adopted, scientific research on whales was largely dependent on lethal methods. As the Court notes, however, the ICRW is an evolving instrument ( paragraph 45 ). The most obvious mechanism of evolution is contained in the ICRW itself. Article V gives the International Whaling Commission (IWC) the power to amend the ICRW though the adoption of amendments to the ICRW’s Schedule by a three-fourths majority of those IWC members voting (Art. III.2). The Schedule has the same legal status as the Convention by virtue of Article I.1.

4.  A second, less direct, mode of evolution is through recommendations of the IWC (Art. VI) which are adopted by a simple majority of members voting (Art. III.2). Although such recommendations do not bind IWC members, they are relevant to the interpretation of the ICRW if they come within the terms of Article 31.3 (a) or (b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969. Article 31.3 (a) requires that “any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions” be taken into account in its interpretation, together with the treaty’s context. Article 31.3 (b) takes the same approach to “any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation”. Since the moratorium on commercial whaling came into effect in the 1985/1986 pelagic and 1986 coastal seasons, most IWC resolutions on special permit whaling have attracted a number of negative votes, which precludes them as evidence of the parties’ agreement on the ICRW’s interpretation. However, there remain some significant resolutions that were adopted by consensus and thus must inform the interpretative task. I note that resolutions adopted by a vote of the IWC have some consequence although they do not come within the terms of Article 31.3 of the Vienna Convention. Particularly when they are adopted by a large majority of IWC members, the resolutions are relevant to the duty of co-operation, discussed below.

5.  The issue of the status of IWC resolutions is of special significance in this case with respect to the use of lethal methods “for purposes of scientific research” under Article VIII. While Article VIII envisages the killing of whales for scientific ends, it must be read in light of developments in the treaty parties’ views on lethal research methods. Although the Court acknowledges at a general level that resolutions adopted by consensus or by a unanimous vote “may be relevant for the interpretation of the Convention or its Schedule” ( paragraph 46 ), with respect to lethal research methods it states that any such resolutions “do not establish a requirement that lethal methods be used only when other methods are not available” ( paragraph 83 ). In my view, however, the applicable resolutions establish a principle that lethal methods should be of last resort in scientific research programmes under Article VIII. IWC resolution 1986-2 on “Special Permits for Scientific Research” was adopted by consensus and records the views of parties to the ICRW that both permit-issuing Governments and the IWC’s Scientific Committee in reviewing permits should take into account whether the relevant scientific research objectives “are not practically and scientifically feasible through non-lethal research techniques”. Annex P, the most recent version of the Guidelines for the Review of Scientific Permit Proposals, adopted by consensus by the Scientific Committee and endorsed by the IWC in 2008, requires an assessment of “why non-lethal research methods … have been considered to be insufficient”. These resolutions and guidelines give primacy to non-lethal methods in scientific research relating to whaling and insist that permit-issuing States explain why non-lethal methods are inadequate. In turn, the Scientific Committee must assess such explanations against current scientific knowledge and practice. These instruments thus support an interpretation of Article VIII that lethal methods should be essential to the objectives of the scientific research programme.

6.  The precautionary approach to environmental regulation also reinforces this analysis of the conditions in which lethal research methods may be undertaken. The approach was formulated in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development in 1992 as “[w]here there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation”. The precautionary approach entails the avoidance of activities that may threaten the environment even in the face of scientific uncertainty about the direct or indirect effects of such activities. It gives priority to the prevention of harm to the environment in its broadest sense, including biological diversity, resource conservation and management and human health. The essence of the precautionary approach has informed the development of international environmental law and is recognized implicitly or explicitly in instruments dealing with a wide range of subject-matter, from the regulation of the oceans and international watercourses to the conservation and management of fish stocks, the conservation of endangered species and biosafety.

7.  This Court has referred to the precautionary approach in Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (although not using this term) and Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay. In both these cases, the Court contemplated the interpretation of treaty obligations in light of new approaches to environmental protection. In the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case, dealing with a bilateral treaty signed in 1977, the Treaty on the Construction and Operation of the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Barrage System, the Court stated:

“The Court is mindful that, in the field of environmental protection, vigilance and prevention are required on account of the often irreversible character of damage to the environment and of the limitations inherent in the very mechanism of reparation of this type of damage.

