1  The formula good administration of justice is quite common in contemporary international jurisprudence and literature. For every dispute settlement institution it appears to be a basis that should not be ignored as well as an ideal to reach in the accomplishment of its duty. Some expressions are considered synonymous or equivalent: proper administration of justice, fair administration of justice, sound administration of justice, effective administration of justice, correct administration of justice, accurate administration of justice, bonne administration de la justice (in French in English decisions), better administration of justice, interests of the due administration of justice, the overriding interests of justice, and the requirements of the judicial process.

2  The good administration of justice ‘is distinct from the function of settling disputes, in that it emphasizes the need for effectiveness and efficiency in judicial decision-making’ (Brown, 2005, 231). The International Criminal Court (ICC) seemed to endorse this opinion in a very controversial decision stating that it would not be in the interest of justice to grant the authorization of ‘investigations which are likely to ultimately remain inconclusive’ (Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2019, para 33). The concept is very rich and can be broadly referred to in many different situations (Cazala, 2009, 55) but has by no means been clearly defined. It is commonly accepted that it has, at least, two dimensions: it has to do both with the good administration of the proceedings and the idea of good justice. It can easily be understood that the proper administration of proceedings may favour good justice (a fair, equitable, reasonable, and efficient outcome of the proceedings). This is the opinion expressed by the Chamber of Appeal of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the Mucic, Delic, and Landžo case when it declares that

As Judge Cançado Trindade states in his Separate Opinion on the Order rendered in 2013 by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) regarding the Construction of a Road along the San Juan River case (Certain Activities Carried out by Nicaragua in the Border Area and Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River Cases):

This presentation of the good administration of justice seems very natural-law-oriented and stresses the ideal of good justice. It seems that, to reach such an ideal, the reference to the good administration of justice could be made to justify or legitimate some measures taken by a court, even if it is out of step with its own rules, as the outcome of the proceeding is more important than the procedure itself.

3  As the primary function of a tribunal is the settlement of disputes in accordance with the idea of justice, every single rule of procedure could easily be read in light of the concept of the good administration of justice (Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, 1986, para 31). On several occasions, the ICJ referred to the concept of good administration of justice to underline, support, or explain the importance of a written rule of procedure. Such is the case when it points out that ‘there can be no doubt of the Chamber’s power and duty to indicate, if need be, such provisional measures as may conduce to the due administration of justice’ (Frontier Dispute, Burkina Faso/Mali, 1986, para 18; Frontier Dispute Case (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali); Provisional Measures: International Court of Justice (ICJ)). The indication of provisional measures as such, can be seen as an instrument to assure the good administration of justice. The Court sometimes refers to the good administration of justice to recall the necessary implementation of an undisputed rule of procedure. President Lachs joined a declaration to the judgment rendered in the Nuclear Tests Case (Nuclear Tests Cases) stating that ‘[g]ood administration of justice and respect for the Court require that the outcome of its deliberations be kept in secrecy and nothing of its decision be published until it is officially rendered’ (Nuclear Tests Case, Australia v France (Declaration of President Lachs), 1974, 273). In the same vein, there is the statement made by President Owada declaring that even if both parties have developed some substantial arguments during the hearings on the preliminary exceptions, ‘the Court cannot and should not, for the fair administration of justice, go into this aspect of the claim at this stage, without hearing the full exposition of the Parties’ positions with regard to the merits of the case’ (Case concerning Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, Georgia v Russia (Separate Opinion of President Owada), 2011, para 28). Of course, we do not intend to present a comprehensive analysis of every single rule of procedure applicable before international courts and tribunals. Our presentation of the concept must be more specific. We will focus on the circumstances in which an international tribunal uses the concept of the good administration of justice to justify a decision or orientation of procedure beyond what the Statute or Rules of procedure state. This can be seen as a basis for specifying, justifying, and using a procedure which exists neither in the Statute nor in the Rules of a court or tribunal.

4  The question of the good administration of justice can, of course, refer to domestic and international tribunals. Both dimensions can be of interest from an international law perspective. We will discuss the principle of the good administration of international justice at length but can also say a few words regarding the good administration of domestic justice from an international law point of view. The way domestic tribunals accomplish their duty can be a subject of concern for international law, as many instruments of international law intend to protect individuals from denial of justice. The first references to the good administration of justice in international jurisprudence are related to the way domestic proceedings were conducted (Lelarge, 2009, 25). In such a situation, the rules of international law can be used to evaluate if there was sound administration of justice by domestic tribunals. There is an obvious link between the concept of denial of justice and the concept of the good administration of justice (or the improper administration of justice). It is mostly in the context of an allegation of denial of justice that good administration of justice is examined in the realm of Investor-State dispute settlement tribunals. ‘Denial of justice relates to the administration of justice, and some understandings of the concept include both judicial failure and also legislative failures relating to the administration of justice (for example, denying access to the courts)’ (Limited Liability Company Amto v Ukraine, 2008, para 75). The perception of the denial of justice is not restricted to the procedure itself:

5  The legal status of the good administration of justice is a disputed issue. It is clear that every single dispute settlement body has to look for the good administration of justice. But the sanction of this obligation may be uncertain. The Rome Statute of the ICC expressly states that the Court has jurisdiction over the following offences against its administration of justice when committed intentionally: false testimony, corruptly influencing a witness, presenting evidence that the party knows is false or forged, etc. (Art 70 ICC Statute). This kind of provision is quite uncommon in international tribunals’ Statutes. Of course, this can be justified by the distinction between criminal adjudication and international dispute settlement in general. The ICJ and the ICC share the same objective, to render good justice, but the ratione of the two types of proceedings is undoubtedly different. States can be seen as ‘users’ of the ICJ, a qualification that could not be extended to individuals accused before the ICC or any other international criminal tribunal. Therefore, it is not easy to identify the consequences of failure to properly administer justice or to decide the legal consequences of acts or actions that may infringe the good administration of justice. On some occasions, the good administration of justice is referred to as a form of comity. In this sense we can mention the Practice Directions adopted by the ICJ. Practice direction VIII states that:

In such a case, it appears that the Court does not have the power to forbid such a designation but strongly invites the parties to refrain from proceeding to the aforementioned designations. In the same way, it could be argued that the good administration of justice has a clear connexion with equity. In the Continental Shelf case, the ICJ precisely stated that ‘[e]quity as a legal concept is a direct emanation of the idea of justice’ and ‘[t]he Court whose task is by definition to administer justice is bound to apply it’ (Continental Shelf, Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 1982, para 71).

