1  The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) (‘IACtHR’ or ‘the Court’) has established a comprehensive system for monitoring compliance with its judgments which thus far have included over 11,000 reparation orders from 223 cases. Assessment of compliance with judgments is not periodic, it is a constant function of the Court. The Court takes a primary role in seeking compliance from the point when it is drafting its reparation orders, holding compliance hearings and on-site visits, issuing special orders monitoring compliance, seeking reports by States and experts, and publishing resolutions confirming partial or full implementation by the State. The formalization of the processing of compliance has required a significant shift of resources and time for the Court and its Secretariat. The wide breadth of reparation orders contained within judgments requires sustained follow-up by the Court, as well as the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACommHR), (‘the Commission’), academic institutions, human rights organizations, and victims’ representatives. The IACtHR is a principal actor in the supervision of the execution of its judgments. Its approach in monitoring compliance matches its progressive jurisprudence and reparation orders. In contrast, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) relies on the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe (COE) for supervision of the execution of the Court’s judgments. Furthermore, the Council of Europe’s Department for the Execution of Judgments of the ECtHR provides support to Member States to effect implementation of the judgment and the order of compensation. Similarly, the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACtHPR) is expected to report State non-compliance to the Assembly of Heads and Government that in turn will be assisted by the Executive Council to monitor the execution of the Court’s judgments. The IACtHR is unique in its embrace of the role as a standard-bearer of compliance.

2  According to Article 63 (1) American Convention on Human Rights (1969) (‘ACHR’), the Court has the mandate to order remedies and compensation:

3  However, the Organization of American States (OAS) General Assembly did not establish supervisory execution powers for the Court, leaving the Court in a position in which it had to create its own supervisory function. There is only an indirect reference to supervision of execution of the judgments of the Court by the General Assembly within the ACHR in Article 65:

4  In the case of Baena-Ricardo et al v Panama (2003), Panama challenged the Court’s competence to monitor compliance, indicating that supervision is a post-judgment political act, belonging to the OAS General Assembly, not the Court. The Court responded by citing Article 33 ACHR:

5  The Court declared monitoring compliance to be part of its jurisdictional function, underscoring that it ‘has the authority inherent in its attributions to determine the scope of its own competence (compétence de la compétence/Kompetenz-Kompetenz)’ (Baena-Ricardo et al v Panama, para 68). Furthermore, the Court invoked the principle of State obligation to comply with international law in its order on monitoring compliance with the judgment in 2013 (Baena-Ricardo et al v Panama, 2013, para 61):

6  It is notable that Article 2 ACHR requires States to make human rights effective at the domestic level:

7  Moreover, Article 68 ACHR sets forth an obligation of States to comply with the judgments:

8  The IACtHR has taken a primary role regarding supervision of compliance since its first order of reparation in the Case of Velásquez Rodríguez (1987) in which it called upon the State to provide just compensation to the family of the victim who had been forcibly disappeared and specifically stated that it would oversee implementation of the order. The Court similarly stated that it would supervise the order of investigation and prosecution in the Case of El Amparo v Venezuela (1996). In the Case of Barrios Altos v Peru (2001), the Court called upon the State to provide a compliance report within six months. In 2002, in the Bámaca Velásquez v Guatemala case the Court issued a complete time schedule for payment of compensation, apology, legal reform, and fulfilment of additional non-repetition guarantees, a model which it has followed since then in its jurisprudence. Furthermore, in 2005, the Court issued a Resolution on Supervision of Compliance with Sentences. It sets forth that the Court will issue reports on compliance and determine whether or not the State has fulfilled its obligation within the time period set in the judgment. The Court will inform the OAS of the status of compliance in its annual report. Lixinski states that the OAS General Assembly retains some formal mandate for supervision ‘but it seems to be largely residual in practice, and restricted to receiving IACtHR reports on what the Court itself has done. In fact, the OAS activity in this space has decreased in correlation to the IACtHR’s increased activity’ (Lixinski, 2019, 64).

9  The Court sets forth an obligation upon the State to provide the Court with a report within one year delineating its compliance with the orders set out in the judgment. The Court shares the report and any supporting materials sent by the State with the victims’ representatives and the Commission. In turn, they offer observations on the report. Furthermore, non-governmental organizations (‘NGOs’), academic institutions, and other expert bodies monitor compliance with reparation orders by providing amicus curiae to the Court or organizing seminars or reports (Amicus Curiae: Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR)). In 2008, the NGO Center for Justice and International Law (‘CEJIL’) presented the Court with an amicus curiae which addressed the impact of gender stereotyping and helped the Court identify reparation orders that would aim to rectify this phenomenon within the Case of the Cotton Fields v Mexico (2009). The State of Mexico created training courses for public officials which taught gender stereotyping, gender violence, and gender discrimination.

