1.  Background

1  Investment codes are standalone, unified codes where all the rules are relevant for inward foreign investment. They typically specify the types of admissible capital, the sectors open and closed to foreign investors, the environmental, planning, and other regulations for foreign investment, and the conditions under which such investment may be terminated. They often provide for tax breaks and other incentives. Some apply only to existing foreign investment. Others seek to encourage new investment flows. They may be generally applicable or sector-specific.

2  Investment codes have a two-fold purpose: to encourage foreign investment; and to maintain control over it. They typically reflect a compromise between control over, and facilitation of, foreign investment. On the one hand, they seek to insulate foreign investors from domestic policy change and political risk. On the other hand, they enable host countries to absorb foreign investment under a predictable framework provided by their domestic law.

3  Investment codes have been a prominent feature of international investment relations since the 1950s, especially between countries at different levels of economic development. Their heyday was in the 1970s and 1980s, when more than sixty countries had enacted investment codes domestically. Some codes acted as substitutes for the underdevelopment of general commercial law in the host country.

4  Other investment codes set out different rules for cross-border as compared to domestic investment, often creating more attractive conditions for foreign investment than the host country’s general commercial law. In such cases, investment codes coexist alongside general commercial law. Large and developed economies often rely on general commercial law to regulate inward foreign investment. The United States and countries in the European Union absorb foreign investment under general commercial law. Central elements of their legal infrastructure for foreign investment include company and intellectual property law, complemented by specific provisions on immigration and taxation.

2.  Rationales for Investment Codes

5  The primary motivation for investment codes is to increase investment inflows, which are widely regarded as a catalyst for modernization and economic growth. A unified code has the potential to enhance the attractiveness of the host country as an investment destination, often through fiscal inducements or other more favourable treatment compared to domestic investors. A related benefit is the stability in the regulatory framework and transparency as to the applicable rules that an investment code may provide. This rationale is particularly important for countries that would otherwise not be an attractive investment destination, due to factors such as a small market size or a burdensome regulatory regime.

6  The second motivation is to maintain control over foreign investment and to mitigate the loss of political and economic control that may be associated with it. Inward investment flows are often seen as increasing the dependence of the recipient country on foreign investors. As a result of these fears, restrictions on investment flows are common in many countries. They often decrease the prospective returns to foreign investors. The Chinese and Vietnamese investment codes, for example, only allow foreign investment through joint ventures with a local partner in the host country. In some cases, the partner needs to be a State entity, to ensure continuous official oversight. We can therefore distinguish two ideal types of codes, even though no country falls neatly into either category; regulatory and facilitative investment codes.

7  Aside from the general rationales of encouraging and regulating investments, investment codes often pursue some or all of the following objectives: transfer of capital and technology (Technology Transfer); access to markets abroad; inputs into the production process difficult to find elsewhere; hard currency earnings; and the development of entrepreneurial skills. The hope is that importing these elements will lead, in due course, to their development locally. These elements often figure prominently in the decision on whether or not to admit a particular investment. Finally, investment codes are one method for a host State to offer investor-State arbitration to investors, though the most common form today is an offer in a bilateral investment treaty (‘BIT’) (see below paras 33–50). For instance, the 1993 Law on Foreign Investment of the Republic of Albania contains a binding offer of consent by the host State to International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (‘ICSID’) arbitration.

8  Regulatory investment codes typically provide limits on the types of shareholdings by foreign investors. Certain sectors or activities may be closed to foreign investment altogether. Justifications include national security and maintaining effective regulatory control. However, there is also often a desire to insulate local firms from foreign competition. In many cases, a mix of motivations may explain the decision to liberalize a sector for foreign investment, to subject it to important restrictions of a quantitative or qualitative character, or to keep sectors closed entirely.