6  The concept of the good administration of justice is absent from many international tribunals’ Statutes or Rules of Procedure. Nevertheless, almost every international dispute settlement body refers to the good administration of justice or to an equivalent concept using another expression. When the Statute and Rules of an international court or tribunal remain silent on the concept of good administration of justice, it can be used as a basis to justifying a procedural decision. The court or tribunal may rely on the good administration of justice to fill a procedural lacuna. At other times it is a means to justify the interpretation of a rule that is neither clear nor precise. It confers an inherent power to the court or tribunal to decide on some procedural issues to enable it ‘to conduct its proceedings in an effective and efficient manner for the good administration of justice’ (International Company for Railway Systems v Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 2010, para 16; Inherent Powers). The extent of the autonomy of the court may vary. As Hironobu Sakai points out regarding the ICJ, ‘if a legal ground is required, one of the candidates might be the proper power or the implied power, which are said to be given to the Court’ (2012, at 128). This dimension may explain why the good administration of justice is more often mentioned by the ICJ than arbitral tribunals. Robert Kolb suggests that it is the case because arbitral tribunals constitute common organs of the parties; thus, a permanent court is more autonomous than an arbitral tribunal from the litigants to the dispute (2009, at 5). Whatever the form or nature of the organ, it could be ascertained that every single institution in charge of the settlement of a dispute has inherent power to fulfil its duty (Brown, 2005, 195). Statutes and Rules of those institutions cannot be precise enough to deal with every single circumstance that may arise in conducting a dispute settlement procedure.

7  The concept of the good administration of justice can be used by international tribunals faced with a gap in the procedural rules they have to follow and apply. This is precisely what the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) stated in the Mavrommatis case:

In such circumstances, it would be hard to deny the inherent power of an international court or tribunal to decide on the missing rules of procedure in the name of the proper and effective administration of justice (RSM Production Corporation v Saint Lucia, 2016, paras 12 and 43). The filling of a gap can be illustrated by the way the ICJ developed its practice on joinder long before the institute of joinder was endorsed in the Rules of the Court (1978, Art 47). It can clearly be demonstrated that the Court was guided by its awareness of the necessity to administer justice properly. A similar observation can be noted regarding the increasing practice of many international tribunals in accepting the submission of amicus curiae briefs even where their Statutes do not confer an express power to do so (panels and the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization, International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), Tribunals, Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), etc).

8  The good administration of justice gives flexibility to international tribunals and courts in the accomplishment of their duty. A good illustration of this is the way international tribunals may decide on admissibility requirements such as the required domestic recourses to be pursued before bringing a case to arbitration. In the Casinos Austria case, the applicable bilateral investment treaty (‘BIT’; Investments, Bilateral Treaties) expressly included an 18-month recourse to domestic tribunals requirement. The claimants brought the case before an ICSID tribunal only ten months after seising a domestic tribunal in Argentina. The ICSID tribunal decided that:

Expressed that way, the decision might appear surprising as it may give the impression that, in the name of the good administration of justice, a tribunal could decide to set aside a requirement included in the treaty on the basis of which it has been established. But the tribunal justifies its decision by saying that:

This majority opinion clearly highlights the connexion between the two dimensions of the good administration of justice. As already mentioned, the concept refers to the good administration of the proceeding and the objective of rendering good justice. The first dimension can be seen as a means to perform the second one. The ICSID tribunal cogently expresses the idea that the rules have to be interpreted taking this fundamental objective into account. Here again, this is not neutral as each member of a tribunal can defend various conceptions of this goal of good justice depending on his or her own values. This decision of the majority of the tribunal was firmly contested by the dissenting arbitrator Torres Bernárdez. He declared that:

It is not uncommon to see the principle of equality between the parties being invoked to determine the limits within which a tribunal has to stick when it decides to adapt the rules to the objective of the good administration of justice. In such a case, to balance the rights of the parties and the objective of the good administration of justice the tribunal may quite often refer to procedural fairness (Legality of Use of Force, Serbia and Montenegro v Belgium, 2004, para 116).

9  If the concept can lead a court or tribunal to apply its own procedural rules flexibly or to fill the gaps in these rules, we have to identify what the limits of such a use of the good administration of justice are or could be (Brown, 2005, 239–42). The dissenting opinion Judge Abraham joined to the judgment rendered in 2011 by the ICJ in the Territorial and Maritime Dispute Case (Nicaragua v Colombia) is of great interest on this point. He firmly and cogently declared that:

Judge Abraham also directed his criticism towards the uncontrolled use of the concept of sound administration of justice in the Separate Opinion he joined to the Croatia Genocide judgment on preliminary objections. He criticized the majority because of their broad conception of the discretion the concept of sound administration of justice would confer to the Court (Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Croatia v Serbia (Separate Opinion of Judge Abraham), 2008, para 54; Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide Case (Croatia v Serbia)). This does not mean that there is no margin of appreciation for the court. But of course it can be difficult to understand in what circumstances the use of the good administration of justice might be justified in the interpretation process of a rule, as each member of the Court has his or her own system of values on this point, depending on their individual conception of justice. In the declaration he joined to the Obligation concerning negotiations relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament case, President Abraham pleaded in favour of a flexible and pragmatic approach to the condition relating to the existence of a dispute in the assessment of the jurisdiction of the Court (Marshall Islands v Pakistan (Declaration of President Abraham), 2016, para 4; Marshall Islands Cases). A court or tribunal has broad but not unlimited powers to fashion or implement the procedural rules in the name of the good administration of justice. It should not disregard rules expressly laid down in its Statute or Rules, but, if the rule is not clear or precise enough, which is quite common, it may be guided by the good administration of justice to interpret those rules. As such, the proper administration of justice can be used as a framework for expressing the judge's room for manoeuvre in the implementation of the rules of procedure. The interpretation process leaves the tribunal or court with wide discretion to express its commitment to the good administration of justice. In that way, an ICSID tribunal declared in the ICES case that ‘inherent jurisdiction cannot, of course, be exercised so as to conflict with a statute or rule. Moreover, because it is a special and extraordinary power, it should be exercised only sparingly and in a clear case’ (International Company for Railway Systems v Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, para 16). As the tribunal decides for itself what the obligation to give the proper administration of justice allows it to do, we can easily understand, and this is not unusual, that some may interpret this as a manifestation of judicial activism. The sound administration of justice, presented as justifying a gap filling decision or a flexible approach to some rules organizing the mission of a court is not without an axiological or political dimension. Of course, on this point the manner in which the jurisdiction is granted to the court is not neutral in terms of how it may express its inherent power and refer to the good administration of justice. Were the ICJ to pronounce itself in a very heterodox way, the community of States could depart from the Court, which is less likely to happen for an accused person before an international criminal tribunal.