10  The Court often declares that the State is in partial compliance and then issues more orders on compliance with the remaining orders and follow up review by the Secretariat. As an example, in the monitoring order of the Case of Da Costa Cadogan v Barbados (2020), the Court recognized the partial compliance of the State in reforming its death penalty legislation to conform with the ACHR, to provide information on the right to a psychiatric evaluation to persons accused of death penalty crimes, and to set aside the death penalty pronounced on Mr Da Costa. The Court will continue to review what type of hearing Mr Da Costa will receive pursuant to the new legislation. States are more likely to comply with material and moral compensation as well as satisfaction orders, which may include acknowledgement of responsibility and publication of the judgment, while lagging behind in implementation of investigation, prosecution, restitution of property, and provision of medical and psychological rehabilitation to victims and their families (Braga Navarro, 2018, 11; Baluarte, 2012, 287–300). The Court depends on cooperation from national courts, executive actors, legislative, and administrative actors to implement orders on retrial, removal of charges or fines, determination of lost wages and benefits, etc (Case of Baena Ricardo v Panama, 2005). The Secretariat issues notes to parties requesting further information, clarification, and updates on compliance. The Court may also choose to hold hearings or conduct on-site procedures in order to strengthen compliance. It first started holding compliance hearings in 2008.

11  In 2015, the Secretariat of the Court established a Unit on Monitoring Compliance with the Judgment. The Court will issue orders confirming the degree of compliance, request detailed information on measures taken by the State, urge the State to comply with the orders, give specific instruction for compliance, and clarify aspects on which there is a dispute between the parties regarding the execution and implementation of the reparation. Article 69 (4) Rules of Procedure of the IACtHR (2009) sets forth: ‘[o]nce the Tribunal has obtained all relevant information, it shall determine the state of compliance with its decisions and issue the relevant orders’. The Court expects the State to file regular reports on measures it has taken for compliance, commencing generally within a period ranging from six months to one year; should the State fail to file reports or demonstrate evidence of compliance, the Court will declare it to be in non-complicance. Article 69 (1) Rules of Procedure of the IACtHR sets forth:

Article 69 (2) sets forth that the Court may seek out additional reports or expert opinions to help it evaluate compliance. Article 69 (3) indicates that the Court may convene the State and victims’ representatives to a hearing on compliance, and the Commission shall present its opinion. The Commission has presented reports on non-compliance with the Court’s judgment in the Cases of the Girls Yean and Bosico and Expelled Dominicans and Haitians (2019), Nadege Dorzema et al v Dominican Republic (2019); Case of Gonzalez Medina and family v Dominican Republic (2019); Case of Chinchilla Sandoval et al v Guatemala (2019); the Cases of Yakye Axa, Sawhoyamaxa and Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Communities v Paraguay (2017).

12  Pursuant to its Resolution on 29 April 2010, the Court has employed a joint specialized monitoring mechanism that enables the Court to address a common obstacle to compliance within several cases involving a State. The joint mechanism allows the Court to address systemic problems such as lack of access to justice or failure of the State to provide medical and psychological treatment for victims (Monitoring Compliance in Nine Colombian Cases, Order, 2012). When it holds hearings on compliance, the State’ representatives, victims’ representatives, and the Commission are invited to present their concerns. Hearings may be public or private, and they may be held in the Seat of the Court in Costa Rica or in the country in which the violation occurred and the approach is one marked by mediation and dialogue. The Court first commenced holding private compliance hearings in 2007 and public hearings in 2009 (Schneider 2014).

13  The Court aims to hold external hearings twice a year and will send a committee composed of three judges and two Secretariat lawyers. The hearings enable different victims’ representatives to meet as well as participation by representatives of various State institutions relevant to compliance such as an Ombudsperson or a National Human Rights Institution and may seek to establish a concrete timetable for compliance. For example, on 10 June 2016, the Court held a session addressing the detention conditions within the Penitentiary Center of Curado in Brazil. The judges were able to visit the penitentiary and speak with the administrators, staff, and inmates of the penitentiary. They held a session with representatives of the State, the Commission, and the beneficiaries of the provisional measures issued by the Court. This hearing served to ensure implementation of protective orders issued by the Court (Matter of the Penitentiary Complex of Curado regarding Brazil, Provisional Measures, 2018).

