Part 1 Delimitation of the Problem, Two The Social Setting of Human Rights: The Process of Deprivation and Nonfulfillment of Values
From: Human Rights and World Public Order: The Basic Policies of an International Law of Human Dignity (2nd Edition)
Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell, Lung-chu Chen
- Right to non-discrimination — Economic, social, and cultural rights — Human rights remedies
(p. 94) Two The Social Setting of Human Rights: The Process of Deprivation and Nonfulfillment of Values
The existence in fact of a world community, in the sense of the long-term interdetermination of all individuals with regard to all values, is today commonly recognized. This larger community of humankind may be observed to comprise a whole hierarchy of interpenetrating lesser communities, of many different sizes and characteristics, with the larger communities affecting the lesser communities contained within them, and the lesser communities, in turn, affecting the larger communities which they compose. In the comprehensive social process which transcends all these different communities, individual human beings, affected by constantly changing environmental and predispositional factors, are continuously engaged in the shaping and sharing of all values, with achievement of many different outcomes in deprivation and fulfillment. It is these outcomes in deprivation and fulfillment in the shaping and sharing of values which constitute, in an empirical and policy-oriented conception, the human rights which the larger community of humankind protects or fails to protect.
The first indispensable step in relevant and effective inquiry must be that of creating a map or model of world social process, as the larger context of human rights, which will permit empirical reference to human rights problems in whatever degrees of comprehensiveness and precision performance of the necessary intellectual tasks may require. It is this most comprehensive social process which affects, not merely degrees in the achievement of human rights, but also the kinds of claims that are made to authoritative decision for redress of deprivations and nonfulfillments, as well as the responding outcomes in decision. With a map of world social process, which both exhibits broad outlines and points to relevant detail, a scholarly observer may be able to formulate the claims which participants make to authoritative decision in factual terms of discrepancy between community aspiration and achievement (p. 95) and, hence, may be able to facilitate comparisons in flows of authoritative decisions through time and across community boundaries.
The map of comprehensive world social process we recommend, in expansion of the generalized image of “man” striving to maximize “values” by applying “institutions” to “resources,” includes, as previously noted, a number of distinguishable, but interrelated, features:
6. Outcomes. The shapings and sharings of values achieved.1
In more detailed exposition of the reference and potential significance of these features, we emphasize items that may especially affect deprivations and nonfulfillments in the achievement of values.
The principal participants in the world social process, in which human rights are both deprived and fulfilled, are individual human beings with all their many different group identifications. Individual human beings are the ultimate actors in any social process; but they affiliate, voluntarily or involuntarily, with many different groups (both territorial and functional) and act through the form of, or play roles in, organizations of the greatest variety, including not only nation-states but also international governmental organizations, political parties, pressure groups, and private associations of all kinds. Individuals operate through all these groups in many different interacting circles (which may or may not overlap one another), playing multiple roles under dynamically changing circumstances, either in their own behalf or on behalf of groups, and increasingly with transnational consequences.2 Aside from prominent figures who make headlines, millions and millions of human beings daily make their own choices regarding participation in different value processes, travel beyond particular territorial communities, and communicate and collaborate, transnationally as well as nationally, in pursuit of all values.
The individual human being, as the basic actor in all interactions, is always potentially both a depriver and a deprivee of human rights. The extent to which particular individuals become deprivers or deprivees relates importantly to the broader features of the context: the roles they play (governmental or private), the perspectives they entertain (human dignity or anti-human dignity), the situational dynamics (crisis or non-crisis), the authority and other base values at their disposal (concentrated or nonconcentrated), and the strategies employable (persuasive or coercive). With the vast increases in population described above, the number of people with the predispositions to impose and capabilities of imposing deprivations has increased enormously, along with cumulating tension and conflict in human relations.3 Similarly, as more and more individuals have become available as targets, the number of people who in fact sustain deprivations and cannot secure fulfillment of important values has significantly multiplied.
Because of an enormous diversity in both cultural environment and biological endowment, individuals exhibit a comparable diversity in the detailed patterns of activities by which they pursue different cherished (p. 97) values. While this diversity undoubtedly enriches the quality of life and culture, it has simultaneously contributed to the present state of deprivation and nonfulfillment of values. Consider, for example, the various grounds in the name of which discriminatory deprivations are commonly imposed, including biological characteristics (race, sex, age), culture (nationality), class (in reference to wealth, power, respect, rectitude, and all other values), interest (group memberships), and personality.4
The groups which individuals create in the pursuit of values, like the individuals themselves, today proliferate in great abundance. Group interactions are those in which, in the pursuit of collective activities, individuals identify with other persons and concurrently establish relatively stable patterns of subjectivity and operation. The interaction between one individual and another typically results in value indulgence and deprivation. Viewed in the perspective of group-to-group interaction—which is typically a multi-individual to multi-individual phenomenon—the results are both value indulgent and value deprivational.5
The significant groups in the world context are organized and unorganized (or partially organized). The organized groups are conspicuous in the processes specialized to government, law, and politics (political power) because the organizations involved include all the members and are comparatively easy to identify as participants. The unorganized groups do not completely coincide with persons who share the common characteristics that define the groups.
We employ five categories of organized groups whose interactions of (p. 98) value indulgence and deprivation can be described in detail. We identify nation-states, international governmental organizations, political parties, pressure groups, and private organizations. In addition, we single out terror groups and gangs for special attention.
In a territorially organized world, the nation-state remains, despite the growing roles of other groups, a dominant participant in the shaping and sharing of all values. The kinds and magnitudes of deprivations and nonfulfillments of human rights to which individuals are today subjected are largely determined by the nation-states of which they are members. Subject to certain reservations to be specified as we proceed, the degree to which demands for human dignity values are fulfilled is still largely dependent upon the performance of governmental functions within territorially organized communities.
In spite of the myth of formal equality, the nation-states of the world are far from congruent with one another. Nation-states vary tremendously in size, population (number and composition), resources, complex matrix of institutions, and stages of development measured by science and technology.6 It is noteworthy that political boundaries are far from congruous with ethnic, linguistic, cultural, religious, and other boundaries.7 In terms of the public order system demanded and projected, particularly in the structure of power shaping and sharing, states differ profoundly in characteristics that range from totalitarian or authoritarian to the patterns of democracy.
At the end of World War I a rapid proliferation of nation-states occurred as the ancient empires of Europe divided their continental domains. World War II initiated a fantastically accelerated process which was mainly characterized by the breakup of extra-European empires.8 (p. 99) At the same time the numerous demands to bring into effective being a transnational network of effective cooperation fell far short of the dreams and challenges of the world political arena. Failing to achieve sufficient agreement on common purposes, nation-states, like private groups, often give expression to special interests. The massive transformation of ex-colonies into independent states has typically failed to combine nationalism, democracy, and development into coherent and effective programs.9 The world community is sensitized to a generation of “petty tyrants,” who are determined to hold onto power at all cost.10 Sheltered behind the relative indifference of many elements in the outside world, local rulers have given effect to measures of deprivation and nonfulfillment.
Parallel tendencies have made their presence felt in the older nation-states, some of which were commonly assumed to be insulated from the impact of factors that undermine authority and control. The growing role of government in society, which has frequently gone hand in hand with the centralization of power and the concentration of effective decision making in a few hands, has often led to bureaucratic rigidity and regimentation, corruption, and loss of confidence in the body politic.11
Under the pressures generated by interdependence, nation-states have found it expedient to organize a network of transnational intergovernmental structures to accomplish a range of specific objectives. Being creatures of nation-states, these organizations are generally handicapped in activities relating to human rights by the acute concern of the most influential elements in particular nation-states with avoiding either a formal or an effective loss of power. Though formal competences for the promotion or protection of human rights may be conferred upon those organizations, their actual capacity for furthering value fulfillment is commonly curtailed by the limited resources made available to them.12
The disappointing developments to which brief allusion has been made are especially painful to the large number of articulate spokesmen of human interest values in the nontotalitarian or ex-colonial powers who cooperated to achieve international or local treaties and statutes that put into authoritative language the aspirations of many generations of humanizing and revolutionary politicians and lawyers. The Charter of the United Nations and the many accompanying declarations and conventions about human rights are the most influential and conspicuous and therefore the most important sources of hope, action, and partial disappointment.13
As we shall have occasion to demonstrate, the turbulence, confusion, and conflict connected with human rights have created a state of affairs that multiplies participants in the world (including local) processes of politics, which are more dynamic than ever before as factors in issues pertaining to human dignity.
Whatever the words of authority that authorize action on behalf of human rights, the somber story is that, so far, the resources of manpower, facilities, and support have been insufficient to take advantage of the growing complexities of the situation.
The world situation relevant to human dignity is affected by the positive, negative, or indifferent roles played by political parties that cooperate or coordinate across national lines.14 In totalitarian states that share the tradition of international socialism, the language of the constitution is consonant with the doctrines and procedures of human rights. When the actual situations in such societies are investigated, however, it is far from obvious that the prescriptive norms are put into effect. Underground political parties include organizations that protest as vigorously as they can under the circumstances against the contradictions between proclamation and practice. However, it is not to be taken for granted that every vestige has disappeared of sociopolitical orders that were pushed aside by revolutionary programs championing the cause of human dignity. Underground movements continue in the hope of reinstating as much as possible of previous systems. These residual fragments make common cause with one another, and with the reactionary elites of the world arena. These party programs may speak in the name of ancient programs of caste and class, and of value and religion. On the whole, however, it is correct to affirm that political parties are more heavily weighted in favor of than in opposition to human rights.
It is worth taking note of a distinction that can usefully be made between genuine political parties and monopoly organizations that may be called political parties. The latter are more properly known as political orders. Political parties are institutions that evolved in arenas where organized participation in the decision process of the nation-state is relatively open.
Unlike political parties, many organizations concentrate on a single demand rather than upon comprehensive programs of public order. (p. 102) Socialism or liberalism, for instance, is translated into inclusive conceptions of governmental structure and function by political parties. Pressure groups concentrate on particular details, such as the abolition of slavery, the graduated income tax, women’s suffrage, free public education, and so on, through scores of proposals.15 Almost every measure that has a recognized relation to human dignity has been, or is currently, a target of pressure group action. Sometimes the political system permits a “one-issue group” to call itself a political party and to nominate candidates. Strictly speaking, the “conventional” labels are misleading. In a functional sense, these are pressure groups.
It is not to be overlooked that pressure groups, like political parties, may operate on all sides of an issue. We are not surprised to find that collective action is directed against as well as for human rights. In practice, the true orientation of a group may be disguised by the rhetoric of “liberalism,” “moderation,” or “progressivism.”
A comprehensive inventory of organizations with transnational impact quickly establishes that political power is only one of the value outcomes that are pursued chiefly by private or mixed public and private associations. Nation-states, political parties, and pressure groups emphasize power. Yet it is apparent that their distinctive accent on political power in no way implies that their impacts on enlightenment, wealth, or any other value-institution sector are trivial. The same pattern is present in associations that are primarily private (in the civic order). Scientific societies, both local and transnational, are distinctively aimed at the cultivation and dissemination of knowledge. At the same time it is perceived that they require funds and manpower to get on with their goals, and that they contribute to the economy of the territories where they are based.
(p. 103) The point is especially evident when we consider the multinational corporations, i.e., those transnational corporations and associations that frequently operate in finance, transportation, communication, mining, fishing, agriculture, manufacturing, wholesaling, retailing, and other branches of economic life. They employ a wide variety of modern technologies, in activities ranging from production and marketing to financing and management. Thanks to these new technological developments, new management techniques, and the transnational network of communication and transportation, multinational corporations have grown in number, size, activities, and importance. As they operate across many state boundaries, they serve as a global vehicle for the transfer and dissemination of capital and skill, as well as of technology. They have greatly contributed to the internationalization of production, finance, and ownership, and to the growing integration of national economies into a world economy.16
Multinational corporations, since they may possess more resources than many nation-states, have sometimes been seen as posing threats to nation-states.17 Their actual and potential impact on deprivations and (p. 104) nonfulfillment in the shaping and sharing of values has provoked increasing alarm. Multinational corporations, profit-oriented as they have to be, are variously perceived as exploiters of the labor and physical resources of the developing countries, practitioners of corrupt business practices, environmental polluters, manipulators of currencies and commodities, tax dodgers, instruments of their national governments, and supporters of reactionary regimes.18 In recent times they have achieved notoriety by the exposure of the widespread business practice of bribery, regarded as corrupting and conspiring with power elites to the detriment of the masses of the population.19
(p. 105) The foregoing examples of private groups have dealt chiefly with power and wealth, with a brief allusion to scientific enlightenment. Specialized operations connected with the gathering, processing, and dissemination of current information are often in the hands of news associations. These activities are especially germane to the focusing of attention on, or distraction of attention from, matters that pertain to human rights. The number of topics that may arouse the curiosity of human beings, and that initiate the formation of groups, is infinite. In an important sense, a long-range drive is to explore the total environment of mankind, and—almost as a by-product—to discover the interconnectedness of human lives.
Private as well as governmental groups are absorbed with all aspects of well-being. These range from the survey of health threats and opportunities to the cultivation of diversions that counteract any tendency toward boredom. Another enormously variegated sector of value and institutional practice is related to skill. Skills are occupational and professional; and they include all manner of artistic expression, since a relatively distinctive use of skill implies the completion of acts and of physical arrangements in ways that emphasize the pattern of internal adjustment, rather than the impact on wealth, power, or other discussions of social process. The “human right to enjoy and pursue excellence in the arts” is a manifestation of deep-lying initiatives in human personality.
Unquestionably the institutions related to intimacy and loyalty are deeply intertwined with human rights. Wherever there is human contact, it is probable that friendship and intimacy will appear; and these commitments are frequently such that barriers that seek to block these culminations are pushed aside.
With the intensification of association on a global scale it is clear that the interplay of admiration and contempt are differentiated, and that the giving and receiving of respect become major demands that affect the patterns of respect. In the same way global exposure modifies targets and judgments of decency and belief (rectitude). These are among the parameters that define the content and significance of human rights.