10  On this specific issue the opinion expressed by the ICJ is balanced. It stated in the judgment on the application by Honduras for permission to intervene in the Territorial and Maritime Dispute case that:

Judge Cançado Trindade seems to defend a broader option. He declared that ‘the exercise of the international judicial function is not—cannot be—limited to a simple application of positive law in the cas d’espèce; there is a certain element of creativity inherent to it, and there are always “superior principles of justice” to be kept in mind’ (Construction of a Road along the San Juan River, Nicaragua v Costa Rica (Separate Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade), para 16). This quote highlights the fact that the content of the concept of good administration of justice, or the extent to which members of a court can try to use it, is strongly related to the perception that each could defend its mission to render justice. The concept of the good administration of justice could thus be used by an international court or tribunal to support its lawmaking activity. Relying on a concept as fundamental as the good administration of justice is of course, a good means for judges or arbitrators to justify decisions that could be designated as unorthodox or based on political considerations or orientations. A tribunal may express the idea that the need for the sound administration of justice in a specific case is not strong enough to justify a decision not supported by the Statute of Rules of the tribunal. In the Berkowicz case, an ICSID tribunal used an ambiguous formulation when it concluded ‘that a stay of its proceedings is not warranted in the interests of the administration of justice and that there is no sound or proper basis for it to exercise its discretion to order a stay of its proceedings’ (Berkowitz and ors v Costa Rica, 2017, para 56). A court or tribunal may refer to the concept of good administration of justice to develop a flexible approach of its own rules of procedure but, of course, it has to take into consideration some other interests, and especially the interests of the parties to the case. The good administration of justice requires balancing various issues or interests.

11  The good administration of justice can be invoked in various circumstances. But it is especially in the context of incidental proceedings that international courts and tribunals refer to this concept, which clearly has a functional nature. It is referred to as a guide when a tribunal has to compare or balance a variety of distinct interests. Judges or arbitrators can refer to the good administration of justice as a frame to explain how they may balance opposing interests. The list we are presenting is certainly not exhaustive, but it includes the main interests involved in the use of the concept of the good administration of justice by international courts and tribunals. As there is a balance of the interests, most of the cases we now mention could appear in one or other subdivision. One particular example of this is given in the Casinos Austria case. In that ICSID arbitration, the respondent wanted the arbitral tribunal to dismiss the case at the jurisdictional stage.

12  Good justice is rendered in reasonable and appropriate time. As President Basdevant recalled it, ‘to ensure a good administration of justice, it is necessary not to delay the settlement of this dispute’ (Colombian-Peruvian Asylum Case, 1949, 267; see also Prosecutor v Brima et al, 2006, para 18). In the Ahmadou Sadio Diallo Case (Republic of Guinea v Democratic Republic of the Congo), the ICJ gave full weight to this principle, recalling that:

Of course, expeditious justice is not necessarily good justice. A fair balance has to be struck between the various aspects of the proper administration of justice (Boddaert v Belgium, 1992, para 39).

13  In the Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v Belgium), the ICJ decided against Yugoslavia for invoking a new basis of jurisdiction in the second round of its oral arguments on a request for the indication of provisional measures. It stated that ‘such action at this late stage, when it is not accepted by the other party, seriously jeopardizes the principle of procedural fairness and the sound administration of justice’ (Legality of Use of Force, Yugoslavia v Belgium, 1999, para 44, and Judgment, 2004, para 116; Yugoslavia, Cases and Proceedings before the ICJ). According to Article 56 (2) ICJ Rules, whether or not any documents can be produced by a party after the closing of the written proceedings depends upon the discretion of the Court. Exercising this discretionary power, the Court takes into account the rights of the litigant States and the necessity not to surprise the other party to the dispute by such a late presentation of a new document. The objective is clearly to preserve equality between the parties. In the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide Case (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro), the ICJ decided that it was in the interests of the good administration of justice that a CD-ROM brought by the applicant at a late stage of the proceedings, be withdrawn since it was difficult for the other Party and the Court to come to terms with such an immense mass of documents (2007, at para 54). In the LaGrand Case (Germany v United States of America), the ICJ underscored, while granting the provisional measures requested by Germany, that ‘the sound administration of justice requires that a request for the indication of provisional measures founded on Article 73 of the Rules of the Court be submitted in good time’ (1999, para 19). The decision of Germany to seise the ICJ only one day before the scheduled date of execution of Walter LaGrand did not give the Court much time for examination in the proceedings and could question the rights of the United States to reply properly to the request, but the critical circumstances commanded the Court to indicate the requested provisional measures. The consequences of the timing of the request have of course to be evaluated regarding the good administration of justice. In the Ballantine case before the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), the Respondent filed an emergency request for an order to access the land and premises of the claimants. Even though it appeared late, the Tribunal decided to grant the Respondent’s Emergency Application because ‘it does pertain to matters which seem to be relevant and material to this dispute … In the interest of preserving the Parties’ rights to present their cases, the principle of equal treatment, the principle of sound administration of justice and to allow the Tribunal to be as much informed as possible’ (Ballantine and Ballantine v Dominican Republic, 2018, para 24).

14  Timing is a critical element in the treatment of the requests for provisional measures. As the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) pointed out in the Mamatkulov case, ‘it can be said that, whatever the legal system in question, the proper administration of justice requires that no irreparable action be taken while proceedings are pending’ (Mamatkulov and Askarov v Turkey, 2005, para 124). The ICJ uses its discretionary power to decide on the requests for provisional measures. Beyond what is stated in its Statute and Rules, it commonly decides that the establishment of ‘plausible character of the alleged rights in the principal request’ is a requirement for the indication of provisional measures (Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear, Cambodia v Thailand, 2011, para 33; Temple of Preah Vihear Case).