1.  Regulating Investment Flows (1914–1980)

11  The original goal of investment codes was to control foreign investment rather than to attract it. Foreign investment was controlled and screened to fulfil the host country’s development priorities and to avoid disruption to the domestic economy. A good example is the 1944 Mexican Emergency Decree, the first unilateral investment code with a regulatory rather than facilitative purpose. It safeguarded against capital flight after a sustained influx of capital into Mexico during World War II. Additionally, a set of economic activities by companies with foreign participation were required to have prior authorization by the Finance Ministry. The first comprehensive national investment code was the one enacted by Israel in 1950. It balanced facilitative and regulatory objectives.

12  After 1945, there was much hostility towards foreign investment, in part fuelled by the nationalism inherited from the two World Wars. Because of divisions among the capitalist and communist countries, and between the traditional capital-exporting countries and newly independent countries which wished to maintain national control over the process of foreign investment, agreement on a set of international rules was elusive.

13  During this period, investment codes were sometimes used to reassert greater domestic control over areas of economic activity that were largely in the hands of foreign investors. Foreign investment in certain sectors was regulated either to stimulate local entrepreneurship, to protect sectors deemed to be of strategic interest, or to maintain the monopoly position of State enterprises. Discrimination against foreign investors in activities judged to be particularly suited to national or local entrepreneurs was common. Historical examples include Nigeria’s 1972 National Economic Development Plan that proposed the gradual indigenization of the economy by the transfer of foreign holdings to the indigenous people. Similarly, the 1969 Andean Code contained divestment clauses, which required foreign investors to sell their majority share to domestic investors over time. These policies often reflected a desire to protect or promote selected sectors or to wrest control over natural resources from foreign investors. South Korea’s investment code, one of the world’s most restrictive at the time, shielded South Korean conglomerates from competition in their home market, which provided them with the economies of scale for an aggressive push into overseas markets in the 1960s and 1970s.

14  Until the 1980s, Latin American and socialist States often rejected the theoretical foundations and the practical implications of the traditional doctrine of State responsibility. To them, the practice of diplomatic protection involved, all too often, strong interference in their domestic affairs, coupled with excessive demands for compensation, on occasion under the threat of the use of force. They favoured national treatment, which accorded to aliens the same rights as those enjoyed by nationals, and opposed the international adjudication of investment disputes. Instead, they favoured dispute settlement in domestic courts.

15  The Andean Code was premised on a series of beliefs about the negative effects of investment, such as interference of foreign investment with the growth of the domestic private sector, and loss of effective national regulatory space. It also aimed at avoiding a race to the bottom in terms of the permissible domestic regulatory sphere against the background of competition among host countries to attract investments on ever more generous terms and through a system with minimal or no restrictions. The Andean Common Market was a regional attempt by Latin American States to commit to a common baseline.

16  To counteract these effects, the Code classified investments in accordance with its degree of ‘foreignness’; limited entry in certain sectors subject to the requirement that existing companies did not adequately cover the activity in question; required disinvestment by existing foreign holders down to minority levels; and the repatriation of invested capital and profits was subject to approval by the host State. Furthermore, no clauses could be included in contracts with investors that abrogated national jurisdiction and host countries could not exercise diplomatic protection in favour of their investors. Member States could deviate from the code in four specific areas: extractive industries; public utilities; banking and insurance; and marketing.

17  In some cases, such as the Tanzanian nationalization programme instituted in 1967, the major aim was the ‘socialization’ of the means of production and increased self-reliance of the host country. In other cases the aim was to focus foreign investment in particular areas of the economy, sometimes in combination with a desire to divert it away from areas where greater domestic participation was regarded as desirable, such as with the National Economic Development Plan.

18  Hesitation about foreign investment was not confined to developing countries. Canada’s 1973 Foreign Investment Review Act was an investment code that sought to maintain effective control over the Canadian economy, especially in the extractive industries, against the background of extensive cross-border investment in these sectors. The Foreign Investment Review Agency approved new foreign investment only if it was likely to be of ‘significant benefit’ to Canada. One fact used in this assessment was the degree of use and significance of Canadian participants. The investor bore the burden of showing that a significant benefit existed.

