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Max Planck Encyclopedia of International Procedural Law [MPEiPro]

Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (CMW)

Vincent Chetail

From: Oxford Public International Law (http://opil.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved.date: 09 August 2020

Migration — Economic, social, and cultural rights — Migrants, rights — Individual complaint procedure

Published under the direction of Hélène Ruiz Fabri, with the support of the Department of International Law and Dispute Resolution, under the auspices of the Max Planck Institute Luxembourg for Procedural Law.

A.  Establishment and Background

The Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (‘MWC’) is the supervisory organ of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (‘ICRMW’, ‘UN Convention’, or ‘Convention’). It was established on 1 January 2004 after a long ratification process. Though adopted in December 1990 by the General Assembly of the United Nations (United Nations, General Assembly), the ICRMW only entered into force in July 2003 after having obtained its 20th ratification. This long delay was mainly due to the anxiety of States towards migrant workers and the competing interests at stake between sending and receiving countries. Still today, the Convention counts only 51 States Parties, with no Western countries having ratified it.

Besides its late entry into force, the MWC came close to never existing. During the drafting history of the ICRMW, some—mostly Western—countries favoured the International Labour Organization (ILO) to supervise the Convention because of its longstanding experience in the field of labour migration and the supervisory capacity of its Governing Body (Report of the Open-Ended Working Group, 1984, para 48). However, States from the Global South preferred the creation of a specific monitoring body in line with the other core human rights treaties of the United Nations (‘UN’) (Report of the Open-Ended Working Group, 1985, paras 46, 49, and 53). The human rights orientation of the ICRMW was, in their opinion, beyond the competence of the ILO, and UN conventions had always been supervised by UN organs. A compromise was ultimately found: a specific treaty body was created, whilst the ILO retained a consultative role.

As the monitoring body of the ICRMW, the work of the MCW is conditioned by the very content of the Convention which constitutes the most comprehensive treaty in the field of labour migration. The ICRMW is also the longest UN human rights treaty, with 93 articles divided into nine parts. Parts I and II ICRMW determine the scope of the Convention in a quite extensive manner. According to Article 1 (2), the ICRMW shall apply ‘during the entire migration process of migrant workers and members of their families, which comprises preparation for migration, departure, transit and the entire period of stay and remunerated activity in the State of employment as well as return to the State of origin’. The term ‘migrant worker’ is further defined in a broad sense as ‘a person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been engaged in a remunerated activity in a State of which he or she is not a national’ (Art 2 (1) ICRMW).

The main body of rights is spelled out in Parts III and IV ICRMW. The former enumerates a comprehensive set of civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights applicable to all migrant workers and their families (including those who are undocumented), while Part IV grants additional rights to those who are in a regular situation. Most rights of the ICRMW are not fundamentally new, but mainly restate and specify the applicability of rights already enshrined in general human rights treaties. This is particularly the case of those rights contained in Part III, such as the right to leave any country and to return to their country of origin (Art 8), the prohibition of torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment (Art 10), the prohibition of slavery and forced labour (Art 11), freedom of religion (Art 12), the right to recognition as a person before the law (Art 24), and the right of children to registration of birth and to nationality (Art 29). This normative commonality between the ICRMW and other general human rights treaties can also be observed regarding several additional rights granted by Part IV to documented migrant workers, such as liberty of movement and residence within the territory of States Parties (Art 39), and the right to vote and to be elected at election of the State of origin (Art 41).

Part V ICRMW further details the rights for specific categories of migrant workers (including seasonal workers and frontier workers). Part VI ICRMW then identifies the obligations of States Parties in combating irregular migration and promoting sound and equitable conditions of migration. It notably concerns the recruitment process of migrant workers (Art 66) and their return to the State of origin (Art 67). The most substantial and demanding provisions, however, focus on the prevention and elimination of irregular migration. They include the fight against the dissemination of misleading information relating to emigration and immigration, the detection and suppression of clandestine movements of migrant workers, as well as the adoption of effective sanctions against those who organize such unlawful movements (Art 68).

Finally, Parts VII to IX ICRMW deal with the application of the Convention, including the membership, working methods, and functions of the MWC as detailed below (see also Chetail, 2018).