15  It is clear that it is mostly in the frame of requests for provisional measures that questions of timing can be raised. But we can also find some explicit references to time considerations in connexion with the concept of good administration of justice in other incidental proceedings. We can mention here, the fact that the ICJ quoted the relevant part of the LaGrand order we referred to in the previous paragraph and added that ‘the same applies to an application for permission to intervene, and indeed even more so, given that an express provision to that effect is included in Article 81(1) of the Rules of the Court’ (Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan, Indonesia/Malaysia, 2001, para 21; Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan Case (Indonesia/Malaysia)). Once again, the purpose of the concept of the good administration of justice is to preserve the rights of the parties from the potential abuse of the right to intervene used by a third party.

16  One last illustration of the connexion between the good administration of justice and time can be seen in the scheduling of the phases of the proceedings. Litigants need time to prepare and present their submissions and rebuttal submissions. This question can generate tensions. In the Abaclat case, the dissenting arbitrator Torres Bernárdez, regretting that the majority of the tribunal decided in favour of a scheduling contested by Argentina, recalled that:

In the interest of the proper administration of justice, international courts and tribunals always try to reasonably accommodate all the persons involved in the proceedings, but of course, this should not lead to a de facto suspension or a postponement of the proceedings. The international courts and tribunals have to find the balance to ensure that the parties can prepare their submissions which can be analysed by the tribunal in due time. This is what ICJ Practice Direction V pursues, ‘[w]ith the aim of accelerating proceedings on preliminary objections made by one party …, the time-limit for the presentation by the other party of a written statement of its observations and submissions … shall generally not exceed four months from the date of filing of the preliminary objections’ (Practice Direction V, as amended on 21 March 2013).

17  International justice does not come free. International tribunals and courts have to bear in mind the cost of the proceedings and should decide in the best interest of the resources of the parties. We can easily understand this issue when a tribunal discusses the appropriateness of a request for consolidation of procedures. It is quite common to consider that a tribunal can decide to consolidate two or more actions involving a common question of law or facts when consolidation would facilitate the administration of justice. In the Canfor case, the arbitral tribunal indicated that ‘[i]n any event, in this instance, the Consolidation Tribunal means to refer in particular to the goal of alleviating the resources of the State Parties in defending against multiple claims’ (Canfor Corporation v United States – Tembec et al v United States – Terminal Forest Products Limited v United States, 2005, para 76). Consolidation of procedures is not always feasible as some questions of confidentiality may arise. In such cases, as when the disclosure of documents is at stake, the ‘proper administration of justice principle has to be balanced with some considerations of confidentiality’ (Merrill and Ring Forestry LP v Canada, 2008, para 24). A tribunal may also invoke the good administration of justice to decide in favour of the bifurcation of two proceedings (Bifurcation of Proceedings). In the Guaracachi America case the respondent set forth that ‘[r]easons of efficiency, cost, control and sound administration of justice favour bifurcation when issues of arbitrability/jurisdiction are invoked by one of the parties’ (Guaracachi America Inc (USA) and Rurelec PLC (United Kingdom) v Plurinational State of Bolivia, 2012, para A.2.c). The same reasoning can be seen in some decisions regarding the acceptance of a third-party intervention. Such an application for intervention can be rejected if it can impinge on the proper administration of justice. In their assessment of the application, the courts and tribunals frequently refer to considerations of cost, efficiency, usefulness, etc. In a very similar way, the concept of the good administration of justice may be referred to by a tribunal to request expertise on one specific point of the case. But the very same concept could also justify the refusal of a tribunal to request the assistance of an expert where it appears to be costly, time-consuming, or unnecessary for the settlement of the dispute. Once again, we see here the expression of the connexion between the two dimensions of the concept of good administration of justice (good administration of the proceeding and rendering good justice). A court’s rules of procedure must be implemented with due regard for the fundamental objective of giving good justice.

18  Undoubtedly the concept of the good administration of justice entertains a strong connection with the protection of the rights of litigant parties. The ICJ constantly defends the opinion that the principle of equality before the Court is ‘a central aspect of the good administration of justice’ (Judgment no 2867 of the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organization upon a Complaint Filed against the International Fund for Agricultural Development, 2012, para 35). This has been already exposed in the presentation of the time and cost issues but is sometimes stated in a more general manner by international courts and tribunals. As such, the protection of the rights of the parties can be balanced with other interests. That is the opinion expressed by the ICJ when it declared that ‘the safeguarding of the rights of respondent States is equally an essential part of the “good administration of justice”’ (Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, New Application: 1962, Belgium v Spain, 1964, 43, emphasis added; Barcelona Traction Case). The adversarial system which derives from the principle of equality of the parties is designed to ensure the good administration of justice. The same relation exists with the requirements of independence and impartiality of judges and arbitrators (Lehigh Valley Railroad Company and ors v Germany, 1930, 102; Independence: International Adjudication; Impartiality: International Adjudication) or with the principle according to which litigants have to be held accountable for the same rules of international law (Avena and Other Mexican Nationals and Mexico v United States, 2004, para 45; Avena and Other Mexican Nationals Case (Mexico v United States of America)).

19  In a 1956 Advisory Opinion, the ICJ explained that the ‘principle of equality of the parties follows from the requirements of good administration of justice’ (Judgments of the Administrative Tribunal of the ILO upon Complaints Made Against the UNESCO, 1956, 86). In that case, the UNESCO had the right to present its claims directly before the Court, but the other party, an official of the organization, did not have standing before the Court. The Court wanted to make sure that the principle of equality would not be impaired, being a condition of the good administration of justice. The Court declared that ‘the observations of the officials were made available to the Court through the intermediary of Unesco and, on the other hand, by dispensing with oral proceedings’; ‘although no oral proceedings were held, the Court is satisfied that adequate information has been made available to it’ (Judgments of the Administrative Tribunal of the ILO upon Complaints Made Against the UNESCO, 86). Regarding the good administration of justice, the affirmation of a principle of equality of the parties means that both parties must be given equal opportunities to be heard and to obtain justice (Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, Qatar v United Arab Emirates, 2019, para 59; Equality of Arms).

