1.  Overview of Doctrine

1  The concept of reasonableness exhibits an important link with human reason, a philosophical concept par excellence. Reasonableness is also generally perceived as opening the door to several ethical or moral, rather than legal, considerations (see also Justice and Morality in International Relations). A number of legal philosophers insist upon the importance of reasonableness in law. Furthermore, lawyers are able to fill lacunae in existing positive law by reference to reasonableness, and thereby also to societal values and even to conceptions of natural law (Natural Law and Justice). Consequently, in public international law, it has been postulated that such notions as these are inherently incompatible with any attempt at objective definition. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) seems to concur with this view: ‘[W]hat is reasonable and equitable in any given case must depend on its particular circumstances’ (Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt [Advisory Opinion] [1980] 96). In a similar vein, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has held that ‘reasonableness … must be assessed in each case according to its special features’ (Wemhoff v Germany para. 10). As a result, reasonableness has, thus far, received scant consideration in scholarship on positive international law.

2.  Reasonableness as a Legal Concept

2  However, as is the case with well-recognized principles such as equity (Equity in International Law), good faith (bona fide), and necessity (Necessity, State of), it is eminently possible to analyse reasonableness as a legal concept. Reasonableness has been subject to extensive application in the field of public international law, where it fulfils a number of essential functions (see section C below). Furthermore, beyond the specific meanings that the term conveys in various contexts, we may even discern a number of overarching, fundamental characteristics (see section D below). Naturally, any such general conception would afford the interpreter considerable room for manoeuvre, with the result that application of the concept necessarily requires engagement with a number of delicate legal issues.

3  Is it possible to conclude that reasonableness is a merely legal concept of which moral evaluation is not to be made? Even if, in a formal sense, a judge’s reasoning is expressed in legal terms, in reality, any determination of what is or is not reasonable cannot be made in purely legal terms. The question remains, however, as to whether the contemporaneous presence of both a formally legal discourse and a reality in which moral or political choices are prevalent reflects the true nature of the application of many, if not all, legal concepts.

4  Reasonableness has the role of allowing a smoother application of legal norms, ie operating intra legem as a standard of appreciation, of action, or the like. In exceptional circumstances, however, it sometimes happens that it is used contra legem in order to cast aside a set of applicable legal norms. Thus, it has been claimed that the United Nations Charter–based and customary rules on the use of force in international relations cannot be upheld in a world fighting hyper-terrorism and needing some degree of pre-emptive action (Use of Force, Prohibition of). It is then most often proposed to replace the detailed legal rules on the subject matter by the mere standard of what is reasonable in context (see AD Sofaer ‘On the Necessity of Pre-Emption’ [2003] 14 EJIL 209–26). In a positive law analysis, such a substitutive role of the reasonableness standard cannot be countenanced. The standard can operate only as a measuring rod of what is reasonable according to the legal rule, and not to what is reasonable de lege ferenda in the subjective view of a particular author. Stated briefly, reasonableness within the law must be distinguished from political arguments on reasonableness—legal reasonableness is not the same as political reasonableness.

3.  Reasonableness as a Legal Standard

5  Legal standards can be distinguished from legal principles, in particular from general principles of law such as good faith or proportionality. The distinction lies in the degree of normativity of a legal concept and in the coagulation of its contents into a number of more or less neatly tailored juridical rules or doctrines. Under this lens, reasonableness is a simple standard, whereas in most of its complexions good faith, for example, is a general principle. The standard has to deal with situations of great factual complexity, where the circumstances of the various cases are so manifold that a single rule could not do justice to the situations likely to arise. The standard makes it possible to give a certain measuring rod for the appreciation of the various relevant circumstances (eg in the context of judicial expenses: Sylvania Technical System Inc v Iran 323–24). It is normatively relatively poor, allowing the legal operator to shape the legal answer with full regard to the varying circumstances of the case. In a sense, a standard is thus a window on the facts. It tries to give the legal operator a conception of what ought to be considered ‘social normalcy’ at a certain time and place. Thus, the standard concerns a sort of medium range of expected behaviour—namely ‘reasonable’ behaviour as it is viewed today in the prevalent social and moral conceptions. However, when the main reasons giving rise to the application of the standard are progressively specified, the standard gains in normativity and approaches the halls of a legal principle. Thus, if the reasons excusing delays in the procedure are fleshed out in the case law (eg complexity of the case, behaviour of the claimant, etc), the standard builds up some stronger normative elements. But these elements remain fundamentally related to the facts and circumstances. The way towards a true legal principle is consequently not completed. Reasonableness is not the only such standard. There are other ones closely related to it, such as ‘appropriate’, ‘useful’, ‘due’, ‘not excessive’, ‘legitimate’, or ‘feasible’.