We note that the linkages between public and civic order are subtle, and hence visible only when special procedures are used to bring them to the focus of an observer’s attention. Complex socialist societies give relative prominence to the role of government, and hence to public order. As a rule, the official doctrine attempts to modulate the passage of public into private and of private into explicitly public activities. The pattern of (p. 106) ultimate regimentation on a world scale would approximate a global prison camp in which the top hierarchy would do everything it could to specify in detail the daily calendar of individual and small-group, as well as large-group, contact and to mobilize every means for the purpose of regimenting behavior in conformity with these detailed prescriptions.20 Thus far, at least, regimentation of this kind is rarely approximated.
Terror Groups and Gangs
We single out for special mention terror groups and gangs. Depending as they do on the use of violent coercion, they obviously are functionally related to power and can be thought of as closely akin to pressure groups. They differ, however, in that although they rely on a form of power, they do not necessarily limit themselves to the pursuit of power as the principal value toward which their efforts are directed.21 Some terror gangs are focused on wealth, as in the notorious instance of the slave trade,22 or that of the organized criminal associations whose dealings in drugs or prostitution, for example, penetrate the boundaries of many countries. Value objectives other than power or wealth are seldom of major importance. We know of tribal societies in the past, however, whose members engaged in mutual raiding that was principally a matter of respect. It was a necessary act to demonstrate the readiness of a youth to become a man.
In the contemporary world, terror gangs have become particularly (p. 107) prominent participants in the processes of politics, reflecting a complex constellation of factors that condition, and in turn are conditioned by, the social process as a whole.23
The organizations mentioned heretofore include in their membership those who by formally binding themselves together share significant traits. Unorganized participants in the world social process share certain common characteristics, even though they are not typically joined together for joint operations. We consider culture, class, interest, personality, and crisis groups, and give particular attention to the fact that they interact as conditioning factors with the organized groups enumerated above.
The term “culture” is employed to designate distinctive and stable patterns of values and institutions that are deployed around the globe.24 Each culture may assign value priorities in a somewhat distinctive manner, as when we find that nomadic tribesmen glorify power, whereas neighboring agriculturalists emphasize the production of wealth and the gratifications of peace. Institutional practices vary greatly from culture to culture and from value to value.
In earlier times—notably in the fourth or fifth millennium b.c.—the urban division of labor supplemented tribal cultures with civilization. In more recent years science and technology have moved toward universality, with the result that communities throughout the globe are exhibiting (p. 108) an enormous variety of transitional patterns. This distinctiveness has been described in many different ways: “primitive, archaic, historic, pre-modern, or modern”;25 traditional or modern; nomadic, agricultural, industrial, or postindustrial.26 The accent may be on traditional collectivities or upon a multitude of functional (pluralized) groups. The class structure may be limited to a two-class model or diversified into a multiple-class system. There may be low or high social mobility.27
In an increasingly interactive world, the cultural factors play complicating and contradictory roles. It is easy to recognize the trends toward instantaneous news, transnational travel, or world science, for example. At the same time, observant individuals perceive that the trend toward technological universalization has not meant peace, understanding, and cooperation for the common interest; rather, it often signifies the use of universal cultural traits to enhance parochial demands and identities, accompanied by partial adaptation to a limited number of common activities. Abiding parochialism has meant that surviving or novel practices are not always tolerated as functional equivalents. Conflicts arise over different ways of doing the same thing, and the aggregate common interest is not discovered.
It may be worth emphasizing that urban civilization evolved only seven or eight thousand years ago, and that prior to that time, prodigious (p. 109) emphasis was put on identifying with small groups.28 This was a necessary means of socializing individuals to incorporate the demands of others, and prepared the way for cooperation on a much larger scale. In civilization, writing and other modes of transmitting knowledge become dynamic factors in accelerating the evolution of social institutions.29
Anxieties are generated by the unceasing challenge to change by modifying value priorities and institutional arrangements.30 “Culture shock” is a continuing cost of innovation and complicates the task of those who strive for effective action in the field of human rights.31
Within any given society, classes are formed according to the degree of control individuals exercise over values. All known societies are more or less class-ridden, although the character and magnitude of stratification differ from one community to another.32 Rigidity of stratification exhibits a wide spectrum that ranges from a highly hierarchized, closed society to an open society that is highly mobile.33
(p. 110) From the time of their first appearance, urban civilizations have accentuated class differences with special reference to wealth and power. The rich and the poor, the strong and the weak, became the criteria of identification, superseding family and kinship as bases of loyalty.
The class divisions of modern urban and industrial society combined with the structure of feudalism to lend plausibility to political movements in the name of class. Class distinctions, however, continue to clash with other perspectives. Upper-, middle-, and lower-class attitudes are often in conflict with conceptions of equal opportunity for all.34
The factor of interest cuts across both culture and class lines. Less comprehensive than either culture or class groupings, interest groups are formed in reference to particular values, institutional perspectives, and operations. In a modern technological society a great number of interest groups is continually generated as a consequence of the division of labor and the multiplication of patterns of both symbols and operations. Consequently, perspectives about interest have tended to cut across and dissolve large cultural and class groupings. The result is to increase the frequency and fluidity of the coalitions involved in the shaping and sharing of values.35 The individuals who constitute the core of an interest group may be widely distributed over the globe. Typically, they are surrounded by persons whose perspectives are nebulous and whose conduct is little influenced by the central perspective. Contemporary processes, dynamic as they are, confront individuals with a bewildering variety of interests. Collective programs—focused on human rights, for example—suffer corresponding difficulties.
The conception of personality is not to be confused with that of the individual as a biological entity.36 The biological entity that appears at (p. 111) birth is equipped with dispositions to initiate and to respond to the various components of the body and also of the surrounding environment. The physical individual becomes a “person” in the process of interaction. When an act is rewarded by a value indulgence—such as food and cuddling—the result is to strengthen the tendency to initiate or complete the rewarded act. If the completed act is met with value deprivations rather than indulgences, the resulting tendency is for the person to avoid or cut short the act. Taken as a whole, the dispositions of the person to interact in a discernible manner are “personality.”
Without going into detail, it is nevertheless useful to recognize that a personality system, viewed as an entirety, includes three categories of acts. The “ego” covers all the moods and images that are fully conscious. The “superego” includes the norms that are automatically implied to bar the completion of acts or to expedite completion as a compulsive or obsessional occurrence. The “id” refers to basic impulses, especially to those that are denied expression by the superego.37
Personality structures are formed in interaction with patterns of culture. The exposure of the person to the value indulgences or deprivations of the culture environment results in the formation of an ego and superego system that incorporates the value priorities and practices. To the degree that “socialization” is successful, personalities monitor themselves in accordance with the identities, demands, and expectations of the culture.38
It is apparent that if violations of human rights are component elements (p. 112) of a culture, it is essential to bring about the reconstruction of culture before the norms compatible with human rights can be effectively realized. Within the broad framework of a culture, many of the established class and interest group differences must be changed before human rights can become embedded in the culture.
It has often been argued that human beings include natural “slaves” and that the demand to move toward a public and civic order of human dignity is a chimera. Much evidence has accumulated to show that the biological inheritance is relatively plastic, and that persons who are subjected to a culture of slavery will conform to their socialization. However, there is ample evidence that the culture of slavery is not an inevitable outcome.39 The varieties of human motivations are such that varying degrees of rejection have culminated in “slave revolts” and in the substitution of cultures of freedom. In particular, there is evidence that personalities who are totally power indulged or power deprived exhibit characteristics that limit the potential creativity of the persons concerned.
The personality structure of the oppressor (depriver) is of particularly direct concern to the analyst of human rights and of the circumstances in which cultures are altered in ways that discourage the formation of value deprivers. The modern study of personality growth recognizes the important consequences of early experiences of deprivation of affection, respect, and other significant outcome opportunities.40 Persons who occupy an advantaged social position often respond to the ordinary misadventures of life by intense overreactions that seize every occasion to reaffirm the significance of the weakened ego by attacking the self-respect of other human beings, and especially by adopting an intransigent attitude toward anyone who, occupying an inferior position in society, attempts to improve his status or to alter the established routines of the social structure. These truly “reactionary” personalities stand in the way of relatively peaceful readjustment of the system of value shaping and sharing, and therefore seek to block the spread of effective adoption and enforcement of norms compatible with human rights.41
The connotations of a crisis include stress generated by conflict and the likelihood that at least some members of a group will suffer value deprivation. Among the most evident factors in the study of world change are the crises that are internal or external to organized or unorganized groups. Many crises fail to correspond to any definite line of demarcation, since they involve participants who are widely scattered in accord with culture, class, or similar characteristics.
The recurring crises among organized groups receive the greatest attention, whether the value frame of reference is power, wealth, or other. Among the more subtle crises are the tensions elicited between traditional and innovative sharers of an established culture, or between the compulsive-obsessional mechanisms and the innovative mechanisms at the disposal of personalities in decision-making elites.42
Studies of crisis tend to confirm the view that a moderate level of tension is a valuable incentive for well-considered change. The fact of crisis is enough to open many minds to the probability that prevailing values and institutions are less than perfect; and the modesty of the crisis permits the rational use of the mind—and of collective policy processes—in the search for solutions.43
It is the perspectives of the individuals who participate in the world social process that constitute the predispositional variables which in interaction with the environmental factors affect the flow of deprivations and fulfillment of values. These perspectives may be described in terms of demands for values, the identities of those for whom such values are demanded, and expectations about the conditions affecting the fulfillnent or nonfulfillment of values.
The demands people make for preferred events in the contemporary world cover a wide range of values, whatever the particular characterizations employed, and embrace every variety of nuance in institutional practice in the shaping and sharing of values. It has already been shown that in many parts of the world people increasingly share rising common demands for human dignity values.44 In other parts of the globe countertrends may predominate. The different demands that are made for values are sometimes inclusive, in the sense that they affect many people, and are linked with expectations of reciprocity for all who are comparably situated. Sometimes demands are exclusive, in the sense that they are made on behalf of rather limited identities and actually affect very few participants in the world process. On occasion demands may be special rather than common, since they are made without regard for the value consequences affecting others, whether they are few or many. Similarly, demands may be constructive and expansionist, designed to increase aggregate values for all, or defensive, intended to protect existing values, whether of all or of relatively exclusive groups. In chosen modality, demands may vary from the most manifest and explicit to the latent and the covert.45
In most of the world today, there is, as a consequence of socialization, a high and continuing acquiescence in the prevailing pattern of equality or inequality in the shaping and sharing of values. Millions of the earth’s population are socialized to acquiesce in whatever plight of deprivation and nonfulfillment they have come to know in their cultural environment. Established deprivations and nonfulfillments tend to be internalized and tolerated by the middle and lower classes.46 Many people are (p. 115) so cut off from the outside world, and so conditioned by internal routines, that their latent demands for greater participation in the shaping and sharing of values are suppressed or repressed. This continues to characterize the world scene in spite of growing discontent based on widened experience and exposure to agitational activity.47
The demand for total subordination to a governing elite continues in many localities and among many functional groups. Many elites are trained to take no notice of the fact that they are imposing deprivations on others or denying the fulfillment of values. In part, this seeming callousness is to be understood as a standard result of a process of socialization that displaces private motives onto public objects and rationalizes these objectives in terms of common interest.48
People demand values for particular identities, with various levels of inclusiveness. Changing perspectives of demand and expectation bring about changes in conceptions of the self. The self-system of each individual is composed of the primary ego symbol (of the “I,” “me”) and the symbols of reference singly or collectively to those egos who are included in a common “we.”49 The self-system also includes symbols that identify the “nonself other,” such as members of other nation-states. It is clear on analysis that individuals have multiple identifications, some of which may crosscut and latently conflict with one another.50 While some identifications (p. 116) are ascriptive, and reflect the traditional routines of a social context, more and more identifications appear to be matters of individual choice.
As indicated above, the identifications of many individuals express high ambivalence, exhibiting both expanding and contracting empathy with the inclusive community.51 Sometimes human dignity demands are made on behalf of lesser groups, even tiny localities and small functional groups.
In an epoch of exacerbated nationalism and accelerated nation building, it must be recognized that dominant identities (loyalties) remain parochial, not universal. Sentiment on behalf of “spaceship earth” remains scattered and weak.52 It is relatively unusual for people to evolve a system of identities that ranges from the importance of the individual human being to the whole of mankind.
Exaggerated images of the difference between the “self” and “other” help to account for the continuing vogue of large-scale deprivation. How the depriver perceives and identifies the deprivee (target) is crucial. The deprivee may be perceived as possessing common humanity, or as a “subhuman” “thing.” When human beings are perceived as subhuman, it is easy to magnify perspectives of hatred and contempt, and to further denigrate the “humanity” of the target.53
In the early stages, at least, of a rapidly expanding technological society, local symbols of identity may weaken. However, this is usually for the benefit of entities (like nation-states) that are intermediate between the older territory and the inclusive world community.54
A persisting residue of the ancient past and of more recent conflict is (p. 117) the practice of imaging both the self and other in terms of characteristics that bear no rational relation to basic humanity and to potential contributions to the common interest. Random characteristics, having no relation to capability, are seized upon to justify deprivations, to exclude participation, and to deny fulfillment. Notable examples are phrased in reference to race, color, sex, religion, political or other opinion, language, nationality, age, and life-style.55
The degree to which peoples can attain their demanded values is deeply affected by the comprehensiveness and realism of their expectations about the conditions under which these values can be secured. It cannot be denied that the peoples of today’s world exhibit almost every conceivable degree of comprehensiveness and realism in their expectations about the circumstances that determine the realization of human dignity.
The expectations of the great bulk of humankind are still fragmented and uninformed. Few individuals have a cognitive map of the world social process of value shaping and sharing. Relatively few have access to the information (intelligence) essential to the attainment of such a map. Comparable to the absence of inclusive identification with the global community, there is a failure to achieve a shared vision of the conditions and potentialities of a comprehensive, concerted program for the realization of dignified, humane existence for humankind as a whole.
Despite a growing perception of interdependence, the significant facts of global interdependence are not widely understood. The intimate interdependences that condition the inner and external relations of particular value processes at all levels of geographic and functional interaction are rarely explored and articulated with the necessary comprehensiveness and realism.56 Even when common values are objects of demand, the effort to clarify and implement common interest falters, with the result that participants in the total interaction do not necessarily recognize their common interests, both inclusive and exclusive. In consequence, assertions of special interest are often made that are destructive of the common interest.57 Further, participants exhibit varying degrees of willingness or unwillingness to engage in the task of clarifying, articulating, and implementing the common interest. Too many individuals, living in (p. 118) too many parts of the world, continue to expect to gain more by perpetuating the practices of human indignity than by transforming the routines of the world community by promoting human dignity through cooperative activities.