2.  Liberalizing Investment Flows (1980-)

19  When the potential of cross-border investment to stimulate economic growth became more apparent from the 1970s onwards, the facilitative purpose of investment codes grew in importance. Over time, pragmatism won the upper hand. In Nigeria, for example, the pendulum went from a regime of indigenization to one of rapid liberalization. The Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission No 16 of 1995 allowed unfettered foreign investment in Nigeria. Similar shifts occurred elsewhere, such as in the Tanzanian Investment Act of 1997 and in Venezuela’s Decree on the Promotion and Protection of Investments of 1994, which conferred on foreign investors the same legal status as on local investors and ended most restrictions on investment.

20  Such facilitative investment codes stated the conditions under which foreign investment could enter the host country, and contained certain treatment guarantees. For example, the Thai Investment Promotion Act of 2002 contains an undertaking not to expropriate a foreign investment which has been promoted by the government under the legislation. The Chinese joint venture law accords protection to joint ventures between a domestic and a foreign investor in accordance with the law. Cuba’s Law 50, its first investment code in 1982, represented an attempt to substitute Soviet aid with private investment and tourism. Law 77 of 1995 pursued similar objectives. It contained a guarantee against expropriation and created duty-free zones and industrial parks. Such duty-free zones have been an increasingly popular device to attract investment to particular geographic areas, especially in the People’s Republic of China, but also in Egypt, the Philippines, and even between North and South Korea.

21  The end of the Cold War and the disintegration of centrally-planned economies accelerated this trend and led to a substantial shift in policies on foreign investment. Greater openness and liberal investment policies were on the ascendancy. National investment codes moved towards greater liberalization. Since 1991, a number of countries with restrictive trade-related investment measures liberalized unilaterally, prompted by a desire to capture the benefits of increased foreign investment for development. For example, Brazil, India, and Indonesia began to liberalize their foreign investment regimes in the early 1990s. In the Philippines, the Foreign Investments Act of 1991 expanded the number of economic sectors where 100% foreign ownership was permissible. Indonesia removed most foreign-ownership restrictions.

22  From the 1980s onwards, the international community stepped up its efforts at the multilateral level to increase private capital and investment flows to developing countries, increasingly regarded as essential to encourage development and combat poverty. The Uruguay Round ushered in significant advances in multilateral rules for investment, including the General Agreement on Trade in Services (1994) (‘GATS’), the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (1994) (‘TRIPS Agreement’), the Government Procurement Agreement (‘GPA’), the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures(‘ASCM’), and the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (‘TRIMs’). Indirectly or directly, all these agreements also concern cross-border investments. Importantly, the positive list approach of the GATS, with its reliance on schedules of commitments, gives member countries considerable flexibility on the scope and speed of their liberalization of services.

23  Moreover, a number of initiatives outside the World Trade Organization (WTO) also gathered steam and aimed to improve investment climates. These include efforts to curb bribery and corruption (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development [‘OECD’]); rules governing the conduct of multinational enterprises (OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; Global Compact); guidelines on corporate social responsibility and corporate governance (OECD, World Bank); and the World Bank’s Doing Business project.

3.  Bilateral Investment Treaties as Successors to Investment Codes

24  The importance of investment codes has declined with the advent of BITs (Investment, Bilateral Treaties), especially over the last two decades. BITs are bilateral framework treaties for the encouragement and protection of investment in the territory of each contracting State (Property, Right to, International Protection). BITs are consensual in that the home and host country agree jointly on the treatment standards guaranteed to cross-border investment. By contrast, investment codes are unilateral measures for the admission and regulation of foreign investment.

25  A first reason for the recent popularity of BITs is a marked trend towards openness in the area of foreign investment. As developing countries came to realize the full potential of foreign investment for economic development, they embraced BITs that promised to strengthen investment protection internationally (Investments, International Protection). The popularity of BITs has surged in the last two decades, complementing the trend of unilateral and multilateral trade liberalization. A second reason for the decline of investment codes is the upgrading of countries’ general legal infrastructure, a trend that has been particularly marked in the formerly centrally planned economies in Asia and Africa.

