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Oxford Law Citator
Contents
Expand All
Collapse All
Preliminary Material
Editor’s Preface and Acknowledgements
Foreword
Foreword
Table of Contents
Table of Cases
Democratic Republic of Congo
The Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo
The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui
The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda
The Prosecutor v. Callixte Mbarushimana
The Prosecutor v. Sylvestre Mudacumura
Central African Republic
The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo
The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Aimé Kilolo Musamba, Jean-Jacques Mangenda Kabongo, Fidèle Babala Wandu and Narcisse Arido
Uganda
The Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony
The Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen
Sudan
The Prosecutor v. Ahmad Muhammad Harun (“Ahmad Harun”) and Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman (“Ali Kushayb”)
The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir
The Prosecutor v. Bahar Idriss Abu Garda
The Prosecutor v. Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain
Republic of Kenya
The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang
The Prosecutor v. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta et al.
The Prosecutor v. Walter Osapiri Barasa
Libya
The Prosecutor v. Abdullah Al-Senussi and Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi
Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire
The Prosecutor v. Simone Gbagbo
The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo and Charles Blé Goudé
ICC Applications
ICTY
ICTR
SCSL
STL
ECCC
Inter-American Court of Human Rights
ECtHR
ICJ
PCIJ
Arbitration
Other
National Cases
Australia
Canada
Germany
Ireland
Israel
Italy
New Zealand
Peru
South Africa
Uganda
United Kingdom
USA
Table of Legislation
Table of International Instruments
Table of National Statutes
Austria
Botswana
Brazil
Colombia
France
Germany
Holland
Italy
Lebanon
Netherlands East Indies
Norway
Poland
Republic of Congo
South Africa
Spain
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC)
Uganda
UK
USA
List of Abbreviations
List of Contributors
Introduction More than a Court, Less than a Court, Several Courts in One?: The International Criminal Court in Perspective