In a divided world where pervasive expectations of violence generate chronic anxiety and personal insecurity, many individuals and groups still expect to be better off by strategies of violence than by those of peaceful cooperation. Many governing elites, preoccupied with the consolidation and expansion of power, are determined to exclude most of the population from participating effectively in important value processes. They therefore continue to impart a distorted world view to their people. They not infrequently mobilize the masses in ways that encourage docility despite persisting circumstances of deprivation and nonfulfillment. They cultivate international tension as a means of deflecting latent hostility toward foreign targets.58
There are, more happily, increasing numbers of people who realistically perceive the interdependences of the world, and who expect to achieve human dignity values through peaceful cooperation. Closely connected with this perception of interdependence is the revolution of “rising expectations,” with its frequent accompaniment of “rising frustrations.” A view that distinguishes the contemporary world from the outlook of traditional societies is the assumption that, within ever widening limits, it is possible for human beings to control their destinies. This view is attributable in part to the explosive expansion of scientific knowledge and in part to the realization that historic inequalities have no anchorage in an immutable decree of nature. In consequence, the middle and lower strata of the global community, such as the undeveloped nations, are stirred by a spark of hope that is fanned by a sense of injustice at their traditional predicament. Despite elite efforts to hold the rank and file of the population in check, more people are coming to entertain the expectation that the endurance of deprivation and nonfulfillment of values is no rational answer to deprivation, and that things can be changed for the better.59
All these competing demands, ambivalent identifications, and conflicting expectations of individuals and groups today interact and culminate in contending systems of public order. It is the great diversity in the demands, identifications, and expectations of peoples that underlies the contemporary contention of different systems of world public order, a contention which renders the fulfillment of human dignity values increasingly difficult.
Rhetorically, the major contending systems are in many fundamental respects already unified. All systems proclaim the dignity of the human individual and the ideal of a worldwide public order in which dignity is authoritatively pursued and effectively approximated. They differ, however, in many details of the institutionalized patterns of practice by which they seek to achieve such goals, both in specific areas and in the world as a whole.60
Universal words in praise of human dignity obviously do not imply universal deeds in harmony with the rhetoric. The crux of the matter is that operational practices in the shaping and sharing of values diverge widely from professed goals. Special interests continue to assert themselves in effective sabotage of proclaimed objectives. There remains chronic tension among competing common interests, interests whose accommodation is always necessary.61 The realization of the overriding prescriptions of an authoritative legal system depends upon compatible structures in the decision process as a whole, and in the everyday mustering of support in coalitions that give effect to aspiration.
The fundamental dimensions of the social process set the parameters within which the shaping and sharing of values must proceed. These parameters are not immutable. Even the geographic constraints that (p. 120) affect life on this planet are in flux, and the temporal sequences and juxtapositions of interactive factors are of decisive significance. We have made previous references to the tangle of institutional practice and the levels of crisis action that circumscribe results.
The geographical ramifications of value deprivations and nonfulfillment may be universal, regional, national, or subnational in either origin or impact. Within particular communities, further, these impacts may be central or peripheral, omnipresent or occasional. The global scene has never before been the stage for interactive events of such frequency, intensity, and impact. More and more occurrences ignore state boundaries and generate repercussions beyond the limits of a single state.62 The movements of people, goods, services, and ideas involve several nation-states. The cumulative impact of even the most local-seeming event may be transnational in scope. Parallel events may be observable on a worldwide scale. This means that, in contrast to previous times, when the shock wave generated by war, natural disaster, or other significant events could be contained within a particular locality (or the adjacent area), at the present time events tend to reverberate with great rapidity throughout the globe. In actuality, the transnational community is a complex matrix of situations whose spatial limits have begun to transcend “habitat earth” and to implicate other components of the solar system.63 To take one another into account is the most enlightened form of interaction; and it is evident today that the inhabitants of the globe constitute a whole that takes its elements progressively into consideration.
We must not, however, exaggerate the degree to which awareness has been universally achieved. Many peoples remain outside the major forums of interaction; they are, for one reason or another, anchored in their localities without significant contact with the outside environment. Even now there are large blocs and pockets that permit little penetration by “outsiders.” As a result, the world at large is totally uninformed about the deprivations and nonfulfillments that persist in those areas.64 We (p. 121) cannot therefore assume that parochialism is overcome as a direct consequence of accelerated communication. It is, in fact, typical to find that symbols of local references have multiplied so rapidly at the focus of attention that wider aspects of the world are effectively excluded.
Over a longer interval it is to be assumed that the annihilation of distance by modern technology will accentuate the sense of relative deprivation in a particular area and magnify the importance of nonfulfillment everywhere. In the words of McNamara:
For centuries stagnating societies and deprived peoples remained content with their lot because they were unaware that life was really any better elsewhere. Their very remoteness saved them from odious comparisons. The technological revolution changed all that. Today, the transistor radio and the television tube in remote corners of the world dramatize the disparities in the equality of life. What was tolerable in the past provokes turbulence today.65
Value deprivation and nonfulfillment have temporal dimensions. The duration of a particular practice may be temporary or permanent, and its manifestation may be sporadic or continuous. The more permanent (p. 122) and continuous the deprivation, the greater is the destruction of human dignity values and the danger of destructive response.
Instantaneous global communication informs the world about itself. The world community is in effect becoming an open forum in constant session on matters of value deprivation and indulgence.66 When deprivations occur it is no longer necessary—in a host of specific instances—to wait for days or weeks before hearing, for example, of imprisonment without a trial.67
It is important, however, to recognize that, while instantaneity in communication has grown, many interferences prevent realization of the full potential of instantaneity. Countering the growing demand that information be spread quickly is the no less intense demand by many elites that information be stifled. Trapped in a pervasive sense of insecurity, many power elites attempt to maintain their ascendancy by keeping the levels of aspiration of their peoples low and attempt to accomplish this by insulating the rank and file of the population from open exposure to the outside world. Messages that originate in the outside community are carefully scrutinized and tightly controlled in the hope of forestalling any “contamination” of established perspectives.68
More positively, it seems to be impracticable for apprehensive ruling classes to prevent “leakage” of information from the outside world into (p. 123) their domains. This leakage occurs as an incident to any contact in the spheres of science, music, sport, medicine, and so on. Further, modern instruments enable compatible political persons and groups to maintain covert, if not overt, communication with one another and to coordinate strategies of change.69
As the intensity of contact increases in space and time, institutional changes are initiated, diffused, or restricted as means of protecting or extending the value positions of participants. The cultural matrix of deprivations and nonfulfillment may or may not be institutionalized. Deprivations or nonfulfillment may be organized or unorganized, patterned or unpatterned, centralized or decentralized, secret or open. The pattern of deprivation and nonfulfillment may be occasional or systematic and routinized.70 Sometimes deprivations and nonfulfillment are so deeply ingrained in cultural practices that members of the community are hardly conscious of their existence.71 At other times, in contrast, deprivations and nonfulfillment may be made a deliberate and manifest instrument of oppression and of monopoly.72
In a technologically differentiated society, both public and private activities have become highly complex and institutionalized. Organizational complexity in government, in the corporate world, and in other (p. 124) sectors of life is subjecting people to intense organizational pressures. They respond by feeling like cogs in a machine, or simple accessories to the technology and organization. Their autonomy, integrity, and spontaneity as human beings are in jeopardy. It is quite evident that big organizations follow a logic of their own. Stressing the purposes and efficiency of the organization as paramount, they tend to adopt a purely instrumental view of the human beings at their disposal. In extreme cases, they have practically taken possession of the lives of their members, directing their basic political orientation, controlling the information that reaches their focus of attention, and decisively influencing their opportunities for work and livelihood, education, health, recreation, recognition, friendship, family activities, and religious observances.73
The psychological impacts of large-scale organization are compounded by the tensions that have been generated by changes in the relations between the public and private sectors of society. In a divided and militarized world where expectations of violence persist, there has been a persistent trend toward greater govermentalization, centralization, concentration, bureaucratization, and regimentation.74 Governments multiply functions in response to intensifying demands upon public authorities. The tendency accelerates even in societies which have traditionally been resistant to “encroachment” by the state. Within nation-states the centralized decisions are taken and implemented at the top level of highly concentrated authority and control. This does not, however, imply that a direct trend exists to centralize decisions in a world-inclusive political organization. Since effective power in the global arena is monopolized in the hands of nation-states, vested and sentimental interests oppose further centralization, which would involve supranational entities. Within any nation-state the concentration of authority and control in the hands of a few officials or structures at a given level varies from one entity to another. The most concentrated structure in a political arena is a hierarchy in which effective decisions are made by one person and a limited number of advisors.
When there is a relatively low circulation of officials through a hierarchy, we speak of bureaucracy. Govermentalizing, centralizing, and concentrating tendencies foster hierarchy; and the stabilization of large hierarchies is almost certain to spell bureaucracy.75 Bureaucratization is (p. 125) typically followed by regimentation, meaning that the state seeks to restrict all areas of private and individual as well as organized choice by using measures that depend on varying degrees of coerciveness. It is often alleged that a new “organization man” has emerged, a dedicated person who submerges his individuality to fit the requirements of large-scale action programs.76 The trend toward govermentalization—which is sustained by the associated syndromes of centralization, concentration, bureaucratization, and regimentation—has upset the traditional balance between the public and the private sector, and the change is largely at the expense of civic order and personal autonomy.77 In the extreme case, such as a totalitarian regime, society is practically swallowed up by government.78
(p. 126) Confronted with the frontal assaults of large scale organization and especially of expanding governmentalization (with its associated syndromes), various countermovements are set in motion. Popular demands are for less governmentalization, less bureaucratization, and less regimentation and for more decentralization and deconcentration, more spontaneity, and more personal autonomy. People demand more widespread and effective participation, through various strategies, in power and other value processes intended to make government responsive and responsible. Where private organizations are fortified by traditions of social diversity, the drift toward “big government” is rather successfully opposed by vigorous private organizations. Wherever the established political practice favors decentralization within government—as in a federal system—any fundamental change in the structural balance is achieved with difficulty. In consequence, the tension between the public and the private sector persists; and the balance between the two is fluid, dynamic, and shifting.79
The direction and rapidity of institutional change are closely linked to the spread and intensity of the crises that accompany the evolution of an interdependent world. Crises are situations in which impending large-scale value deprivations are expected, and in which acute stress toward action is generated. Crises exhibit many differing degrees in intensity of expectation about the threat of damage. In security crises all values are critically at stake. Obviously, the growing militarization of the world arena has pervasive and far-reaching impacts upon the fulfillment and nonfulfillment of every value. It is commonplace to acknowledge that (p. 127) humankind is today living in the shadow of nuclear war and the possible annihilation of humanity and civilization.80 Reflective minds recognize that the commonplaceness of this perception should in no way dull the sense of the reality of danger.81 A partial consequence of the delicate balance of nuclear terror is that limited violence by private armies and private groups has increased tremendously, and the destructive potentiality of chemical and biological weapons are not neglected.82
The more important crises in the contemporary world can be analytically related to every important value. Such an itemization would include:
Power—war, internal violence, breakdown in internal order;
Wealth—depression, speculative booms, rampant inflation, acute and widespread poverty, acute shortage of food and other goods;
Enlightenment—the communications revolution, exposing many people to the stress of new maps of man, environment, and nature; large-scale breakdown in communication; systematic manipulation of information;
Skill—the rapid obsolescence of skill because of the technical revolution, excessive automation and sudden displacement, critical shortages in educational facilities and manpower, the brain drain;
Affection—the massive dislocations of the family caused by refugee movements and by mass migration from rural to urban areas; vast increase in unwanted children precipitated by the disintegration of the family;
Respect—confrontations between castes, classes, and ethnic groups; collective defamation;
Rectitude—conflicts between the church and the state; conflicts between different religions.
In the contemporary world, crises in different value sectors (such as expansion and contraction in wealth processes) become more severe and rapid. Millions of human beings are exposed to contrasting life styles, conjoined with the possibility of obtaining at least short-range advantage by experimenting with variations from the culture norms in which they were socialized. Subcultures of mutual approbation spring into ephemeral and excited existence, only to recluster around a new and equally transient model. Thousands of individuals shift from one religious belief to another or from one secular ideology to another. Millions have been soldiers, gangsters, refugees, prisoners, vagabonds, and drifters. Millions have been unemployed, forced out of jobs by technological change, converted to new and uncomprehended tasks, uprooted from homes and shelters, jammed into crowded vehicles, and moved in and out of confinement. The weapons of the nuclear age contribute to the death threat that is permanently symbolized in the mushroom cloud over Hiroshima.83
Critical to crises are the perceptions of the people involved. People must be aware of intense demands and of the necessity to act before situations become full-blown crises. The elites and the rank and file may diverge radically in their perceptions of the same situation. Elite members are disposed to use crisis terms prematurely in a developing situation (p. 129) as they attempt to secure popular support and maintain their ascendancy. Real or imagined crises impel ruling elites to take disproportionately severe measures. Elite overreactions take various forms: initially justifiable measures of deprivations may be retained long after the alleged crisis is over; excessive measures cause more destruction than conservation of values; arbitrary measures may bear no rational relation whatever to the actual dangers involved in the alleged crisis.84 Preoccupied with the task of maintaining their ascendancy in a highly insecure world, elites may go beyond the exploitation of crises to the fabrication of crises for exploitation. It is not uncommon for harsh measures of deprivation and nonfulfillment to be justified in the name of national security. It is notorious that many dictatorial regimes have arbitrarily declared and maintained martial law (a “state of siege” or a “state of emergency”) as an excuse to suppress and liquidate dissenters and to consolidate the regime.85
In a world of instantaneous communication, crises are generated by the mass media themselves through sensationalism or over-reporting.86 While genuine crises may positively affect the mobilization of public support and collective action,87 the perpetual pseudo-crises fabricated by hyperactive mass media may become so routinized as to interfere with the future capacity of the media to arouse attention. Audiences may be so overwhelmed by sensational trivialization as to become numbed, (p. 130) apathetic, impotent, and immobilized; they may lose a legitimate sense of outrage, withdrawing effective identity with the larger self, and may remain unresponsive in times of genuine crisis.88
Potentially, all values—respect, power, enlightenment, well-being, wealth, skill, affection, and rectitude—may be bases of power affecting deprivations and fulfillments. In different contexts different participants in world social process may employ any one or all of these values in imposing deprivation or seeking fulfillment of human rights. The degree to which any given value is important in a particular instance is a function of context.