14  The Court holds on-site procedures in which it sends a delegation to facilitate immediate communication between higher State officials and victims’ representatives in order to generate direct action on compliance, eg El Salvador, Guatemala, Panama, and Paraguay. These on-site visits enable the entire community and various State representatives to discuss, for example, problems relating to demarcation and titling of indigenous property. For example, on 15 October 2015, a delegation composed of Judge Sierra Porto and three Secretariat lawyers visited the indigenous territory of the Ipetí and Piriatí de Embera de Bayano communities in Panama to monitor compliance with the judgment. Nonetheless, the demarcation and titling of the indigenous property in Panama and Paraguay have yet to be complied with, in spite of the on-site visits. The Court has had greater success with its on-site visits that pursue due diligence implementation of reparation orders that address other issues. For example, in 2018, the Court sent a delegation to El Salvador composed of Judges Sierra Porto and Zaffaroni, as well as a lawyer from the Secretariat. The on-site visit facilitated the payment by the State of reparations to victims, discussed the extent of progress of identification and exhumation of bodies of the victims, and underscored the need for psychosocial care to be made available to the community. The Court will also hold informal meetings with State agents and victim representatives to discuss reparations and deadlines for reports. The Court’s strategy is to give all parties and stakeholders an opportunity to be heard, thereby increasing good will towards compliance.

15  The Court publishes information regarding compliance within its Annual Reports as well as directly on its website. Moreover, it includes the views of human rights organizations on State implementation of non-repetition orders, pursuant to Article 69 (2) Rules of Procedure:

16  The Court is also able to request further information from State institutions to follow up the concerns raised by civil society groups. The Court has signed agreements with national human rights institutions and ombudspersons to cooperate to provide spaces for dialogue between parties as well as assistance to victims through the Inter-American Public Defenders Office (Inter-American Defender: Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR). For example, on 27 July 2020 the Court signed a cooperation agreement with the Public Defender’s Office of Ecuador, on 2 February 2015 with the Public Defender’s Office of Colombia, and on 9 September 2015 the Court renewed its Cooperation Agreement with the National Human Rights Commission of Mexico.

17  The Court considers national courts, executive actors, and legislators to be partners in ensuring compliance with the Court’s orders through the conventionality control doctrine. This doctrine requires national actors to interpret national law in accordance with the ACHR and the Court’s jurisprudence, and should the law be incompatible it should be considered inapplicable by the State. Some jurisdictions, eg Colombia and Peru, have specific legislation and/or procedures on the implementation of IACtHR decisions (Kristicevic, 2009). Nevertheless, there are cases of institutional resistance or indifference by courts, legislators, or public ministries that render compliance difficult (Schonsteiner and Couso 2015, 345). In 2016, El Salvador’s Constitutional Court struck down an amnesty law that had been passed by the legislature due to its incompatibility with Constitution and the jurisprudence of the IACtHR. The Legislature drafted a new blanket Amnesty and in 2019 the Court had to issue a provisional measure ordering the Legislature to desist and implement the reparations ordered in the Case of El Mozote v El Salvador (2012).

18  In the event of non-compliance, the IACtHR issues a report to the General Assembly of the OAS, in accordance with Article 65 ACHR:

19  Similarly Article 30 Statute of the IACtHR (1979), sets forth that the Court ‘shall indicate those cases in which a State has failed to comply with the Court's ruling’ to the OAS General Assembly. At present, there are two cases involving Haiti and fifteen cases involving Nicaragua that are subject to the Article 65 procedure. The Court has formally requested that the OAS General Assembly contact the States regarding non-compliance, specifically Haiti in the Case of Fleury et al (2011) and Venezuela in the Case of Díaz Peña (2012) and Case of Uzcátegui (2012). This procedure is selected when the State has specifically stated that it does not intend to comply with the judgment, or when an extensive amount of time has passed without receiving information from the State on compliance with remaining orders. Nevertheless, in practice the OAS General Assembly has never actually taken up non-compliance cases involving the Court, thereby weakening the system. Basch and co-authors have specifically opined that ‘the General Assembly of the OAS should take a more active role in this matter, by eventually applying costly political sanctions to the States which are reluctant to comply with the measures ordered’ (2010, at sec 5.5). However, Trinidad and Tobago withdrew its recognition of the Court’s jurisdiction after the President of the Court denounced its practice of capital punishment before the OAS General Assembly pursuant to Article 65, hence this strategy may result in a backlash against the Court (Baluarte 2012, 282). Venezuela has also withdrawn its recognition of the Court’s jurisdiction and the OAS remains highly polarized, resulting in stagnation of its institutional functions.