1 The International Criminal Court and Crisis
2 Refining Premises and Narratives
2.1 Reality and perception
2.2 Productive and irreconcilable tensions
3 The Law in Motion
4 Structure and Content of the Book
4.1 Context, challenges, and constraints
4.2 Relationship to domestic jurisdictions
4.3 Prosecutorial policy and practice
4.4 The ICC and its applicable law
4.5 Fairness and expeditiousness of proceedings
4.6 Impact, legacy, and lessons learned
5 Not a Conclusion
Main Text
Part I Context, Challenges, and Constraints
1 The International Criminal Court (ICC) and Double Standards of International Justice
1.1 Introduction
1.2 Context
1.3 Double Standards in ICC-Related Practice
1.4 Beyond the Status Quo
2 The ICC and the Politics of Peace and Justice
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Arguing for Justice
2.3 The Triumph of Consequences
2.4 Four Dilemmas
2.4.1 Sequencing justice
2.4.2 Displacing the local
2.4.3 Impairing neutrality and undermining legitimacy
2.4.4 Raising the stakes for justice
2.5 Rewriting Justice
3 The Relationship between the ICC and the United Nations Security Council
3.1 Introduction
3.2 The Relationship between the Court and the Council: Three Theories
3.2.1 The ICC as an instrument of international peace and security
3.2.2 Institutional autonomy
3.2.3 The Council as executive enforcement organ
3.3 The Framing of Referrals
3.4 The Funding of Referrals
3.5 Obligations to Cooperate with the Court
3.6 Non-Cooperation and Enforcement
3.6.1 Communications to the Council
3.6.2 Findings on non-cooperation
3.6.3 Responses to non-cooperation findings
3.7 Political and Operational Support for Situations Not Referred by the Council
3.8 Deferrals
3.8.1 Conditions and criteria for invoking Article 16
3.8.2 Explaining a deferral decision
3.8.3 Containing deferrals
3.9 Conclusions
4 The ICC and the AU
4.1 Introduction
4.2 The Conflation of Politics and Law: Africa and International Criminal Justice
4.3 African Efforts to Close the Impunity Gap
4.4 Complementarity in Action
4.4.1 DRC
4.4.2 South Africa
4.4.3 Uganda
4.5 Expanding the Jurisdiction of the African Court
4.6 Conclusion
5 How Much Money Does the ICC Need?
5.1 Introduction
5.2 How much does the ICC Cost and how is that Money Spent?
5.3 The Constituencies
5.4 The 2013 Budget Process
5.5 How Efficient is the ICC?
5.6 Possible Explanations for the Comparative Inefficiency of the ICC
5.7 Conclusion
6 The ICC and the ASP
6.1 Introduction
6.2 Overview of the ASP
6.3 Administrative Oversight
6.3.1 Policy-setting and strategic planning
6.3.2 Inspection, evaluation, and investigation
6.4 Budgetary Decisions
6.5 Legislative Decisions
6.5.1 Amendments at the Review Conference
6.5.2 Expediting the ICC’s proceedings
6.5.3 Amendments arising from some African states’ concerns regarding the ICC’s cases
6.5.3.1 Amendments to Rule 134 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence
6.5.3.2 Kenyan and AU States Parties’ proposals to amend the Rome Statute
6.6 Elections
6.6.1 Elections of judges
6.6.2 Elections of the prosecutor and the deputy prosecutors
6.7 Responding to Non-Cooperation
6.8 Other Initiatives to Support the ICC and the Rome Statute System
6.8.1 Plan of Action for achieving universality and full implementation of the Rome Statute
6.8.2 Promoting cooperation
6.8.3 Promoting complementarity
6.9 Conclusions
Part II The Relationship to Domestic Jurisdictions
7 Jurisdiction
7.1 Introduction
7.2 Jurisdictional Parameters
7.3 Subject Matter Jurisdiction
7.4 Personal Jurisdiction
7.5 Territorial Jurisdiction
7.6 Temporal Jurisdiction
7.7 Conclusion
8 Ad Hoc Declarations of Acceptance of Jurisdiction: The Palestinian Situation under Scrutiny
8.1 Introduction
8.2 The 2009 Palestinian Declaration: Inconsistencies and Legal Uncertainties
8.3 Potential Review and Alternative Avenues
8.4 Palestine’s New Status and its Effect on the First and Second Declaration
8.5 Conclusion
9 Self-Referrals as an Indication of the Inability of States to Cope with Non-State Actors
9.1 Introduction
9.2 Self-Referrals: Genuine ‘Inability’ or Insidious Attempt to Frame One’s Enemies?
9.3 Puzzled Trial Chambers Struggling with the Concepts of ‘Inactivity’ and ‘Inability’
9.4 The ICC and Non-State ‘Terrorists’
9.5 Self-Referrals and the State-Centred Paradigm of International Criminal Justice
9.6 Some Final Reflections
10 Admissibility Challenges before the ICC: From Quasi-Primacy to Qualified Deference?
Preliminary Material
10.1 Introduction
10.2 The Status Quo
10.2.1 Article 19 challenges in review
10.2.2 Legal methodology in review
10.2.2.1 Article 17(1)—Too few prospects for deference?
10.2.2.2 Article 17(2) and (3): too much space for deference?
10.3 Dilemmas
10.3.1 Timing dilemmas
10.3.1.1 The ‘race for time’ dilemma
10.3.1.2 The review dilemma
10.3.2 Deference and monitoring
10.3.2.1 The rudimentary ICC framework on deferral of cases
10.3.2.2 Post-(in)admissibility monitoring
10.4 Improving ‘Qualified Deference’
10.4.1 Time-management of admissibility: managing parallel proceedings
10.4.2 Monitoring of deference
10.4.3 Conditional admissibility: supervising deference
10.5 Conclusions
11 The ICC and its Relationship to Non-States Parties
11.1 Introduction
11.2 The Rome Statute and Third Parties: The Law
11.2.1 Theme
11.3 The Practice of the Court with Respect to Third Parties
11.3.1 The nature of obligations for non-Party States and their nationals after a Security Council referral