Power is a principal base for nation-state officials, who typically utilize both authority and effective control. The effective control at the disposal of these officials is a combination of all values. Differences in the internal constitutive processes of states bear directly upon the configuration of authority and effective control. The degree to which authority and effective control are concentrated or nonconcentrated (totalitarian or democratic) affects the patterns of deprivation and fulfillment. In recent times there has been a tremendous expansion of totalitarian and authoritarian regimes. By their nature, totalitarianism and authoritarianism involve the employment of authority in deprivation of human rights. Totalitarian regimes are notorious for arrogating all choices into the sphere of public order, and for exercising practically unlimited authority over the value deprivation of individuals.89 It must be recognized that in polities (p. 131) that proclaim themselves to be democracies individuals may at times be victimized by the misuse and abuse of authority. Governmental officials may act without authority, under pretended authority, or under authority incompatible with human dignity; they may exercise authority arbitrarily to impose deprivations and deny fulfillment.90 In extreme cases, law may be perverted into an instrument of oppression.
Participants in the world social process who are not state officials may, of course, draw upon authoritative decisions as power assets in support of their activities. Primarily, however, nongovernmental participants depend on values other than power (notably wealth, knowledge, and skill). The degree to which individuals are vulnerable to deprivation and are capable of achieving the fulfillment of their human rights depends largely upon the kind of public order system—totalitarian, authoritarian, or democratic—in which they live and upon the base values at their disposal. The degree to which authority is available for the defense of human rights, especially in challenge of deprivations, varies substantially from community to community.91
The distribution of base values within the world social process obviously conditions the deprivation and fulfillment of values. The influence extends to the distribution among and within states. As between states, the distribution is glaringly discrepant. Within a particular state, discrepancy extends not only to power and wealth but also to all other values which comprise effective power. Many countries have an abundance of resources and potential values, while others appear almost hopelessly deprived. Thus, important technology is still monopolized by the developed countries; nuclear power and other technology are still closely held. New scientific discoveries, technological developments, and access to outer space are bases for only a few communities. There has been (p. 132) increasing recognition of the importance of knowledge and skill as bases of power; but these values are not widely and evenly spread about the globe. The cumulative result is the deep disparities between have and have-not countries (as summarized in North-South division).92 Consequently, such countries differ in priority and direction in their respective programs for facilitating various human rights.93
The uneven distribution of values and resources between territorial communities is carried forward within even the best of states. Within many national communities, disparities in the distribution of wealth and other values are a commonplace phenomenon. The disparity is especially pronounced in the relationship between the power elite and the rank and file. While ruling elites tend to achieve overwhelming power, the masses of people remain powerless. The masses, in whose name the elite rules, become more often than not mere objects of deprivation rather than subjects of fulfillment, whatever the official rhetoric may allege.
In the light of the structure of effective power in the contemporary world, it is certain that no individual can control sufficient base values to be immune from deprivations emanating from various sources and to achieve the utmost fulfillment of values. Every individual depends upon the groups (nation-state, political party, union, trade association, educational institution, church, family, and so on) of which he is a member for his value position.
(p. 133) In examining the entire spectrum of base values available for value deprivations and indulgences, special attention must be given to the unique position of science-based technology. The impact of technology on the fulfillment and deprivations of values is widely felt and appreciated. Great contributions have of course been made to human rights by the technology which has eliminated so much physical labor (depending upon political power and social structure) and released tremendous manpower and leisure for creative and rich pursuits of values. On the other hand, increasing threats to human rights have obviously come from the spectacular developments of modern science and technology. These threats may be exemplified in multiple detail, including such items as the sophisticated techniques of physical, psychological, and data surveillance that penetrate the traditional zones of privacy and jeopardize the very core of personal autonomy;94 the reign of terror made possible by modern weapons; the horrible techniques of torture that dehumanize, intimidate, and oppress;95 the routinization of work caused by widespread automation;96 the obsolescence of skill caused by the technical revolution; and the ambivalent potentialities of the burgeoning science and technology of genetic engineering.97
(p. 134) As modern science and technology move toward universality, certain uniformities are imposed upon world attention, and attitudes are molded in similar ways. Long a monopoly of Western Europe, modern science and technology are spreading throughout the globe, although at present inhibited by factors that find expression through the contending systems of public order. Certain consequences follow inexorably from the appearance in a community of the “machine,” or modern techno-scientific complex. The machine, with all the problems it brings, confers a sense of mastery. Even those who at first are mastered do not fail to observe and presently to admire the impersonal strength and precision of mechanical, electrical, and other forms of energy applied to production. On the basis of direct experience, certain inferences sprout into belief and harden into faith, such as the speculation that if the brain of man can grasp and shape the hidden dynamics of nature, man is capable of controlling himself and his gadgets for the common good. This inference comes not from propaganda or pedagogy alone, or even principally; rather, it rises from indelible impressions left by association with man’s handiwork. From glimpses of the possible develop demands that authority be induced or coerced to make whatever provision is necessary to share the fruits of knowledge with the “common man.” However supine the traditional outlook of any culture, contact with the machine touches off a dynamic approach to life.98
The strategies employed by both deprivers and deprivees to manage base values in the pursuit of their objectives in the shaping and sharing of values embrace the whole range of possible instruments of policy. All the different types of strategy—commonly characterized as diplomatic, ideological, economic, and military—are employed, singly and in varying combinations, with many differing degrees of coerciveness and persuasiveness.99
Each particular type of strategy differs from the others in the degree to which it relies upon symbols or material resources. Diplomacy in the broadest sense depends primarily upon symbols in the form of offers, counter-offers, and agreements (deals) among elite figures. Ideological strategy also uses symbols as the principal means of action, its distinctiveness being communications directed to large audiences.100 Economic instruments involve goods and services; military strategy employs means of violence and destruction. While diplomacy and ideology are especially concerned with perspectives, economic and military instruments are based upon capabilities. No instrument, however, is restricted to its most distinctive modality. Similarly, any organization primarily specialized to one instrument finds it expedient to make use of all. Every strategy can be employed, singly or in combination with other strategies, for productive, constructive purposes as well as for deprivational, destructive purposes.
Agreements (deals) of various types are made by group participants as well as individuals with varying degrees of explicitness and reciprocity. Deals are frequently made by governmental officials, business tycoons, gang leaders, and so on. As interaction accelerates about the (p. 136) globe, there would appear a new intensity in the use of agreements of all kinds to promote the shaping and sharing of values. Given the ubiquity of the effective power processes operating at all levels of communities and organizations, it is no surprise that practices of deprivations and nonfulfillment are frequently effected through secret, as well as overt, deals of one kind or another. Among the elite who engage in such practices there is of course a shared expectation of silence and reciprocity—a consensus about not asking too many questions.
Improved techniques in communication enhance potential not only for a richer and wider fulfillment of values but also for deprivations. Such deprivational potentiality has been manifested in various ways. In many communities in which the media of mass communication are more or less monopolized by power elites, the gathering, processing, and dissemination of information are made a deliberate and vital instrument of thought conditioning and coerced conformity; generally, censorship prevails; information may be fabricated, distorted, restricted, and blocked out; and nonconforming opinions are suppressed.101 In parallel, in some communities in which the media of mass communication are concentrated in the hands of wealth elites, the gathering, processing, and dissemination of information tend to be dominated by profit considerations and colored by inordinate commercialism, thereby debasing the quality of enlightenment.102 Under contemporary conditions, the ideological instrument is often closely associated with instruments of physical destruction. It has, further, accentuated the sense of relative deprivation and nonfulfillment.103 To minimize the deepening sense of relative deprivation and nonfulfillment, power elites in relatively closed societies take measures to prevent and interfere with the flow of information from dangerous or “undesirable” sources (both internal and external) and to restrict the free movement of people both beyond and within national boundaries.104
(p. 137) It may be noted that, despite the difficulty in gaining effective access to the mass media, deprivees have increasingly resorted to the ideological instrument (the mass media of communication) to dramatize their grievances and aspirations and to gain wider attention (locally, nationally, regionally, or globally).105 The politically persecuted, when denied internal channels of attention, seek to gain attention and support through the available media abroad.106
Goods and services may of course be managed to impose deprivations not only of wealth, but also of all other values. Individuals are highly vulnerable to deprivations stemming from the manipulation and withholding of goods and services. The breakup of family and traditional organizations in the production of goods and services (especially rural organizations) makes the individual largely dependent upon a new economic system against which the lone individual is commonly powerless.107 The damage that can be done by mismanagement of goods and services has been recently exemplified by rampant corrupt practices of bribery in many parts of the world.108
In an insecure world of persisting expectations of violence, many people (elite and nonelite alike) not only expect violence but preach violence as the key to solution of human miseries, injustices, and inequalities (transnationally and nationally).109 Convinced that their ascendancy depends upon a monopoly of the organization and means of (p. 138) violence and destruction, power elites in many communities have achieved high degrees of concentration and control. It is such monopoly that enables many dictatorial regimes and military juntas to stay in power despite intense popular resentment and opposition; overwhelmed by a vast network of terror, buttressed by the modern military, para-military, and police organizations of the state, individuals have little choice but to conform and be silent.110
Despite widespread attempts by power elites to monopolize the means of violence, the fact remains that the cheapness and easy availability of military hardware has put violence and terror at the disposal, not merely of state elites, but of individuals and small groups as well. This has made possible a transnational network of terror and has enhanced the danger and range of deprivation and destruction.111
The outcomes of the process of interaction are a continuing flow of deprivations and fulfillment with regard to all values, as manifested in variable patterns of value accumulation and distribution. From a long historical perspective, it would appear that just as science and technology move toward universalization, so the overall trend is toward the wider shaping and sharing of major values, despite zigzag patterns occurring at different times and in different communities. Yet the contemporary world has scarcely begun to mobilize its full potential to fulfill the rising common demands of humankind; though the nature, scope, and magnitude of the values at stake differ from one community to another and from one occasion to another, large-scale value deprivations and non-fulfillments of individuals and pluralistic groups continue to prevail. Deprivation and nonfulfillment appear to characterize the value-institutional processes of vast segments of the world’s population, and a rich flow of fulfillment is enjoyed by only a small segment of that population. In the previous chapter, we itemized in summary outline the flow of (p. 139) deprivations and nonfulfillment in regard to all values, by reference to the distinctive features of each of the value processes.112
Because of the interdependences brought about by accelerating changes in science and technology (particularly in communication), in population growth, in the demands and identifications of peoples, and in techniques of organization, there continue to be rising, common demands among peoples about the world for the greater production and wider sharing of all the basic values and an increasing perception by them of their inescapable interdependence in the shaping and sharing of all such demanded values.113 Peoples everywhere (elites and nonelites alike), while cherishing parochial identifications, are also exhibiting increasing identifications with larger and larger groups, gradually extending to the whole of humankind. In an earth-space arena in which pre-dispositional and environmental factors are in constant interplay, and in which mass destructive means intimidate and threaten humankind and civilization, no people can fully be secure unless all peoples are secure.
Even in these days of wars and revolution, and of genocide and arbitrary internal violence, the basic interrelationship of human rights and security (peace) is not difficult to discern: that interrelationship is one, not of contraposition or indifference, but rather of an interdependence so comprehensive and intense as to approximate identity.114 In increasingly common conception, human rights and peace (security) are today regarded, not as static and independent absolutes or vague and utopian goals, but rather as the shared aspirations of peoples engaged in a cooperative community enterprise and inspired both by identifications with the whole of humankind and by realistic perceptions of a complete interdetermination in the achievement of such aspirations. Even when conceived in the minimal sense of freedom from the fact and expectation of arbitrary violence and coercion, peace is increasingly observed to be dependent upon maintaining people’s expectations that the processes of effective decision in public order will be responsive to their demands for a reasonable access to all the values commonly characterized as those (p. 140) of human dignity or of a free society.115 When peace is more broadly conceived as security in position, expectation, and potential with regard to all basic community values, the interrelationship of peace and human rights quite obviously passes beyond that of interdependence and, as suggested, approaches that of identity. To President John F. Kennedy’s question “Is not peace, in the last analysis, basically a matter of human rights?” there can be but one rational answer. In the light of all the pervasive interconnections of both predispositional and environmental factors, as previously elaborated, it would appear incontestable that in today’s world, without a more secure peace and continuing expectations of peace, there can be little hope of an improved and sustained protection of human rights and, conversely, that without a more extensive protection of human rights, there can be little realistic hope of a better peace.
The comprehensive world social process, which includes the processes of all its component communities from local to global and which determines the degree to which individuals can achieve their demanded values through time, is a dynamic and changing, not static and changeless, process. It embraces the whole manifold of historic events, extending from the past to the present and to the future. In this comprehensive process, each feature is constantly changing and interacting with the other features:
Participants are constantly changing in characteristics, as they affect, and are affected by, the changing variables of culture, class, interest, personality, and crisis;
The perspectives of participants are in continuous flux and revision in the light of changing conditions—they shift in the intensity and scope of their demands, expand or contract their identifications, and modify their world views and maps of reality;
Changing dimensions of time, space, institutionalization, and crisis exert constant pressures on the situation of interaction;
Strategies are employed and manipulated in varying combinations to cope with ever changing contexts; and
The varied outcomes find expression in changing aggregate patterns of value accumulation and distribution and in differing impacts on different individuals, groups, and communities.
The impacts of this ongoing process of deprivation and fulfillment of values reach beyond immediate deprivees and deprivers, affecting in the long run the aggregate patterns in innovation, diffusion, and restriction of value-institutional practices at all levels of communities (local, national, regional, and global) in the earth-space arena. Beyond even living generations, impacts extend to all future generations of humankind; ultimately at stake is the entire pattern of balance or imbalance among people, institutions, resources, technology, and the ecosystem.116
Given this dynamism of change inherent in the world social process, with its constant feedback of the flow of continuing events, immediate value outcomes, and long-term consequences, it is apparent that rational inquiry about world social process requires a continuing, systematic monitoring by reference to each of its main features.117 This monitoring and appraising task is indispensable to the creation and maintenance (p. 142) of a continuing map of the interactions that constitute the events from which claims for freedom from deprivations and for value fulfillments emanate, and to which the process of authoritative decision responds. A continuing monitoring of the world social process which would present a dynamic world map with adequate comprehensiveness, selectivity, and realism would enhance effective performance of all the necessary intellectual tasks—clarification of goals, description of trends, analysis of conditioning factors, future projection, and recommendation of alternatives—necessary to facilitate and optimalize the defense and fulfillment of human rights.