26  Modern BITs are European in origin. Germany and Pakistan signed the first BIT in 1959. In the 1960s, the OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property played an important role in the development and formulation of subsequent investment treaties. For three decades thereafter, the negotiation of BITs proceeded slowly, before the flood of modern BITs from the 1990s onwards. A significant development occurred in the 1960s when developing States started entering into BITs among themselves, heralding an era of South–South cooperation to facilitate investment flows. Dispute settlement under BITs takes place most commonly under the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Arbitration Rules and before the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).

27  BITs can be viewed as negotiated, transnational investment codes. They include substantive protections, provisions on dispute settlement, and standards on compensation previously often found in investment codes. They follow the facilitative model, and generally do not contain restrictions on the behaviour of investors. Applicable restrictions on entry are reserved, since BITs almost always only apply to investments once admitted (‘in accordance with the law of the host State’). Restrictions on admission are typically found in domestic law and in the schedules of commitment under the GATS. Any pre-admission protection does not prejudice the host country’s decision whether or not to admit a particular investment or investor.

28  In contrast to bilateral efforts to liberalize investment flows, efforts to create comprehensive multilateral rules for investment have generally been unsuccessful, even where they were limited to non-binding agreements, such as the World Bank Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment. Prominent examples of multilateral efforts include the United Nations Draft Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations in the 1980s and the failed Multilateral Agreement on Investment (‘MAI’) developed by the OECD in the late 1990s.

1.  Investment Codes as a Source for a State’s Consent to Arbitration

33  A court or a tribunal’s adjudicative authority is derived from its jurisdiction, and, in case of arbitration, from the consent of the parties thereto. The parties’ mutual consent represents the single most important condition for vesting an arbitral tribunal with jurisdiction over a dispute.

34  A State’s or an investor’s consent to submit disputes to arbitration can be expressed in a variety of ways, and the parties’ consent does not necessarily need to be formulated in a single instrument. Nor is it necessary for the parties to consent simultaneously. A party may accept a standing offer of arbitration only after a dispute has arisen. In the context of investment arbitration, the parties’ consent to arbitration may be set out in a bilateral or multilateral investment treaty, a bi-party investment agreement, or may, in the case of the host State, be expressed unilaterally in a declaration contained in its domestic legislation. In the latter case, the State’s declaration is usually to be found in an investment code.

35  The drafters of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (‘ICSID Convention’) envisaged that national investment legislation could contain a State’s consent to arbitration under the Convention. Accordingly, the parties need not express their consent in a single instrument. National investment legislation constituted the jurisdictional basis for some of the earliest cases initiated under the aegis of the ICSID. Such cases have become less frequent since 1980 due to the increasing prevalence of BITs (see above paras 24–28).

36  Notwithstanding this trend, investors have, even recently, invoked national legislationnot necessarily as the sole basis of jurisdiction, but as an alternative to either jurisdiction derived from a bilateral or multilateral investment treaty. Problems have arisen in the past concerning how much weight should be placed on such national legislation. Further, there has been a significant level of debate as to the application of the different sets of rules on interpretation that should be applied to this national legislation.

2.  Investment Codes as Unilateral Standing Offers to Arbitrate Disputes

37  The host State’s consent to the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal, when made in domestic legislation, is traditionally considered as valid, and is treated as amounting to a unilateral standing offer. If the investor accepts the offer, the arbitral tribunal has jurisdiction over the parties’ dispute.

38  However, national investment legislation comes in a variety of forms and it is not always clear that such legislation amounts to consent on behalf of the host State. It is therefore essential to carefully consider whether the relevant national legislation constitutes a simple acknowledgement by the host State of a certain dispute resolution forum or whether it is sufficient to amount to a unilateral (and binding) promise to refer disputes to arbitral jurisdiction.

39  In some cases, national investment laws do provide a comprehensive reference to ICSID arbitration (see for instance Art. 8 (2) Albanian Law on Foreign Investment of 1993; Art. 30 Central African Republic Investment Code of 1988; Art. 24 Côte d’Ivoire Investment Code of 1995). In other cases, further action is required on the part of the State in order to establish consent to arbitration (see for instance Art. 23 (2) Tanzania Investment Act of 1997).