6  The principle, on the other hand, is more intensely normative: its contents have coagulated around certain stable poles. In that sense, the principle is a window on legal rules concretizing it, and not merely a window on varying sets of facts. Thus, the principle of good faith is centered on the protection of legitimate expectations and on the protection of some social finalities, giving rise to a series of rules in those specific contexts: pacta sunt servanda, the obligatory force of unilateral acts (Unilateral Acts of States in International Law), normative acquiescence, estoppel, the prohibition of abuse of rights or détournement de pouvoir, etc. It sometimes happens, however, that good faith plays the role of a simple standard, such as in the expression that some regulations have to be interpreted or applied bona fide, where the term good faith could be replaced by the term ‘reasonably’ (see eg North Atlantic Coast Fisheries [1910] 189). Expressed in the briefest terms, a standard is a legal auxiliary, a principle a legal norm.

4.  Reasonableness as Fact-Relatedness

7  As we have seen, reasonableness relates to the world of facts, to the factual matrixes of the different situations. Thus, in attempting to extrapolate a rational model of the interpretation of the notion of reasonableness from international jurisprudence, it must be remembered that the threshold of reasonableness is always largely context-dependent. Any general model set out must, therefore, be adapted in response to the particularities of the area of law and the factual situation at issue. For example, in applying the notion that cases must be heard within a reasonable period of time, assessment must be based upon the criteria set out in case-law on this specific issue: complexity of the case (a more complex case necessitates a longer period); conduct of the applicant (for a more conscientious applicant, proceedings should occur sooner); and conduct of the relevant State authorities (the latter must be able to justify each delay in the relevant hearings). Similarly, when deciding issues involving the delimitation of maritime zones (Maritime Delimitation Cases before International Courts and Tribunals), a reasonable conclusion will require assessment of the relevant factors, geographical and otherwise, traditionally considered by the courts: length and shape of coastline, the presence of islands, certain rocks or headlands, the proximity of neighbouring States, etc. As regards the law of the sea, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) has consistently maintained the view that any assessment of the reasonableness of a bonding or other financial guarantee depends, in a given situation, upon several factors: ‘the gravity of the alleged offences, the penalties imposed or imposable under the laws of the detaining State, the value of the detained vessel and of the cargo seized, the amount of the bond imposed by the detaining State and its form’ (‘Camouco’ [Panama v France] [Prompt Release] [Judgment] para. 67). Or, as a last example, what the ‘reasonable precautions’ in the sense of Art. 57 (4) Geneva Conventions Additional Protocol I (1977) are must be ascertained in the context of military practice and all the factors that have been built up by various lessons learned processes. These practices relate to time of attack, angle of attack, choice of weapons, warnings, place where the blast is calculated to take place, area screening to identify the precise location of items, etc. The overarching conception of reasonableness must, therefore, be adapted to the legal and factual particularities of the case under consideration.

5.  Reasonableness: Negative and Positive

8  The distinction between positive and negative philosophies is well known: it is rooted in the fact that in most cases it is easier to conclude what should not be allowed than what should be allowed, what is evil rather than what is good. Thus, in many cases the legal operator will in the first place attach to what appears excessive or unreasonable, before delving into what appears reasonable. In a sense, unreasonableness is the first test while reasonableness follows suit, always according to the factual matrix of a given case. An illustration can be found in the famous Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua Case (Nicaragua v United States of America) of 1984 decided by the ICJ: in order to withdraw from an optional declaration under Art. 36 (2) ICJ Statute (International Court of Justice, Optional Clause; Optional Clause Declarations: International Court of Justice [ICJ]) the Court decided that when no time requirement is set in the declaration itself a ‘reasonable time’ is required; and the Court then goes on to state that three days does not amount to such a reasonable time, since it allows any abusive manoeuvre (Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua [Nicaragua v United States of America] [Jurisdiction and Admissibility] para. 63). This is tantamount to saying that a period of three days is clearly an unreasonable time. The unreasonableness test may also be referred to for controlling the use of discretionary powers, its main legal complexion being in this context to rule out arbitrary and abusive practices (see eg Arbitration concerning Heathrow Airport User Charges [United States v United Kingdom] at 66, para. 6.40). Another example can be found in Art. 32 (b) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (‘VCLT’; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties [1969]): complementary elements of interpretation such as preparatory work can be used if the interpretation by the main methods under Art. 31 VCLT yields a manifestly ‘unreasonable’ result (Interpretation in International Law; Treaties, Interpretation of; Travaux Préparatoires). This term is generally linked with the context as well as with the object and purpose of the treaty (Treaties, Object and Purpose). An example of an unreasonable result is said to be an interpretation of one provision of the treaty which contradicts another provision of the same treaty. The ICJ has itself found that the application of the equidistance method in maritime delimitations may lead to ‘unreasonable’ results when there are concave coastlines and the terrestrial boundaries lie in such a way that the delimitation obtained has a cutting-off effect on the State sandwiched between two other States (see North Sea Continental Shelf [Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands] [Judgment] [1969] para. 24; North Sea Continental Shelf Cases). In such a case, the unreasonableness was an intuitive first fact obtained by a glance at the result of the delimitation on a map. Consequently, as with most things in life, reasonableness has two sides of the coin: a positive concept, requiring reasonable behaviour; and a negative concept, ruling out unreasonable attitudes or results. The two aspects are closely related but give rise to different sets of appreciation, the latter being generally easier to handle than the former.