1 For exposition of the theoretical system see H. Lasswell & A. Kaplan, Power and Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry (1950). For preliminary applications of the theory in various fields, see, for instance, R. Arens & H. Lasswell, In Defense of Public Order: The Emerging Field of Sanction Law (1961); L. Chen & H. Lasswell, Formosa, China, and the United Nations (1967); D. Johnston, The International Law of Fisheries: A Framework for Policy-Oriented Inquiries (1965); M. McDougal & W. Burke, The Public Order of the Oceans: A Contemporary International Law of the Sea (1962); M. McDougal & F. Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public Order: The Legal Regulation of International Coercion (1961); M. McDougal, H. Lasswell, & J. Miller, The Interpretation of Agreements and World Public Order: Principles of Content and Procedure (1967); M. McDougal, H. Lasswell, & I. Vlasic, Law and Public Order in Space (1963); B. Murty, Propaganda and World Public Order: The Legal Regulation of the Ideological Instrument of Coercion (1968); W. Reisman, Nullity and Revision (1971); Toward World Order and Human Dignity: Essays in Honor of Myres S. McDougal (W. Reisman & B. Weston eds. 1976) [hereinafter cited as Toward World Order and Human Dignity]; A. Rogow & H. Lasswell, Power, Corruption, and Rectitude (1963).
For comparable maps by other social scientists, see Political Development and Change: A Policy Approach (G. Brewer & R. Brunner eds. 1975); A. Etzioni, The Active Society: A Theory of Societal and Political Processes (1968); J. Galtung, Theory and Methods of Society Research (1967); P. Kelvin, The Basis of Social Behaviour (1970); R. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (3d ed. 1968); R. Nisbet, The Social Bond: An Introduction to the Study of Society (1970); G. Mead, Mind, Self, and Society (C. Morris ed. 1943); T. Parsons, The Social System (1951); N. Smelser, Theory of Collective Behavior (1971).
2 For the many roles individuals play in everyday life, see the brilliant works by Erving Goffman, including: E. Goffman, Encounters (1961); E. Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (1959). See also P. Kelvin, supra note 1, at 139–67; R. Nisbet, supra note 1, at 148–80.
3 See chapter 1 supra.
4 See chapters 8–15 infra.
See also The Fourth World: the Imprisoned, the Poor, the Sick, the Elderly and Underaged in America (L. Hamlian & F. Karl eds. 1976); P. Van den Berghe, Man in Society: A Biosocial View 93–124 (1975); 1 & 2 Case Studies on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms: A World Survey (W. Veenhoven ed. 1975); E. Vierdag, The Concept of Discrimination in International Law (1973); The Fourth World: Victims of Group Oppression (B. Whitaker ed. 1973).
5 On group interaction, see R. Bales, Interaction Process Analysis: A Method for the Study of Small Groups (1952); C. Cooley, Social Organization: A Study of the Larger Mind (1909); G. Homans, The Human Group (1964); Group Relations and Group Antagonisms (R. MacIver ed. 1944); E. Malecki & H. Mahood, Group Politics (1972); M. Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (rev. ed. 1971); G. Simmel, The Sociology of George Simmel (K. Wolff ed. & trans. 1950); S. Stoljar, Groups and Entities: An Inquiry into Corporate Theory(1973).
For convenient summaries of various group theories, see Greenstone, Group Theories, in 2 Handbook of Political Science 243–318 (F. Greenstein & N. Polsby eds. 1975); Homans, et al., Groups, 6 Int’l Encyc. Soc. Sc. 259 (1968).
7 See L. Doob, Communication in Africa: A Search for Boundaries (1961); Ethnicity: Theory and Experience (N. Glazer & D. Moynihan eds. 1975) [hereinafter cited as Ethnicity]; Claydon, The Transnational Protection of Ethnic Minorities: A Tentative Framework for Inquiry, 13 Canadian Y.B. Int’l L. 25 (1975); Connor, Ethnology and the Peace of South Asia, 22 World Politics 51 (1969); Connor, Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying? 24 World Politics 319 (1972); Connor, The Politics of Ethnonationalism, 27 J. Int’l Affairs 1 (1973); Possony, Nationalism and the Ethnic Factor, 10 Orbis 1218 (1967); Hughes, The Real Boundaries in Africa Are Ethnic, Not Lines on a Map, N.Y. Times, June 15, 1975, § 4, at 4, col. 4.
8 See Chen, Self-Determination as a Human Right, in Toward World Order and Human Dignity, supra note 1, at 198–261. See also A. Cobban, The Nation State and National Self-Determination (1969); R. Emerson, From Empire to Nation (1960); R. Emerson, Self-Determination Revisited in the Era of Decolonization (Occasional Paper No. 9, Harvard University Center for International Affairs, 1964); D. Gordon, Self-Determination and History in the Third World (1971); H. Johnson, Self-Determination within the Community of Nations (1967); A. Sureda, The Evolution of the Right of Self-Determination (1973); U. Umozurike, Self-Determination in International Law (1972).
9 For difficulties associated with contemporary nation building, see D. Apter, The Politics of Modernization (1965); L. Binder, et al., Crises and Sequences in Political Development (1971) (other contributors are: James S. Coleman, Joseph LaPalombara, Lucian W. Pye, Sidney Verba, & Myron Weiner); C. Black, The Dynamics of Modernization (1966); S. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (1968); A. Inkeles & D. Smith, Becoming Modern: Individual Change in Six Developing Countries (1974); D. Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East (1963); M. Levy, Modernization and the Structure of Society: A Setting for International Affairs (1966); Lasswell, The Policy Sciences of Development, 17 World Politics 286 (1965).
10 See, e.g., Hills, Amin Is a Tyrant, but Not without Admirers, N.Y. Times, July 11, 1976, § 4, at 3, col. 3; Sulzberger, No Antidote to ‘Big Daddy,’ id., June 29, 1975, § 4, at 15, col. 2; Africa Can’t Afford Him, id., July 12, 1975, at 24, col. 1 (editorial); id., July 10, 1976, at 3, col. 1; id., Oct. 5, 1975, § 1, at 2, col. 3 (Ambassador Daniel Moynihan’s criticism of Amin).
See also Uganda: Amin vs. the World, Newsweek, Aug. 9, 1976, at 35–36; N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1976, § 1, at 15, col. 1 (city ed.) (the transformation of the Central African Republic to the Central African Empire and of Salah Eddine Ahmed Bokassa from president for life to Emperor Bokassa I).
11 See M. Halperin, et al., The Lawless State: The Crime of the U.S. Intelligence Agencies (1976); J. Lieberman, How the Government Breaks the Law (1972); D. Wise, The Politics of Lying: Government Deception, Secrecy, and Power (1973); A. Wolfe, The Seamy Side of Democracy: Repression in America (1973).
12 The 1972 budget of the United Nations was $213 million. N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1972, at 13, col. 4. In U.N. circles, the U.N. budget is compared to that of the Fire Department of New York City. According to Professor Karl W. Deutsch’s estimate, as based on data in B. Russett, supra note 6, at 56–68, the total governmental expenditures (governments at all levels—national, state or provincial, and local) of all the nation-states are between approximately one-quarter and one-third of the GNP of the non-Communist countries. On the other hand, the total expenditures of all the international organizations are roughly 1 percent of the GNP of these same countries. Deutsch, The Probability of International Law, in The Relevance of International Law 60 (K. Deutsch & S. Hoffmann eds. 1968).
13 Relevant human rights prescriptions are conveniently collected in Basic Documents on Human Rights (I. Brownlie ed. 1971); Basic Documents on International Protection of Human Rights (L. Sohn & T. Buergenthal eds. 1973); United Nations, Human Rights: A Compilation of International Instruments of the United Nations, U.N. Doc. ST/HR/1 (1973).
14 See generally W. Chambers, Political Parties in a New Nation (1963); R. Dahl, Political Oppositions in Western Democracies (1966); Regimes and Oppositions (R. Dahl ed. 1973); M. Duverger, Political Parties (1954); V. Key, Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups (5th ed. 1964); Political Parties and Political Development (J. LaPalombara & M. Weiner eds. 1966); H. Lasswell & A. Kaplan, supra note 1, at 169–73; D. MacRae, Parliament Parties, and Society in France, 1946–1958 (1967); S. Neuman, Modern Political Parties (1956); J. Saloma & F. Sontag, Parties: The Real Opportunity for Effective Citizen Politics (1972); Epstein, Political Parties, in 4 Handbook of Political Science 229–77 (F. Greenstein & N. Polsby eds. 1975).
See also Laqueur, Eurocommunism and Its Friends, 62 Commentary 25 (Aug. 1976); Seligman, Communism’s Crisis of Authority, Fortune, Feb. 1976, at 92–95 et seq.; Seligman, Communists in Democratic Clothing, Fortune, Mar. 1976, at 116–19 et seq.; Birnbaum, The New European Socialism, N.Y. Times, May 15, 1976, at 25, col. 2 (city ed.); Gordon, Changes in Communist Parties in Developed Capitalist Nations, N.Y. Times, Mar. 21, 1976, § 4, at 17, col. 1.
15 See J. Lador-Lederer, International Group Protection 373–417 (1968); L. White, International Non-Governmental Organizations (1951); Interest Groups in International Perspective, 413 Annals 1 (May 1974); Non-Governmental Organizations, U.N. Doc. E/4476 (1968) (report of the secretary-general).
See more generally C. Astiz, Pressure Groups and Power Elites in Peruvian Politics (1969); H. Eckstein, Pressure Group Politics: The Case of the British Medical Association (1960); Interest Groups on Four Continents (H. Ehrmann ed. 1958); A. Holtzman, Interest Groups and Lobbying (1966); V. Key, supra note 14; Private Government: Introductory Readings (S. Lakoff ed. 1973); J. LaPalombara, Interest Groups in Italian Politics (1964); G. McConnell, Private Power and American Democracy (1966); Voluntary Associations (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1969); H. Ziegler & G. Peak, Interest Groups in American Society (2d ed. 1972); Pressure and Interest Groups, in Comparative Politics 388–430 (H. Eckstein & D. Apter eds. 1963) (articles by Almond, Eckstein, and LaPalombara); Salisbury, Interest Groups, 4 Handbook of Political Science 171–228 (F. Greenstein & N. Polsby eds. 1975).
16 The increasing attention accorded the roles of multinational corporations is clearly demonstrated by the rapid proliferation of literature. See The Multinational Corporation and Social Change (D. Apter & L. Goodman eds. 1976); Global Companies: The Political Economy of World Business (G. Ball ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as Global Companies]; World Business: Promise and Problems (C. Brown ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as World Business]; The Multinational Enterprise (J. Dunning ed. 1971); N. Fatemi, G. Williams, & T. DeSaint-Phalle, Multinational Corporatons (2d ed. 1976); B. Ganguli, Multinational Corporations (1974); International Labour Office, Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy (1973); The Multinational Corporation (C. Kindleberger ed. 1970); E. Kolde, The Multinational Company (1974); J. Stopford & L. Wells, Managing the Multinational Enterprise (1972); C. Tugendhat, The Multinationals (1972); L. Turner, Multinational Companies and the Third World (1973); United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, The Impact of Multinational Corporations on Development and on International Relations, U.N. Doc. E/5500/Rev. 1 (ST/ESA/6) (1974) [hereinafter cited as The Impact]; United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Multinational Corporations in World Development, U.N. Doc. ST/ECA/190 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Multinational Corporations in World Development]; United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Summary of the Hearings Before the Group of Eminent Persons to Study the Impact of Multinational Corporations on Development and on International Relations, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/15 (1974); R. Vernon, Sovereignty at Bay: The Multinational Spread of United States Enterprises (1971); Seidl-Hohenveldern, Multinational Enterprises and the International Law of the Future,  Y.B. World Affairs 301; Cary, Multinational Corporations as Development Partners, N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1975, at 27, col. 2 (city ed.).
17 Starting from the assumption that “The men who run the global corporations are the first in history with the organization, technology, money, and ideology to make a credible try at managing the world as an integrated unit,” Barnet and Muller argue that “the goal of corporate diplomacy is nothing less than the replacement of national loyalty with corporate loyalty. If they are to succeed in integrating the planet, loyalty to the global enterprise must take precedence over all other political loyalties.” R. Barnet & R. Muller, Global Reach: The Power of the Multinational Corporations 13, 89 (1974). For detail, see id. at 72–104.
Raymond Vernon dramatizes the threat of the multinational enterprises in these words: “Suddenly, it seems, the sovereign states are feeling naked. Concepts such as national sovereignty and national economic strength appear curiously drained of meaning.” R. Vernon, supra note 16, at 3.
See also J. Behrman, National Interests and the International Enterprise: Tensions Among the North Atlantic Countries (1970); The Nation-State and Transactional Corporations in Conflict, with Special Reference to Latin America (J. Gunnemann ed. 1975); T. Moran, Multinational Corporations and the Politics of Dependence: Copper in Chile (1974); Ball, Introduction, in Global Companies, supra note 16, at 1–2; Behrman, Multination Corporations and National Sovereignty, in World Business, supra note 16, at 114–25; Barnet & Muller, Planet Earth, A Wholly-Owned Subsidiary, N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1975, at 33, col. 1.
18 See R. Barnet & R. Muller, supra note 17, at 123–84, 278–83, 334–62. For a case study, see A. Sampson, The Sovereign State of ITT (1973).
As Katzenbach points out:
The earlier literature tended to regard the so-called multinational corporation as a new form of internationalism which would have beneficent results in terms of rationalizing the world economic order irrespective of political boundaries, of transferring technology from the haves to the have-nots, and being a sort of great engine for economic development in the post-war period.