B.  Membership

Membership of the MWC follows the same rules as those of most other UN treaty bodies (Human Rights, Treaty Bodies). The MWC consists of independent experts who serve for a term of four years (Art 72 ICRMW). With a total of fourteen experts, its current size is nonetheless smaller than the vast majority of UN treaty bodies which are composed of eighteen members. The election process largely mirrors the procedure usually followed by other UN supervisory bodies. As detailed in Articles 72 and 73 ICRMW, members of the MWC are elected by secret ballot by the States Parties from a list of persons nominated by them. The four-year term of service can be renewed following the same process.

Compared to other treaty bodies, the election of members of the MWC presents one distinctive feature: the traditional criterion of equitable geographical distribution is refined by an explicit qualification referring to ‘both States of origin and States of employment’ (Art 72 (2) (a) ICRMW). This specification, inserted on the proposal of India, was intended to ensure a balanced and representative membership which would take into account the presumed conflicting interests between States of origin and of employment. However, the relevance of such qualification remains debatable because the same States increasingly qualify as both countries of employment and origin as this is already the case for most State Parties.

The composition of the MWC has raised two concerns also frequently addressed to other UN treaty bodies. First, women are poorly represented in the Committee in contradiction with the growing feminization of labour migration. This concern is further exacerbated by the ICRMW’s lack of gender specificity. Although the Convention includes women both as migrant workers and members of their family, the ICRMW has been criticized for failing to give specific attention to them (Satterthwaite, 2005, 1). Second, States have the tendency to nominate individuals who held governmental positions with the risk of politicizing the work of the MWC. As a way to mitigate the risk of partiality, Article 72 (2) (b) ICRMW recalls, as with the other UN core instruments, that members ‘shall serve in their personal capacity’.

C.  Working Methods

10  The working methods of the MWC are also similar to those of the other UN supervisory bodies. They are detailed in its Provisional Rules of Procedure, adopted in May 2004 by the MWC. According to this document, its meetings are to be held in public, unless it decides otherwise. Furthermore, the MWC usually reaches its decisions by consensus. If consensus cannot be reached, decisions are put to a vote. Each member has one vote and any proposal or motion put to a vote is adopted by simple majority.

11  The key originality of the MWC relies on the consultative role granted to the ILO. The ICRMW is indeed the only UN human rights treaty that explicitly assigns a role to the ILO in its supervisory mechanism. According to its Article 74 (5), ILO representatives have the right to participate in the meetings of the MWC in a consultative capacity. Moreover, the ILO’s Director-General shall receive copies of the States’ reports on the implementation of the ICRMW, and the MWC shall consider in its deliberations such comments and materials as the ILO may provide (Art 74 (2)).

12  The advisory function of the ILO has a twofold purpose. First, it enables the MWC to benefit from the well-established expertise of the ILO without interfering in the adoption of its decisions, since only members of the MWC have the right to vote. Second and more importantly, the ILO’s participation is aimed at avoiding variations and conflicting guidance in the interpretation and implementation of the ICRMW, because its content overlaps with the ILO Conventions No 97 and 143 on migrant workers, respectively adopted in 1949 and 1974.

13  The need to promote consistency between the UN Convention and its ILO counterparts is not limited to Conventions No 97 and 143. In fact, the vast majority of ILO Conventions are also applicable to all workers, regardless of their nationality or legal status. They include, for example, Convention No 29 concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour (1930) and Convention No 105 concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour (1957); Convention No 87 concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize (1948); Convention No 138 concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment (1973); and Convention No 182 concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour (1999). Furthermore, though adopted for a broader purpose, several ILO Conventions contain specific provisions on migrant workers. They are most notably Convention No 168 concerning employment promotion and protection against unemployment (1988), Convention No 181 concerning private employment agencies (1997), and Convention No 189 concerning decent work for domestic workers (2011).