11.3.2 Practical aspects of situations referred by the Security Council
11.3.2.1 Sudan
11.3.2.2 Libya
11.3.3 The ICC and P-1(?): the United States
11.3.4 A Prosecutor’s headache: Palestine
11.3.5 Situations in other non-Party States
11.4 Conclusion
12 The Frog that Wanted to Be an Ox: The ICC’s Approach to Immunities and Cooperation
Preliminary Material
12.1 Introduction
12.2 Mapping the Interaction between Immunities and Cooperation in the Rome Statute
12.2.1 The applicable law
12.2.2 Methodological mapping of the interaction between immunities and cooperation
12.3 Preliminary Question: Can the ICC Actually Exercise Jurisdiction in the First Place?
12.3.1 Reference to customary international law
12.3.2 Removal of immunity through UNSC referral
12.3.3 The case for just applying Article 27(2) of the Rome Statute
12.4 Is There an Obligation to Cooperate with the ICC?
12.4.1 An obligation to cooperate as a consequence of the application of Article 27?
12.4.2 Finding an independent basis for the removal of immunity under Article 98
12.4.2.1 Removal of immunity under customary international law
12.4.2.2 Removal of immunity by the UNSC
12.4.2.3 The literal interpretation approach and its consequences on cooperation and immunities
12.4.3 The special case of the Genocide Convention
12.4.4 How to analyse possible conflicting obligations of states under international law
12.5 Conclusion
Part III Prosecutorial Policy and Practice
13 Putting Complementarity in its Place
13.1 Introduction
13.2 Meaningful National Prosecutions
13.2.1 Policy objectives in criminal justice
13.2.2 Referrals and the limits on national efforts
13.2.3 Conditions for national prosecutions
13.2.4 The role of civil society
13.2.5 Transitions, timing, and the interests of justice
13.2.6 The role of the international community
13.3 The Role of the Office of the Prosecutor in Catalysing National Proceedings
13.3.1 A review of the original position
13.3.1.1 Making the most of preliminary examination
13.3.1.2 Efficient hypotheses and opportunities during preliminary examination
13.4 Technical Analysis of National Proceedings
13.4.1 UK forces in Iraq
13.4.2 Colombia
13.5 Steps for the OTP
13.6 Conclusions
14 Investigative Management, Strategies, and Techniques of the ICC’s OTP
14.1 Introduction
14.2 Organization and Administration of the OTP
14.2.1 Issues relating to the organization and administration of the OTP
14.2.2 Recommendations relating to the organization and administration of the OTP
14.3 Size and Composition of Investigation Teams
14.3.1 Issues relating to the size and composition of investigation teams
14.3.2 Recommendations relating to the size and composition of investigation teams
14.4 Evaluating the Sufficiency of Evidence
14.4.1 Issues relating to evaluating the sufficiency of evidence
14.4.2 Recommendations relating to evaluating the sufficiency of evidence
14.5 Conclusion
15 The Selection of Situations and Cases by the OTP of the ICC
15.1 Introductory Remarks
15.2 The Selection of Situations by the OTP
15.2.1 The process
15.2.2 Outcome
15.2.3 Observations on triggering mechanisms
15.3 The Selection of Cases by the OTP
15.3.1 Governing principles
15.3.2 When to move forward?
15.3.3 Who must be prosecuted?
15.3.4 What crimes to prosecute?
15.3.5 Briefly: when not to prosecute?
15.3.6 Judicial review of the exercise of prosecutorial discretion
15.4 Conclusions
16 Selecting Situations and Cases
16.1 Introduction
16.2 Distinguishing Situations and Cases
16.3 Selection of Situations
16.4 Selecting Cases
16.5 Conclusion
17 Accountability of International Prosecutors
17.1 Introduction
17.2 Balancing Accountability and Effectiveness
17.3 Internal Oversight
17.4 Judicial Oversight
17.5 Political Oversight
17.6 Administrative and Professional Oversight
17.6.1 IOM
17.6.2 Bar associations
17.6.3 Informal sanctions
17.6.4 Preventive measures
17.7 Conclusion
Part IV The ICC and its Applicable Law
18 Article 21 and the Hierarchy of Sources of Law before the ICC
18.1 Introduction
18.2 Internal Sources of Law
18.2.1 The applicable legal texts and their hierarchy
18.2.1.1 The main legal texts
18.2.1.2 The supplementary legal texts
18.2.2 The case law of the ICC
18.3 External Sources of Law
18.3.1 Subsidiary sources of law
18.3.2 ‘Internationally recognized human rights’ as source of law before the ICC
18.3.2.1 What are ‘internationally recognized human rights’?
18.3.2.2 The meaning of ‘interpretation and application’
18.4 Conclusion
19 The Rome Statute and the Attempted Corseting of the Interpretative Judicial Function: Reflections on Sources of Law and Interpretative Technique
19.1 Introduction
19.2 The Rome Statute as a Means of Codifying Judicial Interpretative Restraint
19.3 Identifying the Applicable Law—From Nuremberg to the Ad Hoc Tribunals
19.4 Articles 21 and 22(2) of the Rome Statute: A Deliberate Effort to Restrict the Creative Capacity of the Bench?
19.4.1 Article 21(1) and (2)—the chaperoning of the judicial function and the prioritization of textual interpretation
19.4.1.1 The interpretation of Article 25(3)(a): the betrayal of textualism
19.4.1.2 Charting the origins of Article 21’s hierarchy of sources and the potential impact on the interpretative judicial function
19.4.1.3 Article 21(1)(b)–(c) and Article 21(2): the position of customary international law, general principles of law, and internal and external precedent in the Rome Statute’s interpretative regime