40  Certain other investment laws do not contain any express reference to arbitration, but a residual referral in all cases in which a BIT does exist, in the absence of which arbitration may be commenced (see for instance Art. 19 Somalia Foreign Investment Law No 19 of 1987).

3.  Interpretation of Unilateral Standing Offers to Arbitrate Disputes in Investment Codes

41  In several investment cases under investment codes, the parties, and ultimately arbitral tribunals, had recourse to the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on unilateral declarations made by States under the Statute of the International Court of Justice. Rules on interpretation necessarily have to be considered in these cases, and the same rules can be of assistance in cases concerning unilateral consent to arbitration in national investment legislation.

42  In the case Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v Canada), for instance, the ICJ stated that no reference could be made to a State’s interpretation of its own unilateral consent to the jurisdiction of an international tribunal. Furthermore, the ICJ made clear that one should not consider the same regime that applies for the interpretation of treaties under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) (‘1969 Vienna Convention’) in construing a unilateral declaration. The provisions of that Convention, in fact, could only apply analogously and as far as they are compatible with the peculiar nature of unilateral acts. As a result, priority must be given to the text of the relevant instrument in order to determine the intention of the declaration’s author. Ultimately, the ICJ in the case Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v Canada) stressed that a declaration of acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court establishes a consensual bond and the potential for a jurisdictional link with the other States which have made similar declarations. As an international law instrument it must therefore be interpreted by reference to international law. In the case Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali) the ICJ said that account needs to be taken of all the circumstances in which the relevant act occurred.

43  The International Law Commission (ILC) in its Guiding Principles Applicable to Unilateral Declarations of States Capable of Creating Legal Obligations (‘Guiding Principles’) said that a unilateral declaration entails obligations for the formulating State only if it is stated in clear and specific terms. In the case of doubt as to the scope of the obligations resulting from such a declaration, such obligations must be interpreted in a restrictive manner. In interpreting the content of such obligations, weight shall be given first and foremost to the text of the declaration, together with the context and the circumstances in which it was formulated.

45  The tribunal reviewed three previous ICSID awards in which arbitral tribunals had dealt expressly with the question of rules of interpretation to be applied in order to construe a unilateral act of a sovereign State’s consent to arbitration (SPP v Egypt; CSOB v Slovak Republic; and Zhinvali v Georgia). As the three tribunals applied different standards, the tribunal in Mobil Corp v Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela sought to identify a common legal basis to apply in relation to questions of interpretation.

46  In SPP v Egypt, the tribunal noted that the issue was whether an investment code has created an international legal obligation under the ICSID Convention. The tribunal was willing to apply principles of statutory interpretation and to take into consideration, where appropriate, relevant rules of treaty interpretation and principles of international law applicable to unilateral decisions.

47  In CSOB v Slovak Republic, however, the tribunal stated that no reference should be made to national law, but that consent was only governed by international law.

48  In Zhinvali v Georgia, the tribunal adopted yet another approach and concluded that national guidance should be followed, but always subject to ultimate governance by international law.

49  In Mobil Corp v Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, the tribunal concluded that unilateral acts must be interpreted according to the ICSID Convention itself and to the rules of international law governing unilateral declarations of States. Even though the Vienna Convention was not relevant in the interpretation of unilateral acts, the provisions of that Convention may apply analogously to the extent compatible with the sui generis character of unilateral acts. The tribunal concluded that Art. 22 Venezuela Investment Law cannot be used as a basis for its jurisdiction.

50  The ILC’s Guiding Principles clarify that a unilateral declaration that has created legal obligations for the State making the declaration cannot be revoked arbitrarily. In assessing whether a revocation would be arbitrary, consideration should be given to: (i) any specific terms of the declaration relating to revocation; (ii) the extent to which those to whom the obligations are owed have relied on such obligations; and (iii) the extent to which there has been a fundamental change in the circumstances. This rule may well be seen as a corollary to the notion that a State’s standing offer to arbitrate establishes a consensual bond and the potential for a jurisdictional link with foreign investors.