20  The IACtHR has an originative approach to the realization of justice, as it issues a variety of different reparation orders which go beyond monetary compensation to victims and calls for State action to address structural discrimination, inequality, and exclusion at the root of violations (Saavedra Alessandri, 2020, 178). These ‘integral reparative’ orders are categorized as non-repetition guarantees and present challenges in attaining compliance, in part due to the weakness of judicial independence within the region (Cruz Marin, 2020, 23; Bailliet, 2013, 480) as well as lack of political will by institutional actors, such as national judges or prosecutors, to cooperate (Huneeus, 2011, 509; Hillebrecht, 2012, 971). Non-repetition guarantees are intended to benefit society as well as the victims and may require a long-term approach for implementation.

21  The Court’s reparation orders have a broad spectrum: provision of psychological, psychiatric, and/or medical support to victims and their families (Case of the Miguel Castro Castro Prison v Peru, 2020); the erection of a memorial or publication of a book or documentary to remember the victims and set forth a truthful account of events (Case of the Massacres of El Mozote v El Salvador, 2018); prevention-oriented social awareness campaigns promoting non-discrimination narratives; training of police, doctors, army, and judges in human rights, including women’s rights, LBGTI rights, indigenous rights, and refugee/migrant rights (Case of IV v Bolivia, 2020); reform of national law to conform with international law, such as prohibiting the death penalty or inclusion of the crime of forced disappearance within the national criminal law, or amendment of constitutional law or military law (Case Raxcacó Reyes v Guatemala, 2019; Case of Gómez Palomino, Anzualdo Castro, Osorio Rivera and family, and Tenorio Roca et al v Peru, 2019; Case of Cabrera García and Montiel Flores v Mexico, 2020; and Case of Torres Millacura et al v Argentina, 2020); the establishment of a database of missing persons/victims of gender crimes (Case of López Soto et al v Venezuela, 2018); and the recovery and identification of persons forcibly disappeared (Case of the Caracazo v Venezuela 2018, Cases of the Yakye Axa, Sawhoyamaxa and Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Communities v Paraguay, 2017) etc. States often are able to comply with part of the orders but leave others outstanding when there is an issue of lack of political will among domestic actors, budget concerns, or other factors resulting in delays. Reparation orders that call for investigation, prosecution, and punishment of those responsible for violations or orders requiring identification, grant, and transfer of title of indigenous territory may face limitations due to power imbalances within the State impeding arrests or resistance by third parties to land conflicts (Case of Barrios Altos and Case of La Cantuta v Peru, 2018). The Court has declared national amnesty laws addressing torture, extrajudicial executions, and forced disappearances to be in violation of the ACHR, thereby setting a foundation for the reform of national legislation to include international crimes as well as national prosecution for these crimes (Case of Torres Millacura et al v Argentina, 2011). For example, Fujimori was prosecuted for crimes against humanity before the Supreme Court of Peru in April 2009. However, the IACtHR faced the challenge of addressing the State’s resistance in the form of an issuance of a pardon on humanitarian grounds to Fujimori, thereby resulting in a state of non-compliance denounced by the Court (Case of Barrios Alto and Case of La Cantuta v Peru, 2018).

22  Although the Court states that governments are not supposed to invoke domestic law to refuse to implement Court orders, there have been problems in cases involving politically sensitive issues. For example, in 2019 the Costa Rican Legislature refused to implement an order by the IACtHR to legalize In Vitro Fertilization (‘IVF’) (Case of Artavia Murillo et al (In Vitro Fertilization) and Case of Gómez Murillo et al v Costa Rica, 2019). This resulted in a crisis which led to the government’s invitation being extended to the Unit on Monitoring Compliance with Judgments which decided to send its lawyers with Judge Pazmiño Freire to visit Costa Rica to verify the availability of IVF within health institutions. Compliance with the Court’s order was finally made available by Executive Decree legalizing IVF. Naurin, Stiansen, and Boyum have found a correlation between a State’s filing of preliminary objections to the Court’s jurisdiction over a case and the likelihood of political resistance to implementing the judgment; whereas if a State accepts responsibility in a case, it is unlikely that there will be political resistance to compliance (Naurin and others, 2020, at 18).