14  Contrary to the unique role given to the ILO by the ICRMW, participation of other institutional stakeholders is not a right in itself. It is conditioned upon an explicit invitation from the Committee. According to Article 74 ICRMW, the MWC may invite representatives of other UN organs and intergovernmental organizations to be present and heard in its meetings and to submit written information. In practice, most concerned UN agencies are invited to take part in its meetings, including the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (Refugees, United Nations High Commissioner for (UNHCR)), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). Likewise, the MWC encourages NGOs to submit reports and information on the implementation of the Convention. By contrast, regional intergovernmental organizations are rarely invited by the MWC. This remains regrettable as States Parties to the ICRMW are members of several regional organizations which have adopted specific standards on migrant workers (including the African Union and the Organization of American States).

D.  Functions

15  As with its membership and working methods, the functions of the MWC are in line with those of the other UN treaty bodies. Its supervisory functions are threefold: the examination of States’ reports on the application of the Convention; the review of complaints from States and individuals; and the drafting of general comments. Each of these functions has, however, been unequally developed. The first function clearly constitutes the centrepiece of its work, while the second one is not yet operative and the third function is growing.

1.  Consideration of States’ Reports

16  The primary function of the MWC is to examine reports submitted by States Parties on the implementation of the Convention. States Parties must initially report one year after ICRMW’s entry into force and then every five years, as well as whenever the MWC so requests (Art 73 (1) ICRMW).

17  Both the content of the reports and the examination process largely correspond to those provided in other UN human rights treaties. States are not only bound to describe legislative, judicial, administrative, and other measures they have taken to give effect to the Convention; they must also indicate factors and difficulties affecting its implementation (Art 73 (1) and (2) ICRMW). In addition to the information also requested by other UN instruments, Article 73 (2) requires specific information on ‘the characteristics of migration flows in which the State Party concerned is involved’, including emigration, transit, and immigration flows.

18  The general framework provided by the Convention has been detailed by the MWC in the Provisional Guidelines Regarding the Form and Contents of Initial Reports, adopted in April 2005, and the Guidelines for the Periodic Reports, adopted in April 2008. According to these documents, consideration of the report takes place in two public meetings in which representatives of the State Party are invited. The leading role of the review is ensured by two rapporteurs per report. At the end of the review, the MWC discusses the concluding observations on the State Party’s report in a private meeting. Once adopted, concluding observations are transmitted to the State concerned and made public.

19  The whole process of such a review is not confrontational but rather aims at establishing a constructive dialogue between the State and the Committee on the progress and obstacles encountered in implementing the ICRMW. Overall, the main subjects of concern raised by the MWC are related to undocumented migrant workers in relation to the principle of nondiscrimination, the right to an effective remedy, the prohibition of arbitrary detention (Detention, Arbitrary), the procedural guarantees governing expulsion, as well as equal access to emergency medical care.

20  However, the MWC is confronted with the same recurring difficulty as other treaty bodies: most States Parties have failed to submit their initial reports in due time. The failure of states to submit their reports represents an important source of concern: it undermines the primary function of the MWC and some State Parties could avoid scrutiny by not reporting. In order to avoid this situation, the MWC assesses the implementation of the Convention despite the absence of the State’s report on the basis of information from other UN bodies and related mechanisms.

21  Another source of concern relates to the follow-up of the concluding observations. Although the MWC requests States to transmit its concluding observations to a broad range of domestic actors (government, parliament, judiciary, public agencies, local authorities, and civil society), there is no follow-up undertaken by the MWC before its review of the following periodic report (ie five years after). This situation is far from being satisfactory and could be resolved if the MWC establishes a follow-up procedure similar to most treaty bodies, including the one established by the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination in order to maintain a continuing dialogue with States and ensure the effectiveness of the reporting procedure.

2.  Examination of Inter-State and Individual Complaints

22  The second function of the MWC focuses on the examination of inter-state and individual complaints alleging violations of the Convention. Neither of these two mechanisms is in force for the time being because the minimum threshold of ten declarations of States Parties accepting these optional competences has not yet been reached (Arts 76 (2) and 77 (8) ICRMW). Only two State Parties have accepted the inter-state complaint mechanism (Guatemala and El Salvador), while four have done so for the individual one (Guatemala, Mexico, El Salvador, and Uruguay).