19.4.2 Article 21(3)—consistency with international human rights law as a general interpretative provision
19.4.3 Article 22(2)—interpretative freedom and the requirements of strict construction
19.5 Conclusions
20 Perpetration and Participation in Article 25(3)
20.1 Introduction
20.2 JCE and its Predecessors: A Twist on Complicity Liability
20.2.1 Non-categorization in normative terms
20.2.2 JCE: ever-expanding and a weak theoretical basis
20.3 Control Theory: A Novel Approach
20.3.1 The normative principal
20.3.2 Organizational liability
20.4 How to Understand Article 25(3): Some Suggestions
20.4.1 Categorization and fair labelling
20.4.2 Two liability models in one provision
20.4.3 Mitigation for aiding and abetting?
20.4.4 Control through an OSP: Dogmatik gone wrong
20.5 Concluding Observations
20.6 Outlook on the Future
21 Co-Perpetration: German Dogmatik or German Invasion?
21.1 Introduction
21.2 The Emergence of Co-Perpetration
21.3 Criticisms of the Control Theory of Perpetration
21.4 Alternative Accounts of Co-Perpetration
21.5 Concluding Evaluations
22 Indirect Perpetration
22.1 Background
22.2 Ad Hoc Tribunals and Indirect Perpetration
22.3 The Inception of Article 25(3)(a) of the ICC Statute
22.4 Application of Article 25(3)(a) of the Statute by the ICC
22.4.1 Indirect co-perpetration
22.4.2 Perpetration through another person by means of an organization
22.5 Criticism of the Pre-Trial Chamber’s Approach
22.6 A Narrow Version of Indirect Perpetration?
22.6.1 Indirect perpetration and the principle of legality
22.6.2 Substantive arguments
22.6.2.1 Perpetration through an organization
22.6.2.2 Indirect co-perpetration
22.7 Outlook
23 Forms of Accessorial Liability under Article 25(3)(b) and (c)
23.1 Introduction
23.2 Ordering, Instigating, and Planning (Article 25(3)(b) of the ICC Statute)
23.2.1 Ordering
23.2.1.1 Introduction
23.2.1.2 Material elements
23.2.1.3 Mental elements
23.2.1.4 Differences with perpetration
23.2.2 Instigating
23.2.2.1 Introduction
23.2.2.2 Material elements
23.2.2.3 Mental elements
23.2.2.4 Differences with ordering and perpetration
23.2.3 Planning
23.2.3.1 Introduction
23.2.3.2 Material elements
23.2.3.3 Mental elements
23.2.3.4 Differences with ordering, instigating, and perpetration
23.3 Aiding, Abetting, or Otherwise Assisting (Article 25(3)(c) of the ICC Statute)
23.3.1 Introduction
23.3.2 Material elements
23.3.3 Mental elements
23.3.4 Differences with ordering, instigating, planning, and perpetration
23.4 Conclusions
24 The ICC and Common Purpose—What Contribution is Required under Article 25(3)(d)?
24.1 Preliminary Remarks: Key Features of Article 25(3)(d) and Necessary Delimitations
24.2 The Key Issue: What Objective Contribution is Required?
24.2.1 The factual nature of the contribution
24.2.2 The legal nature of the contribution
24.3 Conclusion
25 Command Responsibility under Article 28 of the Rome Statute
25.1 Introduction
25.2 Development of this Mode of Liability
25.3 Commanders and Forces, Superiors and Subordinates
25.4 Effective Command, Authority, and Control
25.5 Duties on Commanders and Superiors
25.5.1 Failure to exercise control
25.5.2 Duty to ‘prevent’ the commission of the crimes
25.5.3 Duty to repress or submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution
25.5.4 Taking all necessary and reasonable measures within the commander’s or superior’s powers
25.5.5 The ‘crimes committed’ by forces or subordinates
25.6 Proof of Causation
25.7 Mens Rea Requirements
25.7.1 Knowledge
25.7.2 Military commanders and persons effectively acting as such—‘should have known’
25.7.3 Superiors—‘consciously disregarded information which clearly indicated’
25.8 Brief Concluding Words
26 Rethinking the Mental Elements in the Jurisprudence of the ICC
26.1 Introductory Observations: The (Quest for) Balance between Intent, Specificity, and Proportionality
26.2 The Default Rule of Article 30 ICC Statute: A Groundbreaking Step in the History of ICL or the Source of Irresolvable Interpretative Uncertainties?
26.2.1 Anatomy of the default rule of Article 30 ICC Statute
26.2.2 The concept of dolu directus of the first degree
26.2.3 The requirement of awareness that the result ‘will occur in the ordinary course of events’; its (complex) relation with the area of conscious risk-taking