23  Some estimates calculate that partial compliance can take an average of eight years from the delivery of the judgment to 11 years for full compliance (Pérez-Liñán and others, 2019, 2). Although monetary compensation remains the type of order that is most often implemented, Palacios Zuloga suggests that other orders have an ‘extra compliance’ impact value by serving as a foundation for public policy advocacy strategies by civil society actors (Palacios Zuloaga, 2020, 54) (Human Rights, Remedies).

24  According to Article 63 (2) ACHR, the Court can order provisional measures when necessary to avoid irreparable damage to persons in cases of extreme gravity and urgency. The Court has issued provisional measures in connection with compliance, for example calling for protection of victims or witnesses (Case of the Miguel Castro Castro Prison v Peru 2020).

25  The Victims Legal Assistance Fund was created in 2010 to guarantee access to the Court by victims who lacked resources. Victims and their representatives may seek support to cover the cost and expenses related to participation in compliance hearings and proceedings. Participation by victims and representatives in compliance hearings is important to enable continued dialogue, identification of obstacles to compliance, and resolution of disagreements regarding the form and timing of implementation of the reparation orders. A case must first be submitted to the Court, then the victim can request financial assistance. The Court’s Rules for Operation of the Fund (2010) call upon victims to declare by a sworn affidavit that they lack sufficient means to cover the participation costs within the submitted brief, including pleadings, motions, and evidence. The Secretariat conducts an initial review of the request and may require the submission of more background information. The President of the Court then determines the application for admissibility and sets the amount to be granted. This decision shall be made within three months of the delivery of the background information. The Secretariat informs the victims’ representative, the State, and the Commission of the decision on funding. The Secretariat administers the Fund and retains a file of expenditures which are recorded and reported to the respondent State. The respondent State may submit observations regarding the funding. The Court can order the respondent State to reimburse the Fund for the disbursements (Case of Torres Millacura et al v Argentina, 2020).

26  The Court has set forth that compliance with its judgments is an intrinsic aspect of the right of access to international justice. As noted by Cançado Trindade (2011), the right of an individual to international justice is contingent upon the State’s recognition of its obligation to pursue a good faith and timely execution of the judgment of the Court and provision of reparation. Failure to comply with the Court’s judgment, including the reparation orders, may thus be considered to be an internationally wrongful act, violating the victim’s right to judicial protection according to Article 25 ACHR. State actors may not invoke domestic law as a justification for failure to comply with the Court’s orders, as States have an obligation to guarantee the effet utile of the ACHR. The integrity of the regional human rights system is contingent upon the premise that the Court is an important guarantor of judicial remedies that strengthen the rule of law within each nation. The substantial commitment of the Court towards monitoring compliance in diverse ways and in cooperation with various national and international partners serves as a model for other institutions.

Cecilia M Bailliet

Cited Bibliography

• V Kristicevic, Implementacíon de las decisiones del sistema interamericano de derechos humanos: Aportes para los procesos legislativos (CEJIL 2009).

• F Basch, L Filippini, A Laya, M Nino, F Rossi, and B Schreiber, ‘The Effectiveness of the Inter-American Human Rights System’ (2010) 12 SUR 9–35.

• A Cançado Trindade, The Access of Individuals to International Justice (OUP Oxford 2011).

• A Huneeus, ‘Courts resisting courts: Lessons from the Inter-American Court's struggle to enforce human rights’ (2011) 44 CornellIntlLJ 493–533.

• DC Baluarte, ‘Strategizing for Compliance: The Evolution of a Compliance Phase of Inter-American Court Litigation and the Strategic Imperative for Victims' Representatives’ (2012) 27(2) American University International Law Review 263–321.

• C Hillebrecht ‘The Domestic Mechanisms of Compliance with International Human Rights Law: Case Studies from the Inter-American Human Rights System’ (2012) 34 HumRtsQ 959.

• C M Bailliet, ‘Measuring Compliance with the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: The Ongoing Challenge of Judicial Independence in Latin America’ (2013) 31(4) Nordic Journal of Human Rights 477–95.

• J Schneider, ‘The Execution of Judgments of the European and Inter-American Courts of Human Rights’ (2014) 14 Cadernos de Direito 7–25.