20  Sometimes, international courts or tribunals expressly state that the equality of rights between the litigant parties is the main objective of the concept of the principle of the good administration of justice. This is especially the case when a party to the dispute refuses to appear before an international court or tribunal. ‘[T]he Court usually expresses regret, because such a decision obviously has a negative impact on the sound administration of justice’ (Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, para 27). In such circumstances, international courts or tribunals have to balance various interests. This is clearly summarized by the ICJ in the judgment on the merits in the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua Case (Nicaragua v United States of America). It recognized that:

We know that in this landmark case, the United States Information Office in The Hague sent documents to an official of the ICJ’s Registrar. The Court decided that it could take into consideration those documents even if their transmission was not made in accordance with the Statute and the ICJ Rules (at para 73). In such a situation, the Court must be prudent in its use of the principle of the good administration of justice and should not take the risk to be perceived as being in the exclusive favour of one of the parties to the case.

21  It can also be underscored that Article 40 (1) Statute of the ICJ requires that the subject of the dispute submitted to the Court must be indicated in the Application. The objective is yet again to make sure that the defending party has enough information to decide how to reply to the application. In the Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru Case (Nauru v Australia), the ICJ recalled that the subject of the dispute and the precise nature of the claim must be indicated in the application in accordance with Article 40 (1) Statute of the Court as well as with Article 38 (2) Rules of the Court, and it must also be pointed out clearly that ‘these provisions are so essential from the point of view of legal security and the good administration of justice’ (Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru, Nauru v Australia, 1992, para 69). We can recall here that Article 38 (2) Rules of the ICJ states that ‘[t]he application shall specify as far as possible the legal grounds upon which the jurisdiction of the Court is said to be based; it shall also specify the precise nature of the claim, together with a succinct statement of the facts and grounds on which the claim is based’. But the ICJ can interpret this provision flexibly when it believes that the rigid application of this procedural rule would impair the good administration of justice (Dispute regarding Navigational and Related Rights, Costa Rica v Nicaragua, 2009, paras 134–39; Dispute regarding Navigational and Related Rights Case (Costa Rica v Nicaragua)).

22  One final example of the consideration shown for the equality of the parties when invoking the good administration of justice regards counter-claims (Counterclaim; Counterclaim: International Court of Justice (ICJ)). In a Separate Opinion joined to the order adopted by the ICJ in the Genocide case (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Yugoslavia), Judge Koroma declared that:

23  Judicial economy allows a court or tribunal to refrain from making ‘multiple findings that the same measure is inconsistent with various provisions when a single, or a certain number of findings of inconsistency, would suffice to resolve the dispute’ (Canada – Wheat Exports and Grain Imports, 2004, para 133). The principle of judicial economy gives a tribunal the power not to address claims beyond those necessary to resolve the dispute but does not compel it to do so (for a critical analysis: Lauterpacht, 1982, 37). Quite often the concept of the good administration of justice is referred to in relation to judicial economy or procedural economy. Referring to the overall interests of administering justice, Judge Singh mentioned in an Opinion joined to the judgment rendered by the ICJ in the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case that ‘in the proper discharge of its judicial function, a court is not required to pronounce on those aspects which do not call for a decision in the task of accomplishing the adjudication of the dispute’ (1978, at 46). In such circumstances, a tribunal may refer to the good administration of justice to justify adopting a decision for which it would be difficult to rely on the Rules or Statute of said tribunal. A court or tribunal can, referring to the good administration of justice, fill in some gaps where procedural rules are lacking, or interpret these. The good administration of justice gives the power to adapt the rules of procedure. The main example can be seen in the situation where a party does not satisfy the requirements for the establishment of the jurisdiction of a court or tribunal at the date of referral. The situation is well known. In the Croatia Genocide case, the ICJ stated that ‘[w]hat matters is that, at the latest by the date when the Court decides on its jurisdiction, the applicant must be entitled, if it wishes, to bring fresh proceedings in which the initially unmet condition would be fulfilled’ and the Court added that in such circumstances, it is ‘not in the interests of the sound administration of justice to compel the applicant to begin the proceeding anew—or to initiate fresh proceedings—and it is preferable, except in special circumstances, to conclude that the condition has, from that point on, been fulfilled’ (at 85). Even if, in a recent case, the ICJ seems to defend a more formalistic approach (Negotiations relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament, Marshall Islands v United Kingdom, 2016, para 57, and Dissenting Opinion of Vice-President Yusuf, 867; Dissenting Opinion of Judge Robinson, 1084; Separate Opinion of Judge Tomka, 894; Declaration of Judge Xue, 1030), its jurisprudence expresses the idea that judicial economy is an element of the requirements of the sound administration of justice. The purpose of such a solution is clear: avoiding unnecessary and costly proliferation of proceedings.

24  On the same basis, considerations for procedural or judicial economy can explain the way a tribunal decides on counter-claims. According to the ICJ, accepting some counterclaims, instead of a fresh case before it, ‘is merely in order to ensure better administration of justice’ and ‘the idea is essentially to achieve a procedural economy whilst enabling the Court to have an overview of the respective claims of the parties and to decide them more consistently’ (Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Bosnia-Herzegovina v Yugoslavia, 1997, para 30). Following the same reasoning, the ICJ confirmed that it is in the interest of the good administration of justice ‘to rule on the respective claims of the parties in a single set of proceedings’ (Oil Platforms, Islamic Republic of Iran v United States, 1998, para 43; Oil Platforms Case (Iran v United States of America)) or that ‘the sound administration of justice and the interests of procedural economy call for the simultaneous consideration of those counter-claims and the principal claims’ (Armed Activities on the Territory of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo v Uganda, 2001, para 44; Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo Cases). To recognize its jurisdiction over counter-claims, a tribunal has to verify the existence of a direct connection of the counterclaim with the principal claim. But the tribunal must also give full consideration to the preservation of the rights of the claimant to have its claims examined in a reasonable time (Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Bosnia-Herzegovina v Yugoslavia, 1997, para 40).

