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- Core Issues
- Background
- Summary
- Analysis
- Impact
- Further Analysis and Relevant Materials
- Source text
- Decision [eng]
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- Separate Opinion of President Nagendra Singh
- Separate Opinion of Judge Lachs
- Separate Opinion of Judge Ruda
- Separate Opinion of Judge Elias
- Separate Opinion of Judge Ago
- Separate Opinion of Judge Sette-Camara
- 23 Separate Opinion of Judge Ni
- Dissenting Opinion of Judge Oda
- 1
- 2
- 3
- I Effect of the Application Given to the “Vandenberg Reservation” by the Judgment — Nicaragua's Application Based on Article 36, Paragraph 2, of the Statute Should Be Dismissed
- II The Non-Justiciability of the Present Case — Nicaragua's Application Based on Article 36, Paragraph 2, of the Statute Should Be Declared Inadmissible
- A Introduction
- B Limited Scope of “Legal Disputes” in Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute
- 1 The justiciability and concept of legal disputes — historical survey
- 20
- (i) The concept of “legal disputes subject to compulsory arbitration”prior to the institution of the Permanent Court of International Justice
- (ii) Justiciable and non-justiciable disputes under the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice
- (iii) The concept of justiciable disputes subsequent to the inception of the Permanent Court of International Justice
- (iv) Legal disputes found suitable for settlement by the International Court of Justice
- 2 The difficulty of viewing the present case as concerning a “legal dispute” within the meaning of the Statute
- 1 The justiciability and concept of legal disputes — historical survey
- C Considerations of Judicial Propriety that Should Have Dissuaded the Court from Pronouncing on the Nicaraguan Application on the Basis of Article 36, Paragraph 2, of the Statute
- D Concluding Remarks on Non-Justiciability
- III Breach of Obligations Under the 1956 Treaty Of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation — The Court's Appropriation of the Case Under Article 36, Paragraph 1, of the Statute
- A The Court's Jurisdiction Granted by Article XXIV, the Compromissory Clause, of the 1956 Treaty
- B The Court's Partial Reversion to Jurisdiction under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute in Relation to the Treaty
- C Misconception of the Customary-Law Rule not to Defeat the “Object and Purpose” of a Treaty
- D Breaches of the Terms of the 1956 Treaty
- IV Supplementary Observations
- Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schwebel
- I Introduction
- II Summary of Salient Legal Conclusions
- III Factual Premises
- A The Nicaraguan Government Came to Power on the Back of Some of the Very Forms of Foreign Intervention of Which it now Complains (Appendix, Paras. 2–7)
- B The New Nicaraguan Government Achieved Foreign Recognition in Exchange for International Commitments concerning its Internal and External Policies, Commitments Which it Deliberately Has Violated (Appendix, Paras. 8263–13)
- C The New Nicaraguan Government Received Unprecedented Aid from the International Community, including the United States (Appendix, Paras. 14–15)
- D The Carter Administration Suspended Aid to Nicaragua in January 1981 Because of its Support of Insurgency in El Salvador, Support Evidenced, inter alia, by Documents Captured from the Salvadoran Guerrillas (Appendix, Paras. 16–22)
- E The Reagan Administration Terminated Aid to the Nicaraguan Government while Waiving the Latter's Obligation to Repay Aid already Extended in the Hope that its Support of Foreign Insurgencies Would Cease; Subsequently, it Twice Officially Offered to Resume Aid if Nicaragua Would Stop Supporting Insurgency in El Salvador, Offers Which Were not Accepted (Appendix, Paras. 23–24)
- F The Reagan Administration Made Clear to the Nicaraguan Government in 1981 that it Regarded the Sandinista Revolution “As Irreversible”; its Condition for Co-existence Was Stopping the Flow of Arms to El Salvador (Appendix, Paras. 25–26)
- G Before this Court, Representatives of the Government of Nicaragua Have Falsely Maintained that the Nicaraguan Government Has “Never” Supplied Arms or Other Material Assistance to Insurgents in El Salvador, Has “Never” Maintained Salvadoran Command-and-Control Facilities on Nicaraguan Territory and “Never” Permitted its Territory to Be Used for Training of Salvadoran Insurgents (Appendix, Para. 2 7)
- H The Nicaraguan Government, Despite its Denials, in Fact Has Acted as the Principal Conduit for the Provision of Arms and Munitions to the Salvadoran Insurgents from 1979 to the Present Day; Command and Control of the Salvadoran Insurgency Has Been Exercised from Nicaraguan Territory with the Co-operation of the Cuban and Nicaraguan Governments; Training of Salvadoran Insurgents Has Been Carried out in Cuba and Nicaragua; the Salvadoran Insurgents' Radio Station at One Time Operated from Nicaraguan Territory; and Nicaraguan Political and Diplomatic Support of the Salvadoran Insurgency Has Been Ardent, Open and Sustained (Appendix, Paras. 28–188)