• J Schonsteiner and J Couso, ‘La implementacion de las decisiones de los órganos del sistema interamericano de derechos humanos en Chile: Ensayo de un Balance’ (2015) 22 (2) Revista de Derecho Universidad Catolica del Norte 315–55.

• A Pérez-Liñán, LL Shenoni, K Morrison, K Burgos-Morón, MC Clare Enright, K Erhardt, E Fennelly, K Moeinvaziri, A Olavarrieta Trejo, N Reysa, F Shipley, L Watts, N Yepez-Frías, ‘Compliance with the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Methodological Proposal and Preliminary Findings’ (2019) <https://kellogg.nd.edu/sites/default/files/ReportIACtHR2019.pdf> (accessed 3 March 2021).

• L Lixinski. ‘Mechanisms of systemic change in regional human rights courts: swinging the pendulum between legitimacy and impact’ (2019) 8:1 Cambridge International Law Journal 60–83.

• GC Braga Navarro, ‘The Struggle after the Victory: Non-compliance in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ Jurisprudence on Indigenous Territorial Rights’ (2020) Journal of International Dispute Settlement 1–27.

• P Cruz Marin, ‘Compliance of Judgments of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ (2020) <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3647326> (accessed 9 November 2020).

• P Saavedra Alessandri, ‘The Role of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in Monitoring Compliance with Judgments’ (2020) 12 Journal of Human Rights Practice 178–84.

• O Stiansen, D Naurin, and L Standal Boyum, ‘Law and Politics in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. A New Database on Judicial Behavior and Compliance in the IACtHR’ (2020) 8 Journal of Law and Courts 359–79.

• P Palacios Zuloaga, ‘Judging Inter-American Human Rights: The Riddle of Compliance with the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ (2020) 42 Human Rights Quarterly 392–433.

Further Bibliography

• TM Antkowiak, ‘Remedial Approaches to human rights violations: The Inter-American Court of Human Rights and Beyond’ (2007) 46 ColumJTransnatlL 351.

• M Robles ‘La Supervisión del Cumplimiento de las Sentencias en el Sistema Interamericano de Protección de los Derechos Humanos’ (2007) 18 Anuario Hispano-Luso-Americano de Derecho Internacional 169–206.

• R Díaz and E Pedro, El Cumplimiento de las decisiones y recomendaciones de los organismos internacionales de derechos humanos en Colombia: la sentencia de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos en el caso ‘Diecinueve Comerciantes’ (Universidad Libre Bogota 2008).

• JI Acosta López and D Bravo Rubio, El cumplimiento de los fines de reparación integral de las medidas ordenadas por la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos: énfasis en la experiencia colombiana (Editorial Pontificia Universidad Javeriana Bogota 2009).

• D Bravo Rubio, ‘El cumplimiento de las sentencias de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, buenas prácticas en el caso colombiano’ (2009) 60 Revista IIDH 129–56.

• V Corasaniti, ‘Implementación de las sentencias y resoluciones de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos: un debate necesario’ (2009) 49 Revista IIDH 13–28.

• S Long Saborío, ‘Aciertos y desaciertos de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos en el caso Baena Ricardo y otros vs. Panamá (Caso Ley 25)’ (2009) IV (5) Revista CEJIL 38–49.

• J Staton and A Romero, ‘Clarity and compliance in the Inter-American human rights system’ (2011) <https://biblioteca.cejamericas.org/bitstream/handle/2015/448/Clarity-and-Compliance-in-the-Inter-American-Human-Rights-System.pdf> (accessed 3 March 2021).

• M Jesko Langer and E Hansbury, ‘Monitoring Compliance with the Decisions of Human Rights Courts: The Inter-American Particularism’, in L Boisson de Chazournes, MG Cohen, and JE Viñuales (eds), Diplomatic and Judicial Means of Dispute Settlement (Martinus Nijhoff Leiden 2012) 213.

• LA Benavides, La ‘Despolitización’ del proceso de ejecución de sentencias de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (Tirant Lo Blanch 2013).

• D Cassel. ‘Fortaleciendo el rol de las víctimas en el cumplimiento de las sentencias de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos’, in E Sosa, J Carmona, and P Saavedra, (eds), Impacto de las sentencias de la corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (Tirant lo Blanch Mexico 2013) 123–37.

• E Corzo Sosa, P Saavedra Alessandri, C Tinoco, and J Ulises, Impacto de las sentencias de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (Tirant Lo Blanch 2013).