1.  Flexibility

18  One of the reasons for the use of the notion of reasonableness in law-making is to render legal rules more flexible. Frequently, States include the term ‘reasonable’ in legal instruments in order to introduce a degree of flexibility. For instance, Art. 3 First Protocol to the ECHR stipulates that parties to the ECHR must organize elections at ‘reasonable intervals’. This expression was obviously chosen in order to cover a variety of evolving national electoral practices. This ‘adaptability function’ is even more remarkable when judges reformulate a rule by introducing the notion of reasonableness despite its absence in the original text. For example, according to Art. 14 ECHR, rights protected by the ECHR must be recognized ‘without discrimination on any ground’ or, in the French version, ‘sans distinction aucune’. Faced with this text in particular cases, the ECtHR held that:

The notion of reasonableness thus enabled the ECtHR to adapt the text so as to recognize as legitimate a number of differences in treatment.

2.  Gap-Filling

19  The term ‘reasonable’ plays an essential function in one of the most fundamental of the judicial tasks: the transcendence of the aporias to which positivist law can lead when confronted with social reality. Indeed, positivist thinking suggests that one, and only one, legal solution applies to any particular case (Legal Positivism). When faced with the absence of criteria with which to arrive at such a solution, whether at the stage of establishing facts, interpreting the applicable law, or reaching the conclusions of a ‘judicial syllogism’, judges will draw upon the notion of reasonableness in order to avoid declaring a non liquet. It is as an example of such an approach that we might view the references to ‘reasonable certainty’ and ‘reasonable interpretation’ found frequently in case-law. Here, the notion of reasonableness is used in order to legitimize an assertion which is, by definition, subject to challenge. The ‘discovery’ of facts, of the will of the parties, or of some legal principle which is meant to transcend the literal meaning of a text, to fill a lacuna or to resolve a textual contradiction, is always the result of choices. These choices do not impose themselves through the application of simple legal technique: they also, perhaps mostly, find their justification in the sphere of ethics or politics. The notion of reasonableness aims at masking this axiological dimension, by elaborating a solution apparently based solely on reason.

20  At a more global level, the notion of reasonableness allows judges to present international law as a complete, coherent, and closed legal order. In other words, as a ‘system’ as generally understood by legal writers. This function partakes of the process of ‘systematisation’, to borrow from Max Weber. The notion of reasonableness is thus used to fill legal lacunae, whether of an interpretative (in the sense that a rule exists, but for which many equally acceptable interpretations are possible) or fundamental (in situations where no rule seems applicable to a particular set of facts) character. One can think of the ‘reasonable degree of proportionality’ criteria, which provides a legal standard in the absence of existing criteria, in matters as different as the setting of maritime boundaries or human rights. In such a case, the notion of reasonableness demonstrates the contradiction between on the one hand, the static, and in theory closed, nature of a legal system, and, on the other, the need to integrate facts, and sometimes values, within that system.

