1. Legal Form
8 As cession requires the consent of both States involved, it normally takes place by means of a treaty or any other form of understanding. It is thus reminiscent of certain modes of transfer of ownership in private law. But since the concept of consent in international law is not dependent on certain formalities, cession may also be the object of a unilateral declaration by the grantor State which is accepted by the grantee. Such an understanding may also arise if the grantee is already in possession of the territory in question, although what happens then is more properly qualified as renunciation (Unilateral Acts of States in International Law).
9 An understanding of cession is always intended to be constitutive, ie to transfer legal title or to be the basis of such a transfer, while States may also conclude an agreement to settle a frontier or territorial dispute, which agreement would then probably be of a declaratory character. Also cession is always explicit and thus different from acquiescence, when a State does not protest against its territory being claimed or used by another State and thereby provides the basis for that territory being acquired by way of prescription.
2. Validity
10 An act of cession can only be valid if both the State to which the territory has belonged so far and the State to which it is intended to belong in the future have declared their genuine consent, eg by concluding a treaty on that matter. Failing such consent by one of them, any arrangement of cession would be a res inter alios acta without legal effect vis-à-vis the non-consenting State. A consent procured through the use or threat of force is invalid according to Art. 52 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) (‘VCLT’; see also Use of Force, Prohibition of Threat), which reflects a generally recognized rule of customary international law (Fisheries Jurisdiction [UK v Iceland] (Jurisdiction) [1973] ICJ Rep 3 para. 24; Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases [United Kingdom v Iceland; Federal Republic of Germany v Iceland]).
11 On the other hand, the distribution of their own territory between two States is their sovereign prerogative and part of their domaine réservé. Thus, under international law, there is no requirement for a valid cession other than the sovereign will of the States concerned, and the exercise of that will is protected by the international rules of State sovereignty. A different question is, of course, whether the domestic law of one of the States involved contains legal preconditions for alterations to the State’s territory.
12 Apart from the prohibition of force, no other rules are recognized in present international law that would restrict the right of sovereign States to dispose of their territory, and the violation of which would result in an agreement of cession being null and void (Treaties, Validity). True, States can undertake—and indeed have undertaken in the past—an obligation not to cede or not to acquire a certain territory, or to do so only with the consent of an international body. But it seems that those obligations do not normally affect the title of the grantor State, thus their violation would render the cession illegal, but not invalid.
13 The question arises, though, whether certain parts of a State’s territory are by their very nature, and not by virtue of a special legal commitment, inalienable and thus cannot be validly ceded. A proposition of that kind has sometimes been put forward with reference to the territorial sea and the airspace above State territory. It appeared, for example, in the opinion of Judge McNair in the Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v Norway) when he pointed out that international law imposes upon a coastal State certain obligations arising out of its sovereignty over its territorial sea, and that, therefore, ‘the possession of this territory is not optional, not dependent upon the will of the State, but compulsory’ (at [1951] ICJ Rep 158, 160). But does that mean that a State can neither abandon nor cede its territorial waters to another State? The sovereign right of every coastal State to determine the breadth of its territorial sea (Art. 3 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea) and the right of two coastal States to determine their common maritime boundary by agreement (ibid Art. 15) would suggest that the coastal State is also in a position validly to dispose of the whole of its territorial sea.
14 If the preconditions for a valid cession are fulfilled, legal opinion is divided over the precise moment at which transfer of title occurs: on the entry into force of the relevant agreement or when effective possession is taken by the grantee. The better position seems to be that everything depends on the individual case and, above all, on the interpretation of the agreement concerned. Since cession is dependent on the sovereign will of the States concerned, it is up to them to decide on the moment when the transfer of territory takes effect. Because of the principle of effectiveness, however, that moment should not be before the coming into force of the relevant agreement; a provisional application of a treaty of cession is, therefore, not possible (Treaties, Provisional Application).
15 If the cession has been implemented by the two States, its effects are opposable to all third States (see also Treaties, Third-Party Effect). Because it is the sovereign right of the affected States to determine the legal status of their own territory and their common border, that determination, such as a transfer of territory to another State, develops effects erga omnes. All other States must be deemed to have implicitly recognized that right, so that they are precluded from invoking the res inter alios acta rule. If treaty rights of third States are adversely affected by the cession, they might claim reparation under the law of State responsibility.
3. Issues of Legality
16 As pointed out previously (see para. 12 above), a treaty of cession may be in disregard of international obligations of one or both of the parties. Such violation would render the cession illegal for the State bound by that obligation, but would in principle not affect the validity of the cession as such. This could be different, however, if the treaty of cession was contrary to a norm of international ius cogens.
17 A controversial issue in legal doctrine has always been whether an acquisition of territory by cession presupposes the consent, or at least the consultation, of the population affected by the transfer of territory. In legal terms, it may be asked if such a requirement can be derived from the right of peoples to self-determination which today is universally recognized as a rule of customary international law. At least two major problems arise here. First, in order to be entitled to self-determination, ie to qualify as ‘people’ within the meaning of that rule, a group of human beings must be characterized by at least one common feature which binds them together as a homogenous group. It is very doubtful whether to live on a common territory alone can be considered such a feature: population does not constitute a people. Secondly, and more importantly, international practice does not seem to regard the will of the population as decisive for the legality of cessions or other territorial changes. Although the idea of plebiscites (Plebiscite) had been put forward at the end of World War I, subsequent practice in the wake of both World Wars, as well as at the demise of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia (Yugoslavia, Dissolution of), did not follow that idea and did not inquire about the consent of any population of the territories concerned.
18 However, in its recent advisory opinion on the Chagos Archipelago (Chagos [Advisory Opinion]), the International Court of Justice (ICJ) held that, at least in the context of decolonization of non-self-governing territories, self-determination entails a right to the territorial integrity of those territories, and that, therefore, any detachment by the administering Power of part of a non-self-governing territory, unless based on the freely expressed and genuine will of the people of the territory concerned, is contrary to the right to self-determination (at para. 160). The Court considered, therefore, that the detachment in 1965 of the Chagos Archipelago from the British colony Mauritius and its incorporation into the newly created British Indian Ocean Territory was unlawful. Applying that opinion to the case of cession, one might make the argument that ceding a part of a non-self-governing territory to a third State, without the consent of the people concerned, would also be illegal under international law.