• E Corzo Sosa, Las Medidas provisionales: Cumplimiento, impacto e incumplimiento (Tirant Lo Blanch 2013).

• E Ferrer Mac-Gregor Poisot, ‘Eficacia de la sentencia interamericana y la cosa juzgada internacional: Vinculación directa hacia las partes (res judicata) e indirecta hacia los estados parte de la Convención Americana (res interpretata). (Sobre el cumplimiento del Caso Gelman vs. Uruguay)’ (2013) 11(2) Estudios Constitucionales 641–94.

• B Ivanschitiz Boudegeur, ‘Un estudio sobre el cumplimiento y ejecución de las sentencias de la corte interamericana de derechos’ (2013) 11(1) Estudios Constitucionales 275–331.

• G Morales, Implementación de las sentencias interamericanas en México: Obstáculos y desafíos (NOVUM 2015).

• JE Antoniassi and others, Incumplimiento de sentencias internacionales: Sistema Interamericano de Derechos Humanos (Editorial EDIAR 2018).

• S Rousset and J Andrés, Ejecución de sentencias de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (Rustica 2018).

• J Staton and A Romero ‘Rational remedies: the role of opinion clarity in the Inter-American Human Rights System’ (2019) 63 International Studies Quarterly 477–91.

• M Silva Abbott, ‘A Radiographic Analysis of Compliance with the Decisions of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ (2020) 26 ILSA JIntl&CompL 479.

• C Sandoval-Villalba, P Leach, and R Murray, ‘Monitoring, cajoling and promoting dialogue – what role for supranational human rights bodies in the implementation of individual decisions?’ (2020) 12(1) Journal of Human Rights Practice 71–100.

Cited Documents

• American Convention on Human Rights (22 November 1969) OASTS No 36, 1144 UNTS 123, B-32, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev.1, 25.

• Amicus Curiae on the Case of Campo Algodonero (8 December 2008) (Centro por la Justicia y el Derecho Internacional CEJIL) <https://cejil.org/sites/default/files/amicus-campo-algodonero-espl.pdf>.

• ICtHR ‘Cases Applying Article 65 of the American Convention on Human Rights’ <https://www.corteidh.or.cr/casos_aplicacion_articulo_65_convencion.cfm> (accessed 2 March 2021).

• IACtHR ‘Rules for the Operation of the Victims’ Legal Assistance Fund of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ (adopted 4 February 2010) <https://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/regla_victimas/victimas_eng.pdf>.

• IACtHR ‘Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ (2009).

• IACtHR ‘Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (2010).

• Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (1979) OAS Res 447 (IX-0/79), OAS Doc OEA/Ser.P/IX.0.2/80, OAS Doc OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev.1 at 93 [1992].

Cited Cases

• Case of Artavia Murillo et al (‘In Vitro Fertilization’) v Costa Rica, Monitoring Compliance with Judgments, Order, 22 November 2019.

• Case of Baena Ricardo et al v Panama, Competence, 28 November 2003, IACHR Series C No 104, IHRL 1487 (IACHR 2003), [2003] IACHR 7.

• Case of Baena Ricardo et al v Panama, Monitoring Compliance with Judgment, Order, 28 November 2005.

• Case of Bamaca Velasquez v Guatemala, Bamaca Velasquez and ors v Guatemala, Reparations and costs, 22 February 2002, IACHR Series C No 91, IHRL 1474 (IACHR 2002).

• Case of Barrios Altos v Peru, Chumbipuma Aguirre and ors Peru, Merits, 14 March 2001, IACHR Series C No 75, IHRL 1458 (IACHR 2001).

• Case of Barrios Altos v Peru, Chumbipuma Aguirre and ors v Peru, Monitoring Compliance with Judgment, Order, 30 May 2018.

• Case of Cabrera García and Montiel Flores v Mexico, Monitoring of Compliance with Judgment, Order, 24 June 2020.

• Case of Chinchilla Sandoval et al v Guatemala, Monitoring Compliance with Judgment, Order, 7 October 2019.

• Case of the Caracazo v Venezuela, Monitoring Compliance with Judgment, Order, 30 May 2018.

• Case of Da Costa Cadogan v Barbados, Monitoring Compliance with Judgment and Reimbursement of Victims' Legal Assistance Fund, Order, 11 March 2020.

• Case of Díaz Peña v Venezuela, Díaz Peña v Venezuela, Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs, 26th June 2012, IACHR Series C No 244.