3.  Standard of Evaluation

21  When legal acts have to be reviewed by a legal operator, such as a judge, some standards are needed under which the review will take place. Various notions will apply in that context, ranging from a review of capacity, necessity, and proportionality to legality, and possibly also to reasonableness. Which standard is applicable depends on the substantive norms at stake and on the practice of the controlling organ. Thus, in Swiss administrative law, the judge assesses inter alia whether the measure at stake is cast in a reasonable relation of means and end (see P Tschannen U Zimmerli and M Müller Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht [4^th edn Stämpfli Bern 2014] 168–69). This type of review is known also in international law, and not only in the context of the practice of the international administrative tribunals. Thus, in the Filleting within the Gulf of St Lawrence between Canada and France case (1986), the arbitral tribunal recalled that the exercise of a competence to edict rules must always be exercised reasonably, which means in particular that it must take due account of the rights and liberties of other States and that the rules adopted must be proportionate to the aim pursued (para. 54). Thus it is a standard of legal review. Similarly, in Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v Japan: New Zealand Intervening) (2014), the ICJ had to assess whether the killing of whales was undertaken only for reasons of scientific research. It stated that it would adopt an objective standard of review (not a subjective one: bad faith), centered upon the reasonableness of the measures in regard to the stated aim (para. 67; see also Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua [Merits] para. 224, in relation to ‘essential security interests’; this case is also discussed in para. 8 above).

4.  Standard of Action

22  In some cases, the point is not to offer a standard of review only after the fact, but in addition to offer a general standard of action of some State organ in the first place. This is the case, for example, of the standard of ‘reasonable military commander’ applied since the end of World War II in order to judge, for example, whether a belligerent has taken all the necessary measures to protect civilians from excessive collateral damage (proportionality test). It is impossible to set up a hard and fast rule on the issue of incidental civilian damages taking place in the context of an attack on a military objective (Military Objectives; Civilian Objects). The circumstances to take account of are so manifold and so context-related that the law can state only general criteria and give instruction to the military commander and his legal advisor, acting in good faith, to concretize all the relevant elements in a decision balancing up the military advantage anticipated and the civilian losses expected by a certain course of action. Consequently, Art. 51 (5) (b) Geneva Conventions Additional Protocol I, as much as Art. 57 (2) (a) (ii) of the same text, are addressed in the first place to the commanders themselves. They must execute the relevant normative injunction in the particular factual matrixes of different cases—an issue particularly complex in shifting urban warfare. Reasonableness is not a particularly tight or clear standard. But it has been concretized by a series of military practices, including the recourse to decisional matrixes and lessons learned sessions (on this issue see ICRC The Principle of Proportionality in the Rules Governing the Conduct of Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law [International Committee of the Red Cross Geneva 2016] 52 ff).

5.  Legitimacy

23  Over and above particular cases, the use of the notion of reasonableness provides legitimacy to the international legal order as a whole, by presenting an image of a closed, coherent and complete legal system (Legitimacy in International Law). From that perspective, references to reason suggest an ideal of unity and community of values that is particularly remarkable in a very loosely integrated international society, which is characterized by decentralized loci of power and acute cultural and political differences. In fact, the very presence in the international legal discourse of references to the notion of ‘reasonableness’ is indicative of the persistent problem of legitimacy of a legal order which is neither based on a common ideology, nor controlled by a centralized enforcing body. It thus appears that the introduction of the concept of ‘reasonableness’ in judicial discourse leads to a true occultation: it masks persistent contradictions regarding the meaning of a rule, behind a formula which leaves open the possibility of divergent interpretations.

1.  Formal Elements of Definition

25  The first model inferred from the case-law is concerned with formal elements: it deals with the manner in which a judge or a State will justify an interpretation, independently from the actual content given to the notion of reasonableness in a particular case.

26  First, one notes that the method used to provide content to the notion of reasonableness follows the traditional principles of legal interpretation: reference to the applicable instrument, to its object or to criteria identified in similar case-law. For instance, in dealing with Art. 6 ECHR, the ECtHR systematically refers to the ECHR, as well as to criteria identified in precedents, such as the complexity of the case or the respective behaviours of the applicant and the State’s public authorities. Moreover, from that perspective, the consequences of interpreting the notion are similar to those of the interpretation of other legal notions: for instance, violation by a State of a rule enjoining the adoption of ‘reasonable measures’ will lead to the secondary obligation to repair damages. Similarly, exceeding a ‘reasonable time’ will give rise to a declaration of violation of the ECHR, and to the appropriate measures which such a violation entails. In other words, the notion of reasonableness is considered as a regular positive law notion, not as a notion drawing from half-way categories between law and non-law, such as so called soft law, so heavily discussed by authors.