Throughout the ages, mankind has, for economic and other reasons, constantly interfered with nature. In the past, this was often done without consideration of the effects upon the environment. Owing to new scientific insights and to a growing awareness of the risks for mankind — for present and future generations — of pursuit of such interventions at an unconsidered and unabated pace, new norms and standards have been developed, set forth in a great number of instruments during the last two decades. Such new norms have to be taken into consideration, and such new standards given proper weight, not only when States contemplate new activities but also when continuing with activities begun in the past.” (Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1997, p. 78, para. 140.)

8.  In the Pulp Mills case, the Court considered that “a precautionary approach may be relevant in the interpretation and application of the provisions of [the 1975 Statute of the River Uruguay]” (Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2010 (I), p. 71, para. 164). It went on to state that:

“the obligation to protect and preserve, [under the Statute], has to be interpreted in accordance with a practice, which in recent years has gained so much acceptance among States that it may now be considered a requirement under general international law to undertake an environmental impact assessment where there is a risk that the proposed industrial activity may have a significant adverse impact in a transboundary context, in particular, on a shared resource” (ibid., p. 83, para. 204).

9.  These observations suggest that treaties dealing with the environment should be interpreted wherever possible in light of the precautionary approach, regardless of the date of their adoption. This is also consistent with the Court’s statement in Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970): “an international instrument has to be interpreted and applied within the framework of the entire legal system prevailing at the time of the interpretation” (Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 31, para. 53).

10.  Both Parties to this dispute endorsed the precautionary approach at a theoretical level, although they disagreed about its application to the facts. In my view, the precautionary approach requires that non-lethal methods of research be used wherever possible. In relation to Article VIII, which contemplates the killing of the subject of research by the research activity, an implication of the precautionary approach is that lethal methods must be shown to be indispensable to the purposes of scientific research on whales.

11.  The second point on which I differ from the majority is whether Japan has acted consistently with paragraph 30 of the Schedule to the ICRW. Paragraph 30 sets out the process by which States parties submit proposed scientific permits to the IWC’s Scientific Committee for review and comment. In my view, paragraph 30 must be read in light of a duty of co-operation of States parties to the ICRW with the IWC and its committees. While the Judgment of the Court recognizes such a duty of co-operation ( paragraphs 83 and 240 ), it does not specifically address Japan’s compliance with the duty. As the duty of co-operation is a critical element of the fabric of the ICRW, it merits some elaboration.

12.  The ICRW was designed as a new form of international regulation of whaling after the failure of two earlier attempts. The Convention for the Regulation of Whaling 1931, prepared under the auspices of the League of Nations, and the International Agreement for the Regulation of Whaling 1937 (amended by several protocols) had relied on the parties’ national regulatory systems for enforcement. Although they laid the foundations for international co-operation to bring scientific knowledge to bear on the whaling industry, neither instrument was able to respond to rampant commercial whaling. The ICRW departed from these treaties’ national enforcement schemes by creating an international institution, the IWC, of which each treaty party was a member. The fact that membership of the ICRW is open to all States reinforces its purpose of internationalizing the regulation of whaling beyond those States directly involved in whaling. As noted above, the IWC has the power to regulate whaling closely through amending the Schedule to the ICRW. The IWC can deploy a variety of mechanisms to this end, including the designation of protected species and sanctuaries, setting annual catch quotas and size limits (Art. V.1).

13.  Article VIII of the ICRW was based on Article 10 of the 1937 Agreement, which aimed to promote scientific research. An important difference in the ICRW provision is the monitoring role of the IWC in relation to whaling for purposes of scientific research. This entails a duty of co-operation by States parties with the IWC and its subsidiary bodies reflecting the overarching object and purpose of the Convention, which is to create “a system of international regulation” for the conservation and management of whale stocks (preamble, para. 6). The concept of a duty of co-operation is the foundation of legal régimes dealing (inter alia) with shared resources and with the environment. It derives from the principle that the conservation and management of shared resources and the environment must be based on shared interests, rather than the interests of one party. Article VIII incorporates a specific aspect of this duty in mandating immediate reporting to the IWC of the grant of any special permits for lethal activities for purposes of scientific research (Art. VIII.1). Article VIII.3 makes another element of this duty explicit in providing that States parties

“shall transmit to such body as may be designated by the Commission [the Scientific Committee], in so far as practicable, and at intervals of not more than one year, scientific information available to that Government with respect to whales and whaling, including the results of research conducted pursuant to [Article VIII.1] and to Article IV [general whaling research]”.