• Case of El Amparo v Venezuela, Araujo and ors v Venezuela, Reparations and costs, 14 September 1996, IACHR Series C No 28, [1996] IACHR 6, IHRL 1410 (IACHR 1996).

• Case of the Girls Yean and Bosico and Case of Expelled Dominicans and Haitians v Dominican Republic, Monitoring Compliance with Judgement and Competence, Order, 12 March 2019.

• Case of Gómez Palomino, Anzualdo Castro, Osorio Rivera and family, and Tenorio Roca et al v Peru, Monitoring Compliance with Judgment, Order, 14 May 2019.

• Case of González et al (‘Cotton Field’) v Mexico, González and ors v Mexico, Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs, 16 November 2009, IACHR Series C No 205, IHRL 4151 (IACHR 2009).

• Case of Gonzalez Medina and family v. Dominican Republic, Monitoring Compliance with Judgment, Order, 22 November 2019.

• Case of IV v Bolivia, Monitoring Compliance with Judgment, Order, 1 June 2020.

• Case of López Soto et al v Venezuela, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, 26 September 2018, Series C No 362.

• Case of Lysias Fleury et al v Haiti, Merits and Reparations, Judgement, 23 November 2011, Series C No 236.

• Case of the Massacres of El Mozote and surrounding areas v El Salvador, Merits, reparations and costs, 25 October 2012, IACHR Series C No 252.

• Case of the Massacres of El Mozote and surrounding areas v El Salvador, Monitoring Compliance with Judgment, Order, 30 May 2018.

• Case of the Miguel Castro Castro Prison v Peru, Request for Provisional Measures and Monitoring Compliance with Judgment, Order, 29 July 2020.

• Case of Nadege Dorzema et al v Dominican Republic, Monitoring Compliance with Judgment, Order, 22 November 2019.

• Case Raxcacó Reyes v Guatemala. Monitoring Compliance with Judgment, Order, 30 January 2019.

• Case of Torres Millacura et al v Argentina, Monitoring Compliance with Judgment and Reimbursement of Victims' Legal Assistance Fund, Order, 21 July 2020.

• Case of Torres Millacura et al v Argentina, Torres Millacura v Argentina, Merits, reparations and costs, 26 August 2011, IACHR Series C No 229.

• Case of Uzcátegui et al v Venezuela, Merits and reparations, 3 September 2012, Series C No 249.

• Case of Valle Jaramillo et al v Colombia, Valle Jaramillo and ors v Colombia, Order of the President of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights - Monitoring compliance with the measures of reparation concerning the medical and psychological attention ordered in nine Colombian cases: Notice of a private hearing, 8 February 2012.

• Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v Honduras, Velásquez Rodríguez v Honduras, Preliminary objections, 26 June 1987, IACHR Series C No 1, IHRL 1382 (IACHR 1987), [1987] IACHR 3.

• Case of Yakye Axa, Sawhoyamaxa and Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Communities v Paraguay, Monitoring Compliance with Judgment, Order, 30 August 2017.

• Matter of the Penitentiary Complex of Curado regarding Brazil, Provisional Measures, Order 28 November 2018.

Further Cases

• Case of Baena Ricardo et al v Panamá Monitoring Compliance with Judgment, Order, 5 February 2013.

• Case of Barrios Altos v Peru, Chumbipuma Aguirre and ors v Peru, Monitoring compliance, 7 September 2012.

• Case of Barrios Altos v Peru, Chumbipuma Aguirre and ors v Peru, Monitoring compliance, 7 December 2009.

• Case of Castillo Petruzzi et al v Peru, Castillo Petruzzi and ors v Peru, Compliance with judgment, 17 November 1999, IACHR Series C No 59, IHRL 1442 (IACHR 1999).

• Case of the Massacres of El Mozote and surrounding areas v El Salvador, Request for Provisional Measures and Monitoring Compliance with Judgment, Order, 19 November 2020.

• Case of the Massacres of El Mozote and surrounding areas v El Salvador, Request for Provisional Measures and Monitoring Compliance with Judgment, Order, 3 September 2019.

• International Responsibility for the Promulgation and Enforcement of Laws in Violation of the Convention (Arts 1 and 2 of the American Convention on Human Rights), Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Advisory opinion, Advisory Opinion OC-14/94, 9 December 1994, IACHR Series A No 14, IHRL 3321 (IACHR 1994), (2000) 116 ILR 320.