27  The formal method of defining the concept actually incorporates a ‘discussion’ that systematically takes place between judges and the parties before them, regardless of the particular circumstances of the case and of the actual meaning that will finally be ascribed to the term ‘reasonable’ in that particular case. To illustrate this point, reference may again be made to the example of the obligation for a State to ensure that trials take place within a ‘reasonable time’. Judges called upon to decide whether the rule was actually complied with in a particular case will not set a precise ‘reasonable’ time frame before deciding whether the State acted within that delay or not. Rather, they will let the State submit a justification for the delay. Only then will they proceed to a marginal review of this justification. This is sometimes referred to as the theory of the margin of appreciation.

28  In this same context, the formal model that is actually followed is founded on five cumulative elements. First, judges will verify whether the State has provided an explanation regarding the whole contested delay. If the State does not manage to invoke an explanation with regard to each element of the delay, it will be considered to be unreasonable (Lechner and Hess [ECtHR] paras 54 and 59). Secondly, assuming that an explanation is provided, this explanation must appear in the form of ‘reasoning’. In this context, ‘reasoning’ can be defined as a series of propositions aimed at explaining the delay. This may seem obvious, but that simply goes to show how powerful this aspect of the model is: it is so integrated that it is no longer questioned, or a fortiori, challenged. No one would seek a return to ancient rhetorical, literary or poetic approaches, not based on modern reasoning techniques. Thirdly, the explanation provided must be capable of intersubjective understanding. It must be understandable for the judge called upon to render a decision. Often, the ECtHR considers a delay to be unreasonable because it ‘cannot understand why’ there were delays between different stages of a set of proceedings (H v United Kingdom para. 80). On a similar line, the fourth element requires that the justificatory discourse be exempt from contradictions. There are numerous examples of this requirement: the opposition between ‘reasonable’ and ‘contradictory’ can be traced to a significant body of case-law (Temple of Preah Vihear [Cambodia v Thailand] [Preliminary Objections] [1961] 32; Temple of Preah Vihear Case). Finally, the fifth element of this model requires that the explanation given be supported by relevant legal authorities. This criterion will not be satisfied according to international law standards if only internal law is invoked, as would be the case if a State attempted to justify a delay by signalling that the delay complied with its national legislation (Wiesinger v Austria [ECtHR] para. 60).

29  The formal model limits, to a certain extent, the subjectivity of the notion. Regardless of the content that will be attributed to the notion in a particular case, someone seeking to provide meaning to the notion of reasonableness will arrange his or her argument according to some commonly accepted rules. If this is not done—as has often been the case in existing jurisprudence—the justificatory discourse will fail to convince, and may be rejected by the judge. While this model describes particularly well the decisions rendered by the ECtHR concerning the right to be tried within a reasonable time, it can also be transposed to any interpretation of the notion of reasonableness, whether it be aimed at a judge, a State, or even public opinion. This is what certain philosophers, such as Habermas, call ‘procedural reason’. Nothing is reasonable in the absolute. ‘Reasonable’ is what is considered as such following a discussion in which each interested party has had an opportunity to present arguments. ‘Reasonableness’ is thus both relative, since it only holds for a specific community, and temporary, to the extent that its meaning can be modified as a result of a new discussion. Yet, it remains ‘rational’, ie coherent or logical, to the extent that one accepts a contemporary conception of rationality.

2.  Substantive Elements of Definition

30  The interpretation of the term ‘reasonable’ by international jurisdictions does not only follow the formal model examined above. To understand fully this interpretation, we must also consider a second—substantive—model. In other words, a model that integrates content into the justificatory discourse. This model assumes a sufficient causal link between the legitimate objective sought, and the behaviour that one seeks to establish as reasonable. An example of such reasoning can be offered. Public international law prohibits arbitrary requisitions, that is, according to the ICJ, ‘unreasonable requisitions’ (Elettronica Sicula SpA [ELSI] [United States of America v Italy] 76; Elettronica Sicula Case). The verification that a particular requisition is reasonable proceeds in three stages. First, there is the legitimate purpose or objective. In principle, States have a discretionary power to proceed with a requisition. Within the exercise of their sovereignty, they can unilaterally designate the requisition’s purpose. In the absence of an express prohibition, this purpose is presumed to be legitimate (Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali [ECtHR] para. 72). Hence, a State can justify the requisition of a car by invoking the need to transport military troops in times of war. Second, there is the requirement of a causal link. The requisitioning State must then demonstrate that the alleged legitimate purpose is the actual basis of the requisition. Consequently, a measure which is totally ineffective in realizing the alleged purpose will be deemed unreasonable (Raimondo v Italy [ECtHR] para. 30). Such would be the case, for instance, if the requisition took place after the troops had already been transported. Third, there is the criterion of proportionality, ie of sufficiency of the causal link. Assuming that the measure is effective, judges will then assess the proportionality between that measure and the purpose sought. This implies a comparison of the behaviour in question with the standard of what is generally done, or what should legally be done, in similar situations. Hence, the requisition of an ambulance already in service would be considered unreasonable, at least to the extent that the act is found to be incompatible with the way States normally act in similar circumstances.