26.2.3.1 The terms of the debate—knowledge, dolu eventualis, and recklessness
26.2.3.2 The early practice of the ICC
26.2.3.2.1 The Lubanga Decision on the confirmation of charges
26.2.3.2.2 The Katanga and Ngudjolo Decision on the confirmation of charges and subsequent jurisprudence
26.2.3.3 Liability for more serious consequences?
26.2.4 The requirement of ‘awareness that a circumstance exists’; the doctrine of wilful blindness
26.3 The Default Rule of Article 30 ICC Statute between Applicability and Non-applicability
26.3.1 The (controversial) meaning of the opening clause ‘Unless otherwise provided’
26.3.2 Intent, attack against civilians, and collateral damage
26.4 Concluding Remarks
27 The ICC’s First Encounter with the Crime of Genocide: The Case against Al Bashir
27.1 Introduction
27.2 The ICC’s Al Bashir Case Law on the Crime of Genocide
27.2.1 The teleology behind the law against genocide
27.2.2 The basic structure of the crime of genocide
27.2.2.1 The texts
27.2.2.2 The 2009 Decision
27.2.2.3 Analysis
27.2.2.3.1 The definition of the crime and the common Element of Crimes on genocide
(i) The significance of the principle of strict construction
(ii) History and travaux préparatoires
(iii) Systematic considerations
(iv) The Elements of Crimes as evidence of the opinio juris of states
(v) The prior case law
(vi) Summary
27.2.2.3.2 The genocidal campaign and a realistic genocidal intent
27.2.2.4 No requirement of a concrete threat
27.2.3 The material elements
27.2.3.1 On the concept of ‘protected group’ in general and that of ‘ethnical group’ in particular
27.2.3.2 The genocidal acts
27.2.3.2.1 Killing
27.2.3.2.2 Causing serious bodily or mental harm
27.2.3.2.3 Deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about physical destruction
27.2.4 The genocidal intent
27.2.4.1 The intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a protected group as such
27.2.4.2 The intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a protected group as such
27.2.4.3 The intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a protected group as such
27.2.4.3.1 The predominant view: the purpose-based approach
27.2.4.3.2 The knowledge-based approach
27.2.4.3.3 The 2009 Decision
27.2.4.3.4 The argument in support of a knowledge-based approach embodying the concept of realistic genocidal intent
(i) The ‘ordinary’ meaning of the term ‘intent’
(ii) The travaux préparatoires and the customary law argument
(iii) The particular seriousness of genocide
(iv) Genocide and crimes against humanity
(v) Questions of consistency
27.2.4.4 The destiny of the genocide charge in the case against Al Bashir
27.3 An Acquittal in re Genocide—A Failure? On the Rhetorics of Genocide
28 Crimes against Humanity: A Better Policy on ‘Policy’
28.1 Introduction
28.2 The Theory Behind the Policy Element
28.2.1 Why a ‘policy element’ (or something similar) is needed
28.2.2 What the policy element means
28.2.3 What the policy element does not mean
28.2.4 The resulting concept of crime against humanity
28.2.5 A word on the approach of the Tribunals
28.3 Concerns about ICC Jurisprudence
28.3.1 Equating ‘policy’ with ‘systematic’
28.3.2 Re-introducing ‘grounds’ of targeting
28.4 The Gbagbo Adjournment Decision: Direct Proof of Formal Adoption?
28.4.1 The general authorities on the policy element
28.4.2 The policy element under ICC applicable law
28.4.3 Lessons from the Gbagbo adjournment Decision
28.5 Mbarushimana: Distracted by Ulterior Purposes?
28.5.1 Incongruity of legal conclusion and factual findings
28.5.2 Reticence to find policy
28.5.3 The distraction of ulterior purpose
28.5.4 Lessons from Mbarushimana
28.6 Conclusion and Proposal for Reform
29 Charging War Crimes: Policy and Prognosis from a Military Perspective
29.1 Introduction
29.2 The Underlying Permissiveness of the jus in bello Regime
29.3 Understanding the Underlying Structure of Article 8
29.3.1 The authoritative backdrop of jus in bello
29.3.2 Specific textual incorporation into Article 8
29.3.3 The consensus compromises negotiated by states
29.4 Interrelationship of the Court with Operational Realities
29.4.1 Preserving the jurisdictional floor of war crimes charging
29.4.2 Status of forces agreements
29.4.3 Protecting the precepts of command responsibility
29.4.3.1 The limits of co-perpetratorship
29.4.3.2 Properly applying the Article 28 standard
29.5 Conclusions
30 The Characterization of Armed Conflict in the Jurisprudence of the ICC
30.1 Introduction
30.2 The Exercise of Jurisdiction over War Crimes
30.3 The Characterization of Armed Conflict under the Rome Statute
30.4 Issues Impacting on the Characterization of Armed Conflict by the ICC
30.5 Conclusion
31 The Crime of Aggression
31.1 Introduction
31.2 The Kampala Amendments on the Crime of Aggression
31.2.1 Article 8bis—the definition
31.2.2 The Elements of Crimes
31.2.3 Structure of Articles 15bis and 15ter—‘conditions’
31.3 Implementing the Kampala Amendments Domestically
31.3.1 Should a ratifying state criminalize aggression domestically?
31.3.2 Jurisdiction under international law
31.3.3 Immunities
31.3.4 Par in parem non habet imperium/act of state
31.3.5 Are there any additional considerations that a state contemplating exercising victim state or universal jurisdiction might ponder?