Select Bibliography

• AA Fatouros ‘An International Code to Protect Private Investment: Proposals and Perspectives’ (1961–62) 14 University of Toronto Law Journal 77–102.
• CT Oliver ‘The Andean Foreign Investment Code: A New Phase in the Quest for Normative Order as to Direct Foreign Investment’ (1972) 66 AJIL 763–84.
• F Armstrong ‘Political Components and Practical Effects of the Andean Foreign Investment Code’ (1975) 27 StanLRev 1597–1628.
• TM Franck and KS Gudgeon ‘Canada’s Foreign Investment Control Experiment: the Law, the Context, and the Practice’ (1975) 50 NYULRev 76–147.
• DF Vagts ‘Coercion and Foreign Investment Rearrangements’ (1978) 72 AJIL 17–36.
• SKB Asante ‘Stability of Contractual Relations in the Transnational Investment Process’ (1979) 28 ICLQ 401–23.
• J Turner ‘Canadian Regulation of Foreign Direct Investment’ (1982) 23 HarvIntlLJ 333–56.
• R Simon ‘Roads to Follow: Regulating Direct Foreign Investment’ (1989) 43 IntlOrg 543–84.
• FC Beveridge ‘Taking Control of Foreign Investment: A Case Study of Indigenisation in Nigeria’ (1991) 40 ICLQ 302–33.
• CD Wallace The Multinational Enterprise and Legal Control: Host State Sovereignty in an Era of Economic Globalization (Nijhoff The Hague 2002).
• F El Rahman and A El Sheik The Legal Regime of Foreign Private Investment in Sudan and Saudi Arabia (2^nd ed CUP Cambridge 2003).
• W Butler Russian Foreign Relations Law and Investment Law (OUP Oxford 2006).
• CF Dougan et al Investor–State Arbitration (OUP Oxford 2008).
• M Sornarajah The International Law on Foreign Investment (3^rd ed CUP Cambridge 2010).

Select Investment Codes

• Albanian Law on Foreign Investments (2 November 1993) in ICSID (ed) Investment Laws of the World (Oceana Dobbs Ferry) vol 1 (Release 95-1) 1–6 (Albania).
• Andean Foreign Investment Code, Decision 24 of the Andean Pact: Common Regime of Treatment of Foreign Capital and of Trademarks, Patents, Licences, and Royalties (31 December 1970) (1977) 16 ILM 138.
• Burundi Investment Code, Law No 1/24 (signed 10 September 2008, entered into force 1 January 2009) (Burundi).
• Central African Republic Investment Charter (Law No 01-010) (16 July 2001) in ICSID (ed) Investment Laws of the World (Oceana Dobbs Ferry) vol 1 (Release 2009-2) 3–10 as amended by the 2007 Appropriation Bill (Central African Republic)).
• Decree No 356 on Promotion and Protection of Investments (3 October 1999) in ICSID (ed) Investment Laws of the World (Oceana Dobbs Ferry) vol 10 (Release 2000-1) 1–11 (Venezuela).
• Foreign Investment Act (Republic Act No 7042) (23 July 1991) in ICSID (ed) Investment Laws of the World (Oceana Dobbs Ferry) vol 7 (Release 93-1) 1–12 (Philippines).
• Foreign Investment Act (10 April 2000) in ICSID (ed) Investment Laws of the World (Oceana Dobbs Ferry) vol 7 (Release 2000-2) 1–5 (Saudi Arabia).
• Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007, Pub L Nos 110-49, 121 Stat 246 (United States).
• Foreign Investment Law No 19 (9 May 1987) in ICSID (ed) Investment Laws of the World (Oceana Dobbs Ferry) vol 8 (Release 87-3) 1–11 (Somali Democratic Republic).
• Foreign Investment Review Act (1973–74) Statutes of Canada c 46.
• Foreign Trade and Payments Act (27 May 2009) Federal Law Gazette I 1150 (Germany).
• Investment Code of the Republic of Belarus No 37-Z (22 June 2001) as amended 15 July 2008 (Belarus).
• Investment Law No 13 of 2006 (Iraq).
• Investment Promotion Act BE 2520 (4 May 1977) in ICSID (ed) Investment Laws of the World (Oceana Dobbs Ferry) vol 9 (Release 2000-2) 1–20 as amended by Investment Promotion Act (No 3) B.E. 2544 (Thailand).
• Investment Promotion Act (signed 20 August 2004) in Supplement to the Sierra Leone Gazette vol CXXXV No 49 (26 August 2004) (Sierra Leone).
• Law No 95-620 on the Investment Code of the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire (3 August 1995) in ICSID (ed) Investment Laws of the World (Oceana Dobbs Ferry) vol 2 (Release 97-2) 1–8 (Côte d’Ivoire).
• Law 373-11 of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Investments of 2003.
• Law on State Support for Foreign Investments in the Republic of Kazakhstan (28 February 1997) in ICSID (ed) Investment Laws of the World (Oceana Dobbs Ferry) vol 4 (Release 2002-2) 19–25 (Kazkhstan).
• Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission Decree No 16 (16 January 1995) in ICSID (ed) Investment Laws of the World (Oceana Dobbs Ferry) vol 6 (Release 2001-1) 1–14 (Nigeria).
• Ordinance No 01-03 concerning the Development of Investments (20 August 2001) in ICSID (ed) Investment Laws of the World (Oceana Dobbs Ferry) vol 1 (Release 2009-2) 5–15 as amended by Ordinance No 06-08 (5 July 2006) 15–23 (Algeria).
• ‘Saudi Arabia: Foreign Capital Investment Law’ (2001) 16 Arab Law Quarterly 101–04.
• Tanzania Investment Act (9 September 1997) in ICSID (ed) Investment Laws of the World (Oceana Dobbs Ferry) vol 9 (Release 99-1) 1–15 (Tanzania).