31  Hence, a State whose actions are being challenged will need to justify its behaviour by presenting an understandable and logical reasoning (formal model), but also by invoking substantive criteria which consist in an articulation between the legitimate purpose and the sufficient causal link between the objective and the measures undertaken (substantive model). Subjectivity persists: the State maintains a large margin of appreciation with regard to its conception of what is ‘reasonable’ in specific circumstances. In the foregoing example, the sovereign power of requisition is not in itself called into question. The exercise of this power, however, must be accompanied by a justificatory discourse that complies with the particular aspects pertaining to the notion of reasonable. Moreover, this discourse will have to adapt both to the particular audience, as well as to the social and political context in which it takes place.

32  The requisition example is of course overly simplified. What is essential to understand, however, is that rationality is omnipresent in the application of these two models. Judges will avoid condemning a State on the basis of moral, ethical or political arguments which have not first been formalized and translated into legal arguments. Rather, they will develop a discourse framed in syllogistic terms, invoking elements which appeal to reason, such as reliance on scientific authorities. In any event, values are theoretically absent from this discourse. What we observe is a formal evacuation of the axiological dimension of the notion of reasonableness.

Select Bibliography

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Select Documents

• Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v United Kingdom (ECtHR) Series A No 94.

• Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v Serbia) (Merits) [2015] ICJ Rep 3.

• Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia v Greece) [2011] ICJ Rep 644.

• Arbitration concerning Heathrow Airport User Charges (United States v United Kingdom) (1992) 24 RIAA 1.

• Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co Ltd (Belgium v Spain) (Second Phase) [1970] ICJ Rep 3.

• ‘Camouco’ (Panama v France) (Prompt Release) (Judgment) [2000] ITLOS Rep 10.

• Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v Nicaragua) (Compensation Judgment) [2018] ICJ Rep 15.

• Certain Aspects of the Laws on the Use of Languages in Education in Belgium (Merits) (ECtHR) Series A No 6.

• Chorherr v Austria (ECtHR) Series A No 266-B.

• COE ‘Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’ (signed 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953) 213 UNTS 221 (European Convention on Human Rights).

• COE ‘Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’ (opened for signature 20 March 1952, entered into force 18 May 1954) CETS No 9.

• Corfu Channel (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v Albania) (Merits) [1949] ICJ Rep 4.

• Elettronica Sicula SpA (ELSI) (United States of America v Italy) [1989] ICJ Rep 15.

• Filleting within the Gulf of St Lawrence between Canada and France (17 July 1986) (1990) 19 RIAA 225.

• Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 31 (Geneva Convention I).

• Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 85 (Geneva Convention II).

• H v United Kingdom (ECtHR) Series A No 120.

• International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171.

• Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt (Advisory Opinion) [1980] ICJ Rep 73.

• Lechner and Hess (ECtHR) Series A No 118.

• Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) (Jurisdiction and Admissibility) [1984] ICJ Rep 392.

• Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14.

• North Atlantic Coast Fisheries (1910) 11 RIAA 167.

• North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands) (Judgment) [1969] ICJ Rep 3.

• Observer and Guardian v United Kingdom (ECtHR) Series A No 216.

• Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) (adopted 8 June 1977, entered into force 7 December 1978) 1125 UNTS 3.

• Raimondo v Italy (ECtHR) Series A No 281-A.

• Sylvania Technical System Inc v Iran (1985) 8 Iran-US CTR 298.

• Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v Thailand) (Preliminary Objections) [1961] ICJ Rep 17.

• United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (adopted and opened for signature 21 May 1997, entered into force on 17 August 2014) (1997) 36 ILM 700.

• United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (concluded 10 December 1982, entered into force 16 November 1994) 1833 UNTS 3.

• Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (done 18 April 1961, entered into force 24 April 1961) 500 UNTS 95.

• Wemhoff v Germany [ECtHR] Series A No 7.

• Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v Japan: New Zealand Intervening) (Merits) [2014] ICJ Rep 226.

• Wiesinger v Austria (ECtHR) Series A No 213.