25  Judicial economy is also at the heart of the reasoning of international courts and tribunals when they have to assess the opportunity of joining two (or more) cases in a single proceeding (Joinder of Cases and Proceedings). The good administration of justice sometimes commands the joinder of two proceedings (Turnbull, Manoa Company (Limited), and Orinoco Company (Limited), 1903, 299); on other occasions, it is simply considered more convenient (Lehigh Valley Railroad Company, Agency of Canada Car and Foundry Company Limited and Various Underwriters, 84). The issues are very similar regarding the question of the intervention of a third party. Intervention before an international tribunal entertains an evident relation with the concept of the good administration of justice. It was precisely outlined by Judge El-Khasawneh declaring that the institution of intervention has a ‘potential to avoid repetitive litigation and to afford a fair hearing of those States whose interests may be affected by the Court’s decision, and thus to ensure a better administration of justice’ (Territorial and Maritime Dispute, Nicaragua v Colombia (Dissenting Opinion of Judge El-Khasawneh, 2011, para 7; Intervention: International Court of Justice (ICJ)).

26  We could also mention the practice followed before the Dispute Settlement Body (‘DSB’) of the World Trade Organization (Judicial Economy: Dispute Settlement System of the World Trade Organization (WTO)). In the Australia – Salmon case, the Appellate Body convincingly stated that:

27  In the Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v Spain) case, the ICJ stated that ‘within a system of consensual jurisdiction, to maintain on the General List a case upon which it appears certain that the Court will not be able to adjudicate on the merits would most assuredly not contribute to the sound administration of justice’ (Legality of Use of Force Yugoslavia v Spain, 1999, para 35). When there is no alleged basis of jurisdiction, the Court can reasonably decide the removal of a case, even at an early stage of the procedure (here during the provisional measures procedure). The Court confirmed this position in 2004 when it decided that there is no doubt that the Court may of its own motion put an end to proceedings in certain circumstances (Legality of Use of Force, Yugoslavia v Belgium, 2004, para 33). In those circumstances, the principle of good administration of justice, is, as designated by Robert Kolb, acting as a firefighter always available to overcome the shortcomings of the written rules (2009, at 19).

28  The ICJ may sometimes rely on the concept of judicial integrity to pursue the objective of the good administration of justice. In such circumstances, the very purpose of the use of the concept of the good administration of justice is to protect the integrity of the procedure or the judicial propriety of it. The core idea is that the Court has inherent power to enable it to conduct its proceedings in an effective and efficient manner (Nuclear Tests Case, Australia v France, 1974, paras 23 and 55; see also The ‘Camouco’ Case, Panama v France (Dissenting Opinion of Judge Treves), 2000, para 6). The purpose of the good administration of justice is precisely to ensure the proper functioning of the procedure. In such circumstances, a court or tribunal could justify its decision to rule on the preliminary objections and the merits in a single decision or to decide on a request for provisional measures. The orders or judgments regarding provisional measures are good manifestations of the necessary balance of issues decided by the court. When deciding on a request for provisional measures, a tribunal has to duly take into account the respective interests of the claimant and defending parties but also the proper functioning of the tribunal. Beyond the question of indication of provisional measures, the ICJ declared that:

29  The proper functioning of the procedure is frequently mobilized in the frame of a decision on a request for provisional measures. There is no doubt that the granting of provisional measures can contribute to the good administration of justice (Frontier Dispute, Burkina Faso v Mali, 1986, para 19). But it would be in contradiction with the good administration of justice principle if the Court decided to grant provisional measures without evaluating its own prima facie jurisdiction on the case (Armed Activities on the Territory of Congo, New Application: 2002, Democratic Republic of Congo v Rwanda, 2006, para 25). The standard of review is of course prima facie, there is no need to rule definitively on the jurisdiction and admissibility at this stage. It can be said that there is an extension of the objects of provisional measures in international proceedings. This mirrors the diversity of the objectives of the concept of the good administration of justice. In the name of the good administration of justice, a tribunal can ask a State to suspend an extradition request (Pugachev v Russian Federation, 2017) or to modify the conditions of detention of the claimant (Munshi v Mongolia, 2018) to ensure the participation of the claimant in an arbitral procedure initiated against a State.

30  The concept of the good administration of justice has, not uncommonly, been used to join the preliminary objections to the merits. In a landmark order, the PCIJ stated in 1938 that it ‘may order the joinder of preliminary objections to the merits, whenever the interests of the good administration of justice require it’ (Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway Case, 1938, 7; Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway Case). This passage of the order has often been quoted by the ICJ (see among others, Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident in Lockerbie, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v United States, 1998, para 48; Lockerbie Cases (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v United Kingdom and United States of America)). We know that the Court may take such a decision when it does not have at its disposal enough information at the preliminary stage to decide on the preliminary objections raised by the defending party. Thus, it can decide on the preliminary objections after having heard the arguments regarding the merits.

31  A tribunal may use the concept of the good administration of justice to avoid contradictory or divergent decisions. In the Coëme case, the ECtHR underscores that ‘joinder in the present case was either fully justified to avoid the risk of contradictory decisions or desirable for reasons of coherence, to save having more than one trial and in short to ensure the proper administration of justice’ (Coëme and ors v Belgium, 2000, para 106). Sometimes the joinder of two parallel proceedings cannot be invoked because they are engaged before two distinct international tribunals. In such a case, a party may try to request one of the tribunals to enjoin a party from further pursuing one of the proceedings (Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, Qatar v United Arab Emirates, 2019, para 66). This is not the only purpose of the joinder of proceedings. Article 47 ICJ Rules confers to the Court a discretionary power to decide on the joinder as it states that the ‘Court may at any time direct that the proceedings in two or more cases be joined’ (emphasis added). It is clear that in circumstances where the Statute or the Rules confer to the Court such a prerogative, it may easily rely on the concept of the good administration of justice to uphold or to dismiss the application for joinder (Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River (Separate opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade), para 27).

32  Bifurcation constitutes the very opposite of the junction of procedures. When deciding on a request for bifurcation, a court or tribunal has to ‘determine what will best serve the Parties and the sound administration of justice, in particular with respect to procedural efficiency’ (Eco Oro Mineral Corps v Republic of Colombia, 2018, para 50).