23  When the ten declarations have been gathered, the procedure established by the ICRMW will largely reproduce those existing under other UN treaties. As detailed in Article 76 ICRMW, the State Party which considers that another Party is not fulfilling its obligations under the Convention may, by written communication, bring the matter to the attention of that State and inform the MWC. Then, within three months after the receipt of the communication, the State must provide an explanation in writing clarifying the matter. If the matter is not adjusted to the satisfaction of both States Parties, either State has the right to refer the matter to the Committee.

24  At this stage, the role of the MWC is specified by two qualifications. First, it can deal with a matter referred to it only after domestic remedies have been exhausted. However, this shall not be the rule where, in the view of the Committee, the application of the remedy is unreasonably prolonged. Second, the MWC will make available its good offices to the States Parties concerned for the purpose of reaching a ‘friendly solution’.

25  The examination of communications is done in closed meetings where the States Parties concerned have the right to be represented and to make submissions orally and in writing. At the end of this procedure, the MWC will, within twelve months after the receipt of the notice referring the matter, submit a report. If a friendly solution is reached, the Committee will confine its report to a brief statement of the facts and of the solution reached. If not, the Committee shall set forth the relevant facts and may communicate its views to the States Parties concerned. Although the inter-state complaint mechanism has never been used by the other UN treaty bodies, the possibility provided by the ICRWM could be invoked in the future given the growing awareness among countries of origin of the need to protect their nationals abroad.

26  Similar to the inter-state mechanism, the individual complaint procedure follows the same pattern as those applied before other UN treaty bodies. The admissibility requirements detailed in Article 77 (2) and (3) ICRMW are identical. Any communication is admissible provided that the following five conditions are fulfilled: the communication is not anonymous; it does not constitute an abuse of the right of submission; it is not incompatible with the provisions of the ICRWM; the same matter has not been, and is not being, examined under another procedure of international investigation or settlement; and the individual has exhausted all domestic remedies, except if their application is unreasonably prolonged or is unlikely to bring effective relief.

27  As restated by Article 77 (4) ICRMW, the Committee will bring any communications to the attention of the concerned State Party. Within six months, the State must submit to the Committee its written explanations. Then, the communication is examined by the MWC in closed meetings in the light of all information made available to it by the individual and the State concerned (Art 77 (5) and (6) ICRMW). At the end of this quasi-judicial process, the Committee forwards its views to the State Party concerned and to the individual (Art 77 (7) ICRMW). Though such views are not formally binding, the experiences under other treaty bodies have shown that the individual complaint procedure represents an important way for redressing violations. This is further needed when migrant workers—especially undocumented ones—do not have an effective access to domestic courts as required by Article 18 ICRMW.

28  Although the inter-state and individual complaint procedures are not yet in force, four main alternatives do exist within the UN system. Firstly, the ICRMW provides for the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for any disputes between States Parties concerning its interpretation or application. Under Article 92 ICRMW, such disputes must first be submitted to arbitration at the request of one State Party. If, within six months from the date of the request for arbitration, the Parties are unable to agree on the organization of the arbitration, any one of those Parties may refer the dispute to the ICJ. However, States Parties may declare at the time of ratification that they are not bound by this mechanism of peaceful settlement. For the time being, only Argentina, Algeria, Morocco, and Venezuela have done so. The compromissory clause contained in Article 92 is accordingly binding for all the other States Parties, although it has not been invoked so far.

29  Secondly, as restated by its Article 78, the inter-state complaint mechanism provided by the ICRMW is without prejudice to any other procedures for settling disputes or complaints in the field covered by the Convention and laid down in the constituent instruments of, or in conventions adopted by, the UN and its agencies. States Parties to the ICRMW may thus resort to the inter-state complaint mechanisms established by other UN human rights treaties. They can also use the ILO complaint procedure governed by Article 26 to 34 of the ILO Constitution and the specific complaint procedure for violation of freedom of association.

30  Thirdly, besides inter-state complaints, migrant workers and members of their families can bring an individual complaint to the seven existing treaty bodies (Human Rights Committee, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Committee against Torture, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Committee on Enforced Disappearances, and Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities). These supervisory bodies are particularly relevant for most of the rights contained in the ICRMW and are already endorsed in the more general human rights treaties.