31.3.5.1 The implications of concurrent jurisdiction
31.3.5.2 Action or inaction by the Security Council
31.3.5.3 Could the Security Council halt the domestic proceedings?
31.3.5.4 Defences/grounds for the exclusion of responsibility
31.3.5.5 Should any special consent be required?
31.3.5.6 Triggering the prosecutorial function
31.4 Conclusion
32 La Lutte Continue: Investigating and Prosecuting Sexual Violence at the ICC
32.1 Introduction
32.2 Charges for Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes: The OTP’s Attrition Problem
32.3 Ocampo and Investigations: The OTP’s Evidence Problem
32.4 Bensouda and the Policy Paper: The OTP’s Future Strategy
32.5 Conclusion
33 Cumulative Charges and Cumulative Convictions
33.1 Introduction
33.2 Cumulative Convictions
33.2.1 The matrix of substantive concursus delictorum
33.2.1.1 Identity of facts constituting several offences
33.2.1.1.1 Class 1: non-application of a concurring offence
33.2.1.1.2 Class 2: application of all concurring offences: norm competition
33.2.1.2 Non-identity of facts constituting several offences
33.2.1.2.1 Class 3: non-application of a concurring offence
33.2.1.2.2 Class 4: application of all concurring offences: norm competition
33.2.2 Customary law
33.2.2.1 Class 1
33.2.2.2 Class 2
33.2.2.3 Class 3
33.2.2.4 Class 4
33.2.3 Rome Statute
33.3 Cumulative Charges
33.3.1 Principle
33.3.2 Customary law
33.3.3 Rome Statute
33.4 Conclusion
Part V Fairness and Expeditiousness of ICC Proceedings
34 The International Criminal Standard of Proof at the ICC—Beyond Reasonable Doubt or Beyond Reason?
Preliminary Material
34.1 Introduction
34.2 Some Theoretical Considerations
34.3 Subjective Standard of Proof
34.4 Formal Standard of Proof
34.4.1 Quantitative Standard of Proof
34.4.2 Model of Relevant Variables—Inductive Probability
34.4.3 Inference to the Best Explanation
34.4.4 Qualitative Probability—Argumentation Theory
34.5 Which Model for the ICC?
34.6 Where to Set the Standard of Proof?
34.7 A Fixed or Variable Standard of Proof?
34.8 Conclusion
35 Confirmation of Charges
35.1 Introduction
35.2 Proceedings during the Confirmation of Charges Phase
35.3 Procedural Avenues for the Pre-Trial Chamber
35.3.1 Confirm the charges
35.3.2 Decline the charges
35.3.3 Adjourn the hearing
35.3.4 Withdrawal of charges
35.4 Subsequent Modification of the Legal Characterization
35.5 Conclusion: The Necessity of an Intermediary Filter Mechanism for Complex International Criminal Trials
36 Trial Procedures—With a Particular Focus on the Relationship between the Proceedings of the Pre-Trial and Trial Chambers
36.1 Introduction
36.2 Trial Experiences
36.3 Relationship between the Pre-Trial and Trial Process
36.4 Charges—From Confirmation to Adjudication
36.5 Proper Disclosure of Evidence
36.6 The Role of the Trial Chamber
36.7 Concluding Remarks
37 Proportionate Sentencing at the ICC
37.1 Introduction
37.2 The ICC’s First Sentencing Judgment
37.3 Proportionality Theories
37.3.1 Retributive proportionality
37.3.2 Utilitarian proportionality
37.3.3 Expressive proportionality?
37.3.4 Implications of proportionality theory for sentencing practice
37.4 Proportionality Principles in the ICC’s Applicable Law
37.4.1 The Rome Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence
37.4.2 Proportionality principles in treaties and customary international law
37.4.3 General principles derived from national systems
37.5 Rejecting International Retributivism
37.5.1 The dominance of retributivism in international proportionality scholarship
37.5.2 The absence of shared norms of retribution
37.5.2.1 Absence of norms regarding cardinal desert
37.5.2.2 Absence of norms to anchor the desert scale
37.5.2.3 Absence of shared intuitions of relative desert
37.5.3 The particular complexity of international judgments of desert
37.5.4 Rhetoric, narrative, and the danger of undeserved international punishment
37.6 Preventive International Proportionality
37.6.1 Components of prevention
37.6.1.1 Norm expression
37.6.1.2 General deterrence
37.6.1.3 Specific deterrence and incapacitation
37.6.1.4 Restorative justice
37.6.2 Implications of preventive proportionality for sentencing procedure
37.7 Conclusion
38 The Role of the Appeals Chamber
38.1 Introduction
38.2 The Appeals Chamber in the Context of the ICC
38.3 Jurisdiction of the Appeals Chamber
38.3.1 Interlocutory appeals
38.3.1.1 Appeals under Article 82(1)(a)
38.3.1.2 Appeals under Article 82(1)(b) and Article 81(3)(c)(ii)
38.3.1.3 Appeals under Article 82(1)(c)
38.3.1.4 Appeals under Article 82(1)(d) and Article 82(2)
38.3.2 Appeals against final decisions of the Trial Chamber
38.3.3 Revision of conviction/sentence
38.3.4 Review of sentence
38.3.5 Disqualification of the Prosecutor or Deputy Prosecutor
38.4 Early Jurisprudence: Cautious Exercise of its Powers
39 ‘A Stick to Hit the Accused With’: The Legal Recharacterization of Facts under Regulation 55