- I In 1979, Members of the Nicaraguan National Guard Escaped to Honduras, from which they Harassed Nicaragua. Officers of the Argentine Army Began Training these Counter-Revolutionaries in Late 1980 or Early in 1981— and Continued to Do So until 1984 (Appendix, Paras. 189–190)
- J In November 1981, after Nicaragua Had Failed to Accept Repeated United States Requests to Cease its Material Support for Salvadoran Insurgents, the United States Decided to Exert Military Pressure upon Nicaragua in Order to Force it to Do what it Would not Agree to Do (Appendix, Paras. 169–170, 173, 110, 121–122, 128–129)
- K The Object of United States Support of the Contras Was Claimed by the United States to Be Interdiction of Traffic in Arms to El Salvador, though Clearly that Was not the Purpose of the Contras (Appendix, Paras. 156–173, and the Court's Judgment)
- L By October 1983, in Apparent Response to United States Pressures, Nicaragua Proposed Four Treaties which Were Interpreted as an Offer to Cease Supporting Rebellion in El Salvador if the United States Would Cease Support of the Contras and of the Government of El Salvador (Appendix, Paras. 174–178)
- M In 1983, the United States Called upon Nicaragua to Cut Back its Arms Build-up, to Sever its Ties with the USSR and Cuba, and to Carry out Us Pledges to the OAS and its Members for a Democratic Society (Appendix, Paras. 194–198)
- N By the Beginning of 1984, the United States Undertook Direct if Covert Military Action against Nicaragua, Assaulting Oil Facilities and Mining Nicaraguan Ports (Appendix, Para. 199, and the Court's Judgment)
- O Particularly Since January 1985, the United States Has Spoken in Terms which Can Be Interpreted as Requiring Comprehensive Change in the Policies of, or, Alternatively, Overthrow of, the Nicaraguan Government as a Condition of Cessation of its Support of the Contras (Appendix, Paras. 200–205)
- P There Is Evidence of the Commission of Atrocities by the Contras, by Nicaraguan Government Forces, and by Salvadoran Insurgents, and of Advocacy by the CIA of Actions Contrary to the Law of War (Appendix, Paras. 206–224)
- Q The Contadora Process Designed to Re-establish Peace in Central America Embraces the Democratic Performance Internally of the Five Central American Governments (Appendix, Paras. 225–227)
- IV The Law
- A Introduction
- B Questions of Admissibility and of Justiciability
- C The Relevance and Effect of the “Multilateral Treaty” Reservation
- D The Question of Jurisdiction under the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation
- E The Effect of the Absence of El Salvador
- F The Effect of the Absence of the United States
- G The Court's Treatment of the Evidence
- H The Nicaraguan Government 's Material Support of Insurgency in El Salvador Is Legally Tantamount to an Armed Attack by Nicaragua upon El Salvador
- I The Court's Conclusion Is Inconsistent with the General Assembly's Definition of Aggression
- J The Question of Whether Measures in Self-Defence May Be Taken Only in Case of Armed Attack
- K The Court's Views on Counter-Intervention and its Implied Support for “Wars of Liberation”
- L El Salvador Is Entitled to Act in Self-Defence against Nicaraguan Armed Attack
- M The United States is entitled to act in collective self-defence with El Salvador
- N Considerations of Necessity and Proportionality
- O Measures of Collective Self-Defence May Lawfully Extend to Nicaraguan Territory
- P The Failure of the United States to Notify the Security Council of Measures of Self-Defence
- Q If United States Reliance on a Claim of Self-Defence Is Well Founded, it Constitutes a Complete Defence to Virtually all Nicaraguan Claims
- R The Mining of Nicaraguan Ports Was Unlawful in Regard to Third States but Lawful in Respect to Nicaragua
- S The United States Has not Unlawfully Intervened in the Internal or External Affairs of Nicaragua
- T The United States Has not Violated its Obligations towards Nicaragua under the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation
- U Responsibility for Violations of the Law of War
- V As the State which First Used Armed Force in Contravention of the Charter, the Aggressor is Nicaragua
- W The Misrepresentations of its Representatives in Court Must Prejudice Rather than Protect Nicaragua's Claims
- X Nicaragua's Unclean Hands Require the Court in any Event to Reject its Claims
- V Factual Appendix
- 1
- A The Sandinistas Came to Power on the Back of Some of the Very Forms of Intervention of Which They Now Complain
- B The New Nicaraguan Government Achieved Foreign Recognition in Exchange for International Pledges concerning its Internal and External Policies, Commitments Which it Deliberately Has Violated
- C The New Nicaraguan Government Received Unprecedented Aid from the International Community, including the United States
- D The Carter Administration Suspended Aid to Nicaragua Because of its Support of Insurgency in El Salvador, Support Evidenced, inter alia, by Documents Captured from Salvadoran Guerrillas