Resolutions adopted by the IWC under Article VI, whether by consensus or by vote, may also inform the duty of co-operation. The resolutions express the views of the IWC and, when adopted by consensus or a large majority vote, they represent an articulation of the shared interests at stake in the regulation of whaling. States parties to the ICRW are thus required to consider these resolutions in good faith.

14.  The duty of co-operation in relation to lethal whaling for purposes of scientific research was given further definition by paragraph 30, inserted in the Schedule in 1979. The object of paragraph 30 was to deter abuse of Article VIII by States parties authorizing commercial whaling in the guise of scientific research (P. Birnie, International Regulation of Whaling, 1985, Vol. 1, p. 190). While the Scientific Committee’s views on special permit proposals are not legally binding on States parties under the terms of paragraph 30, the IWC has empowered the Committee to review and comment on such proposals, thereby creating an obligation on the proposing State to co-operate with the Committee. If the proposing State had no such obligation, it would deprive paragraph 30 of any effect.

15.  In this context, the duty of co-operation at the heart of paragraph 30 requires a permit-authorizing State to provide the IWC with the permits “before they are issued and in sufficient time to allow the Scientific Committee to review and comment on them”; to provide specified information about the proposed scientific permits; to engage and promote the participation of the international scientific community in the research; and to give consideration in good faith to the views of the IWC and the Scientific Committee. This means that, although a State is not bound to accept the Committee’s assessment of proposed permits, it must show genuine willingness to reconsider its position in light of those views. The duty entails keeping the Scientific Committee apprised of the results of scientific research on an annual basis. The duty also implies that permit-authorizing States should provide the Scientific Committee with timely and accurate information about modifications in the implementation of scientific research programmes already reviewed by the Committee and the implications for the authorization of special permits. States may not take a narrow or formalistic approach to the duty of co-operation. It is a substantive duty to consider the views of the IWC and the Scientific Committee and to co-operate with the international scientific community in any research on whales.

16.  The Judgment of the Court states that “consideration by a State party of revising the original design of the programme for review would demonstrate co-operation by a State party with the Scientific Committee” ( paragraph 240 ), but it nevertheless finds that Japan has met the requirements of paragraph 30 with respect to permits issued under JARPA II. In this connection, the Court observes that the submission of the JARPA II Research Plan as the basis for annual permits accords with the practice of the Scientific Committee.

17.  In my respectful view, however, the evidence indicates that Japan has not complied with the duty of co-operation with the Scientific Committee and thus that it has breached paragraph 30. First, JARPA II was launched before a review of JARPA by the Scientific Committee had taken place, and there is no sign that the findings of that review were taken into account as JARPA II continued. Second, while the JARPA II Research Plan provided the information specified in paragraph 30 (for example, objectives, sample sizes, methods and possible effects of the programme), as the Court has observed, there was no evidence of Japan’s meaningful consideration of the feasibility of non-lethal methods in the design of JARPA II ( paragraphs 137 to 141 ). Third, paragraph 30 provides that “opportunities for participation in the research by scientists of other nations” should be specified in proposed permits. This matter is reinforced in the Annex P Guidelines. The JARPA II Research Plan referred to the use of data from the Commission on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources relating to krill predators (p. 10) and Japan’s intention “to actively cooperate with international organizations and projects on oceanographic surveys” (p. 15). The Research Plan also noted that “[p]articipation of foreign scientists will be welcomed” if they meet Japan’s qualification standards (p. 20). However, there is no evidence of international scientific collaboration in JARPA II’s implementation. In response to a question on this issue from a Member of the Court, Japan pointed to JARPA II scientists’ collaboration with other Japanese institutions, but did not identify any broader research participation. Finally, as is noted in the Court’s Judgment, the conduct of JARPA II has differed in substantial ways from the scheme set out in the Research Plan and yet Japan has not modified the terms of its permits accordingly ( paragraph 240 ). Japan’s continued reliance on JARPA II’s original Research Plan as a basis for subsequent annual permits is inconsistent with the duty of co-operation. For these reasons, I am unable to join my colleagues in voting for paragraph 6 of the dispositif.

(Signed) Hilary Charlesworth.