“More recently,” he continues, “for a variety of reasons, multinational corporations have been viewed as instruments of a new imperialism in which the rich exploit the poor and the haves exploit the have-nots.” Katzenbach, Law-Making for Multinational Corporations, in C. Black, et al., A New World Order? 25 (World Order Studies Program Occasional Paper No. 1, Princeton University, Center of International Studies, 1975).
On tax problems involving multinational corporations, see a study prepared by Carl S. Shoup for the United Nations: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, The Impact of Multinational Corporations on Development and on International Relations—Technical Papers: Taxation, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/11 (1974).
19 See W. Reisman, Folded Lies: Bribery, Crusades, and Reforms (1978); N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1976, § 3, at 1, col. 1 (containing a compilation of reported payments abroad by American corporations for bribes, political contributions, sales commissions, and other purposes); id., May 5, 1975, at 1, col. 1 (city ed.) (U.S. Company Payoffs Way of Life Overseas); Cohen, Lockheed Cover-Up? id., Mar. 29, 1976, at 29, col. 2; Barnet, Not Just Your Corner Drugstore, id., June 19, 1975, at 35, col. 1. See also Political Corruption: Readings in Comparative Analysis (A. Heidenheimer comp. 1970).
20 This garrison-state hypothesis was originally presented by one of the authors in 1937. See Lasswell, Sino-Japanese Crisis: The Garrison State versus the Civilian State, 2 China Q. 643 (1937); Lasswell, The Garrison State, 46 Am. J. Sociology 455 (1941); Lasswell, The Garrison State Hypothesis Today, in Changing Patterns of Military Politics 51–70 (S. Huntington ed. 1962). See also Fox, Harold D. Lasswell and the Study of World Politics: Configurative Analysis, Garrison State, and World Commonwealth, in Politics, Personality, and Social Science in the Twentieth Century: Essays in Honor of Harold D. Lasswell 367–81 (A. Rogow ed. 1969).
Cf. A. Huxley, Brave New World (Bantam classic ed. 1958); A. Huxley, Brave New World Revisited (1965); G. Orwell, 1984 (1949); 1984 Revisited: Prospects for American Politics (R. Wolff ed. 1973).
21 See United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Fifth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Geneva, 1–12 September 1975 (report prepared by the Secretariat) 10–15, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.56/10 (1976); W. Whyte, Street Corner Society (1943); Tyler, The Roots of Organized Crime, 8 Crime and Delinquency 325 (1962), reprinted in Social problems in a Changing World 198–214 (W. Gerson ed. 1969); N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1976, § 1, at 1, col. 4 (city ed.).
22 See B. Davidson, Black Mother: The Years of the African Slave Trade (1961); C. Greenidge, Slavery 49–57 (1958); S. O’Callaghan, The Slave Trade Today (1961); Schakteton, The Slave Trade Today, in Slavery: A Comparative Perspective 188 (R. Winks ed. 1972).
23 See J. Bell, Transnational Terror (1975); International Terrorism and World Security (D. Carlton & C. Schaerf eds. 1975); E. Hyams, Terrorists and Terrorism (1975); B. Jenkins, International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict (1975); Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism, 28 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28), U.N. Doc. A/9028 (1973); Rovine, The Contemporary International Legal Attack on Terrorism, 3 Israel Y.B. Human Rights 9 (1973); Terrorism and Political Crimes in International Law,  Proc., Am. Soc’y Int’l L. 87.
See also Organized Crime Reaps Huge Profits from Dealing in Pornographic Films, N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1975, § 1, at 1, col. 1; Key Mafia Figure Tells of ‘Wars’ and Gallo-Colombo Peace Talks, id., July 7, 1975, at 1, col. 1; Kidnapping a Lucrative Crime in Argentina, id., May 29, 1974, at 53, col. 1 (city ed.).
24 See H. Lasswell & A. Kaplan, supra note 1, at 47–51. See generally B. Malinowski, A Scientific Theory of Culture, and Other Essays (1960); R. Benedict, Patterns of Culture (1959); J. Honingmann, Understanding Culture (1963); A. Kroeber, The Nature of Culture (1952); The Science of Man in the World Crisis (R. Linton ed. 1945) especially articles by Clyde Kluckhohn and William H. Kelly and by Abram Kardiner); E. Tylor, Primitive Culture (1871); L. White, The Science of Culture: A Study of Man and Civilization (1949).
In his analysis of religious evolution, Bellah conceptualizes in terms of five stages: “primitive religion,” “archaic religion,” “historic religion,” “early modern religion,” and “modern religion.” Bellah, Religious Evolution, 29 Am. Sociological Rev. 358 (1964). See also R. Bellah, Beyond Belief: Essays on Religion in a Post-Traditional World 20–50 (1976).
26 The classic work on the “stages” theory of economic growth, W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (1960), characterizes the stages as “the traditional society, the preconditions for take-off, the take-off, the drive to maturity, and the age of high mass consumption” (at 4). Cf. A. Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development (1968), which suggests the limitations of Rostow’s theories. Cf. also A. Organski, The Stages of Political Development (1965).
The term “postindustrial” is employed, and made popular, by Daniel Bell. For a comprehensive treatment, see D. Bell, The Coming of Post-Iindustrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting (1973). Other scholars prefer other designations. For example, Brzezinski prefers “technetronic.” Z. Brzezinski, Between Two Ages: America’s Role in the Technetronic Era 9 (1971).
For a standard work on this subject, see S. Lipset & R. Bendix, Social Mobility in Industrial Society (1959). Also, cf. T. Bottomore, Classes in Modern Society (1966).
28 V. Gordon Childe stresses the central importance of the creation of cities for the emergence of civilization. The invention is tentatively located in a few river valleys (notably the Nile, the Tigris-Euphrates, and the Indus) about seven thousand years ago. See V. Childe, New Light on the Most Ancient East (1935). See also R. Redfield, The Primitive World and its Transformations (1953).
31 See A. Toffler, supra note 30, at 10–11, 347–48.
32 A valuable anthology that combines fragments of many of the classics and empirical studies is Class, Status, and Power (R. Bendix & S. Lipset eds. 2d ed. 1966). For a critique of the class system in Communist countries by a top Yugoslav official in disgrace, see M. Djilas, The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System (1959).
See also B. Bernard, Social Stratification: A Comparative Analysis of Structure and Process (1957); Social Inequality (A. Beteille ed. 1969); The Impact of Social Class (P. Blumberg ed. 1971); R. Brown, Social Psychology 101-51 (1965); A. Hollingshead & F. Redlich, Social Class and Mental Illness (1958); Comparative Perspectives on Stratification: Mexico, Great Britain, Japan (J. Kahl ed. 1968); G. Lenski, Power and Privilege: A Theory of Social Stratification (1966); J. Lopreato & L. Hazelrigg, Class, Conflict and Mobility (1972); J. Schumpeter, Social Classes (1951); A. Tuden & L. Plotnicov, Social Stratification in Africa (1970); T. Tumin, Social Stratification: The Forms and Functions of Inequality (1972).
33 Highly hierarchized, closed societies are exemplified by societies in which the caste system or the practice of apartheid prevails. For further factual background and pertinent references, see chapter 7 infra, at notes 303–598 and accompanying text.
Concerning open, mobile, societies, see, e.g., G. Carlsson, Social Mobility and Class Structure (1958); Social Mobility in Britain (D. Glass ed. 1955); S. Lipset & R. Bendix, supra note 27.
34 Systematic inquiry on class has owed significantly to Lloyd Warner and associates, who stressed upper-class exemptions from law enforcement. On middle- and upper-class violations in general, see D. Cressey, Other People’s Money (1953); A. Sutherland, White Collar Crime (1949). The late Svend Ranulf employed quantitative methods to investigate the impact of changes in class structure upon the scope and severity of criminal legislation. See S. Ranulf, Moral Indignation and Middle Class Psychology: A Sociological Study (1964). Research on class remains relatively undifferentiated, focusing largely upon wealth, respect, and skill.
The major theoretical positions are well described in M. Deutsch & R. Krauss, Theories in Social Psychology (1965). See also G. Allport, Becoming: Basic Considerations for a Psychology of Personality (1955); G. Allport, Personality and Social Encounter (1960); G. Hall & G. Lindzey, Theories of Personality (1957); R. Lazarus, Personality (1963); A. Maslow, Motivation and Personality (1954).
37 See S. Freud, The Complete Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis 521–75 (J. Strachey trans. 1966) [hereinafter cited as S. Freud]; S. Freud, The Ego and the Id (J. Riviere trans., J. Strachey ed. 1962). See also C. Brenner, An Elementary Textbook of Psychoanalysis (rev. ed. 1974); H. Lasswell, & A. Kaplan, supra note 1, at 10–15.
38 An excellent overview of socialization and personality development is Socialization and Personality Development (E. Zigler & I. Child eds. 1973) (containing a comprehensive bibliography). See also R. Brown, supra note 32, at 193–417; F. Greenstein, Children and Politics (1965); Personality and Socialization (D. Heise ed. 1972); H. Hyman, Political Socialization (1959); G. Mead, supra note 1; P. Mussen, J. Conger, & J. Kagan, Child Development and Personality (1963); T. Parsons & R. Bates, Family: Socialization and Interaction Process (1955); Personality and Social Systems (N. Smelser & W. Smelser eds. 1963); Sears, Political Socialization, in 2 Handbook of Political Science 93–153 (F. Greenstein & N. Polsby eds. 1975).
For an understanding of the different worlds of childhood, see P. Aries, Centuries of Childhood (1962). See also U. Bronfenbrenner, Two Worlds of Childhood (1972) (an interesting comparative study); Childhood in China (W. Kessen ed. 1975); J. Whiting & I. Child, Child Training and Personality; A Cross-Cultural Study (1953).
41 For broad, sometimes questionable, expositions of the basic point, see R. Ardrey, The Territorial Imperative (1966); K. Lorenz, On Aggression (1966); D. Morris, The Naked Ape: A Zoologist’s Study of the Human Animal (1967).
For more hopeful views of human nature, see A. Alland, The Human Imperative (1972); R. Dubos, So Human an Animal (1968); R. Dubos, Beast or Angel? (1974); E. Fromm, The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness (1973).
42 See, for instance, a brilliant case study probing the tension between tradition and modernity among the Dinka, a Nilotic people in the Republic of the Sudan: F. Deng, Tradition and Modernization: A Challenge for Law among the Dinka of the Sudan (1971).
Crises are practically always a source of enrichment and of renewal because they encourage the search for new solutions. These solutions cannot come from a transformation of human nature, because it is not possible to change the genetic endowment of the human species. But they can come from the manipulation of social structures, because these affect the quality of behavior and of the environment, and therefore the quality of life.
Dubos, The Humanizing of Humans, Saturday Rev./World, Dec. 14, 1974, at 76, 80.
44 In very recent times, as decolonization, nation building, and the expanding role of government have gone hand in hand, hitherto deprived groups and peoples in every continent have made insistent demands for wider participation in the shaping and sharing of values. Contemporary demands for human rights, especially freedom and equality, are made in both positive and negative terms, in both individual and collective terms, and in both national and transnational terms. For further elaboration, see chapter 1 supra.
Long ago Tocqueville pointed out the distinctively dynamic and expanding character of the demand for equality. Once human beings achieve equality in some respects, their quest becomes “totalistic,” moving toward equality in all respects. See A. de Toqueville, Democracy in America (J. Mayer ed. 1969). See also T. Marshall, Class, Citizenship, and Social Development 65–122 (1964); Fallers, Equality, Modernity, and Democracy in the New States, in Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa 158, 204–19 (C. Geertz ed. 1963).
46 A miscellany of researches tends to corroborate the broad hypothesis that “the lower the value position of the participant who suffers a value deprivation the less probable the resort to official arenas; and, once there, the less likely to obtain a value-indulgent result.” We need remind ourselves only of the continuing deprivations to which the powerless, the uninformed, the poor, the weak, the untrained, the unloved, the disrespected, and the heretics are subjected. For a preliminary approach to an appraisal of the working of our “criminal” and “civil” codes, see R. Arens & H. Lasswell, supra note 1. On other dimensions, see A. Rogow & H. Lasswell, supra note 1.
47 Since Plato and Aristotle, attention has focused explicitly upon the problem of maintaining public order by fostering an appropriate “character.” The problem is that of creating self-systems in which the primary ego identifies with the body politic sufficiently to demand of the self and others that behavior conform to what is required to defend and extend the value position of the body politic. In industrialized societies failures of political socialization in the early years are alleged to encourage “alienation.” Transition from traditional to industrial societies is alleged to depend on “empathetic” personalities and on “achievement” orientation. The pertinent context is sketched in G. Almond & S. Verba, Civic Culture (1963); F. Greenstein, supra note 38; E. Hagen, The Theory of Social Change (1962); D. Lerner, supra note 9; D. McClelland, The Achieving Society (1961).
48 See H. Lasswell, supra note 40, at 20–38.
49 An outstanding compendium containing various theories about the self-system is The Self in Social Interaction (C. Gordon & K. Gergen eds. 1968). See also R. Merton, supra note 1; P. Rose, They and We (1965); S. Schachter, The Psychology of Affiliation (1959).
51 See chapter 1 supra.
53 Reflecting upon the Nazi atrocities against the Jews, Yosal Rogat suggests that “to be capable of ultimate cruelty men must first cut off sympathy for and identification with their victims by perceiving them as beings fundamentally different in kind from themselves; or, perhaps more accurately, not as beings at all, but as things.” Y. Rogat, The Eichmann Trial and Rule of Law 9 (1961).
Similarly, Chief Albert Luthuli observes:
We Africans are depersonalised by the whites; our humanity and dignity is reduced in their imaginations to a minimum. We are “boys,” “girls,” “Kaffirs,” “good natives” and “bad natives.” But we are not, to them, really quite people, scarcely more than units in a labour force and parts of a “Native Problem.”
A. Luthuli, Let My People Go 155 (1962).
Cf. M. Buber, I and Thou (W. Kaufmann trans. 1970); O. Klineberg, The Human Dimension in International Relations 33–48 (1965); Berkowitz & Green, The Stimulus Qualities of the Scapegoat, 64 J. Abnormal & Social Psychology 293 (1962).
55 See chapters 8–15 infra.
57 For our concepts on interests, see M. McDougal, H. Lasswell, & I. Vlasic, supra note 1, at 145–67.
For development of the theme that revolutionary elites, once in power, seek scapegoats to lower people’s expectations, because of limited resources available for fulfilling popular aspirations for equitable distribution, see H. Arendt, On Revolution (1963).