39.1 Introduction
39.2 Is Regulation 55 Ultra Vires?
39.2.1 Routine function
39.2.2 Amending charges
39.2.2.1 Does Article 61(9) permit amendments?
39.2.2.2 Is recharacterization an amendment?
39.3 Has the Judiciary Correctly Interpreted Regulation 55?
39.3.1 Lubanga
39.3.2 Bemba
39.3.3 Katanga
39.4 Is Regulation 55 Consistent with the Rights of the Prosecution and the Defence?
39.4.1 Prosecutorial independence
39.4.2 The right to a fair trial
39.4.2.1 Lubanga
39.4.2.2 Bemba
39.4.2.3 Katanga
39.4.2.4 Ruto and Kenyatta
39.4.3 Practical implications
39.4.4 The ‘impunity’ rationale and judicial impartiality
39.5 Conclusion
40 Disclosure Challenges at the ICC
40.1 Introduction
40.2 The Framework
40.2.1 Incriminating evidence
40.2.2 Exonerating evidence and information material to the preparation of the defence
40.2.3 Limits on disclosure
40.3 The Challenges
40.4 Conclusion
41 Sitting on Evidence?: Systemic Failings in the ICC Disclosure Regime—Time for Reform
41.1 Introduction
41.2 General Legal Principles
41.3 Incriminatory Information
41.3.1 Pre-confirmation disclosure
41.3.2 Post-confirmation disclosure
41.4 Information which is Exculpatory or Assists the Defence
41.4.1 Disclosure demands for strategic purposes?
41.5 Exemptions from Disclosure Obligations
41.5.1 Redactions
41.5.2 Non-disclosure to the public
41.6 Concluding Remarks
41.7 Proposals for Reform
42 The Roads to Freedom—Interim Release in the Practice of the ICC
42.1 Introduction
42.2 Burden of Proof
42.2.1 Allocation of burden of proof
42.2.2 Justification for shifting the burden of proof
42.3 Interim Release under Article 60(2): Failing to Meet the Grounds for Detention
42.3.1 Reasonable grounds under Article 58(1)(a)
42.3.2 Conditions under Article 58(1)(b)
42.3.2.1 Risk of flight
42.3.2.1.1 Factors related to the conduct of the accused
42.3.2.1.2 Factors related to the Court proceedings
42.3.2.1.3 Factors related to the cooperation of states
42.3.2.2 Risk of interference with the proceedings
42.3.2.3 Risk of continuing commission of crimes
42.4 Interim Release under Article 60(4): Unreasonable Length of Detention
42.4.1 Two-tiered test under Article 60(4)
42.4.2 Relationship between Article 60(2) and 60(4)
42.5 Interim Release in Exceptional Humanitarian Circumstances
42.6 Conclusions and Recommendations
43 Testifying behind Bars—Detained ICC Witnesses and Human Rights Protection
43.1 Introduction
43.2 Legal Proceedings
43.2.1 Application for asylum
43.2.2 Detention situation
43.3 Taking Stock
43.3.1 Where are we now?
43.3.2 What’s next?
43.4 Future Implications
43.4.1 Knowing the past …
43.4.2 … to understand the future
43.5 Possible Solutions
43.5.1 Preliminary safeguards for human rights protection
43.5.2 Limiting witnesses’ access to human rights protection
43.5.2.1 Virtual transfer of court proceedings
43.5.2.2 Physical transfer of court proceedings
43.6 Concluding Remarks
44 External Support and Internal Coordination—The ICC and the Protection of Witnesses
44.1 Introduction
44.1.1 Topic
44.1.2 Structure
44.2 Legal Framework
44.2.1 Chambers
44.2.2 Prosecutor
44.2.2.1 Prosecution’s disclosure obligation and exemptions
44.2.3 Registrar
44.2.4 travaux préparatoires Article 43(6) and Article 68(1)
44.3 Disagreements about Responsibilities for Protective Measures
44.3.1 Physical protective measures
44.3.1.1 Admittance into the witness protection programme (Lubanga 2008)
44.3.1.2 Preventive relocation (Katanga and Ngudjolo 2008)
44.3.2 Limitations to disclosure of witness identities (October 2006)
44.4 Developed Practices
44.4.1 SRA and IRA
44.4.2 IRS
44.4.3 The ICCPP
44.4.4 Rolling disclosure
44.5 Conclusion
45 Victim Participation Revisited—What the ICC is Learning about Itself
45.1 Introduction
45.2 Challenges of Victim Participation at the ICC: A Bird’s-Eye View
45.3 Implementation of Victim Participation: Problems and Solutions
45.3.1 Application process