- E The Reagan Administration Terminated Aid to the Nicaraguan Government while Waiving the Latter's Obligation to Return Aid already Extended in the Hope that its Support for Foreign Insurgencies Would Cease; Subsequently, it Twice Officially Offered to Resume Aid if Nicaragua Would Stop Supporting Insurgency in El Salvador, Offers Which Were not Accepted
- F The Reagan Administration Made Clear to the Nicaraguan Government in 1981 that it Regarded the Sandinista Revolution “as Irreversible”; its Sole Condition for Co-existence Was Stopping the Flow of Arms to El Salvador
- G Before this Court, Representatives of the Government of Nicaragua Have Maintained that the Nicaraguan Government Has “Never” Supplied Arms or Other Material Assistance to Insurgents in El Salvador, Has “Never” Maintained Salvadoran Command and Control Facilities on Nicaraguan Territory and “Never” Permitted its Territory to Be Used for Training of Salvadoran Insurgents
- H The Nicaraguan Government, Despite its Denials, in Fact Has Acted as the Principal Conduit for the Provision of Arms and Munitions to the Salvadoran Insurgents from 1979 to the Present Day; Command and Control of the Salvadoran Insurgency Has Been Exercised from Nicaraguan Territory with the Co-operation of the Cuban and Nicaraguan Governments; Training of Salvadoran Insurgents Has Been Carried out in Cuba and Nicaragua; the Salvadoran Insurgents' Radio Station at One Time Operated from Nicaraguan Territory; and Nicaraguan Political and Diplomatic Support of the Salvadoran Insurgency Has Been Ardent, Open and Sustained
- 28
- 1 Admissions by authorities of the Nicaraguan Government
- 2 Admissions by witnesses appearing on behalf of the Nicaraguan Government
- 3 Admissions by Nicaraguan counsel
- 4 Admissions by leaders of the Salvadoran insurgency
- 5 Statements by defectors
- 6 Statements by diplomats of uninvolved countries
- 7 Statements by the Government of El Salvador accusing Nicaragua of assisting insurgency in El Salvador
- 8 Statements by the Government of Honduras accusing Nicaragua of subverting El Salvador as well as Honduras
- 9 Statements by the Government of Costa Rica accusing Nicaragua of subversive acts
- 10 Statements by the Congress of the United States and by Congressmen opposed to United States support of the contras
- 11 The transcript of conversation between Assistant Secretary of State Enders and Co-ordinator Ortega
- 12 Further early United States attempts at peaceful settlement
- 13 The four treaties proposed by Nicaragua in 1983
- 14 Details of Nicaraguan subversion of El Salvador provided in “Revolution Beyond Our Borders” and in earlier publications duly submitted to the Court — and Nicaragua's reply
- I In 1979, Members of the Nicaraguan National Guard Escaped to Honduras, from which they Harassed Nicaragua. Officers of the Argentine Army Began Training these Counter-Revolutionaries apparently Late in 1980 or Early 1981 — and Continued to Do so until Early 1984
- J In November 198J, after Nicaragua Had Failed to Accept Repeated United States Requests to Cease its Material Support for Salvadoran Insurgents, the United States Decided to Exert Military Pressure upon Nicaragua in Order to Force it to Do what it Would not Agree to Do
- K The Object of United States Support of the Contras Was Claimed by the United States to Be Interdiction of Traffic in A rms to El Salvador, though Clearly that Was not the Purpose of the Contras
- L By October 1983, in Apparent Response to United States Pressures, Nicaragua Proposed Four Treaties which Were Interpreted as an Offer to Cease Supporting Rebellion in El Salvador if the United States Would Cease Support of the Contras and of the Government of El Salvador
- M In 1983, the United States Called upon Nicaragua to Cut Back its Arms Build-up, to Sever Its Ties With the USSR and Cuba, and to Carry Out its Pledges to the OAS and its Members for a Democratic Society
- N By the Beginning of 1984, the United States Undertook Direct if Covert Military Action against Nicaragua, Assaulting Oil Facilities and Mining Nicaraguan Ports
- O Particularly Since January 1985, the United States Has Spoken in Terms which Can Be Interpreted as Requiring Comprehensive Change in the Policies of, or. Alternatively, Overthrow of, the Nicaraguan Government as a Condition of Cessation of its Support of the Contras
- P There Is Evidence of the Commission of Atrocities by the Contras, by Nicaraguan Government Forces, and by Salvadoran Insurgents, and of Advocacy by the CIA of Actions Contrary to the Law of War
- Q The Contadora Process Designed to Re-establish Peace in Central America Embraces the Democratic Performance Internally of the Five Central American Governments
- Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sir Robert Jennings
- 1
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5
- Effect of the Multilateral Treaty Reservation
- The Principle of Non-Intervention and the Multilateral Treaty Reservation
- The Question of the Mining of Nicaraguan Ports
- The Contras and Humanitarian Law
- Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation of 21 January 1956
- The Place of “Armed Attack”
- The Nature of Collective Self-Defence
- Decision [eng]
- [3.214.184.223]
- 3.214.184.223