31  In practice, however, awareness of the potential of UN instruments for safeguarding rights of migrant workers remains oddly low among lawyers, practitioners, and non-governmental organizations. As a result, whereas a plethora of cases on asylum-seekers have been submitted to UN treaty bodies, individual complaints of migrant workers remain conspicuously scarce. Among such rare cases (which would equally fall within the scope of the ICRMW), the Human Rights Committee found that excluding non-EU nationals for election to a work council on the sole basis of their nationality constitutes a prohibited form of discrimination under Article 26 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Karakurt v Austria, 2002).

32  Fourthly, another way to bring an individual complaint relies on the special procedures established by the Human Rights Council, and, in particular, the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, the mandate for which was created in 1999. The Rapporteur is notably in charge of receiving information on specific allegations of violations and sending urgent appeals to governments asking for clarification. This procedure is more flexible than those of treaty bodies because the exhaustion of domestic remedies is not required. Its practical impact and degree of effectiveness remain, however, limited: the number of communications is modest compared to the potential worldwide violations and States are not obliged to respond to them.

3.  General Comments

33  According to the practice initiated by other UN treaty bodies, the final—albeit implicit—competence of the MWC is the adoption of interpretative comments on the scope and content of the ICRMW’s provisions. Though originally aimed at clarifying the reporting duties of States Parties, general comments have been increasingly used by supervisory bodies for pursuing a broader function. By providing an authoritative—though non-binding—interpretation, they have gained considerable influence in promoting a common understanding of treaty obligations among a wide range of actors (including domestic courts, NGOs, and UN agencies).

35  General Comment No 1 is structured in three parts of uneven legal interests. The first two parts provide a long narrative background on the practical difficulties faced by migrant domestic workers and the gaps of protection. While providing instructive information, one can wonder whether this lengthy factual account has a place in a general comment that is supposed to focus on the legal interpretation of States’ obligations. This interpretative guidance is provided in the last part devoted to recommendations for States Parties. It mainly restates the most salient provisions of the ICRMW as applicable to migrant domestic workers (including equal treatment with nationals in social security and health services, the right to organize and to engage in collective bargaining, and equal access to justice). Other recommendations are more detailed and contextualized. They notably specify the domestic legal framework of recruitment agencies and the role of embassies and consulates of sending countries in protecting their nationals employed abroad.

36  Given the critiques raised towards the ICRMW for its lack of gender sensitivity, one would have expected more detailed and systematic guidance on women who represent the majority of domestic workers. General Comment No 2 on the Rights of Migrant Workers in an Irregular Situation and Members of their Families suffers from the same drawback: women migrants are mentioned in only five paragraphs out of 79.

37  General Comment No 2 is composed of two parts respectively devoted to the general applicable framework and the specific provisions of the ICRMW on undocumented migrant workers. The MWC observes that ‘[m]ost of the rights protected in Part III on undocumented migrant workers] are common to a host of international human rights treaties’, including the two UN Covenants, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) (General Comment No 2, para 6). According to the most favourable treatment restated in Article 81 (1) ICRMW, States Parties are bound to apply it in due accordance with other human rights treaties. This is particularly important since, as acknowledged by the MWC, the UN Covenants provide a broader range of rights, such as the right to freely enter marriage and to equality of rights and responsibilities of spouses, the right to maternity protection, and the right to an adequate standard of living (General Comment No 2, paras 9–10).

38  As further stressed by General Comment No 2, few rights are truly specific to the ICRMW. They include protection against unauthorized confiscation or destruction of personal documents (Art 21 ICRMW) and the right to transfer their earnings and savings upon termination of their stay in the State of employment (Art 32 ICRMW). Other guarantees—such as those governing detention—are more detailed and contextualized to take into account the situation of migrant workers. Arbitrary detention of undocumented migrant workers as prohibited by Articles 16 and 17 ICRMW is clearly the most pressing issue.

39  While specifying the scope of these two provisions, the MWC recalls that ‘crossing the border of a country in an unauthorized manner or without proper documentation, or overstaying a permit of stay does not constitute a crime. Criminalizing irregular entry into a country exceeds the legitimate interest of States parties to control and regulate irregular migration, and leads to unnecessary detention. While irregular entry and stay may constitute administrative offences, they are not crimes per se against persons, property or national security’ (General Comment No 2, para 24).