59 See J. Skolnick, The Politics of Protest (1969); Williams, The Rise of Middle Class Activism: Fighting “City Hall,” Saturday Rev., Mar. 8, 1975, at 12–16; New Militance Bringing Gains for Japan’s “Outcasts,” N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1974, at 18, col. 4 (city ed.); id., Dec. 9, 1976, at 1, col. 5 (city ed.) (growing and intense demands for land by Mexican peons).
60 See McDougal & Lasswell, The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public Order, 53 Am. J. Int’l L. (1959), reprinted in International Law in the Twentieth Century 169–97 (L. Gross ed. 1969). Cf. K. Boulding, The Meaning of the Twentieth Century 156–79 (1965); W. Friedmann, The Changing Structure of International Law 325–40 (1964); R. Higgins, Conflict of Interests: International Law in a Divided World (1965); C. Jenks, The Common Law of Mankind, ch. 2 (1958); Lissitzyn, International Law in a Divided World, 542 Int’l Conciliation (1963); Pachter, The Meaning of Peaceful Coexistence, Problems of Communism, Jan.–Feb. 1961, at 1–8.
61 See McDougal, Human Rights and World Public Order: Principles of Content and Procedure for Clarifying General Community Policies, 14 Va. J. Int’l. L. 387 (1974); chapter 16 infra. See also M. McDougal, H. Lasswell, & J. Miller, supra note 1, at 35–77.
63 See M. McDougal, H. Lasswell, & I. Vlasic, supra note 1.
64 For example, the tight control exercised by the Soviet elite over all forms of communication made it possible to conceal from most Russians, as well as the outside world, the true scope of the famine of 1932–33. Rumors could not be confirmed because of the restriction upon freedom of movement inside the Soviet Union. Foreign correspondents stationed in Moscow could not hold their posts if they tried to send out dispatches at variance with Soviet policy. To smuggle such reports out of the country opened the correspondent to retaliation by the government (withdrawal of visa and other essential privileges). Persistent filing of dispatches with censorable material simply meant that the home paper received nothing from its correspondent, since the censors interfered with transmission. Hence the home newspaper or press association was confronted by the dilemma of encouraging foreign staffs to conform to the official line, or of ceasing to maintain a news contact.
For more recent examples in the Soviet Union, see H. Smith, The Russians 344–74 (1976). After providing a list of examples, Smith concludes: “What is striking about such a list is that the Soviet people are being denied an accurate general picture of their own life and their own society, let alone a chance to compare it with other societies. Censorship prevents that.” Id. at 374.
Comparable problems exist in China and other relatively closed societies. As Marva Shearer writes: “Since 1969, more Americans have landed on the moon than have visited Tibet in the People’s Republic of China.” Shearer, A Journey to the Roof of the World, Parade, Dec. 12, 1976, at 6.
Similarly, after a massive earthquake (the initial shock measured at 8.2 on the Richter scale, “the world’s worst earthquake in twelve years”) struck Tangshan in northern China (a thriving coal and steel city inhabited by more than one million people) in July 1976, no casualty figures were released. It was only in January 1977, more than five months later, that “Peking confirmed for the first time that the quake had taken as many as 700,000 lives.” Hua’s Crackdown, Newsweek, Jan. 17, 1977, at 33. See China’s Killer Quake, id., Aug. 9, 1976, at 30–32.
66 In the words of Marshall McLuhan: “Today, after more than a century of electric technology, we have extended our central nervous system itself in a global embrace, abolishing both space and time as far as our planet is concerned.” M. McLuhan, Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man 3 (1964).
Similarly, Cater observes: “The Gutenberg communicator—for the past 500 years patiently transmitting experience line by line, usually left to right, down the printed page—is no longer relevant. TV man has become conditioned to a total communication environment, to constant stimuli which he shares with everyone else in society.” Cater, The Intellectual in Videoland, Saturday Rev., May 31, 1975, at 12, 15.
For a perceptive analysis of the instantaneity and totality of contemporary communication as revolutionalized by television, see T. Schwartz, The Responsive Chord (1973).
For an interesting study of humankind’s temporal environment from historical and comparative perspectives, see The Future of Time: Man’s Temporal Environment (H. Yaker, H. Osmond, & F. Cheek eds. 1971).
67 In reporting upon the closed nature of the Soviet society, Hedrick Smith wrote: “It [the Soviet government] has stopped jamming selected Western radio stations but has kept sufficient controls at home to prevent the contamination of free ideas from stirring new creativity among the intelligentsia, many of whose members seem more interested in the latest Western fashions than in dissident ideas.” N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 1974, at 1, col. 1, col. 4; at 16, col. 1 (city ed.).
He continued: “Censorship remains tight. Except for brief, chance encounters, foreigners are allowed to mingle with only a selected segment of society.” Id., at 16, col. 1.
69 In the words of Claydon: “Recent improvements in transportation and communications have enabled groups in different parts of the world to recognize their common inferior status, have facilitated their mobilization into organizations capable of pressing effectively for remedial action, and have secured the dissemination of potentially useful methods for rectifying such situations.” Claydon, supra note 7, at 29.
71 For instance, it may seem paradoxical that, despite the liberation movement, many of the sex-based deprivations continue to be accepted, consciously or unconsciously, as an inescapable fact of life by vast segments of the female population around the world. See chapter 10 infra, at notes 6–75 and accompanying text.
Policemen, soldiers, doctors, scientists, judges, civil servants, politicians are involved in torture, whether in direct beating, examining victims, inventing new devices and techniques, sentencing prisoners on extorted false confessions, officially denying the existence of torture, or using torture as a means of maintaining their power. And torture is not simply an indigenous activity, it is international; foreign experts are sent from one country to another, schools of torture explain and demonstrate methods, and modern torture equipment used in torture is exported from one country to another.
Amnesty International, Report on Torture 21 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Report on Torture].
75 See generally P. Blau, The Dynamics of Bureaucracy (2d ed. 1963); P. Blau & M. Meyer, Bureaucracy in Modern Society (2d ed. 1971); M. Crozier, The Bureaucratic Phenomenon (1964); A Sociological Reader on Complex Organizations (A. Etzioni ed. 1969); H. Jacoby, The Bureaucratization of the World (E. Kanes trans. 1976); Bureaucracy and Political Development (J. LaPalombara ed. 2d ed. 1967); R. Merton, supra note 1, at 249–60; F. Morstein-Marx, The Administrative State: An Introduction to Bureaucracy (1957); D. Silverman, The Theory of Organizations (1971); Weber, Bureaucracy, in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology 214 (H. Gerth & C. Mills eds. 1958); Bureaucracy Explosion, U.S. News & World Rep., Aug. 16, 1976, at 22–26.
76 See W. Whyte, supra note 73.
In his analysis of the social structure of bureaucracy, Robert Merton indicates that “the bureaucratic social structure exerts a constant pressure upon the individual to be methodical, prudent, disciplined.” As a consequence, “discipline, readily interpreted as conformance with regulations, whatever the situation, is seen not as a measure designed for specific purposes but becomes an immediate value in the life-organization of the bureaucrat . . . develop[ing] into rigidities and an inability to adjust readily.” R. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure 198, 199 (rev. ed. 1957).
The changing significance of bureaucratization is articulated by Daniel Bell in these words:
In the broadest sense, the most besetting dilemma confronting all modern society is bureaucratization, or the “rule of rules.” Historically, bureaucratization was in part an advance of freedom. Against the arbitrary and capricious power, say, of a foreman, the adoption of impersonal rules was a guarantee of rights. But when an entire world becomes impersonal, and bureaucratic organizations are run by mechanical rules (and often for the benefit and convenience of the bureaucratic staff), then inevitably the principle has swung too far.
D. Bell, supra note 26, at 119.
77 For the threat to personal autonomy posed by growing bureaucratization resulting from the expanding role of government in various value-institutional sectors, see R. Nisbet, Twilight of Authority (1975). See also chapter 16 infra.
Another important feature also distinguishing totalitarian systems from older forms of dictatorship, is the degree to which individual and private life is controlled and subjugated to a “new morality” of collective behavior. The regime demands quite openly the complete politicizing of all realms of life, and its success in performing this part of totalitarian control reveals the degree to which the regime is able to realize its claim to fuse state and society, party and people, individual and collective into the ideal of total unity.
Bracher, Totalitarianism, 4 Dictionary of the History of Ideas 406, 410 (P. Wiener ed. 1974).
79 Within the Soviet world, on the other hand, while the elite structure has remained tenaciously in favor of the formal principle of civilian supremacy, the Party continues to be the major ladder up the authority and control pyramid. Within the Party, of course, it is the specialist on the political-police function who has a distinct advantage, because central power elements look to the police to protect them from the challenges that arise in a totalitarian system. Established elites in such a system typically perceive themselves as threated by demands for decentralization, deconcentration, democratization, pluralization, and deregimentation. See M. Fainsod, Smolensk under Soviet Rule (1958); N. Leites & E. Bernaut, Ritual of Liquidation (1954); B. Meissner & J. Reshetar, The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (1956); The Soviet Secret Police (S. Wolin & R. Slusser eds. 1957).
80 In the words of a Nobel laureate: “We live—while that is permitted us—in a balance of terror. The United States and the Soviet Union together have already stockpiled nuclear weapons with the explosive force of ten tons of TNT for every man, woman and child on the earth.” Wald, It Is Too Late for Declarations, for Popular Appeals, N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1974, at 23, col. 1 (city ed.).
Cf. The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order (B. Brodie ed. 1946); The Effects of Nuclear Weapons (S. Glasstone ed. 1962); M. Halperin, Limited War in the Nuclear Age (1963); H. Kahn, On Thermonuclear War (1960); H. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (1957); H. Kissinger, The Necessity for Choice: Prospects of American Foreign Policy (1962); T. Schelling & M. Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control (1961); Arms, Defense Policy and Arms Control, Daedalus, Summer 1975 (including articles by Graham T. Allison, Les Aspin, Harvey Brooks, Barry Carter, Abram Chayes, Paul Doty, Richard A. Falk, F. A. Long, Frederic A. Morris, G.W. Rathjens, Thomas C. Schelling, Marshall D. Shulman, John Steinbruner, R. James Woolsey); Ikle, Can Nuclear Deterrence Last Out the Century? 51 Foreign Affairs 272 (1973); Note, The SALT Process and Its Use in Regulating Mobile ICBM’s, 84 Yale L.J. 1078 (1975).
81 For the continuing community concern for disarmament, see United Nations, Department of Political and Security Council Affairs, The United Nations and Disarmament, 1945–1970 (1970); United Nations, Department of Political and Security Council Affairs, The United Nations and Disarmament, 1970–1975 (1976); United Nations, Office of Public Information, Disarmament: Progress Towards Peace (1974); United Nations, Comprehensive Study of the Question of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in All Its Aspects: Special Report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, U.N. Doc. A/10027/Add. 1 (1976).
82 See J. Cookson & J. Nottingham, A Survey of Chemical and Biological Warfare (1969); CBW—Chemical and Biological Warfare (S. Rose & D. Pavett eds. 1969); United Nations, Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of Their Possible Use (1969); United Nations, Department of Political and Security Council Affairs, Napalm and Other Incendiary Weapons and All Aspects of Their Possible Use (report of the secretary-general), U.N. Doc. A/8803/Rev. 1 (1973); Larson, Biological Warfare: Model 1967, 46 Military Rev. 31 (1966); Meselson, Chemical and Biological Weapons, Scientific American, May 1970, at 15–25.
84 For instance, in India, what began in June 1975 as “temporary” authoritarian measures adopted in the name of national security were, after sixteen months, becoming “permanent.” These measures included tight press censorship, concentration of power, suppression of dissents, and suspension of a parliamentary election. N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1976, at 1, col. 1 (city ed.).
For further background, see N.Y. Times, July 4, 1975, at 3, col. 1 (city ed.); id., Sept. 8, 1975, at 1, col. 1; id., Dec. 26, 1975, at 1, col. 1; id., Sept. 15, 1976, at 18, col. 1; id., Nov. 3, 1976, at 45, col. 6. See also Nanda, The Constitutional Framework and the Current Political Crisis in India, 2 Hastings Const. L. Q. 859 (1975); Indira’s Next Decade, Newsweek, Feb. 16, 1976, at 37–41.
85 See G. Kennedy, The Military in the Third World (1974); Military Profession and Military Regimes (J. Van Doorn ed. 1969); Chile: The System of Military Justice, 15 Rev. Int’l Comm’n Jurists 1 (1975); George, For Marcos, the Lesser Danger, Far Eastern Economic Rev., Jan. 8, 1973, at 23–25; One More Infant Democracy Dies in the Cradle, The Economist, Oct. 9, 1976, at 55; De Onis, Latin America, the Growing Graveyard for Democracies, N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 1976, § 4, at 1, col. 4.
86 Boorstin has characterized this as “a flood of pseudo-events.” See D. Boorstin, The Image, or What Happened to the American Dream 7–44 (1962). Cf. Tannenbaum & Lynch, Sensationalism: The Concept and Its Measurement, 37 Journalism Q. 381 (1960).
87 The positive or negative effect of a crisis to an individual often depends upon whether he experiences it singly or collectively. Such communal disasters as a flood or an earthquake can have various beneficial effects upon individuals involved. For instance, physical illnesses may suddenly disappear and altruism may prevail upon selfishness.
88 Given the complexities of contemporary life and the media overload, people, including the educated, may become so bewildered as to be indifferent and lose the capacity for outrage and commitment in the face of massive atrocities and deprivations. This state of affairs is in turn apt for exploitation by ruling elites. Similarly, there is danger, amidst abiding parochialism, of contributing to the strength of a local development by magnifying its significance, and hence enhancing its appeal to other local elements who share nothing more tangible than a generalized resentment against outsiders, and the assumption that whatever worries the foreigners deserves support.
Cf. Baker, Stomach-Bulge Defense, N.Y. Times, Apr. 5, 1975, at 29, col. 1 (city ed.); Baker, After the Flood, id., Apr. 19, 1975, at 31, col. 1.