45.3.1.1 Formal requirements
45.3.1.2 Sustainability: the resources black hole
45.3.1.3 Judicial experimentation and review of the system
45.3.1.3.1 Gbagbo: partly collective approach
45.3.1.3.2 Kenya I and II: differentiated approach
45.3.1.3.3 Ntaganda: simplified approach
45.3.1.4 Court’s review of the system and possible avenues
45.3.2 Participation at trial: key modalities
45.3.2.1 Views and concerns
45.3.2.2 Leading and challenging the admissibility of evidence
45.3.2.3 Questioning witnesses
45.3.3 Representation
45.3.4 Towards a pragmatic system: evolution or devolution of the regime?
45.4 Victim Participation as Governance Matter
45.4.1 Victim participation and the ASP: positions and action
45.4.1.1 Evolving perceptions and approaches
45.4.1.2 Appraising harmonization agenda: a case for ‘soft’ harmonization
45.4.2 Forging the way ahead
45.4.2.1 ‘Restorative complex’ of ‘retributive court’
45.4.2.2 Optimal ‘harmonization’ and amendments
45.5 Conclusion
46 The Rome Statute’s Regime of Victim Redress: Challenges and Prospects
46.1 Introduction
46.2 Overview of Rome Statute’s Regime of Victim Redress
46.3 The Character of the Rome Statute’s Reparations Regime
46.4 The Failure of Victim Redress at the National Level: Reparations and Complementarity
46.5 Early Trends: Towards a More Flexible System of Victim Redress?
46.6 Conclusion
Part VI Impact, ‘Legacy’, and Lessons Learned
47 The Deterrent Effect of the ICC on the Commission of International Crimes by Government Leaders
47.1 Introduction
47.2 The Effect of Prosecutions on Political Calculations
47.2.1 Northern Uganda and the LRA
47.2.2 DRC
47.2.3 Colombia
47.2.4 Sudan and the case of Darfur
47.2.5 Newer cases—Kenya and Mali
47.2.6 Other international criminal prosecutions
47.2.7 Assessment of practice
47.3 The Wider Context, Public Policymaking
47.3.1 The normative value of ICC prosecutions
47.3.2 Strengthening the ICC
47.4 Conclusions
48 The ICC and Capacity Building at the National Level
48.1 Introduction
48.2 Complementarity and the Challenges of National Capacity
48.3 Challenges to Domestic Capacity
48.4 Positive Complementarity: A Suitable Basis for Capacity Building?
48.5 The ‘How To’ of Capacity Building
48.6 Concluding Remarks
49 Completion, Legacy, and Complementarity at the ICC
49.1 Introduction
49.2 Adapting the Concept of ‘Completion’ to the ICC
49.2.1 Avoiding restrictions on the ICC’s mandate
49.2.2 Timeliness of devising and implementing completion strategies
49.2.3 Defining completion at the ICC
49.3 Lessons Learned for Capacity Building, Outreach, and Archive Management
49.3.1 Capacity building
49.3.2 Outreach
49.3.3 Archives
49.4 A Role for the Court and the ASP
49.5 Conclusion
50 A Look towards the Future—The ICC and ‘Lessons Learnt’
50.1 Introduction
50.2 Operational Challenges of the ICC
50.2.1 Global membership
50.2.2 Cooperation
50.2.3 Complementarity
50.2.4 Judicial integrity
50.2.5 Efficient management of judicial proceedings
50.3 The ICC’s ‘Lessons Learnt’ Initiative to Increase the Efficiency of its Criminal Process
50.3.1 Initial States Parties initiatives to increase the efficiency of Court operations
50.3.2 The ICC’s ‘lessons learnt’ exercise
50.3.2.1 Identification of legal issues
50.3.2.2 The Roadmap
50.3.3 Activities
50.3.3.1 Rule changes at the twelfth ASP
50.3.3.2 Other initiatives
50.4 Conclusion
Further Material
Name Index
Subject Index
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Introduction More than a Court, Less than a Court, Several Courts in One?: The International Criminal Court in Perspective
Edited By: Carsten Stahn
From:
The Law and Practice of the International Criminal Court
Edited By: Carsten Stahn
Content type:
Book content
Product:
Oxford Scholarly Authorities on International Law [OSAIL]
Published in print:
01 May 2015
ISBN:
9780198705161
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