40  Following this stance, the MWC rightly recalls that ‘[b]y making regular channels of migration available, States parties also contribute to the aim of preventing and eliminating illegal or clandestine movements and employment of migrant workers in an irregular situation’ (General Comment No 2, para 17). This clearly represents a crucial issue: irregular migration will persist as long as domestic legislation continues to restrict immigration without providing legal opportunities of labour migration in accordance with the economic needs of receiving States.

41  General Comment No 3 observes in this sense that ‘the lack of regular and safe channels for children and families to migrate contribute to children taking life-threatening and extremely dangerous migration journeys. The same is true for border control and surveillance measures that focus on repression rather than facilitating, regulating and governing mobility’ (General Comment No 3, para 41). This General Comment restates and specifies the fundamental principles that apply to all children whether documented or not (such as the prohibition of non-discrimination, non-refoulement, and collective expulsion as well the principle of the best interest of the child). General Comment No 4 also reaffirms in clear-cut terms that ‘children should never be detained for reasons related to their or their parents’ migration status and States should expeditiously and completely cease or eradicate the immigration detention of children’ (General Comment No 4, para 5). It further provides a comprehensive and detailed guidance to implement migration control in accordance with the basic rights of children (including due process guarantees, the right to a name and a nationality, the right to family unity, protection from all forms of violence and abuse, and the rights to an adequate standard of living, to health, and to education).

E.  Evaluation

42  Since its establishment in January 2004, the MWC has evolved into a challenging environment for three main reasons of institutional, normative, and practical nature. Firstly, it must find its place among a broad range of actors with concurring and sometimes conflicting mandates. While States remain particularly influential and concerned actors, many other stakeholders (including international organizations and other related supervisory mechanisms) are increasingly involved in the field of labour migration. Although the Committee is still struggling to make its voice heard in the surrounding cacophony, its very existence may constitute an opportunity to establish itself as a forum of discussion gathering the different actors involved in the promotion of a human rights–based approach to migration.

43  Secondly, the rights of migrant workers and their families are governed by a complex set of overlapping norms enshrined in numerous instruments. This dense normative framework requires careful and harmonized guidance in interpreting the ICRWM. The Committee should develop a more articulated and holistic approach in order to promote a cogent and authoritative interpretation.

44  Thirdly, the most serious difficulty encountered by the MWC is linked to the limited number of States Parties to the ICRMW. The MWC should be more proactive in promoting awareness and ratification of its Convention and in dispelling the recurrent misconceptions about its legal and political implications. Contrary to the common belief among receiving countries, its ratification does not imply a loss of sovereignty on admission policies. On the contrary, Article 79 ICRMW preserves ‘the right of each State Party to establish the criteria governing admission of migrant workers and members of their families’.

45  The persisting reluctance of Western countries to ratify the ICRMW is clearly the most challenging issue. While their domestic laws are generally in line with the ICRMW and would make ratification easier, the compatibility of national legislations with the Convention is invoked as an excuse for non-ratification. Besides the obvious political considerations behind their refusal, Western States are unwilling to have their human rights record scrutinized by an independent committee of experts when it comes to migrants. In the meantime, their refusal to ratify one of the core UN instruments puts in doubt their legitimacy in promoting due respect for human rights. It creates a double standard: while they are eager to give lessons on human rights abroad, they reject scrutiny at home for one of the most vulnerable groups of persons.

Cited Bibliography

  • ML Satterthwaite, ‘Crossing Borders, Claiming Rights: Using Human Rights Law to Empower Women Migrant Workers’ (2005) 8 Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal 1–66.

  • V Chetail, ‘The Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families’ in P Alston and F Mégret (eds), The United Nations and Human Rights: A Critical Appraisal (OUP Oxford 2018).

Further Bibliography

  • R Cholewinski, Migrant Workers in International Human Rights Law: Their Protection in Countries of Employment (Clarendon Press Oxford 1997).

  • P de Guchteneire, A Pécoud, and R Cholewinski (eds), Migrant and Human Rights: The United Nations Convention on Migrant Workers’ Rights (CUP Cambridge 2009).

Cited Documents