89 On totalitarianism, see generally H. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (1958); K. Bracher, The German Dictatorship (1970); H. Buchheim, Totalitarian Rule: Its Nature and Characteristics (R. Hein trans. 1968); B. Chapman, Police State (1970); C. Friedrich & Z. Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (1961); C. Friedrich, M. Curtis, & B. Barber, Totalitarianism in Perspective: Three Views (1969); E. Fromm, Escape from Freedom (1941; 1965); F. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (1944); S. Neumann, Permanent Revolution: Totalitarianism in the Age of International Civil War (2d ed. 1965); W. Reich, The Mass Psychology of Facism (1946); L. Schapiro, Totalitarianism (1972); J. Talmon, The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy (1960); E. Tannenbaum, The Facist Experience: Italian Society and Culture 1922–1945 (1972); Totalitarianism (C. Friedrich ed. 1964); World Revolutionary Elites: Studies in Coercive Ideological Movements (H. Lasswell & D. Lerner eds. 1966).
90 For abuse of power associated with the Watergate syndrome, see Watergate: Special Prosecution Force Report (Oct. 1975) (containing a detailed bibliography of Watergate source materials); Hearings and Final Reports pursuant to H. Res. 803, of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) (Impeachment Hearings). See also J. Dean, Blind Ambition: The White House Years (1976); L. Jaworski, The Right and the Power: The Prosectuion of Watergate (1976); E. Richardson, The Creative Balance: Government, Politics, and the Individual in America’s Third Century 1–47 (1976). See also note 11 supra.
91 Cf., e.g., V. Chalidze, To Defend These Rights: Human Rights and the Soviet Union (G. Daniels trans. 1974); T. Taylor, et al., Courts of Terror: Soviet Criminal Justice and Jewish Emigration (1976).
In effect, our world today is in reality two worlds, one rich, one poor; one literate, one largely illiterate; one industrial and urban, one agrarian and rural; one overfed and overweight, one hungry and malnourished; one affluent and consumption-oriented, one poverty-stricken and survival-oriented. North of this line, life expectancy at birth closely approaches the Biblical threescore and ten; south of it, many do not survive infancy. In the North, economic opportunities are plentiful and social mobility is high. In the South, economic opportunities are scarce and societies are rigidly stratified.
L. Brown, World without Borders 41 (1973).
See generally C. Hensman, Rich against Poor: The Reality of Aid (1971); J. Pincus, Trade, Aid and Development: The Rich and Poor Nations (1967); The Gap between Rich and Poor Nations (G. Ranis ed. 1972); P. Uri, Development Without Dependence (1976); B. Ward, The Rich Nations and the Poor Nations (1962); The Widening Gap: Development in the 1970’s (B. Ward, J. Runnalls, & L. D’Anjou eds. 1971). Barraclough, The Haves and the Have Nots, N.Y. Rev. Books, May 13, 1976, at 31–41; Hansen, The Political Economy of North-South Relations: How Much Change? 29 Int’l Org. 921 (1975); Reisman, The Third World’s Fading Dream, The Nation, June 12, 1976, at 716–20.
93 For some of the pertinent issues raised, see the statements and comments made at the panel on Economic Development and Human Rights: Brazil, Chile, and Cuba,  Proc., Am. Soc’y Int’l L. 198. See also M. Ganji, The Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Problems, Policies, Progress, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1108/Rev. 1 (E/CN.4/1131/Rev. 1) (1975); Human Rights and the “Single Standard” (editorial), N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1977, at 32, col. 1 (city ed.).
94 See A. Miller, The Assault on Privacy: Computers, Data Banks, and Dossiers (1971); Privacy and Human Rights (A. Robertson ed. 1973); A. Westin, Privacy and Freedom (1968); A. Westin & M. Baker, Databanks in a Free Society: Computers, Record-Keeping and Privacy (1972). For further references, see chapter 16 infra.
In his classic study, Edward T. Hall observes that a person exists, in effect, within an invisible bubble of “personal space,” which varies in size from individual to individual, depending upon his personality, his culture, and other situational factors in a particular context. See E. Hall, The Hidden Dimension (1966).
95 See Report on Torture, supra note 72, at 39–69. See also Hearings on Human Rights in Chile before the Subcomm. on Inter-American Affairs and on International Organizations and Movements of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); Hearings on Torture and Oppression in Brazil before the Subcomm. on International Organizations and Movements of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); Baraheni, Terror in Iran, N.Y. Rev. Books, Oct. 28, 1976, at 21–25; Colligan, New Science of Torture, Science Digest, July 1976, at 44–49; Human Rights in the World: Torture Continues, 10 Rev. Int’l Comm’n Jurists 10 (1973); Shelton, The Geography of Disgrace: A World Survey of Political Prisoners, Saturday Rev./World, June 15, 1974, at 14 et seq.; Styron, Torture in Chile, The New Republic, March 20, 1976, at 15–17; Styron, Uruguay: The Oriental Republic, The Nation, Aug. 14, 1976, at 107–11; Torture as Policy: The Network of Evil, Time, Aug. 16, 1976, at 31–34.
96 See Automation and Technological Change (J. Dunlop ed. 1962); International Labor Office, Automation and Non-Manual Workers (1967); A. Jaffe & J. Froomkin, Technology and Jobs: Automation in Perspective (1968); C. Silberman, et al., The Myths of Automation (1966); Hoffer, Automation Is Here to Liberate Us, in Technology and Social Change 64–74 (W. Moore ed. 1972).
97 Cf. J. Fletcher, The Ethics of Genetic Control: Ending Reproductive Roulette (1974); P. Ramsey, The Ethics of Fetal Research (1975); P. Ramsey, Fabricated Man (1971); Genetics and the Future of Man (J. Roslansky ed. 1966); Human Rights and Scientific and Technological Development, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1173 (1975) (report of the World Health Organization to U.N. Commission on Human Rights).
98 For a provocative, penetrating analysis of the contemporary technical civilization that borders on “technological determinism,” see J. Ellul, The Technological Society (J. Wilkinson trans. 1964). In Ellul’s words:
Technique has penetrated the deepest recesses of the human being. The machine tends not only to create a new human environment, but also to modify man’s very essence. The milieu in which he lives is no longer his. He must adapt himself, as though the world were new, to a universe for which he was not created.
Id. at 325.
For differing views, see V. Ferkiss, Technological Man: The Myth and the Reality (1969); H. Muller, The Children of Frankenstein: A Primer on Modern Technology and Human Values (1970); L. Mumford, The Pentagon of Power (1970).
See also L. Berkner, The Scientific Age: The Impact of Science on Society (1964); G. Foster, Traditional Cultures and the Impact of Technological Change (1962); Technology and Social Change (W. Moore ed. 1972); L. Mumford, The Myth of the Machine: Technics and Human Development (1967); L. Mumford, Technics and Civilization (1963); C. Haskins, The Scientific Revolution and World Politics (1964); D. Loth & M. Ernst, The Taming of Technology (1972); Modern Technology and Civilization (C. Walker ed. 1962); Lasswell, The Political Science of Science: An Inquiry into the Possible Reconciliation of Mastery and Freedom, 50 Am. Pol. Sc. Rev. 961 (1956).
99 Some violence may be done to ordinary usage when we speak of the diplomatic, ideological, economic, and military strategies of some of the participants whom we have identified in the world arena, or when we refer to the internal rather than to external arenas. The most obvious discrepancies are in reference to the strategies of an individual. We do not usually think of a person as engaged in diplomacy when he is negotiating a deal on his own behalf. Nor do we speak of the use of propaganda by an individual to advance a private project as an example of “ideological” strategy. It is more in tune with everyday discourse to assess someone’s private “economic” policies. Moreover, use of the term “military” seems to overstate the degree of control the individual exercises over destructive instruments which he employs for private purposes. We accept these inconveniences to underscore that strategies operate with the same values as bases whether the objectives sought are identified with the “primary ego” or with the larger self shared by a collectivity.
100 Cf. L. Fraser, Propaganda (1957); B. Murty, Propaganda and World Public Order: The Legal Regulation of the Ideological Instrument of Coercion (1968); J. Whitton & A. Larson, Propaganda: Towards Disarmament in the War of Words (1963); Lasswell, Propaganda, 12 Encyc. Soc. Sc. 521 (1934).
101 See C. Friedrich & Z. Brzezinski, supra note 89, at 107–17; A Sakharov, Progress, Coexistence, and Intellectual Freedom 62–65 (The New York Times trans. 1968); H. Smith, supra note 64, at 344–74; Press Freedom 1970–1975, 16 Rev. Int’l Comm’n Jurists 45 (1976); Reston, The Condition of the Press in the World Today (1), 7 Human Rights J. 593 (1974).
102 See E. Epstein, News from Nowhere: Television and the News 78–130 (1973); N. Johnson, How to Talk Back to Your Television Set (1970); J. Merrill & R. Lowenstein, Media, Messages and Men: New Perspectives in Communication 79–88 (1971); Editors of the Atlantic Monthly, The American Media Baronies, in Sociology in the World Today 89–96 (J. Kinch ed. 1971).
104 See V. Chalidze, supra note 91, at 92–114; W. Korey, The Soviet Cage: Anti-Semitism in Russia 184–200 (1973); Z. Medvedev, The Medvedev Papers 173–270 (V. Rich trans. 1971); A. Sakharov, My Country and the World 51–61 (G. Daniels trans. 1975); H. Smith, supra note 64, at 344–74, 464–88.
105 See Protest and Discontent (B. Crick & W. Robson eds. 1970); S. Eisenstadt, Modernization: Protest and Change 31–35, 61–64, 74–75, 104–09 (1966); The Politics of Confrontation (S. Hendel ed. 1971).
Cf. Amnesty International, Annual Report 1974/75 (1975); P. Litvinov, The Trial of the Four (P. Reddaway ed. 1972); T. Taylor, supra note 91; Scoble & Wiseberg, Human Rights and Amnesty International, 413 Annals 11 (1974).
107 Karl Polanyi maintains that the emergence of the “market mentality” under the laissez-faire climate of the Industrial Revolution led to a fundamental change in the relationship between the public and the private sector. See K. Polanyi, The Great Transformation (1944).
108 See note 19 supra.
Cf. K. Lang, Military Institutions and the Sociology of War (1972). Cf. also American Violence (R. Brown ed. 1970); Assassination and Political Violence (J. Kirkham, S. Levy, & W. Crotty eds. 1970) (a report to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence); G. Sorel, Reflections on Violence (1961); Violence: An Element of American Life (K. Taylor & F. Soady eds. 1972); F. von der Mehden, Comparative Political Violence (1973).
110 See E. Bramstedt, Dictatorship and Political Police: The Technique of Control by Fear (1945). See also note 89 supra.
111 See note 23 supra. See also M. Willrich & T. Taylor, Nuclear Theft: Risks and Safeguards (1974); Howard, Terrorists: How They Operate a Worldwide Network, Parade, Jan. 18, 1976, at 14 et seq.; Laqueur, The Futility of Terrorism, Harper’s Magazine, Mar. 1976, at 99–105; Terrorists with Atomic Bomb Could Hold World for Ransom, New Haven Register, Sept. 17, 1972, at 24G, col. 1.
See also Fisk, The World’s Terrorists Sometimes Are United, N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1975, § 4, at 3, col. 3; Middleton, Could a U.S. Atom Bomb Be Stolen? id., Sept. 22, 1974, § 4, at 3, col. 3; id., July 23, 1976, at A2, col. 3 (“Terrorists’ Techniques Improve, and So Do Efforts to Block Them”); id., July 16, 1976, at 1, col. 1 (city ed.) (“Libyans Arm and Train World Terrorists”).
113 For further elaboration, see chapter 1 supra, at notes 117–59 and accompanying text. An eloquent statement on global interdependences is An Introduction by R. Buckminster Fuller, in E. Higbee, A Question of Priorities: New Strategies for Our Urbanized World xvii–xxxiv (1970).
114 See note 113 supra. See also McDougal & Leighton, The Rights of Man in the World Community: Constitutional Illusions versus Rational Action, 14 Law & Contemp. Prob. 490 (1949), reprinted in M. McDougal, et al., Studies in World Public Order 335, 335–43 (1960); McDougal & Bebr, Human Rights in the United Nations, 58 Am. J. Int’l L. 603, 603–08 (1964); Toth, Human Rights and World Peace, in 1 Rene Cassin, Amicorum Discipulorumque Liber 362–82 (Institut International des Droits de l’Homme ed. 1969).
115 Dismissing the trap of “a semantic jungle” that tends to “identify security with exclusively military phenomena and most particularly with military hardware,” McNamara conceives security in broad terms of “development” in the contemporary modernizing context:
In a modernizing society security means development. Security is not military hardware, though it may involve it; security is not traditional military activity, though it may encompass it. Security is development, and without development there can be no security. A developing nation that does not, in fact, develop simply cannot remain secure for the intractable reason that its own citizenry cannot shed its human nature.
R. McNamara, The Essence of Security, 150, 149 (1968).
One of the most unfortunate aspects of modern society is the increasing tendency to see problems solely in immediate terms. We are fascinated and obsessed by the suddenness and drama of events; we seldom look deeply into their causes, and hardly ever into those elements which could lead to future crises. Yet the Roman adage that great disputes often result from small events but never from small causes remains absolutely valid. The majority of the great issues that confront mankind are profound, complex, and, above all, long-term problems. They cannot be resolved swiftly or dramatically; they are closely interrelated; and they bear directly upon the lives of all. For the great problems are the global problems, and they require a concerted global approach.
Waldheim, Toward Global Interdependence, Saturday Rev./World, Aug. 24, 1974, at 63.
117 See Snyder, Hermann, & Lasswell, A Global Monitoring System: Appraising the Effects of Government on Human Dignity, 20 Int’l Studies Q. 221 (1976). Cf. Lasswell, Toward Continuing Appraisal of the Impact of Law on Society, 21 Rutgers L. Rev. 645 (1967).
To keep abreast of the changing context of world social process, it is vital to improve the coverage provided by surveys of trends that use relatively “extensive” methods of continuous observation. More “intensive” studies need to be made periodically to disclose changing “predispositions” in depth. For a research design of the kind required, though adapted to another field, see Brodbeck & Jones, Television Viewing and Norm-Violating Practices and Perspectives of Adolescents: A Synchronized Depth and Scope Program of Policy Research, in Television and Human Behavior 98–135 (L. Arons & M. May eds. 1963).