Select Documents

• Agreement on Government Procurement (signed 15 April 1994, entered into force 1 January 1996) 1915 UNTS 103.
• Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (signed 15 April 1994, entered into force 1 January 1995) 1868 UNTS 186.
• Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka, AS v Slovak Republic (Decision on Objections on Jurisdiction of 24 May 1999) ICSID Case No ARB/97/4 (2002) 5 ICSID Rep 335.
• Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (opened for signature 18 March 1965, entered into force 14 October 1966) 575 UNTS 159.
• Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v Canada) (Judgment) [1998] ICJ Rep 432.
• Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali) [1986] ICJ Rep 554.
• Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment Issued by the Development Committee of the IMF and World Bank (1992) 7 ICSID Rev/FILJ 297.
• ICSID ‘Report of the Executive Directors on the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States: Resolution No 214’ (adopted 18 March 1965) (1993) 1 ICSID Rep 23.
• Mobil Corp v Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (Decision on Jurisdiction of 10 June 2010) ICSID Case No ARB/07/27.
• OECD ‘Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property’ (1967) 7 ILM 117.
• OECD ‘Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises’ (21 June 1976) (1976) 15 ILM 969.
• OECD ‘OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises’ (2008).
• OECD ‘The Multilateral Agreement on Investment’ (22 April 1998) DAFFE/MAI (98)7/REV1.
• Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Ltd v Arab Republic of Egypt (Decision on Jurisdiction of 14 April 1988) ICSID Case No ARB/84/3 (1995) 3 ICSID Rep 131.
• UN Commission on Transnational Corporations ‘Draft United Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations’ (5 June 1982) UN Doc E/C.10/1982/6 Annex.
• UN ILC ‘Guiding Principles Applicable to Unilateral Declarations of States Capable of Creating Legal Obligations, with Commentaries thereto’ (2006) vol II part II UNYBILC.
• WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (signed 15 April 1994, entered into force 1 January 1995) 1869 UNTS 14.
• Zhinvali Development Ltd v Republic of Georgia (Award of 24 January 2003) ICSID Case No ARB/00/1.