33  As Robert Kolb rightly expresses, the principle of the good administration of justice is one of the flexible standards without which no legal order could function properly (2009, at 19). Were it absent, the mission attributed to a tribunal or court (be it domestic or international) could not be achieved. As such, it could easily be qualified as a general principle under Article 38 (1) (c) Statute of the ICJ. This principle is common to the domestic and international legal orders and is inherent to the very concept of justice (Lelarge, 2009, 31; General Principles of International Procedural Law). But the consequences of the application of the principle of the good administration of justice may be hard to identify. In the Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Colombia, relying on the principle of the good administration of justice, the ICJ decided that Costa Rica did not have the right to intervene in the proceedings. But some judges of the minority sustained that in that case, the application of this principle should have led the Court to take the contrary decision (Territorial and Maritime Dispute, Nicaragua v Colombia (Dissenting Opinion of Judge El-Khasawneh), 2011, para 7, and (Joined Dissenting Opinion of Judges Cançado Trindade and Yusuf), para 28). These contradictory opinions show that the dual dimension of the concept of the good administration of justice (good administration of the procedure and good justice) is dominated by its second branch. In the name of the objective of good justice, the requirement of good administration of the procedure can be mobilized. But it is undisputable that the objective of good justice is charged with an important axiological dimension that justifies the variations of international courts and tribunals in their use of the concept of the good administration of justice.

Arbitration

• Berkowitz and ors v Costa Rica, Procedural Order on the Correction of the Interim Award and the Termination of the Proceedings, 30 May 2017, UNCT/13/2.

• Abaclat and ors v Argentina, Directions from the Tribunal to the Parties, 21 October 2013, ARB/07/5.

• Abaclat and ors v Argentina, Directions from the Tribunal to the Parties (Statement of Dissent by Dr Santiago Torres Bernárdez), 21 October 2013, para 5.

• Canfor Corporation v United States – Tembec and ors v United States – Terminal Forest Products Limited v United States, Order of the Consolidation Tribunal, 7 September 2005.

• Casinos Austria International GmbH and Casinos Austria Aktiengesellschaft v Argentine Republic, Decision on Jurisdiction, 29 June 2018, ICSID Case No ARB/14/32.

• Casinos Austria International GmbH and Casinos Austria Aktiengesellschaft v Argentine Republic, Decision on Jurisdiction (Dissenting Opinion of Arbitrator Santiago Torres Bernárdez), 29 June 2018, ICSID Case No ARB/14/32, para 55.

• Chevron Corporation and Texaco Petroleum Company v Ecuador, Third Interim Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (Opinion of Jan Paulsson), 12 March 2012, PCA Case No 2009-23.

• Eco Oro Mineral Corps v Republic of Colombia, Procedural Order no 2, Decision on Bifurcation, 28 June 2018, ICSID Case No ARB/16/41.

• Guaracachi America Inc (USA) and Rurelec PLC (United Kingdom) v Plurinational State of Bolivia, Procedural Order no 6, 30 August 2012, PCA Case No 2011-17.

• International Company for Railway Systems v Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Procedural Order no 2, 9 July 2010, ICSID Case No ARB/09/13.

• Lehigh Valley Railroad Company, Agency of Canada Car and Foundry Company Limited and Various Underwriters (United States) v Germany), Decision, 16 October 1930, 8 RIAA 84.

• Limited Liability Company Amto v Ukraine, Final Award, 26 March 2008, Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, Arbitration No 080/2005.

• Merrill and Ring Forestry LP v Canada, Decision of the Tribunal on the Production of Documents in Respect of Which Cabinet Privilege Has Been Invoked, 3 September 2008, ICSID Case No UNCT/07/1.

• Ballantine and Ballantine v Dominican Republic, Procedural Order No 8, 4 March 2018, PCA Case No 2016-17.

• Munshi v Mongolia, Award on the Emergency Measures, 5 February 2018, SCC Case No 2018/07.

• RSM Production Corporation v Saint Lucia, Decision on Saint Lucia’s Request for Suspension or Discontinuation of Proceedings, 8 April 2015, ICSID Case No ARB/12/10.

• Pugachev v Russian Federation, Interim Award, 7 July 2017.

• Turnbull, Manoa Company (Limited), and Orinoco Company (Limited), Decision of Umpire Barge, 1 January 1903, 9 RIAA 261.

European Court of Human Rights

• Boddaert v Belgium, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 12 October 1992, App 12919/87, Series A No 235-D.

• Coëme and ors v Belgium, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 22 June 2000, App 32492/96, 32547/96, 32548/96, 33209/96 and 33210/96; ECtHR Reports 2000-VII 75.

• Mamatkulov and Askarov v Turkey, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 4 February 2005, App 46827/99 and 46951/99; ECtHR Reports 2005-I 293.

International Court of Justice

• Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case, Greece v Turkey, Judgment (Separate Opinion of Vice-President Nagendra Singh), 19 December 1978, [1978] ICJ Rep 46.

• Diallo, Republic of Guinea v Democratic Republic of Congo, Judgment, 30 November 2010, [2010] ICJ Rep 639.

• Appeal relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council, India v Pakistan, Judgment, 18 August 1972, [1972] ICJ Rep 46.

• Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Bosnia and Herzegovina v Yugoslavia, Counter-claims, Order, 17 December 1997, [1997] ICJ Rep 243.

• Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Bosnia and Herzegovina v Yugoslavia, Counter-claims, Order, (Separate Opinion of Judge Koroma), 17 December 1997, [1997] ICJ Rep 272.

• Application of the Convention on the prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Bosnia-Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro, Judgment, 27 February 2007, [2007] ICJ Rep 43.

• Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, Qatar v United Arab Emirates, Request for Indication of Provisional Measures to Preserve the United Arab Emirates’ Procedural Rights and to Prevent Qatar from Aggravating or Extending the Dispute, 22 March 2019.

• Armed Activities on the Territory of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo v Uganda, Counter-claims, Order, 29 November 2001, [2001] ICJ Rep 660.

• Armed Activities on the Territory of Congo, New Application: 2002, Democratic Republic of Congo v Rwanda, Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, 3 February 2006, [2006] ICJ Rep 6.

• Avena and Other Mexican Nationals, Mexico v United States, Judgment, 31 March 2004, [2004] ICJ Rep 12.

• Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, New Application: 1962, Belgium v Spain, Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 24 July 1964, [1964] ICJ Rep 6.

• Case concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Croatia v Serbia, Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 18 November 2008, [2008] ICJ Rep 412.

• Case concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Croatia v Serbia, Preliminary Objections, Judgment (Separate Opinion of Judge Abraham), 18 November 2008, [2008] ICJ Rep 524.

• Case concerning Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, Georgia v Russia, Preliminary Objections, Judgment, (Separate Opinion of President Owada), 1 April 2011, [2011] ICJ Rep 70.

• Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru, Nauru v Australia, Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 26 June 1992, [1992] ICJ Rep 240.

• Colombian-Peruvian Asylum Case, Order, 17 December 1949, [1949] ICJ Rep 267.

• Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River, Nicaragua v Costa Rica, Joinder of Proceedings, Order (Separate Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade), 17 April 2013, [2013] ICJ Rep 189.

• Continental Shelf, Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Judgment, 24 February 1982, [1982] ICJ Rep 18.

• Dispute regarding Navigational and Related Rights, Costa Rica v Nicaragua, Judgment, 13 July 2009, [2009] ICJ Rep 213.

• Frontier Dispute, Burkina Faso / Mali, Provisional Measures, Order, 10 January 1986, [1986] ICJ Rep 3.

• Judgment no 2867 of the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organization upon a Complaint Filed against the International Fund for Agricultural Development, Advisory Opinion, 1 February 2012, [2012] ICJ Rep 10.

• Judgments of the Administrative Tribunal of the ILO upon Complaints Made Against the UNESCO, Advisory Opinion, 23 October 1956, [1956] ICJ Rep 77.

• LaGrand, Germany v United States, Provisional Measures, Order, 3 March 1999, [1999] ICJ Rep 9.

• Legality of Use of Force Yugoslavia v Spain, Provisional Measures, Order, 2 June 1999, [1999] ICJ Rep 761.

• Legality of Use of Force, Serbia and Montenegro v Belgium, Judgment, 15 December 2004, [2004] ICJ Rep 279.

• Legality of Use of Force, Yugoslavia v Belgium, Provisional Measures, Order, 2 June 1999, [1999] ICJ Rep 124.

• Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, Nicaragua v United States, Merits, 27 June 1986, [1986] ICJ Rep 14.

• Nuclear Tests Case, Australia v France, Judgment (Declaration of President Lachs), 20 December 1974, [1974] ICJ Rep 273.

• Nuclear Tests Case, Australia v France, Judgment, 20 December 1974, [1974] ICJ Rep 253.

• Obligations concerning negotiations relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament, Marshall Islands v Pakistan, Preliminary Objections, Judgment, (Declaration of President Abraham), 5 October 2016, [2016] ICJ Rep 575.

• Obligations concerning negotiations relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament, Marshall Islands v United Kingdom, Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 5 October 2016, [2016] ICJ Rep 833.

• Obligations concerning negotiations relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament, Marshall Islands v United Kingdom, Preliminary Objections, Judgment (Dissenting Opinion of vice-President Yusuf), 5 October 2016, [2016] ICJ Rep 867.

• Obligations concerning negotiations relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament, Marshall Islands v United Kingdom, Preliminary Objections, Judgment (Dissenting Opinion of Judge Robinson), 5 October 2016, [2016] ICJ Rep 1084.

• Obligations concerning negotiations relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament, Marshall Islands v United Kingdom, Preliminary Objections, Judgment (Separate Opinion of Judge Tomka), 5 October 2016, [2016] ICJ Rep 894.

• Obligations concerning negotiations relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament, Marshall Islands v United Kingdom, Preliminary Objections, Judgment (Declaration of Judge Xue), 5 October 2016, [2016] ICJ Rep 1030.

• Oil Platforms, Islamic Republic of Iran v United States, Counter-claim, Order, 10 March 1998, [1998] ICJ Rep 190.

• Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident in Lockerbie, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v United States, Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 27 February 1998, [1998] ICJ Rep 115.

• Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear, Cambodia v Thailand, Provisional Measures, Order, 18 July 2011, [2011] ICJ Rep 537.

• Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan, Indonesia / Malaysia, Application for Permission to Intervene, Judgment, 23 October 2001, [2001] ICJ Rep 575.

• Territorial and Maritime Dispute, Nicaragua v Colombia, Application for Permission to Intervene (Costa Rica), Judgment (Dissenting Opinion of Judge Abraham), 4 May 2011, [2011] ICJ Rep 384.

• Territorial and Maritime Dispute, Nicaragua v Colombia, Application for Permission to Intervene (Costa Rica), Judgment (Dissenting Opinion of Judge El-Khasawneh), 4 May 2011, [2011] ICJ Rep 374.

• Territorial and Maritime Dispute, Nicaragua v Colombia, Application for permission to intervene (Honduras), Judgment, 4 May 2011, [2011] ICJ Rep 420.

• Territorial and Maritime Dispute, Nicaragua v Colombia, Application for permission to intervene (Honduras), Judgment (Declaration of Judge Al-Khasawneh), 4 May 2011, [2011] ICJ Rep 446.

International Criminal Court

• Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 12 April 2019, Case No ICC-02/17-33.

International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia

• Prosecutor v Mucic and ors, Judgment on Sentence Appeal, 8 April 2003, IT-96-21-A.

International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea

• ‘Camouco’ Case, Panama v France, Prompt Release, Judgment (Dissenting Opinion of Judge Treves), 7 December 2000, ITLOS Rep 2000, 73.

Permanent Court of International Justice

• Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 30 October 1924, PCIJ Series A No 2.

• Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway Case, Preliminary Objections, Order, 30 June 1938, PCIJ Series A/B No 75.

Special Court for Sierra Leone

• Prosecutor v Brima and ors, Decision of Prosecution Motion for Relief in Respect of Violations of Rule 67, 26 July 2006, SCSL-04-16-T-521.

World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Body

• Australia – Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon, Appellate Body Report, WT/DS18/AB/R, adopted 6 November 1998, DSR 1998:VIII, 3327.

• Canada – Measures relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment of Imported Grains, Appellate Body Report, WT/DS276/AB/R, adopted 27 September 2004, DSR2004:VI, 2739.